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Abstract 
This thesis examines the impact of youth bulge, corruption and government size 
on political instability moderated by socioeconomic and political factors. The impact is 
examined using two stages least square (2SLS) in a sample that comprises 139 countries 
from 1984 to 2013. Furthermore, this is examined using the following sub-samples: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, 
democratic countries, oil countries and Middle East and North Africa region (MENA)  
countries.  
Firstly, the role of youth bulge on political instability is examined (Chapter 2). 
The results show that youth bulge enhances political instability in countries with poor 
employment, slow economic growth and insufficient rents from natural resources. 
Interestingly, the results show that moving to democracy enhances the role of youth 
bulge as a factor that causes political instability. The impact of youth bulge is increased 
further if a country has a high level of educational attainment measured by gross tertiary 
enrolment. There are some variations in the relative level of importance of these factors 
across sub-samples. 
Secondly, this study shows that the impact of the joint effect between youth 
bulge and other factors on political instability is stronger in countries experiencing high 
levels of corruption (Chapter 3). Corruption is demonstrated to enhance the effect of 
youth bulge, the adverse effect of unemployment and the impact of a high level of gross 
tertiary enrolment on political instability in some sub-samples. 
Lastly, the potential for government to address factors influencing political 
instability is explored (Chapter 4). The results show that a government can lower the 
impact of some factors by enlarging its size or expanding its role to stabilize the 
prevailing political situation. Interestingly, the results find that enlargement of 
government size enhances the impact of unemployment on political instability in some 
sub-samples. The results also find that enlargement in size enhances the impact of 
corruption, urban growth rate and education on political instability in some sub-
samples. Furthermore it is found that a reduction in government size produces a 
stronger impact of trade openness on political instability. Expanding the role of 
government escalates the impact of unemployment in all sub-samples except oil 
 
 
iii 
countries and MENA region countries. The results also find that expanding its role 
enhances the impact of urban growth rate on political instability in the MENA region.  
 
Key Words: Youth bulge, youth unemployment, gross tertiary enrolment, democracy, 
trade openness, corruption, government size, government role, political instability and 
panel data   
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Introduction 
1.1 Background  
 Factors leading to political instability and the role of youth bulge are not a new 
field of study; however, it has recently attracted the renewed attention of researchers, 
policy makers and international organizations. This has occurred for several reasons.  
First, the role of youth bulge on political instability in several countries suggests that 
youth bulge can increase political risk regardless of the level of economic development 
or the level of democracy in a country. However, there is variation in factors 
influencing youth bulge and the prospective impact on a country’s political 
environment. For example, 50,000 youth protested in London streets in 2010 to express 
their anger against the government plan to raise university tuition fees and decrease its 
grants to universities (Paul , Jeevan , Rachel, & Matthew 2010). Similarly, youth in 
Greece raised political instability in the form of demonstration, riot and strike aftermath 
economic crisis in 2008. The state of political instability in these two countries takes the 
form of small incidences that last for a short period of time and which do not have an 
international impact. On the other hand, youth bulge has escalated political instability to 
severe levels in some countries such as Syria and Yemen that have experienced ongoing 
violence since 2010. The ongoing state of political instability in these countries raises a 
significant security threat not only to neighboring countries but also on an international 
level.  
 Second, although youth bulge constitute a demographic curse in the form of 
political instability, they can be demographic dividends when appropriate economic 
policies are in place. Understanding the factors influencing the role of youth bulge on 
political instability enables the improvement of these underlying factors so that youth 
bulge can be turned from demographic curse into demographic dividends. For example, 
Bloom and Williamson (1998) argue that a high level of economic growth achieved by 
the Asian Tiger’s economies can be attributed to many factors, among which is the high 
percentage of youth bulge and small percentage of dependent young and elderly. 
Furthermore, understanding these factors helps to prioritize their relative importance to 
youth bulge, which in turn affects political stability. These factors include lack of 
democracy, low level of educational attainment and employment opportunities. 
Prioritizing these requirements is important for the stabilization of a country’s political 
environment. For example, installing democracy to reduce the political risk of youth 
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bulge may lead to political instability if youth bulge experience unemployment or have 
low levels of educational attainment. 
 This thesis is motivated by the unexplored role of youth bulge on political 
instability in several countries. It is also driven by the onset of the so-called the Arab 
spring in late 2010 in some countries in the MENA region. Understanding the factors 
influencing the role of youth bulge on political instability is important for policy makers 
to instigate change and turn youth bulge into demographic dividends. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives  
 There is debate in the literature about the independent effect of youth bulge on 
political instability. Furthermore, there is no general agreement on the percentage of 
youth bulge that enhances political instability, although Huntington (1996) suggests that 
this occurs when the percentage of youth bulge within the age bracket of 15-24 years 
old to total population exceeds 20%. Similarly, different streams in the literature offer 
different explanations for factors influencing the role of youth bulge on political 
instability. Modernization theory states that the role of youth bulge on political 
instability is enhanced when youth bulge growth rate exceeds the growth rate in 
socioeconomic and political environments. Opportunity perspective states that a high 
level of educational attainment and high level of employment opportunities lowers the 
impact of youth bulge on political instability. Other streams in literature such as Rentier 
State Theory suggests that oil countries are at lower risk from youth bulge due to 
different forms of distribution expenditure. Thus, this thesis examines the influence of 
socioeconomic and political environment in the role of youth bulge on political 
instability, the influence of corruption and the influence of government size in the role 
of youth bulge on political instability. 
 Youth bulge sit alongside other standard determinants of political instability 
such as unemployment, economic growth, trade openness, rents from natural resources, 
gross tertiary enrolment, urban growth rate and log total population. Taking all these 
factors into consideration, in the second chapter this thesis will explain the impact of the 
joint effect between youth bulge and other socioeconomic and political factors on 
political instability. In the third chapter it will investigate the impact of youth bulge, 
youth unemployment and gross tertiary enrolment on political instability moderated by 
corruption. In the fourth chapter it will further examine the role of government size in 
lowering the impact of unemployment, corruption, education, urban growth rate and 
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trade openness on political instability. Furthermore, it examines the role of expenditure 
on education in lowering the impact of urban growth rate and unemployment on 
political instability.  
 In focusing on the role of youth bulge in enhancing political instability by 
considering economic, institutional and socioeconomic factors, this thesis takes a novel 
approach that expands the literature. The joint effect, rather than the independent effect, 
explains the channels that link youth bulge to political instability. The independent 
effect establishes general correlation between youth bulge and political instability, but 
does not explain the unmet needs and requirements that motivate youth bulge to commit  
violence. In terms of corruption, it examines its direct effect instead of the indirect 
effect analyzed in previous empirical research. The unique combination of youth bulge, 
youth unemployment and gross tertiary enrolment in the presence of corruption on 
political instability is also a novel contribution to the literature. Further, it analyses the 
joint effect of government role and size on political instability in order to establish the 
causal relationship between them, which is not examined by past empirical literature. 
 In addition, the thesis uses a different route of analysis compared to previous 
studies. It uses a broader measure of political instability that considers both minor and 
major forms of it, unlike past empirical research that measures it in the form of 
documented armed conflict which is an inappropriate measurement to capture the effect 
on political instability (because there is a decreasing trend in the number of armed 
conflicts world wide). This leads to the use of a dichotomous dependent variable to 
measure it (Niang, 2012). Dichotomous dependent variables are considered 
inappropriate for the analysis of large panel data containing many cross sections and 
cross time observations, especially when the number of observations of civil war are 
relatively small in comparison to the number of observations of peace (Goldstone, 
2002). Instead, the thesis examines the effect of youth bulge, corruption and 
government size on political instability using panel data analysis, level of democracy, 
source of public revenue and MENA region. These sub-samples have characteristics 
that might influence the effect of these variables on political instability.   
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1.3 Chapter Outline 
The thesis is organized as follows:  
 The second chapter investigates the role of youth bulge on political instability. It 
assumes that the role of youth bulge on political instability is exaggerated by 
socioeconomic and political environment. Several hypotheses are examined. The first 
hypothesis assumes that youth bulge enhances political instability. The second 
hypothesis assumes that higher economic growth lower the role of youth bulge on 
political instability. The third hypothesis assumes that the impact of youth bulge on 
political instability is stronger when they experience unemployment. The fourth 
hypothesis posits that a higher level of democracy lower the role of youth bulge on 
political instability. The fifth hypothesis tests the influence of education on the role of 
youth bulge, assuming that it enhances political instability when youth bulge achieve a 
high level of educational attainment. The sixth hypothesis assumes that higher oil rents 
lower the impact of youth bulge on political instability. 
 The third chapter investigates the impact of corruption on political instab ility. It 
gives a brief overview of the literature regarding the political and economic impacts of 
corruption. It examines four hypotheses. The first hypothesis assumes that corruption 
enhances political instability. The second hypothesis assumes that corruption enhances 
the impact of youth bulge on political instability. The third hypothesis assumes that a 
high level of corruption exaggerates the impact of unemployment on political 
instability. The fourth hypothesis assumes that the impact of level of educational 
attainment on political instability is stronger through its interaction with corruption. 
 The fourth chapter investigates the role of government in lowering the impact of 
several factors on political instability. It examines nine hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
assumes that large government size reduces political instability. The second hypothesis 
assumes that the political risk of unemployed youth is lower in a country with a large 
government size. The third hypothesis assumes that the impact of corruption on political 
instability is stronger when a country has a large government size. The fourth 
hypothesis assumes that the impact of a high level of gross enrolment on political 
instability is lower in countries with a large government size. The fifth hypothesis 
assumes that a government can enlarge its size to lower the impact of trade openness on 
political instability. The sixth hypothesis assumes that the impact of urban growth rate 
on political instability is lower in countries with a large government size. The seventh 
 5 
hypothesis assumes that a government can increase expenditure on education to lower 
political instability. The eighth hypothesis assumes that a government can increases 
expenditure on education to lower the impact of unemployment on political instability. 
The ninth hypothesis assumes that a government can increases expenditure on education 
to lower the impact of urban growth rate on political instability. 
 The fifth chapter provides an executive summary of the empirical results of the 
hypotheses tested in each chapter, contribution to the empirical literature, future 
research areas and policy implications. These, of course, discussed in greater detail in 
the respective substantial chapters. 
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Chapter 2  
The Role of Youth Bulge in Enhancing Political Instability 
2.1 Introduction 
 Historically there have been several cases of political instability associated with 
a highly youthful population distribution (a youth bulge). The French Revolution in 
1789 and the rise of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s are partly attributable to a youth 
bulge that experiences difficulty in finding employment (Urdal, 2004). Similar 
examples from recent history include the outbreaks of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 as 
pointed by Omid  and Tara (2010) and the Algerian armed conflict in 1992 1 (Trends, 
2001). Trends reveal that lack of employment, educational and housing opportunities 
for youth bulge triggered the Algerian armed conflict. Trends cite other similar 
examples in Turkey in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, it indicates that the Sinhalese 
national insurgency and Tamil rebellion conflict in Sri Lanka became severe when the 
country experienced a high percentage of youth bulge in the 1980s. Recently, the role of 
youth bulge on political instability has experienced renewed attention by researchers, 
policy makers and international organizations as a result of the onset of the so-called 
Arab Spring in late 2010 in some countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) (Bricker and Foley, 2013). 
 Given the importance of the role of youth bulge on political instability, 
understanding factors that influence their role is important in order to lower their 
political risk. Commonly, the empirical literature tends to examine the role of youth 
bulge on political instability in the form of armed conflict and civil war (see, for 
example, Marcus, Islam and Moloney, 2008; Barakat and Urdal, 2009; Goldstone et al., 
2010). The literature reaches inconclusive results about the relationship between youth 
bulge and political instability. This is largely because the research measures political 
instability in the form of large-scale incidences such as armed conflict and civil war. 
Such measurement has its limitations in capturing the role of youth bulge on political 
instability because nations have moved toward settling disputes using peaceful means. 
This leads to a decrease in the number of armed conflicts worldwide (Goldstone, 2002). 
Besides which, the determinants of armed conflict are different to the factors 
influencing the role of youth bulge on political instability. Armed conflict is driven by 
                                                 
1 The armed conflict between the Algerian government and various Islamic groups that began in 1991 and 
ended in 2002.  
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religious or ethnic discrimination or other equivalent factors. Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
argue that such discrimination is the main factor behind civil wars in Eastern Europe, 
former Soviet countries and sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s.  
 The presence of youth bulge in a country does not necessarily lead to civil war 
or armed conflict even when they experience low employment and educational 
opportunities. This is because such incidences require significant and permanent sources 
of financial resources. It requires interested parties to organize youth bulge in order to 
raise arms before a government. Also, initiation of any armed conflict needs to consider 
the strength of government military forces. In other words, there are several additional 
factors required necessary alongside the presence of youth bulge to initiate armed 
conflict. Interestingly, few empirical research measure political instability in the form of 
small-scale incidences. Urdal (2006) considers small-scale of political instability in the 
form of terrorism, riots and violent demonstration covering a period from 1984 to 1995 
using the Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA). This data 
set has been criticized by Urdal(2006) for its biasness by reporting incidences of 
political instability in countries where the Western agenda has vested interests. Bricker 
and Foley (2013) measure political instability by constructing an index of political 
instability using the Heidelberg Institute data set that covers a period from 1996 to 
2010. However, in both studies, the short time period might not be sufficient to capture 
the effect on political instability. Furthermore, Bricker and Foley (2013) and Urdal 
(2006) examine the role of youth bulge on political instability using panel data analysis 
(without differentiating between countries) based on the percentage of youth bulge or 
other criteria such as democracy.     
 The moderation effect of socioeconomic and political factors on the role of 
youth bulge on political instability has received less attention in the empirical literature. 
It could be that the role of youth bulge on political instability is moderated by other 
factors, which might partially explain the inconclusive relationship between the 
independent effect of youth bulge on political instability. Furthermore, the independent 
effect captures the broad needs and requirements of youth bulge; however, it does not 
identify the channels that link youth bulge to political instability, such as economic 
growth, unemployment, level of democracy, and education. Identification of such 
channels is important because it directs the effort of policy makers to the main causes of 
political instability caused by youth bulge. By doing so, public policy can successfully 
lower the political risk of youth bulge by targeting the right channel(s). For example, 
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the failure to identify such channels might result in the use of public resources to 
increase educational opportunities while the main problem lies within the labor market 
(or vice versa). By identifying and targeting the right channel, policy makers can turn 
youth bulge from a demographic curse into demographic dividends (Fuller, 2003). The 
stabilization or destabilization effect of youth bulge on political environment is 
determined through their interaction with prevailing social and economic institutions 
(Xenos and Kabamalan, 2005). Similarly, Urdal (2006), Marcus, Islam, and Moloney 
(2008) and Barakat and Urdal (2009) argue that whether youth bulge forms a curse or 
blessing depends on the social, economic and political environment within a country. 
Countries can capture demographic dividends when required policies are in place to 
capture them as indicated by Bloom, Canning, and Malaney (1999). These policies 
include high quality institutions, a well-regulated labor market, good economic 
management, a high level of trade openness, and a good education policy (Bloom and 
Canning, 2004). Bloom and Williamson (1998) argue that a high level of economic 
growth achieved by the Asian Tigers’ economies may be attributed to many factors, 
among which is a high percentage of youth bulge and small percentage of dependent 
young and elderly2. Similarly, Bloom et al. (1999) argue that one third to one half of the 
high rate of economic growth in East Asia countries can be attributed to favorable 
demographic conditions. On the other hand, youth bulge can be a prospective source of 
political instability when unemployment among educated youth exceed the available 
employment opportunities, in countries where the level of political openness is low, or 
in countries with urban crowding.   
 Despite the importance of the role of youth bulge on political instability 
moderated by socioeconomic and political factors, there is little empirical research that 
investigates its impact. Urdal (2006) is the sole study that investigates this joint effect. 
The author tests the impact of the independent effect of a youth bulge and its interaction 
with economic growth, the level of democracy, education and urban growth rate at the 
onset of armed conflict using Uppsala/PRIO data set that covers a period from 1950 to 
2000. He finds a significant positive relationship between the independent effect of 
youth bulge and the onset of armed conflict, but no relationship found between the joint 
effect and the onset of armed conflict. The measurement of political instability and the 
use of the binary estimation technique could be attributed to the inability of this 
empirical analysis to establish a relationship between the joint effect and political 
                                                 
2 Young less than (15) years old and elderly above (65) years old.    
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instability. Niang (2012) indicates that measuring political instability in terms of civil 
war imposes restraints on empirical analysis to be carried out using logistic regression 
or other forms of binary or dichotomous dependent variable to study the relationship 
between youth bulge and political instability.  
 Such methods have been criticized because they are not appropriate for 
analyzing large panel data containing many cross section and cross time observations, 
especially when the number of observations of civil war is relatively small in 
comparison with the number of observations of peace (Goldstone, 2002). Urdal (2006) 
examines the impact of the joint effect on alternative measures of political instability in 
the form of riots, demonstrations and terrorist attacks using the PANDA data set that 
covers a period from 1984 to 1995. The author finds their impact on political instability 
is stronger in countries with high levels of educational attainment measured by growth 
of tertiary education. However, the data set is criticized by Urdal (2006) for reporting 
incidences of political instability in countries that are among high interest within the 
Western agenda and for the short time period of the data set. Under both measurements 
the author pooled all countries together without distinguishing between them, based on 
the percentage of youth bulge, which is important especially when political instability is 
measured in the form of large-scale incidences of political instability. 
 Within the context in mind, this research contributes to the existing literature by 
focusing on the role of youth bulge in enhancing political instability by considering 
economic, institutional and socioeconomic factors. In particular, it differs from earlier 
research in several aspects. First, it investigates the independent effect of youth bulge on 
political instability by using a broader concept of political instability that considers both 
small and major incidences while covering a longer time period from 1984 to 2013. 
Second, it measures youth bulge differently than the measurement used by Bricker and 
Foley (2013), who measure it as a ratio of population aged 0 to 14, by using instead a 
ratio of population 15-24 years old. Third, it explores the impact of youth bulge on 
political instability, when it is moderated by other factors. It examines the impact of the 
independent effect of youth bulge on political instability in sub-samples based on 
differing percentages of youth bulge, and the independent and joint effect on political 
instability in MENA region. 
 This expected moderation effect suggests that the presence of youth bulge 
constitutes political risk in a country through their interaction with the prevailing 
socioeconomic environment. Without the moderation effect, the relationship between 
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youth bulge and political instability does not establish causation run from the former to  
latter variable. For example, Gambia, Malawi and Botswana have a similar percentage 
of youth bulge among total population (the average percentage over the sample period is 
36%); however, there is a significant variation in the level of political instability. 
Gambia and Botswana enjoy high levels of political stability (the average score over the 
sample period is 6.5 and 5 respectively) while the average score in Malawi is 10. The 
importance of socioeconomic and political environment on political instability is noted 
in the case of countries where the percentage of youth bulge is less than the average of 
the entire sample3. For example, the average percentage of youth bulge over the sample 
period in Brunei and Sri Lanka is 27% and 26.5% respectively; however, Brunei has a 
very stable political environment (the average political instability score is 2) in 
comparison with Sri Lanka (the average score over the sample period is 13). The 
importance of such an environment is noted in countries where the percentage of youth 
bulge is one half less than the average percentage over the sample period. For example, 
the percentage of youth bulge in Greece is 17%; however, its score in political 
instability (the average score over the sample period is 7.5) is higher than Ga mbia, 
Botswana and Brunei, where the percentage of youth bulge is higher than Greece. In the 
case of Greece, the prevailing financial crisis since 2008 led to an adverse impact on the 
economic environment, which in turn enhanced the adverse impact of youth bulge on 
the political environment.  
 Furthermore, youth bulge has broad needs and requirements such as education, 
employment and entertainment; however, the past empirical research that investigates 
the independent effect of youth bulge does not point out which specific unsatisfied 
need(s)/requirement(s) enhances their political risk. Additionally, the joint effect might 
reveal that the importance of such needs is varying across the different regions of the 
world. For example, one can expect that the need(s) and requirement(s) of youth bulge 
in OECD countries to be different than their counterparts in developing countries. 
Hence, the joint effect aims to identify the channels that link youth bulge to political 
instability so that it can assist policy makers in reducing their political risk.  
 Given that there is variation in youth bulge need(s) and requirement(s) across 
the world, this research examines their effect on political instability by separating the 
sample into OECD countries, democracy level and oil-rich countries. Moreover, such 
sub-samples aim to identify if there are latent factors that influence the level of political 
                                                 
3 The average percentage of youth bulge in the sample over the sample period is 28%. 
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instability. There is general agreement among commentators that the so-called Arab 
Spring in the MENA region in late 2010 was initiated by a high percentage of youth 
bulge; however, there is debate as to which of their need(s) and requirement(s) 
motivated them to take part in the Arab spring. The research will identify the channel(s) 
that link youth bulge to political instability in the region. The sub-samples used in the 
thesis show significant differences in the percentage of youth bulge, such as for OECD 
countries and non-OECD countries, as well as in democratic and autocratic countries. 
They show significant variation in socioeconomic and political determinants of political 
instability as will be discussed in the following data analysis. They capture the effect of 
latent variables that are not included into the model. Furthermore, it examines the effect 
on political instability using 2SLS to account for a possible causation that run from 
instability to some independent variables, unlike past empirical research that used 
binary regression estimation techniques. Lastly, an alternative measure of political 
instability is also used for the robustness check. 
 To reach these expected contributions to the literature, this research tests several 
hypotheses. The first hypothesis posits that the higher the percentage of youth bulge in a 
country, the higher the risk of political instability. The second hypothesis suggests that 
the impact of youth bulge on political instability is lower in countries experiencing 
higher economic growth. The third hypothesis assumes that the impact of youth bulge 
on political instability is stronger in countries with high levels of unemployment. The 
fourth hypothesis tests whether the impact of youth bulge on political instability is 
lower in countries with higher levels of democracy. The role of youth bulge moderated 
by educational attainment is tested in the fifth hypothesis that assumes their impact on 
political instability is stronger when they achieve high levels of educational attainment. 
The sixth hypothesis assumes that their impact on political instability is lower in 
countries rich in natural resources. 
 In conclusion, the interest of this research in these joint effects is supported by 
Goldstone (2002) who argues that understanding the role of youth bulge on political 
instability requires considering the interaction between a youth bulge and prevailing 
socioeconomic factors. Additionally, it is driven by empirical research that finds no 
relationship between the independent effect of youth bulge and political instability in 
the form of small-scale incidences as per Bricker and Foley (2013). Moreover, it is 
driven by the unreasonable proposition that youth bulge is considered a necessarily 
 12 
destabilizing factor; however, under the right socioeconomic and political co nditions a 
youth bulge can facilitate economic growth as indicated by Bloom and Canning (2004). 
 The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the literature; Section 
2.3 explores the influence of socioeconomic and political factors in the role of youth 
bulge on political instability; Section 2.4 outlines the models, data and methodology; 
Section 2.5 details the estimation strategy; Section 2.6 provides the estimation results of 
the linear relationship of the independent effect of youth bulge; Section 2.7 gives the, 
estimation results of the non- linear relationship of the independent effect of youth 
bulge; Section 2.8 gives the estimation results of the joint effect of youth bulge and 
others factors on instability; Section 2.9 presents the sensitivity analysis; Section 2.10 
discusses and concludes; Section 2.11 presents future research and Section 2.12 lists 
policy implications.  
2.2 Political Instability: Literature Review 
 This section provides a brief overview of the common measures of political 
instability and the main themes within the literature that explain the general 
determinants of political instability. The existing literature draws mainly from 
Modernization theory, exploring the natural resource curse, opportunity perspectives 
and demographic issues relating to political instability.  
2.2.1 Definitions of Political Instability in the Literature 
 There is no universal definition of political instability. The definitions used in 
the literature are classified into four categories based on the longevity and legitimacy of 
the political system, sociopolitical unrest and frequent changes in government within a 
country. 
 The first definition considers a country’s stability when a particular type of 
political system continues for along time. Under this definition a country is stable when 
its political system, either democratic or autocratic, has survived for at least 25 years as 
indicated by Lipset (1960) cited by Miljkovic and Rimal (2008). Several empirical 
studies measure political instability by comparing a regime to itself over different time 
frames. Goldstone et al. (2010) use a 21-point Polity IV autocracy-democracy scale4 to 
classify countries into politically stable and unstable. The authors consider a country 
                                                 
4 High score suggests a high level of democracy and a low score indicates autocracy.  
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unstable when its score worsens by six or more points over three years. Similarly, 
Morrison (2009) and Smith (2004) use a 21-point Polity IV durable variable to classify 
countries as stable or not. The authors consider a country unstable when its annual score 
in the durable variable is zero. Kimenyi and Mbaku (1993) define political instability as 
time length from entry to exit from power by any means, one of which coup. 
Carmignani (2009) defines political instability by the number of changes in government 
head executives that occurs over five years using using a political institution data set 
prepared by Beck et al. (2001). Marcus et al. (2008) and Fuller (2003) construct an 
index of political instability based on a Conflict Barometer data set. This data set 
defines political instability as a conflict in values and interests over a period of time 
between two or more parties. Miljkovic and Rimal (2008) measure political instability 
using three individual definition, namely irregular government change, regular 
government change and a binary variable dictating whether a country is stable or not 
based on data from Siermann (1998).  
 The second definition of political instability measures the legitimacy of the 
political system through revolutions or other equivalent incidences. It has been argued 
that these incidences are an obvious indicator of political instability caused by public 
dissatisfaction (Sanders, 1981, cited by Miljkovic and Rimal, 2008). There are two 
streams under this defibition, the first stream considers these incidences individually as 
form of political instability. Sambanis (2001) measures instability in the form of 
revoluationary and other wars using a State Failure Data Set. Urdal (2006), Barakat and 
Urdal (2009) and Taydas and Peksen (2012) measure instability via civil war using the 
Uppsala/PRIOdataset. Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Collier, Elbadawi, and Sambanis 
(2000), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004) measure instability in 
terms of civil and colonial wars using the Correlates of War project. Basedau and Lay 
(2009) measure instability in terms of civil war using the UCDP/PRIO's conflict 
database.  
 The second stream of literature relies on revolutionary events and other 
incidences of political instability to create an index. Blomberg (1996), Leite and 
Weidmann (1999) and Mo (2001) use the data set of Barro and Lee (1994) who measure 
instability by the number of revoluations, coups and a measure of political assassination 
per one million inhabitants per year. Barro (1989) measures instability by the number of 
coups,  revolutions and number of political assassinations per one million of the 
population per year individually. Alesina and Perotti (1994, 1996) include the number 
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of successful and unseccessful coups in their index among other incidences5. Londregan 
and Poole (1992) use the World Bank Handbook of political and social indicators to 
construct an index that includes successful and unsuccessful coups among other 
components.  
 The third definition shifts away from measuring political instability in the form 
of severe and less frequent incidences (such as civil war) to measure it in the form of 
socio-political unrest, which will be used in this research. The advocates of this 
definition argue that political instability and socio-political unrest in the form of threats 
to the political power of the incumbent are similar because they share common 
characteristics. The number of demonstrations, riots and strikes measures incidences of 
socio-political unrest and assassinations as indicated by Siermann (1998) cited by 
Miljkovic and Rimal (2008). This definition is not widely used in empirical reseearch 
compared to the former definitions of political instability. Smith (2004) measures 
political instability in the form of anti-state activities such as peaceful demonstrations, 
riots and strikes in a country in any given year using the Banks (1998) data set. Marcus 
et al. (2008), Mazhar and John (2009) and Bricker and Foley (2013) use the Conflict 
Barometer data set to construct an aggregate index that measures several political 
incidences, two of which are political instability and socio-political unrest. Urdal (2006) 
utilises the U.S State Failure Task Force (SFTF) project originating from PANDA at 
Harvard University. 
 The fourth definition defines political instability using myopic and polarization 
viewpoints, as frequent change in a government might lead to different policies. The 
frequent change in government provides an indication that a government lacks the 
political support to stay in office (Miljkovic and Rimal, 2008). 
2.2.2 A Discussion of Data Sets Used to Measure Political Instability 
 Past empirical research measures the level of political instability in the form of 
civil war, coups, revolutions and political assassinations. These studies mainly use the 
data set provided by the Correlates of War Project (COW) and Uppsala. These data sets 
offer an objective measurement of political instability incidences; however, they have 
one common drawback in their criterion to classify an incidence as a form of political 
instability. This criterion requires a pre-specified death case to have occurred in order to 
                                                 
5 Lane and Tornell (1996) and Perotti (1996) use the political instability index constructed by Alesina and 
Perotti (1996).   
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consider an incidence as form of political instability as indicated by Gleditsch, 
Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand (2002) 
 The Correlates of War Project has been used since 1972 in the empirical 
literature of political instability. It sets a threshold level of 1000 battle deaths as a 
minimum number for a conflict to be considered as a form of political instability. This 
high threshold excludes some conflicts from the data set when rationally they should 
perhaps be regarded as conflicts (such as Basque and Northern Ireland conflict) because 
they have a lower death toll. A high threshold level dictates statistical analysis for only 
several discrete civil wars over a short period of time. Addressing this issue by 
increasing the number of observations by extending the time period or by splitting the 
sample into more than one sub-sample leads to several problems. Theoretically, 
potential explanations cannot be reasonably meaningful for the entire time period. For 
example, economic development in 1900 is not the same as in 2014. Splitting the 
sample into many sub-samples within a reasonable time length may produce 
insignificant results because the number of civil wars are not equally distributed over 
different time spans (Gleditsch et al., 2002). 
 The second data set, Uppsala, follows the death toll criterion to consider 
incidences as form of political instability similar to the Correlates of War Project. 
However, it reduces the threshold level to be equal to, or more than, 25 cases. It 
considers an incidence as form of political instability when two or more parties are 
involved in a conflict, one of which is a governmental force. It classifies a conflict as 
severe when the death toll exceeds one thousand; otherwise it is minor (Gleditsch et al, 
2002). It has been intensively used in prior empirical research (Marcus et al., 2008). 
 The failure of past empirical research to establish the relationship between the 
independent effect of youth bulge and political instability could be attributed to the 
definitions and criterion used by the COW and Uppsala data sets to classify incidences 
as forms of political instability. Defining political instability exclusively in the form of 
civil war ignores the reality that there is a decreasing trend in total civil wars 
worldwide. Flanigan and Fogelman (1970) and Gurr (2000) indicate this is because 
many nations tend to settle their disputes via other peaceful means, resulting in fewer 
civil wars in the 20th than 19th century. Goldstone (2002) notes that there are a 
decreasing number of civil wars in the twenty-first century. Flanigan and Fogelman 
(1970) argue that some regions in the world are more prone to specific forms of political 
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instability, for instance, Latin America is more prone to socio-political unrest than civil 
war, whereas other regions like sub-Saharan Africa experiences the opposite. 
 While other authors agree that civil war is one form of political instability, they 
argue that its determinants are different to socio-political unrest or civil disobedience.  
For example, Fearon and Laitin (2003) attribute civil wars in Eastern Europe, former 
Soviet countries and sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s to ethnic minorities fighting a 
dominated majority to readdress religious, nationalist, or economic grievances.  
Therefore, some authors such as Bricker and Foley (2013) argue that these data sets are 
more appropriate to study the causes of large-scale incidence like war, not other 
incidences of political instability - one of which is the role of youth bulge on political 
instability. Statistically, Niang (2012) indicates that measuring political instability in 
terms of civil war imposes restriction on empirical analysis to be carried out using 
logistic regression or other forms of binary or dichotomous dependent variable to study 
the relationship between youth bulge and political instability. Such methods have been 
criticized because they are not appropriate to analyze large panel data containing many 
cross sections and cross time observations, especially when the number of observations 
of civil war is relatively small in comparison with the number of observations of peace 
(Goldstone, 2002). 
 The statistical difficulty of analyzing the determinants of political instability 
using a data set that adopts a death toll criterion, such as COW and Uppsala, leads to the 
introduction and use of other data sets in empirical research like SFTF project, 
originating from the PANDA at Harvard University. The SFTF project measures 
political instability in the form of terrorism, riots and violent demonstration (or what is 
termed political-social unrest). Although it measures small-scale incidences of political 
instability it has been criticized for its bias towards countries where the Western agenda 
prevails. For example, Sub-Saharan countries experienced 35% of total global political 
instability incidences from 1955 to 2003 but are not well represented by the data set 
(Urdal, 2006). Another drawback is that it measures the number of violent incidences 
but not their intensity (Neumayer, 2004).  
 The empirical research has shifted to another data set that has a broad definition 
of political instability and contains criterion to identify its intensity, like the Conflict 
Barometer 6 . This data set is published by the Heidelberg Institute for International 
                                                 
6 Used by Marcus et al. (2008) and Bricker and Foley (2013). 
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Conflict Research (HIIK), a research centre at the Department of Political Science, 
University of Heidelberg, Germany. It defines political instability as conflict of values 
or interests between two or more groups in a country over a period of time. The 
definition considers incidences such as formal and informal interstate and small-scale 
violence like riots to measure the level of political instability. It uses a scale of 5 to 
measures conflict in areas of territory, secession, decolonisation, autonomy, 
system/ideology, national power, sub national predominance and international power 
and resources. Each area is divided into additional sub-areas. The scale is used to 
measure the intensity of instability, in which 1 indicates dispute, 2 non-violent crises, 3 
violent crises, 4 limited war and 5 war. The annual total score of each country is 
calculated as the sum of scores in all areas. The data is available for the period from 
1992 to 2013 and all are available in English language except reports from 1992 to 1996 
and 1998 to 2001, which are available in German language (HIIK, 2014). 
 There are very few empirical studies that examine the relationship between 
youth bulge and political instability in the form of socio-political unrest (see, for 
example, Fuller 2003, Urdal 2006, Marcus et al. 2008). These studies have drawbacks 
related to the data set used in the analysis or the definition used to measure political 
instability. The Urdal (2006) study is considered the most pivotal and comprehensive in 
area of the role of youth bulge on instability; however, it has all the above-mentioned 
drawbacks. First, it uses the Uppsala and SFTF data set to measure political instability, 
which is more appropriate with war studies (Marcus et al., 2008). Second, it uses a 
sample covering a long period of time from 1950 to 2000, which raises difficulties when 
it comes to theoretical explanation (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Third, it uses logistic 
regression (onset of armed conflict or not) in the analysis, which has been criticized 
because the number of conflicts is significantly less than the number of stable political 
situations (Goldstone, 2002). The second seminal study, carried out by Bricker and 
Foley (2013), uses the Conflict Barometer to address the issue of limiting political 
instability to civil war. However, they measure political instability as a sum of all 
internal and external conflicts, disputes or other conflicts with bordering countries, 
claiming that the proxy is more able to capture the role of youth bulge on instability. 
One can argue that conflict across borders has nothing to do with youth bulge; in 
contrast, it might increase the level of internal political stability because it leads the 
public to place their dissatisfaction of government performance aside and increase their 
support for government to deal with external risk. Marcus et al. (2008, p. 15) indicate 
that “Youth violence is more spontaneous than the violence perpetrated by national 
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governments and it does not always escalate to this level. Youth bulges and busts are 
likely to be associated with violence more generally conceived than with military 
actions involving national governments”. The third important study carried out by 
Marcus et al. (2008) does not directly address political instability; instead its  main 
objective is business risk associated with demographic age structure, with an emphasis 
on youth bulge.  
2.2.3 Modernization Theory and Political Instability    
 The oldest stream in the literature used to explain the variation in the level of 
political instability across both time and different countries is Modernization theory, 
developed by Deutsch (1961) and Huntington (1968) as indicated by J. A. Goldstone et 
al. (2010). Modernization theory assumes that political instability is a product of 
imbalance in growth rate of politics and socioeconomic factors in a society. These 
factors are a high level of educational attainment and literacy, urbanization and 
industrialization. These processes lead to significant changes in norms and values that 
can create an orientational upheaval (Stavestrand, 2013).  
2.2.3.1  Educational Attainment and Literacy  
 It has been suggested that a country going through a modernization stage 
witnesses a high level of educational attainment. The effect of educational attainment on 
the level of political instability filters through economic and political channels. 
Economically, educational attainment increases the risk of political instability when 
economic growth or economic size fails to create employment opportunities to absorb  
the increasing number of job seekers among educated youth (Lia, 2007). Winckler 
(2002) and Goldstone (2002) point out that historically, high levels of educational 
attainment precede political instability incidences. Politically, educational attainment 
has been suggested to develop civic skills among youth; consequently, it produces a 
generation that is more likely to seek democracy than an uneducated generation. The 
risk of political instability in a country increases when the political system does not 
have channels to accommodate the civic skills of this educated generation (Huntington, 
1968). Hence, a higher education level may increase political instability in a country 
have low level of democracy or small economic size. 
 The existing studies reach mixed results concerning the relationship between 
educational attainment and political instability. Urdal (2006) finds a significant positive 
relationship between tertiary education and probability of civil war. It suggests that high 
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level of level of tertiary education enhances the probability of civil war. Contrarily, 
other empirical research finds that educational attainment has a stabilizing effect. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Barakat and Urdal (2009) find a negative relationship 
between secondary education and onset of civil war. Likewise, Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) find that a country with a high level of primary education is more stable. 
However, Goldstone et al. (2010) find no relationship between educational attainment 
(measured by secondary and tertiary education) and political instability when measured 
by instances of armed conflict. Xu (2011) finds no impact of primary and secondary 
school enrolment on stability. These conflicting results could be attributed to the proxy 
used to measure educational attainment. Primary school enrolment is an appropriate 
proxy to be used in case of reasonably undeveloped countries; however, in many 
countries around the globe youth bulge with higher than secondary level attainment are 
expected to significantly contribute to economic growth that may lead to stability in a 
country, as indicated by Miljkovic and Rimal (2008). Furthermore, Fuller (2003) 
indicates that unlike well-educated youth, barely-educated youth can accept any 
available employment opportunities and are less likely to commit political violence.  
2.2.3.2  Urbanization Growth Rate   
 There are two conflicting views about the impact of urbanization on the level of 
political instability. The first view supports the argument that it leads to high levels of 
political instability. It argues that high levels of urbanization growth rate produced by 
natural population growth rate or high levels of rural-urban migration lead to 
concentrations of a high percentage of the population in a small geographic area who 
may be ready to facilitate collective action against government  (Goldstone, 1991). 
Urbanization growth rate becomes a prospective source of political instability when its 
growth rate exceeds the growth rate of employment and educational opportunities 
(Urdal, 2006). Empirically, Smith (2004) finds a significant positive relationship 
between population density and incidences of political instability such as civil war, civil 
disorder or regime failure. 
 The second view supports the argument that a high level of urbanization is 
associated with low level of political instability. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) indicate 
that a high level of urbanization reduces the risk of political instability. They argue that 
low population density and urbanization inhibit government ability, especially in 
countries with low levels of economic development. They support their view 
empirically with data that the distribution of population over a large geographic area is 
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associated with a high risk of civil war. In another study, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) 
find in panel data analysis comprising a group of African countries a negative, although 
not significant, link between population density and political instability.  
2.2.3.3  Industrialization  
 The third process of modernization is industrialization. A country go ing through 
the industrialization process experiences diversity in economic activities and 
occupations, transfers from subsistence to market agriculture and experiences increases 
in the ratio of capital to labor (Huntington, 1968).  It also experiences rapid changes in 
the existing culture or social system, or both (Sorokin, 1962). There are two views 
relating to the impact of industrialization on political instability. The first view assumes 
it has a destabilizing effect while the second assumes it has a stabilizing effect.  
 The destabilizing effect view assumes that rapid economic growth increases the 
level of income inequality; consequently, it increases the level of grievance that leads to 
political instability. Oslen (1963),  Huntington (1968) and Ansani and Daniele (2012) 
indicate that the level of income inequality increases because the benefits from 
economic growth are not distributed equally across the population. Huntington (1968) 
indicates that rapid economic growth increases the inflation rate that exceeds the 
increases in wage level. Rapid economic growth associated with industrialization 
produces severe social disorder that loosens the relationship between an individual and 
the existing social order such extended family and the village that tends to support the 
individual (Huntington, 1968). In the absence of a well developed institutional structure 
that compensates for the diminished role of the traditional system to deal with 
overlooked workers, rapid economic growth might lead to instability (Hibbs,1973). 
 Just such an institutional structure is attributed to the stabilization effect of 
modernization in the case of Western Europe and Northern America. These countries 
have successfully created a system that integrates all classes in society (Hibbs, 1973). 
The destabilization effect view is based on the rate change associated with 
industrialization and how a country deals with its associated problems. Early 
modernization spread over a long time period unlike contemporary equivalents. For 
example, modernization in England took 183 years from 1649 to 1832. For countries 
that entered the modernization process during the Napoleonic period from 1789 to 1815, 
the average period to reach the consolidation of modernizing leadership was 73 years. 
For countries that started the modernization process in the late 1960s, the p rocess took 
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less than 29 years. It is estimated that the change rate in the principal social indicators 
such as primary and post-primary enrolment, urbanization and infant mortality rate is 
1% per year in the 20th century’s modernizing society while it was only 0.1% per year 
in the 19th century. As a result, countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America that have 
gone through the modernization process in the aftermath of the Second World War have 
experienced political instability incidences. The second channel that causes 
contemporary modernization to breed political instability is the management of its 
problems. Contemporary modernization needs to deal with its process simultaneously; 
however historical modernization dealt with it subsequently. This increases the risk of 
political instability, especially when there are no political institutions to deal with each 
process of modernization individually (Huntington, 1968). Other authors like 
Sandbakken (2006) argue that industrialization leads to political instability because it 
produces middle classes who are financially independent from the government. The 
author indicates that the successful revolution against the Shah regime in Iran 1979 is 
attributable to the existence of large merchant groups who were financially independent 
from the regime. 
 The second view assumes that industrialization, measured by economic growth, 
GDP per capita or other indicators of the level of economic development, has a 
stabilization effect.  It assumes that economic growth in a country is an important factor 
that influences an individual’s opportunity cost to commit political instability 
incidences. High levels of economic growth create an abundance of employment 
opportunities that increases an individual’s opportunity cost to commit political 
instability incidences (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Blattman and Miguel (2010) argue 
that economic conditions in terms of economic growth and level of income are a good 
predictor of the level of political instability when it is measured by civil war.  
 There is a general agreement in the empirical literature that poor economic 
growth enhances political instability. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002) find that poor economic growth leads to high probability of civil war. 
Alberto Alesina, Özler, Roubini, and Swagel (1996) find that poor economic growth 
leads to political instability when measured by political assassinations, revolutions or 
coups. Marcus et al. (2008) find a negative relationship between economic growth and 
level of political instability when it is measured by a broader definition of political 
instability that comprises both small and large-scale incidences. Urdal (2006) finds that 
low economic growth leads to political instability measured by civil war, terrorism, riots 
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and violent demonstrations. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Taydas and Peksen (2012) 
find that low economic growth leads to political instability when measured by civil war.  
Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) find that positive economic growth decreases the level 
of political instability when it is measured by executive removal in a given year.  
Morrison (2009) finds that negative economic growth increases the probability of 
regime instability measured as a binary variable documenting whether there is change in 
regime or not using a Polity IV durable variable. Smith (2004) finds an insignificant 
negative relationship between economic growth and regime failures, a significant 
negative relationship with social protests and significant negative relationship with 
onset of civil war. Bricker and Foley (2013) find that positive economic growth reduces 
risk of political instability. Only Goldstone (2010) finds no relationship between annual 
economic growth and civil war.   
 Circumventing both streams discusses above, another stream in the empirical 
literature measures industrialization by GDP per capita, and while these studies agree 
that it is a good indicator of the level of political instability, the shape of the 
relationship, whether linear or non- linear, is less clear. In the non- linear relationship 
camp, Kerr et al. (1960) conclude that there is a curvilinear relationship. According to 
Kerr et al. (1960), societies at early and late stages of modernization are less likely to 
experience political instability incidences, whereas societies in the middle level of 
economic development are more likely to witness political instability incidences. 
Similarly, Feierabend et al. (1960) cited by Hibbs (1973) analyzed the political 
instability and level of economic development of 74 countries and finds a moderate 
curvilinear relationship. Others, like Russett et al. (1966) cited by Hibbs, (1973) claim 
that the curvilinear model is the best to capture the relationship between the death toll 
from domestic violence and gross national product per capita.  
 Some empirical research examines and finds a linear relationship between 
different proxies of the level of economic development and the level of political 
instability. Flanigan and Fogelman (1970) find a negative and linear relationship when 
the level of economic development is measured by the percentage of labor force in the 
agriculture sector and gross national product per capita. Rubin and Schainblatt (1960) 
cited by Hibbs (1973) find a negative and linear relationship when it is measured by 
energy consumption per capita. Collier et al. (2000), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004), Urdal (2006) and Taydas and Peksen (2012) find a negative and 
linear relationship when it is measured by armed conflict. J. A. Goldstone et al. (2010) 
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find a positive and linear relationship when it is measured by infant mortality rate. Other 
empirical research finds no relationship between the two variables using different data 
sources and statistical techniques (Hibbs 1973). Barakat and Urdal (2009) find an 
insignificant negative linear relationship between GDP per capita and the onset of 
internal armed conflict. Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) find an insignificant positive 
linear relationship between GDP per capita and regime survival. Sambanis (2001) finds 
a weak and insignificant negative linear relationship between the level of economic 
development measured by energy consumption and the onset of civil war. Bricker  and 
Foley (2013) find an insignificant positive linear relationship between GDP per capita 
and the onset of small-scale political instability incidences. Other empirical research 
finds a significant positive between the two variables, such as Marcus et al. (2008) who 
find a significant positive linear relationship between GDP per capita and the onset of 
domestic conflict. 
2.2.4 Curse of Natural Resources 
 This section discusses the impact of natural resources rents on the level of 
political instability. The literature has three dominant streams, namely the Rentier State 
theory, repression 7  and rent-seeking concepts. The main differences among these 
streams is whether rents from natural resources have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect 
on a country  (Smith 2004). 
2.2.4.1  Rentier State Theory  
 Studies in the political economy of rents from natural resources, especially oil, 
focus on its impact on institutional, economic and political aspects. The impact on these 
aspects increases the level of political stability according to Rentier State theory 
(Delacroix,1980), which is in contrast to modernization theory that assumes 
modernization leads to democracy or political instability.  
 Institutionally, governmental activities in a rentier state are developed to carry 
out distributive function rather than an extractive function (Delacroix, 1980). Its 
function is collecting oil rents and setting plans to distribute these across different 
segments of a society through direct and indirect distribution channels. A direct 
distribution channel takes the form of expenditure on education, health services, 
employment and infrastructure. Expenditure on these sectors increases public loyalty to 
a government because the public sees it as promoter of economic development. Indirect 
                                                 
7 Repression will not be covered because it is beyond the scope of this research. 
 24 
transfer systems are mainly designed to distribute oil rents to a narrow network of 
individuals who receive personal favors from governments in the form of the 
distribution of licenses, projects and contracts (Sandbakken, 2006). M. Ross, Kaiser, 
and Mazaheri (2011) indicate that the rent seeking and patronage relationship be tween a 
government and its elite leads to a high level of political stability in oil countries. Herb 
(1999) points out that oil rents have a stabilization effect on monarchies in the Arabian 
Peninsula through welfare expenditure and the patron client network. A government 
relying on oil rents to finance distributive expenditure does not need to tax the public, 
which leads to under-developed tax systems (De Mesquita and Smith, 2009). Free tax 
environments reduce public pressure on governments to move towards democracy 
under the justification of no representation without taxation (Sandbakken, 2006). The 
absence of a democratic environment frees governments from checks and balances that 
restrict its ability to pursue its own agenda (Taydas and Peksen, 2012).   
 Politically, the absence of political accountability has an adverse effect on 
institutional quality. Studies show that oil rents negatively affect the rule of law, the 
quality of bureaucracy and level of corruption. However, the use of several 
measurements of institutional quality makes it difficult to determine which aspects are 
related to the abundance of natural resources and which are relevant to growth (Sachs 
and Warner, 1999). As a result, the overall society prefers to involve in rent-seeking 
activities rather than alliance building and raising political unrest. This creates a strong 
resistance from different interest groups to a reform agenda that gives equal 
opportunities to all of the population (Sandbakken, 2006). 
 Economically, a rentier state plays a major role as an engine of economic growth 
and consequently as an employer. This is because its policies are neither oriented 
towards developing industry nor growth-oriented policies that foster the independent 
middle class that may seek democracy (Lipset, 1959, cited by De Mesquita and Smith, 
2009). As a result, a rentier state government becomes a major employer who 
successfully replaces the independent middle class with a financially dependent class of 
civilian employees in the public sector and military officers (Sandbakken, 2006). 
Okruhlik (1999) points to Saudi Arabia as a typical example of rentier state,  where rents 
from oil have a stabilizing effect because prosperity of private citizens is conditional 
upon their acquisition of government wealth via access to jobs, information, contracts 
and projects. This access is gained through personal relationships, friendships, religious 
branches and regional affiliation.  
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 The direct and indirect distribution channels help a government to eliminate the 
risk of two typical sources of political instability incidences: rivals in the political 
system and mass anti-government movements (De Mesquita and Smith, 2009). Ross 
(2001) examines the causal relationship between oil wealth and democracy and finds 
that there is a positive correlation between oil wealth and military expenditure, which in 
turn is associated with authoritarianism. The author indicates that political instability 
incidences can occur as a result of other factors like ideology, which becomes more 
important than financial and economic benefits. 
2.2.4.2 Oil Rent Seeking Theory  
 Oil rent-seeking, distributional inequality and the greed motive rebellion (or 
what is called the oil as spoils thesis) consider natural resources rents as prospective 
sources of political instability in rentier states. The risk increases because of greediness, 
income inequality, fluctuation in oil prices, modernization, corruption and a poor 
macroeconomic environment. 
 Rents from natural resources revenues are an attractive target to rebellions or 
state breakers, especially when these resources are located in a region with pre-existing 
ethnic or religious grievances. Furthermore, the expensive oil production equipment is 
an attractive target for gang and anti-government movements, particularly when they 
are located in remote areas. For example, municipalities in Colombia often experience 
paramilitary violence, especially during boom periods (Smith, 2004). 
  Rents from natural resources may increase the risk of political instability 
through income distribution patterns that exclude whole segments of the population or 
provide some segments with financial means to challenge a government. The unequal 
distribution of rents from natural resources increases the risk of political instability. 
Morrison (2009) indicates that one prospective source of political instability in a 
dictatorship is the unequal distribution of income. Shambayati (1994) indicates that the 
Iranian revolution in 1979 was partially caused by unequal income distribution that 
raised demand from the public to understand the distribution mechanism used for oil 
revenues. Therefore, some suggestions have been made to turn equal income 
distribution pattern into a source of political stability. M. Ross et al. (2011) use the 
MENA region as an illustrative example, suggesting that subsidy programs in countries 
in the MENA region should be revised to target the most aggrieved societal segments 
that are likely to initiate political instability incidents. The obvious shortcoming in the 
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current subsidy programs is that they distribute subsided products and services across 
all society without any distinction as to their financial capabilities. Accordingly, some 
segments in a society continue to live in poor conditions because the government has 
failed to design a subsidy program that satisfies their needs. Governments typically 
ignore the revision of current subsidy systems because it constitutes political cost. 
Okruhlik (1999) indicates that in the case of Saudi Arabia, welfare expenditure among 
the public is perceived as a citizenry right more than the positive consequences of a 
boom period. Another possibility is to increase transparency in the distribution process 
and budget procedures to eliminate the negative consequences on political stability 
(Sandbakken, 2006). In general, distribution programs pose a challenge for prospective 
political and economic transitions in the region. The pattern of income distribution 
provides interest groups with the financial means to challenge a government (Ross et 
al., 2011). For example, Okruhlik (1999) indicates that the government in Saudi Arabia 
creates its own enemy through the pattern of oil rent distribution. 
 The risk of political instability increases because of fluctuations in oil prices that 
put a government under financial pressure to maintain different forms of distribution. 
Lowi (2004) notes that economic shock forced the Algerian government  in the 1990s to 
eliminate welfare expenditure amidst increasing demand due to rapid population 
growth. This created general dissatisfaction that led to political instability. In contrast, 
Smith and Bueno de Mesquita (2010) cited by Ross et al. (2011) argue that oil rents 
help authoritarian rentier states to smooth economic conditions during crises. Thus, they 
do not make any progress towards democracy.  
 Rents from natural resources further increase the risk of political instability by 
feeding processes of modernization.  Ross et al. (2011) indicate that rents from natural 
resources in the MENA region increases the level of rural-urban migration, which in 
turn increases pressure on the labor market that leads to increased unemployment. Rents 
increase the level of educational attainment and political awareness among youth but 
institutional structure has not developed enough to accommodate such a change. 
Shambayati (1994) presents the impact of oil rents on the socioeconomic and political 
environment in Iran prior to the 1979 revolution. Oil rents speed up the level of rural-
urban migration with the hope that urban life will improve the migrants’ living 
standards; however, migrants are generally disappointed when their expectations are not 
met. This creates feelings of actual and relative deprivation amongst a wide segment of 
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a society. This is exactly what happened in Iran and which set the stage for the Iranian 
revolution in 1979. 
 Oil rents have an adverse impact on institutional quality, which in turn increases 
the risk of political instability as found by several empirical studies. Poor institutional 
quality has substantial costs on public welfare through its adverse impact on economic 
growth and investment as indicated by O'Sullivan, Rey, and Galvez Mendez (2011). 
Ross et al. (2011) present the negative impact of corruption on privatization projects 
that aim to develop the vital private sector in the MENA region. The authors indicate 
that the privatization process in the region, especially in low and middle economies 
such as Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia, is characterized by a high level of corruption, 
patronage and lack of motivation and continuity. Shehata (2011) indicates that the 
factors that led to the fall of the Mubarak regime in 2011 were an increasing level of 
corruption and economic exclusion. As a result of a high level of corruption, economic 
growth achieved in the region over the past decades did not lead to increases in the level 
of GDP per capita. The impact of corruption on creating an economic environment 
where the private sector is an engine of economic growth can be observed from the 
imbalance between economic growth and population growth. In the MENA region, over 
the period from 2000 to 2010 the average economic growth was 4.8% that not match 
GDP per capita growth, which is 2.5% over the same period. This suggests that annual 
economic growth is less than the population growth rate. The gap between these two 
growth rates is considered among the highest in the world, below only sub-Saharan 
Africa (O'Sullivan et al., 2011). Rents from natural resources increases fertility rates 
and lowers child mortality rates, which results in a sudden increase in the ratio of youths 
to total adult population (a youth bulge). This is witnessed as consequences of the 
‘Dutch disease story’ and welfare expenditure systems in rentier states8. The ‘Dutch 
disease’ crowds out women from some typical sectors in the economy that employ 
women, such as agriculture and export-oriented manufacturing sectors. Furthermore, the 
governmental welfare system makes it unnecessary for women to seek employment in 
order to assist their household with a second income (M. Ross et al., 2011).  
2.2.4.3  Past Empirical Literature in Natural Resources-Political Stability Nexus 
 Like theoretical literature, empirical literature concerning the impact of rents 
from natural resources on the level of political instability show mixed results. Empirical 
                                                 
8 ‘Dutch Disease’ is the negative consequences on an economy resulting from a sharp increase in in flow 
of foreign currency from oil rents.    
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studies show oil wealth leads to political instability due to associated rent-seeking 
activities under the ‘oil-and-spoils thesis’ (Bjorvatn and Naghavi, 2011). However, the 
literature in rentier states shows that oil rents have a stabilizing effect on a society due 
to different distribution channels used to pacify different segments in a society.  
The first stream in the empirical literature examines the linear relationship 
between oil rents and political instability measured by civil war, ethnic war and 
domestic armed conflict, and in rare cases its impact on other incidences of political 
instability; however, they reach mixed results. The first group of empirical research 
finds no relationship. Goldstone et al. (2010) find no relationship when natural 
resources rents measured as the percentage of fuel exports to merchandise exports or as 
a percentage of crude petroleum exports to all commodities or as a percentage of ores 
and metal exports to merchandise exports.  Fearon and Laitin (2003) find no 
relationship when natural resources rents are measured as primary commodity exports. 
Bricker and Foley (2013) find no relationship between natural resources rents measured 
as a percentage of GDP and the level of political instability. The second group finds a 
positive relationship between the two variables. Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, and Busby 
(2005) find a positive and significant relationship between natural resources rents when 
measured by the share of primary export to GDP and the level of political instability. 
Taydas and Peksen (2012) find a significant positive relationship when oil rents 
constitute 30% of export revenues and the onset of civil war. The third group finds a 
negative relationship. Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) find a negative and significant 
relationship between natural resources rents when measured as the percentage of oil 
income to GDP and the level of political instability. Smith (2004) finds a significant 
negative relationship between natural resources rents when measured as a percentage of 
oil exports to GDP and regime failure, the onset of civil war and anti-state movement.  
The second stream in the literature examines the quadratic term of rents from 
natural resources and political instability. This stream finds that the level of political 
instability is high when oil rents are low, no effect in the middle ground and at a high 
level, oil rents decrease political instability. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) find a significant quadratic relationship with the onset of civil war when 
natural resources rents are measured as a ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP. 
Collier et al. (2000) find that natural resources rents are significantly and non-
monotonically associated with probability of civil war onset. Basedau and Lay (2009) 
find that natural resources rents when measured by oil production per capita are 
significantly and non-monotonically associated with civil war onset. Bjorvatn and 
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Naghavi (2011) find empirically that the relationship between oil rent and politica l 
instability is non-monotonic. 
The last stream suspects the validity of the empirical link between the two 
variables. Blattman and Miguel (2010) find that this relationship is weak and 
controversial. They argue that economic conditions in terms of economic growth and 
low incomes are better predicators for armed conflict in less developed countries than 
rents from natural resources. 
2.2.5 Opportunity Perspective 
 The opportunity perspective assumes that the risk of political instability is high 
when an individual has a low opportunity cost and a rebellion movement can control 
primary commodity exports. An individual’s opportunity cost is influenced by 
education, which in turn is realised by labour market performance. At one extreme, 
education increases an individual’s opportunity cost to join a rebellion movement by 
increasing his value in the labour market and expanding the prospective income-earning 
opportunities before him. At the other extreme, education raises an individual’s 
expectations in terms of employment opportunities and their associated financial 
benefits, which, if they are not met, make the opportunity cost low; subsequently, an 
individual becomes more likely to join rebellion movements. When labour markets are 
not rewarding, an individual finds it feasible to join rebellion movements because other 
income-earning opportunities are low. Rebellion movements can successfully hire 
labour when it gains access to financial resources. One of the easiest sources is to 
control primary commodity exports. Production of primary commodities does not need 
a complicated network of information and transaction like manufacturing. It is more 
profitable than manufacturing because it depends on extracting natural endowment. 
Alternatively, rebellions may target long trade lines from production area to export port. 
A combination of the availability of financial resources for rebellion, an individual low 
opportunity cost and abundance of youth speeds up the recruitment process (Collier, 
2000). Goldstone (2002) indicates that a rebellion movement is likely to succeed in a 
country when the movement controls the primary commodity exports, there is an 
abundance youth labor supply and there is weak or fragile government that lacks the 
required means to crush the movement, whether peacefully or by force. 
2.2.6 Youth Bulge and Political Instability 
 There are two views regarding the impact of youth bulge on political 
environment.  The first view assumes youth bulge has a stabilization effect under the so-
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called demographic dividends thesis, while the second view assumes youth bulge has a 
destabilization effect under the so-called demographic curse (Fuller, 2003). Several 
authors point out that the realization of either effect depends on a country’s 
socioeconomic and political environment. Xenos and Kabamalan (2005) indicate that 
the nature of the youth bulge impact on political environment is a function of their 
interaction with socioeconomic and political environment. Correspondingly, Urdal 
(2006), Marcus et al. (2008) and Barakat and Urdal (2009) argue that whether youth 
bulge is curse or blessing depends on the social, economic and political environment of 
a country.  
 History presents several examples of socioeconomic and political environment 
that turns youth bulge into demographic curse. The French revolution in 1789 is 
partially attributed to a high percentage of youth bulge. The rise of Nazism in Germany 
in the 1930s is seen as a result of economic depression that increased youth 
unemployment (Moller, 1968) cited by Urdal (2004). Contemporary history offers some 
examples of the role of youth bulge on instability, such as the Islamic revolution in Iran 
in 1979 and Algeria9. Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of youth bulge in age bracket 15-
24 years old to total population and their percentage to population in age bracket 15 and 
above from 1950 to 2010 in Iran. The former percentage reaches its peak at around 20% 
and the latter percentage reaches its peak around 35.5% prior to the Iranian Islamic 
revolution in 1979. Both percentages are above 20% for the entire sample period. In the 
case of Algeria, Trends (2001) indicates that Algerian youth contributed to ongoing 
violence in the 1990s as a result of low employment, educational and housing 
opportunities. The author presents several examples of the role of youth bulge on 
instability in other regions in the world: conflict between Kurdish and Turkish 
governments in 1995 was sparked by high percentage of youth bulge; successful coups 
in Turkey in 1970 and 1980 were caused by youth bulge who experienced 
unemployment and low educational opportunities; armed conflict between the Sinhalese 
national insurgency and Tamil rebellion onset in Sri Lanka in 1970 turned severe in the 
1980s when the percentage of youth bulge in age bracket 15 to 24 years old to total 
population reached its peak; and conflict in Northern Ireland is attributed to youth bulge  
(Ulster more than Catholic).  
Figure 2.1 the Percentage of Youth Bulge in Iran from 1950 to 2011 
                                                 
9The armed conflict between the Algerian government and various Islamic groups, which began in 1991 
and ended in 2002. 
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In other countries socioeconomic and political environment turn youth bulge into 
demographic dividends. Bloom and Canning (2004) point out that a country can capture 
demographic dividends associated with youth bulge when it has in place high quality 
institutions, a well- regulated labor market, good economic management, high levels of 
trade openness, and a good education policy. Bloom and Williamson (1998) use the 
Asian Tigers as illustrative examples of countries that succeed in capturing 
demographic dividends associated with a high percentage of youth bulge and small 
percentage of dependent young and elderly 10. Bloom et al. (1999) indicate that favorable 
demographic conditions is a root cause of one third to one half of the high rate of 
economic growth in East Asia countries. 
2.3 The Influence of Socioeconomic and Political Factors in the Role of Youth 
Bulge on Political Instability  
 There is a general agreement that socioeconomic and political environment 
influence the level of political instability in a country (Goldstone, 2002). The following 
sub-section presents the influence of economic growth, unemployment, level of 
democracy, educational attaintment, and rents from natural resources on the role of 
youth bulge on political instability. 
 Despite of the importance of the influence of socioeconomic and political 
environments in the role of youth bulge on political instability, the moderation effect 
has received less attention in the empirical literature (as mentioned in earlier sections). 
These environments play an important role in determining the prospective outcome of a 
high percentage of youth bulge on a country’s political environment (as discussed in 
section 2.2.6). They can turn youth bulge into demographic dividends through boosting 
economic growth or they can enhance their adverse impact on political environments by 
                                                 
10 Young in age less than (15) years old and elderly in age above (65) years old .    
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turning them into demographic curse. Furthermore, opportunity and grievance 
perspectives explain the role of youth bulge by considering these environments. 
Opportunity perspective states that a combination of high level of educational 
attainment among youth bulge and a tight labor market reduces youth opportunity cost 
so that their risk to political stability is increased (Collier, 2000). Grievance perspective 
emphasizes the importance of some factors, including lack of democracy, to escalate an 
individual’s grievance level (Goldstone, 2001). Likewise, modernization theory 
indicates that instability is a result of imbalance between growth rate in socioeconomic 
and political environments. It points out that one prospective channel of instability is the 
failure of labour markets to match an increasing number of educated youth. Similarly, 
according to this theory, instability can be caused by educated youth who develop civic 
skills yet development of their political systems fails to advance. Anecdotal 
observations based on historical incidences of the role of youth bulge on instability 
point to a combination of high percentage of youth bulge in countries that experience 
limited educational and employment opportunities and where there is insufficient 
political channels to raise their demand peacefully, thus exaggerating their adverse 
impact on political environment. In summary, all of these explanations point out that 
contextual environment gives the youth bulge motive to commit political instability 
incidences. Explanations of their role on instability without considering their interaction 
with these environments may lead to the establishment of weak causal relationships 
between youth bulge and instability.  
2.3.1 Economic Factors  
 Past empirical research finds that economic environment measured by the 
independent effect of economic growth (or alternative measurement) is good predictor 
of political instability in a country, all other thing being constant. Alberto Alesina et al. 
(1996) find empirically that low economic growth can lead to political instability when 
it is measured by unconstitutional government change. Bricker and Foley (2003) argue 
that strong performance of economic environment measured by trade openness brings 
benefits to a wide range of society, making violence less likely. The authors find 
empirically that a high level of trade openness boosts the level of political stability.  
 The risk of political instability in a country is enhanced when poor performance 
in economic environment occurs jointly with a high percentage of youth bulge. Their 
role increases because of the failure of economic size or its growth rate to create 
employment opportunities to absorb the increasing number of youth bulge (Lia, 2007). 
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Brett and Specht (2004) find that low employment opportunities are likely to motivate 
an individual to join anti-government movements. The economic environment enhances 
their role on instability when income opportunities are determined by overall economic 
performance (Urdal, 2006). Other authors point out that the youth bulge political risk 
increases because economic environment determines forgone income that decreases an 
individual’s opportunity cost; consequently, the probability of committing political 
instability incidences increases. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) show that recruitment of 
individuals for rebellion during the Russian civil war was ten times higher in summer 
than winter because the recruited were villagers and their forgone income was much 
higher during harvest time. In summary, economic environment determines the youth 
opportunity cost to commit political instability incidences through potential 
employment and income prospects as well as forgone income. A country with strong 
economic performance that produces abundant employment opportunit ies with 
rewarding income prospects eliminates the political risk of youth bulge caused by low 
opportunity cost. 
 Countries rich in oil resources are expected to face less political risk from the 
presence of high percentage of youth bulge than non-oil countries. Instability 
deescalates through different forms of distribution expenditure as suggested by rentier 
state theory or forces as suggested by repression theory. According to rentier state 
theory, countries abundant in natural resources succeed in stabilizing their political 
environment through high levels of expenditure in areas that are suggested to be among 
the determinants of political instability, such as shortages in educational opportunities, 
lack of employment opportunities and poor economic growth (Sandbakken, 2006).  
 High level of educational attainment enhances political instability over the long 
run when economic growth or economic size fail to create employment opportunities 
for increasing number of educated youth (Lia, 2007). The situation gets worst in oil 
countries because of lack of economic diversification as a result of Dutch disease.  
However, such risk is eliminated in oil countries by creating massive public 
employment. This stabilizes the political environment through replacing the 
independent middle class in a country (who are likely to form opposition movements 
against it) with a financially dependent class of civilian employees in the public sector 
and military officers (Sandbakken, 2006). Okruhlik (1999) indicates that rents from 
natural resources in typical rentier states like Saudi Arabia succeed in stabilizing the 
political environment because prosperity of private citizens is conditional upon their 
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acquisition of government wealth through access to jobs, information, contracts and 
projects.  
 High level of educational attainment enhances political instability through low 
level of democracy. Its high level produces a generation that is more likely to seek 
democracy, which, if not met, leads to instability as suggested by Huntington (1968). 
However, such risk is eliminated in oil countries by not imposing taxes on the public. 
Sandbakken (2006) points out that reliance on oil rents as a main source of go vernment 
revenue reduces public pressure on a government to adopt democracy under 
justification of no representation without taxation. A government in the absence of 
democracy is free to take different measurements to stabilize their political environment 
such as military and security forces. Ross (2001) examines the causal relationship 
between oil wealth and democracy and finds that there is a positive correlation between 
oil wealth and military expenditure, which in turn is associated with authoritarianism. In 
summary, different forms of distribution expenditure and repression measurements 
eliminate the risk of two typical sources of political instability incidences in oil 
countries: rivals in the political system and mass anti-government movements (De 
Mesquita and Smith, 2009). 
2.3.2 Political Factors  
 The political environment of a country characterised by low level of democracy 
influences the role of youth bulge on political instability directly and indirectly through 
its adverse impact on economic environment. Directly, it restricts the ability of youth 
bulge to gain access to the political environment. The environment enhances instability 
when is characterized by immature democratic practice, lack of minority presentation 
and self-governance. In such an environment youth bulge might select violence when 
they find it difficult to influence the political system, gain access to elite positions or 
where there are insufficient channels to raise their demands peacefully (Goldstone, 
2001). Indirectly, a low level of democracy leads to instability through its adverse 
impact on economic growth. O'Sullivan et al. (2011) indicate that political 
exclusiveness (among other factors) contributed to the onset of Arab spring in late 2010 
in the MENA region. The authors indicate that the absence of democratic representation 
is the root cause of the Arab spring. The authors indicate that the absent of checks and 
balances in the region increased the level of corruption, leading to a negative impact on 
economic activity and investment decisions made by the private sector. This hindered 
the sector from playing its important role as an engine of economic growth. 
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2.3.3 Social Factors  
 Youth bulge who have achieved a high level of educational attainment enhances 
instability when expectations raised by education are not rewarded by labor markets and 
political systems fail to accommodate resultant political awareness. An individual’s 
opportunity cost increases through education because it expands prospective income-
earning opportunities. This eliminates an individual’s opportunity to commit political 
instability incidences (Collier, 2000). However, the failure of the labor markets to 
satisfy an individual’s expectation because of imbalance between growth rate in 
employment opportunities and an increasing number of educated youth leads to 
instability (Fuller, 2003). The adverse impact of education on political environment is 
expected to be higher from unemployed youth with tertiary education than unemployed 
youth without tertiary education. Fuller (2003) argues that the risk of political instability 
increases when unemployment hits people with tertiary education. This group is more 
driven to seek white-collar employment, which, if not met, may stir them to commit  
political instability incidences. This is in contrast to people with less than tertiary 
education level education, who may willingly accept blue-collar employment. In 
addition, a high level of educational attainment increases political awareness. The 
failure of the political system to accommodate such awareness enhances instability as 
indicated by Huntington, (1968).       
 The so-called Arab Spring in late 2010 presents anecdotal evidence about the 
importance of considering contextual environment in the role of youth bulge on 
instability. Campante, Chor, and Davin (2011) argue that the Arab spring was driven by 
two structural forces, namely demographic and economic conditions. They indicate that 
the successful revolution against the Mubarak regime in Egypt (for example) was 
quickly dubbed as a youth revolution. Shehata (2011) indicates that the region 
experienced a youth bulge explosion, where more than half of its total population is 
aged from 15 to 29. Shehata (2011) cites the World Bank that this age group achieved a 
high level of educational attainment amid low economic growth that failed to create 
employment opportunities.   
2.3.4 Control Variables  
 In order to ensure that the empirical results of the joint effect are unbiased, 
empirical models will include several control variables that are found empirically to 
contribute to political instability.  
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 Rapid population growth rate in rural area increases the level of rural-urban 
migration with the expectation of better livelihoods. This increases pressure on 
educational institutions and labour markets and creates shortages. Such shortages and 
concentration of a high percentage of population in a small geographic area facilitates 
collective action against a government, especially when youth bulge makes up a high 
percentage of urban population (Goldstone, 1991). Collective action is seen as a 
response to the failure of government to accommodate the growing demand for 
employment and educational opportunities. This depreciates public living standard, 
which leads to public dissatisfaction that might turn into instability (Turchin, 2013). 
Ross et al. (2011) point out that rapid urban growth rate creates shortages of 
employment and contributed partially to the onset of Arab Spring in late 2010 in the 
MENA region. In contrast, there are some authors like Barro (1992) argues that a high 
level of urbanization enhances political stability in countries with a low level of 
economic development because they lack the financial resources to control their entire 
territories when population is spread over a large geographic area.  
 Total population is a confounder explanatory variable in the determinants of 
political instability. It is included in the model to account for the variation in the level of 
political instability based on the differing size of countries (Urdal, 2006).  
 Trade openness is a proxy of the economic environment that reflects the level of 
economic opportunities available for an individual in a country, according to the 
opportunity perspective. Bricker and Foley (2003) find that a high level of trade 
openness decreases the level of political instability. They contend that a high level of 
trade openness increases the economic opportunity available to an individual so that 
he/she is less likely to commit acts that contribute to politica l instability. Similarly, 
Bloom and Canning (2004) argue that a youth bulge can yield demographic dividends 
when high levels of trade openness (among other factors) are present in a country.  
 In light of the previous discussion, this chapter will test the independent effect of 
youth bulge and its interaction with economic growth, unemployment, level of 
democracy, educational attainment and rents from natural resources on political 
instability as following hypotheses show. The empirical analysis will include youth 
unemployment, rents from natural resources, trade openness, GDP annual growth, level 
of democracy, gross tertiary enrolment, logarithm of total population and urban growth 
rate as control variables to support the hypotheses, the expected sign of the youth bulge 
and control variables are shown in the table 2.1. 
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𝐻1:Countries that experience a high percentage of youth bulge are more likely to 
experience political instability than countries that do not, ceteris paribus.  
𝐻2 : The higher the economic growth; the lower the impact of youth bulge on 
instability, ceteris paribus. 
𝐻3: The higher the rate of youth unemployment, the stronger the impact of youth 
bulge on instability, ceteris paribus. 
𝐻4: The higher the level of democracy; the lower the impact of youth bulge on 
instability, ceteris paribus. 
𝐻5: The higher the level of educational attainment, the stronger the impact of youth 
bulge on instability, ceteris paribus. 
𝐻6: The higher the rents from natural resources; the lower the impact of youth 
bulge on instability, ceteris paribus.  
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Table 2.1 The Expected Sign of the Independent and Control Variables in 
Measuring Political Instability 
Dependent variables: Political Instability  
Independent Variables Expected Sign with Political Instability  
Percentage of people (both sexes) aged 15-24 to population  aged (15) 
years and older (Yb) 
Positive 
Yb* GDP growth Negative 
Yb*TYU Positive 
Yb*RT Negative 
Yb*GTE Positive 
Yb*Rents Negative 
Total youth unemployment (TYU) Positive 
Natural resources rents as percentage of GDP (Rents) Negative 
GDP annual growth (GDP growth) Negative 
Logarithm of total population (Log T.pop) Positive 
Level of democracy (RT) Negative 
Trade openness (TO) Negative 
Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary, both sexes (%) (GTE) Positive 
Urban annual growth rate (UGR) Positive 
2.4 Models Specification, Data and Methodology 
This section presents the models, data and methodology used to test the proposed 
hypotheses. 
2.4.1 Model Specification: The Independent Effect of Youth Bulge on the level of 
Political Instability   
𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝑌𝑏)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑒𝑐𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 (𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖 )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜)𝑖𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡              (2.1) 
Where: 
PS is political instability 
Yb is youth bulge 
Eco is economic variables that comprise of rents from natural resources, total youth 
unemployment, trade openness and economic growth. 
Poli is political variables including level of democracy. 
Socio is social variables that incorporate logarithms of total population, gross tertiary 
enrolment and urbanization growth rate.  
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2.4.2 Model Specification: The Joint Effect of Youth Bulge and other Factors on 
the Level of Political Instability. 
 In this model the impact of the joint effect of youth bulge and economic growth, 
youth unemployment, level of democracy, gross tertiary enrolment and rents from 
natural resources on instability will be tested. 
The first joint effect between youth bulge and GDP annual growth is estimated 
as follows: 
𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝛽 1 (𝑌𝑏)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽 2  𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽 3(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝑌𝑏)𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽 4(𝑒𝑐𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽 5(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖 )𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽 6(𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                  (2.2) 
 The impact of joint effect on the level of political instability is captured by 𝛽
 3
 
and the partial effect of youth bulge (GDP growth) on the level of political instability is 
estimated as follows: 
𝑑𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡/𝑑𝑌𝑏𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛽 1 +  𝛽 3 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡           (2.2a) 
𝑑𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡/𝑑𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = 𝛽 2 + 𝛽 3 𝑌𝑏𝑖𝑡           (2.2b) 
Equation (2.2a) applies if 𝛽
 3
< 0 implying that a percentage increase in youth 
bulge yields greater reduction in the risk of political instability with higher rate of 
economic growth. Similarly, 𝛽
 3
< 0 𝑖𝑛 equation (2.2b) implies that a percentage point 
increase in economic growth yields greater reduction in the level of political instability 
with a higher percentage of youth bulge. The interaction effect will be evaluated at 
mean value of each variable.  
The second joint effect between youth bulge and total youth unemployment will 
replace the previous joint effect in model (2.2). The coefficient of 𝛽
 3
 captures the 
partial effect of youth bulge (total youth unemployment) on the level of political 
instability and is estimated as follows: 
𝑑𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡/𝑑𝑌𝑏𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛽 1 +  𝛽 3 𝑇𝑌𝑈𝑖𝑡            (2.2c) 
𝑑𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡/𝑑𝑇𝑌𝑈𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛽 2 +  𝛽 3 𝑌𝑏𝑖𝑡            (2.2d) 
This indicates that if 𝛽
 3 
> 0 in equation (2.2c), a percentage increase in youth 
bulge produces a stronger impact on the level of political instability with higher rate of 
youth unemployment. Similarly, if 𝛽
 3 
> 0 in equation (2.2d), one percentage increase 
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in total youth unemployment produces a stronger impact on the level of political 
instability with higher percentage of youth bulge. The effect of total youth 
unemployment and youth bulge on the level of political instability will be evaluated at 
the mean value of each variable.  
 The third joint effect between youth bulge and level of democracy will replace 
the previous joint effect in model (2.2). The partial effect of youth bulge (level of 
democracy) on the level of political instability, captured as 𝛽
 3
 is computed as follows: 
𝑑𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡/𝑑𝑌𝑏𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛽 1 +  𝛽 3 𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡            (2.2e) 
𝑑𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡/𝑑𝑅𝑇𝑖 ,𝑡= 𝛽 2 + 𝛽 3 𝑌𝑏𝑖𝑡            (2.2f) 
In equation (2.2e) if 𝛽
 3
< 0 then one percentage increase in youth bulge yield 
greater reduction in the risk of political instability with higher level of democracy. 
Similarly, in equation (2.2f) if 𝛽
 3
< 0 then one percentage increases in the level of 
democracy yield greater reduction in the risk of political instability with higher 
percentage of youth bulge. The partial effect will be evaluated at the mean value of each 
variable. 
 The fourth joint effect between youth bulge and gross tertiary enrolment will 
replace the previous joint effect in the model (2.2). The partial effect of youth bulge 
(gross tertiary enrolment) on the level of political instability captured as 𝛽
 3
 is computed 
as follows:  
𝑑𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡/𝑑𝑌𝑏𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛽 1 +  𝛽 3 𝐺𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡            (2.2g) 
𝑑𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡/𝑑𝐺𝑇𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡= 𝛽 2 + 𝛽 3 𝑌𝑏𝑖𝑡            (2.2h) 
 In equation (2.2g) if 𝛽
 3 
> 0  then one percentage increase in youth bulge 
produces a stronger impact on the level of political instability with higher gross tertiary 
enrolment. Similarly, in equation (2.2h) if 𝛽
 3 
> 0 then one percentage increase in gross 
tertiary enrolment produce a stronger impact on the level of political instability with 
higher percentage of youth bulge. The partial effect of each variable is estimated at their 
mean value.  
The fifth joint effect between youth bulge and rents from natural resources will 
replace the previous joint effect in the model (2.2). The partial effect of youth bulge 
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(rents from natural resources) on the level of political instability captured as 𝛽
 3
 is 
computed as follows:  
𝑑𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡/𝑑𝑌𝑏𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛽 1 +  𝛽 3 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡           (2.2i) 
𝑑𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡/𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡= 𝛽 2 +  𝛽 3 𝑌𝑏𝑖𝑡           (2.2j) 
 In equation (2.2i) if 𝛽
 3 
< 0 then one percentage increase in youth bulge yield 
greater reduction in the risk of political instability with higher rents from natural 
resources. Similarly, in equation (2.2j) if 𝛽
 3 
< 0 then one percentage increases in rents 
from natural resources yield greater reduction in the risk of political instability with 
higher percentage of youth bulge. The partial effect of each variable is estimated at their 
mean value.  
2.4.3 Data Description  
 The data set used in this research is unbalanced panel data that includes 139 
countries from 1984 to 201311. 
2.4.3.1   Political Instability Measurement  
This study  uses a new data set that to best of my knowledge has not been used 
before to capture the role of youth bulge on political instability. The definition follow 
other impirical research that measure political instability in form of  social political 
unrest. The study used the International Country Guide Risk (ICGR) data set published 
by the Political Risk Service Group (PRS), a commercial country risk provider. Its 
annual report measures the financial, political and economic risk of countries worldwide 
from 1984 to 2013. It is constructed to assess political risk associated with politics and 
socioeconomic environment in a country (Lambsdorff, 2007). This data set has several 
advantages; first, it meets the objectives of this chapter that aims to examine factors 
contributing to the role of youth on political instability. It covers a significant time 
period in comparison to other data sets that measure the level of political instability in 
the form of small and large-scale incidences, such as Conflict Barometer, which covers 
a period from 1992 to 2013 (some of which are published in German language).  
This study will measure the level of political instability by aggregating a total 
score of internal conflict and government instability in the ICGR data set. Government 
instability is an assessment of a government’s ability to achieve its declared program 
                                                 
11 The full list of countries in listed in the appendix. 
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and to stay in office. It is measured in a scale of 12 as a sum of three subcomponents: 
government unity, legislative strength and popular support (the breakdown of the score 
is not given). Internal conflict is divided equally into three components: civil war/coup 
threat, terrorism/political violence and civil disorder (however, the breakdown of the 
score is not given). According to ICGR, a high score suggests that a country has 
enjoyed a low level of political instability, while a low score indicates that a country 
faces a high risk of instability12. In this study, for ease of interpretation, the original 
score is rescaled so that a high score suggests a high level of instability and a low score 
shows a low level of instability. 
Sensitive analysis will be carried out using an index of political instability 
constructed by Saha and Yap (2013) using the ICRG data set. This index is the average 
of six components included in the political risk data set. These components are: internal 
conflicts (IC), government stability (GS), religion in politics (RP), external conflict 
(EC), ethics tension (ET) and military in politics (MP). Saha and Yap (2013) argue that 
these components are most likely to predict the level of political instability in a country. 
This study excludes external risk because the objective of this study is to investigate the 
impact of youth bulges through their interaction with economic and political factors on 
the level of domestic political instability, not external risk. External risk is driven by 
factors other than a high percentage of young people, such as geopolitical interests or 
border conflicts. The original score is rescaled so that a high score suggests a high level 
of instability and a low score shows a low level of instability.  
Figure 2.2 shows the mean score value of political instability across different 
regions of the world13. The graph shows that Northern Africa has the highest risk of 
political instability whereas central Asia, Western Europe and Oceania have the lowest 
levels of political instability.  
                                                 
12 For more details see www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx.    
13 All graphs in this chapter are based on the average value of a variable over the sample period unless 
otherwise stated. 
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Figure 2.2 The Level of Political Instability Across the World 
           The level of political instability across countries is grouped based on countries’ 
level of democracy14, OECD countries and the percentage of oil export to total export15 
as shown in Figure 2.3. This Figure shows that OECD countries enjoy the highest levels 
of stability across all classifications. Democratic countries enjoy higher levels of 
stability than their autocratic counterparts. The level of instability shows no significant 
variation between oil countries and their non-oil counterparts. 
Figure 2.3 The Level of Political Instability Under Different Contexts 
 
2.4.3.2  Independent Variables 
In the following sub-sections the data source and the definition use to measure 
youth bulge and independent variables are presented.  
                                                 
14 Freedom House data set is used to group countries into democratic and autocratic countries. Count ries 
classified ‘free’ in the data set are considered democratic and take the value of 1; otherwise they are 
considered ‘autocratic’ and take the value of 0. 
15  A country is considered oil dependent when oil export  constitutes one third of exports, taking the value 
of of 1 and 0 otherwise. The measure is adopted from Taydas and Peksen (2012). 
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2.4.3.2.1 Youth Bulge 
 There is no general agreement in the definition of youth bulge or the percentage 
of youth bulge that increases the risk of political instability. The literature measures 
youth bulge in two ways: as a percentage of population aged 15-24 years to total 
population or as percentage to population aged 15 and older. The first definition is 
adopted by Huntington, 1996, Goldstone 2001, and Collier and Hoeffler 2004; however, 
Urdal (2006) argues that the first proxy fails to capture the impact of youth bulge on 
political instability because theories regarding the role of youth bulge on violence 
assume that competition between the young and old generation lead to political 
instability. Urdal (2006) indicates that the first definition underestimates the impact of 
youth bulge on instability in countries that continue to experience high levels of fertility 
because the youth bulge indicator is deflated by the existence of a large percentage of 
youth under the age of 15. Urdal (2006) argues that the second definition is more 
appropriate to capture the role of youth bulge on instability. In this study the second 
definition will be used. There is no agreement in the literature about the percentage of 
youth bulge among population that increases the risk of political instability; however, 
Huntington (1996) suggests when the percentage of youth bulge aged 15-24 years old to 
total population exceeds 20%. 
 Comparing the two proxies of youth bulge across world regions (as shown in 
Figure 2.4) indicates that there is no significant variation in the percentage of youth 
bulge using the first proxy; however, there is a significant difference in the percentage 
under the second proxy, which supports Urdal (2006) and the choice of proxy used in 
this study. Furthermore, under the first definition, MENA region do not have a higher 
percentage of youth bulge compared to other regions in the world. This is in stark 
contrast to views that partially attributed the so-called Arab spring in late 2010 to a high 
percentage of youth bulge. Under the second definition, the percentage in the region is 
among the highest in the world.  
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Figure 2.4 Youth Bulge Percentage Across the World  
 
 There is a significant difference in the percentage of youth bulge under the 
second definition when countries are grouped based on their level of democracy and 
membership in the OECD; but there is only a small difference between oil and non-oil 
countries as illustrated in Figure 2.5. Data on youth bulge is collected from the United 
Nations, The World Population Prospects: the 2012 revision. 
Figure 2.5 Youth Bulge Percentage Under Different Contexts 
 
2.4.3.2.2  Economic Growth  
 Economic growth is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices 
based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S Dollar 
data collected from the World Development Indicators. Figure 2.6 shows GDP annual 
growth across the world. East Asia registers the highest average annual growth over the 
sample period. The lowest annual growth (less than 3%) is registered in Western and 
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Eastern Europe16. The MENA region is considered among the top five-regions in terms 
of performance in annual economic growth, with average annual growth 5.15%. This is 
in contrast to the view that poor economic performance (among other factors) caused 
the Arab Spring in 2010.  
Figure 2.6 Economic Growth Across the World  
 
 Figure 2.7 shows economic growth in different contexts, revealing that there is 
no significant difference between OECD countries, oil countries and democratic 
countries in comparison with non-OECD, non-oil countries and autocratic countries. 
 Figure 2.7 Economic Growth Under Different Contexts 
 
2.4.3.2.3 Trade Openness 
 Trade openness is the percentage of imports and exports to GDP data collected 
from the World Development Indicators. Figure 2.8 shows the level of trade openness 
across the world, showing that Western Europe, Northern America, MENA and Oceania 
                                                 
16 Descriptive statistics are contained in the Appendix.  
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are the most integrated regions, with international markets for their imports and exports 
to GDP reaching 107%, 103%, 98% and 90% respectively. The level of trade openness 
in most other regions is around 70%. Figure 2.9 shows the level of trade openness 
across different contexts; OECD countries are ranked first across all groups followed 
directly by oil countries while autocratic countries have the lowest level of trade 
openness across different contexts.   
Figure 2.8 Trade Openness Across the World 
  
Figure 2.9 Trade Openness Under Different Contexts 
 
2.4.3.2.4 Natural Resources Rents 
 Natural resources rents is the percentage of rents generated from oil, gas and 
forests to GDP, data collected from World Development Indicators Figure 2.10 shows 
the importance of natural resources as a percentage of GDP across the world. The 
highest percentage recorded is in Middle Africa and MENA where it makes up 26% and 
25% to GDP respectively; whereas, it constitutes only 5% and less in East Asia, Eastern 
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Europe, Northern Africa, Northern America, Northern Europe, Oceania, Southern 
Africa, Southern Europe and Western Europe. Figure 2.11 shows the contribution of 
rents from natural resources to GDP under different contexts. Rents contribute more 
than 30% to GDP in countries classified as oil countries, while in OECD and 
democratic countries its contribution is negligent.  
Figure 2.10 the Percentage of Rent from Natural Resources to GDP 
 
                 Figure 2.11 the Percentage of Rent from Natural Resources to GDP    
Under Different Contexts 
 
2.4.3.2.5 Unemployment 
 Unemployment influences the role of youth bulge on political instability 
according to the opportunity perspective. In this study, unemployment is measured by 
total youth unemployment in age bracket 15-24 to total labour force in age bracket 15-
24. This proxy is selected over other proxies of unemployment (such as total 
unemployment to total labour force) because one objective of the study is to identify the 
impact of unemployment among youth bulge on instability. Data is collected from the 
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World Development Indicators and the proxy is transferred to logarithm. Figure 2.12 
shows the youth unemployment rate across the world, revealing significant variation 
across regions. Four regions experience a significantly higher youth unemployment rate 
in comparison with other regions. These regions are the Caribbean, Middle Africa, 
MENA and Southern Europe, where youth unemployment rate reaches 28%, 41%, 23% 
and 28% respectively. Figure 2.13 shows youth unemployment rate across different 
contexts; it does not reveal significant variation across OECD vs. non-OECD, oil vs. 
non-oil and democratic vs. autocratic countries. 
      Figure 2.12 Unemployment Rate Across the World  
 
       Figure 2.13 Unemployment Rate Under Different Contexts 
 
2.4.3.2.6 Level of Democracy 
 Democratic level data is collected from the Polity IV project that ranks countries 
on a scale of 21, from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to 10 (consolidated democracy). In 
this research the score is re-scaled from 1 to 21 where 1 indicates an autocratic regime 
and 21 indicate a fully democratic regime. Figure 2.14 shows the level of democracy 
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across the world. MENA region is the most autocratic regime in the world (as claimed 
by many commentators and media reports). Similarly, all regions in Africa are 
autocratic at different levels, while Oceania and Northern America are the most 
democratic regions in the world. Figure 2.15 shows the score of democracy across 
different contexts; it shows that the variation between the level of democracy is higher 
by almost double in OECD countries vs. non-OECD countries, and similarly in non-oil 
countries vs. oil countries and democratic vs. autocratic countries17.  
             Figure 2.14 Level of Democracy Across the World  
 
             Figure 2.15 Level of Democracy Under Different Contexts 
 
2.4.3.2.7 Social Factors   
 Total population is log transformed and data is collected from The World 
Population Prospects: the 2012 revision (UN, 2014). Figure 2.16 shows the log of total 
population across different world regions. In general, the average growth rate of 
                                                 
17 ‘Free’ countries in the Freedom house data set are considered democratic in this research and are 
otherwise considered autocratic countries. Figure 2.15 use the previous mentioned dummy to  show the 
score of democracy according to the Polity IV project in democratic and autocratic countries.  
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population is similar except for the Northern America region. Similarly, it shows no 
significant variation (as shown in Figure 2.17) when countries are grouped into OECD 
vs. non-OECD, oil vs. non-oil and democratic vs. autocratic countries. Although there is 
no significant difference it is possible that in some regions or groups the population 
growth rate does not reach the required replacement rate to increase the effect of total 
population on instability.    
Figure 2.16 Log of Total Population Across the World 
 
     Figure 2.17 Log of Total Population Under Different Contexts 
 
2.4.3.2.8 Urbanization 
 Urbanization growth rate is annual growth rate in urbanized population and data 
is collected from the World Development Indicators. Figure 2.18 shows urbanization 
growth rate across the world, with all regions experiencing an urbanization growth rate 
between 2% and 3% a year except Northern America, East Asia and Southern Asia 
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where urbanization growth rate exceeds 4%. Figure 2.19 shows the rate of urbanization 
growth in OECD, oil, and democratic countries and shows that oil countries have the 
highest urbanization growth rate across all groups.  
  Figure 2.18 Urbanization Growth Rate Across the World 
 
Figure 2.19 Urbanization Growth Rate Under Different Contexts 
 
2.4.3.2.9 Tertiary enrolment 
 Gross tertiary enrollment is total enrollment in tertiary education as a percentage 
of the eligible official school in age group of population corresponding to the same level 
of education in a given school year (UNESCO, 2009). Figure 2.20 shows gross 
educational attainment across region, with Northern America region showing the 
highest educational attainment to total population at around 70% of the same age 
group18. The percentages vary across regions from as low as less than 3% in eastern and 
western Africa to as high as 49% in Oceania. Educational attainment in the MENA 
                                                 
18 Descriptive statistics are included into Appendix.  
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region constitutes almost 15% of the population, which is lower than the World average 
by 7%.  
Figure 2.20 Gross Educational Attainment Across the World  
 
Figure 2.21 shows gross tertiary enrolment in OECD, oil and democratic 
countries. OECD and democratic countries have higher educational attainment than 
non-OECD and autocratic countries respectively. Similarly, non-oil countries have 
higher educational attainment than oil countries.  
Figure 2.21 Gross Educational Attainment Under Different Contexts 
  
2.5 Estimation Strategy 
 Unlike past empirical research, in this study countries are distinguished 
according to the percentage of youth bulge in age bracket 15-24 years old to population 
in age bracket 15 years old and above and according to the source of government 
revenue. The first dummy variable is for OECD countries. The average percentage of 
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youth bulge over the sample period is 20% in OECD countries while in non-OECD 
countries it is 31%. Furthermore, variables moderating the role of youth bulge on 
political instability proposed by the hypotheses of this study show significant 
differences as shown in Figure 2.22.  
Figure 2.22 The Performance of Dependent and Independent Variables in OECD 
and Non-OECD countries 
 
The study creates dummy variables for democratic countries. The dummy is 
created using Freedom House political and civil liberties data in order to capture the 
variation in the impact of youth bulge on political instability in democratic countries 
and autocratic countries. The data set classifies countries according to their level of 
democracy into free, partly free and not free. In this research a country classified as free 
in the data set is considered democratic and takes the value of 1, otherwise 0 and is 
considered as autocratic. The percentage of youth bulge is 32% in autocratic countries 
while it is only 23% in democratic countries (as Figure 2.23 shows). The difference in 
the factors moderating the role of youth bulge on political instability is clear in gross 
tertiary enrolment and rents from natural resources. However, the difference in 
unemployment and GDP annual growth is insignificant. 
This study also creates a dummy variable for oil countries to examine the 
variation of the role of youth bulge on political instability between countries that rely on 
tax and non-tax revenue. A country is considered oil dependent when oil export 
constitute one third of export, taking the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. This measure is 
adopted from Taydas and Peksen (2012). Oil countries have easy access to oil revenues 
unlike non-oil countries that need to increase the level of taxation in order to respond to 
sudden needs raised by some segments of society like youth bulge. This study considers 
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rents from oil distinct from other natural resources because Morrison (2009) finds that 
non-tax revenues are in general associated with less taxation on the elite in democracies 
and a high level of public spending in autocratic countries that in both contexts 
enhances stability. Figure 2.24 shows the percentage of youth bulge and factors 
moderating their role on instability in oil and non-oil countries. There is variation in the 
level of democracy and gross tertiary enrolment while the differences in other factors 
are marginal.  
Figure 2.23 The Performance of Dependent and Independent Variables in 
Democratic and Autocratic countries 
 
Figure 2.24 The Performance of Dependent and Independent Variables in Oil and 
Non-Oil countries 
 The final dummy is created to capture the impact of youth bulge on instability in 
the MENA region. In the aftermath of the onset of the so called Arab Spring in late 
2010, the region received significant attention by policy makers, international 
organizations and researchers driven to understand factors causing youth bulge to 
commit instability incidences in the region. This study will examine the independent 
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effect of youth bulge and their joint effect moderated by other factors on instability in 
the region. 
 These dummies are created to capture the role of youth bulge on political 
instability in different contexts instead of carrying out empirical analysis of each group 
of countries. However, it does not rule out the possibility that there is variation in the 
percentage of youth bulge and socioeconomic and political variables across countries 
under each group. Data availability restricted further classification of countries under 
each group based on youth bulge and other economic and political variables.  
 The existing literature remains inconclusive about the determinants of political 
instability (Miljkovic and Rimal, 2008). Following Collier and Hoeffler (2002), this 
study examines the determinants of political instability focusing on youth bulge and 
various political economic and social factors.  
 Estimation will begin by examining the role of the independent effect of youth 
bulge on instability in panel data analysis, OECD countries, oil countries, democratic 
countries and the MENA region. Moreover, the joint effect of youth bulge and other 
political and socioeconomic factors on political instability will be examined one by one. 
 This study will estimate the empirical models using 2SLS to account for a 
possible endogeneity issue, which is not addressed previously by empirical research. 
The unaddressed endogeneity issue raises doubt on causal relationships that run from 
independent to dependent variable as indicated by Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 
(2004). Furthermore, it leads to inconsistent and biased estimates of the regression 
coefficient(Gujarati, 2014). Using 2SLS has other advantages. First, the significance 
test in large sample sizes does not depend on normality (Bollen and Stine, 1992). 
Second, its estimators are less sensitive to model misspecification. Cragg (1968) tests 
the impact of incorrect exclusion of some variables from the empirical model and finds 
estimators are affected slightly by ignoring unimportant variables and omitting 
structural equation. Similarly, Bollen and Stine (1992) suggest using it when there is 
suspicion of omitted path and other incorrect structure. In this chapter, statistical tests 
show that GDP annual growth is endogenous; the issue is addressed by using a one-year 
lag of economic growth as an instrument due to the difficulty of finding an appropriate 
external instrument. The statistical test confirms the validity of the instrument for GDP 
 57 
annual growth19. One instrument is used because estimators are more robust with fewer 
instruments than many instruments as found empirically by Bollen and Stine (1992).  
 An alternative measure of political instability is used to carry out sensitivity 
analysis. It is adopted from Saha and Yap (2013). The index is constructed by taking the 
average of six components included in the political risk data set. The components are 
internal conflicts (IC), government stability (GS), religion in politics (RP), external 
conflict (EC), ethics tension (ET), and military in politics (MP). According to the 
authors, these components can predict the level of political instability in a country. This 
study excludes external risk because the objective of this study is to investigate the 
impact of youth bulges through the interaction with economic and politic al factors on 
the level of domestic political instability, not external risk. External risk is driven by 
factors other than a high percentage of young people, such as geo-political interests or 
border conflicts. The original score is rescaled so that a high score suggests a high level 
of instability while a low score shows a low level of instability. The alternative measure 
aims to check the robustness of the results to a change in political instability definition 
because the alternative measure includes several uncommon forms of political 
instability, such as religion in politics and military in politics which can be noted in 
countries like Iran and Egypt, respectively. 
 An alternative estimation technique is used to carry out sensitivity analysis, 
which is fixed effect (period effect). The technique considers heterogeneity that may 
exist among cross section units individually (Gujarati, 2014). Period effect is considered 
rather than two ways fixed effect or cross section effect because unit effect is 
considered by using dummy variables. Furthermore, it is selec ted over cross section 
effect because independent variables are time variant not invariant. It is chosen rather 
than random effect to account for possible correlation between independent variables 
and omitted variables. Saha, Su, and Campbell (2016) indicate that fixed effect absorbs 
the correlation between independent variables and omitted variables as long as they are 
time invariant.  
 This research uses heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard 
error to reduce the effect of heteroskedasticity on the empirical results. This method 
does not assume homoscedasticity and it does not require knowledge about, or 
functional form of, heteroskedasticity like weighted least squares. Furthermore, it does 
                                                 
19 Endogeneity test and the validity of of year lag  of GDP economic growth are given in appendix D table 
D2.1 
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not need to go through arbitrary transformation of independent variable or computer 
stimulation as indicated by Hayes and Cai (2007). This method addresses the effect of 
autocorrelation on t-statistics and p-value without needing to go through trial and error 
methods (Gujarati, 2014).    
2.6 Estimation Results of the Independent Effect of Youth Bulge on Political 
Instability: Linear Models 
 The impact of the independent effect of youth bulge on political instability is 
estimated in panel data analysis, OECD countries, oil countries, democratic countries 
and the MENA region as shown in Table 2.2.  
Model 1 is estimated by including youth bulge without control variables. The 
independent effect of youth bulge has a positive sign and significant coefficient at the 
1% level. It suggests that increasing the percentage of youth bulge in a country 
enhances political instability. Using Egypt as an illustrative example, a standard 
deviation increase in the percentage of youth bulge enhances political instability by 
0.218 units or 9% of a standard deviation of political instability.    
In Model 2 other determinants of political instability are included alongside 
youth bulge. The independent effect of youth bulge enhances political instability and 
has a significant positive coefficient at the 1% level. Its coefficient slightly decreases 
and the adjusted R-square improves slightly from 22% to 28%. The MENA region has 
one of the highest percentages of youth bulge worldwide, facing risk of political 
instability by 0.959 units or 5% of one standard deviation of political instability for each 
one standard deviation increase in youth bulge 20. The results suggest that despite of a 
positive coefficient of youth bulge, political instability is on decline as the constant has 
strong and negative coefficient. 
In model 2 the independent effect of economic growth has a negative sign and 
significant coefficient at the 1% level, implying that poor economic growth enhances 
political instability. It constitutes political risk through low employment opportunities 
and economic benefits. Furthermore, a reduction in tax revenues resulting from sluggish 
economic growth hinders government expenditure on public goods and services that in 
turn enhances political instability. The adverse effect of poor economic growth on 
political stability can be estimated in case of Sudan, where one standard deviation 
                                                 
20 The independent coefficient of youth bulge *(4.382)  its standard deviation in MENA = 0.959 unit, or 
5% = (0.219*100)/ (4.366) (standard deviation of political instability in MENA). 
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decrease in economic growth enhances political instability by 1.942 units or 6% of one 
standard deviation of political instability21.  
Model 2 shows that trade openness has a negative sign and significant 
coefficient at the 1% level, albeit it is weak in comparison to economic growth; 
suggesting that a high level of trade openness has a dumping effect on political 
instability. A standard deviation increase in trade openness in Sudan lowers political 
instability by 0.026 units or 0.057% of a standard deviation of political instability22. The 
independent effect of youth unemployment has a positive sign and significant 
coefficient at the 5% level, showing that political instability rises with an increasing 
unemployment rate. For example, Colombia could enhance its stability (its average 
score over the sample period is 11.2) to the average score of the entire sample 7.589 by 
decreasing its average youth unemployment by 775%23. Rents from natural resources 
have a negative sign and significant coefficient at the 1% level, suggesting that 
increasing oil rents enhances political stability. It might be that rents from natural 
resources offer a country with instruments to improve poor performance in economic 
opportunities in line with projection made by rentier state theory. Alternatively, it might 
be that oil rents are used to enforce stability through expenditure on repression 
measurements.  
Model 2 shows that the independent effect of democracy has a negative sign 
although it is not significant, suggesting that an improvement in the level of democracy 
lowers political instability. It offers channels to raise demands peacefully and settle 
disputes politically. For example, Cameroun can reduce its average score of political 
instability from 4 to 3 by increasing its current level of democracy by 42% 24. The 
independent effect of gross tertiary enrolment has a negative sign but is not significant, 
suggesting that decreasing tertiary enrolment enhances political instability. The log of 
total population has a positive sign and is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that 
increasing population enhances political instability. It might be that the growth rate in 
the population exceeds the growth rate in the economic environment. The independent 
effect of urban growth rate has a positive sign although is not significant, suggesting 
                                                 
21 The independent coefficient of GDP annual growth *(5.922) (its standard deviation in Sudan) = 1.942 
unit Or 6% = (-0.328*100)/ (5.225) (the standard deviation of political instability in Sudan). 
22 The independent coefficient of trade openness *(8.751) (its standard deviation in Sudan) = 0.026 unit 
Or 0.057% = (-0.003*100)/ (5.225) (the standard deviation of political instability in Sudan). 
23 The average score of instability in Colombia (11.2-7.589/0.466)(coefficient of youth 
unemployment)*100=774%. 
24 The average score of instability in Cameroun (4-3/0.027)(coefficient of level of democracy)=42%. 
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that rapid urban growth rate enhances political instability, indicative of a government 
failing to meet different needs and requirements associated with this growth rate. 
Model 2 is re-estimated in sub-samples based on the percentage of youth bulge25. 
It is estimated in countries where the percentage is greater than or equal to 39.38%26. 
The independent effect of youth bulge has the expected positive sign and significant 
coefficient at the 1% level in countries where the percentage is less than the threshold 
percentage. The effect has a negative sign and is not significant in countries where the 
percentage is greater than the threshold due to an insufficient number of observations. 
Model 2 is also re-estimated based on the percentage 24.278% 27 . The 
independent effect of youth bulge retains its sign and is significant in countries where 
the percentage is less than or equal to the threshold percentage; however, in countries 
where the percentage is greater, the independent effect has negative sign and significant 
coefficient at the 10% level. 
Model 2 is next re-estimated based on the percentage 31.407%28. Youth bulge 
exposes political risk in countries where the percentage is less than or equal to the 
threshold as the independent effect of youth bulge has a positive sign and significant 
coefficient at the 1% level; however, in countries where the percentage  is greater than 
the threshold the independent effect of youth bulge has a negative sign and is not 
significant. 
Model 2 is then re-estimated in countries where the percentage of youth bulge 
falls between 34.411% and 42.937%29. The independent effect of youth bulge has a 
negative sign and is not significant for the percentage that falls within the specified 
range; however, it has a positive sign and significant coefficient at the 1% level where 
the percentage is less than 34.411%.  
The empirical results estimated based on the percentage of youth bulge show 
that countries where youth bulges less than the threshold percentage experience higher 
risk of political instability. There are several prospective scenarios behind the empirical 
results. The first scenario is that the risk of political instability in some countries is 
driven by factors other than the percentage of youth bulge. For example, in the MENA 
                                                 
25 The results are reported in the appendix. 
26 The percentage is for quintiles 99. 
27 The percentage is for quintiles 25; the results are reported in the appendix. 
28 The percentage is for quintiles 50; the results are reported in the appendix. 
29 From the percentage in  quintile 75 to maximum percentage in  the data set; results reported in the 
appendix. 
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region Lebanon has the lowest percentage of youth bulge 29% in the region and a high 
level of political instability 11; in contrast, Saudi Arabia has one of highest percentages 
of youth bulge 31% in the region and enjoys a higher level of stability 6.5. In the second 
scenario, poor performance in some factors may be offset by high performance in other 
factors. For example, a low level of democracy can be tolerated in some countries as 
long as economic opportunities are abundant. On the other hand, a high level of 
democracy in a country with poor economic performance can offer a political channel to 
relieve public dissatisfaction. Youth bulge alone may not explain the rise in political 
instability, however youth bulge along with other socioeconomic factors can better 
explain the variation of political instability across countries. Hence, the joint effects of 
youth bulge are crucial to examine the rise in political instability in a country.   
Mode 3 investigates the impact of youth bulge on political instability in OECD 
countries. The independent effect of youth bulge enhances political instability; however, 
it exposes lower risk on OECD countries as the interaction term between youth bulge 
and OECD has a negative sign and is significant at the 10% level. One standard 
deviation increase in youth bulge in OECD countries enhances instability by 0.617 
units30 in comparison with 1.091 units in non-OECD countries31.  
Although youth bulge exposes risk on political environment in OECD and non-
OECD countries, characteristics like institutional structures in each sub-sample might 
reduce their impact on political environment. Institutional structures in OECD countries 
might prevent the risk of youth bulge to escalate into severe conditions of political 
instability; while, in non-OECD countries the absent or weak of such structures could 
lead to severe conditions of political instability. Hibbs (1973) indicates that the 
modernization process produces stability in Western Europe and Northern America 
because they successfully create a system that integrates all classes in society. 
Alternatively, factors contributing to instability in each sub-sample may diff based on 
the stage of the modernization process. In OECD countries that reach a high level of 
economic development the role of youth bulge on political instability is driven by 
factors other than poor living conditions. For example, 50,000 students demonstrated in 
London streets in 2010 to express their anger against the government plan to raise 
university tuition fees and decreasing its grants to universities (Paul  et al., 2010) . On 
                                                 
30 The independent effect of youth bulge + the coefficient of its interaction with OECD dummy = 0. 
129*(4.784)(St. dev of youth bulge in OECD countries )=0. 617 unit. 
31  The independent effect of youth bulge (0.194)*(5.628)(St. dev of youth bulge in non-OECD 
countries)=1.091 unit. 
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other hand, in non-OECD countries the role of youth bulge on political environment 
could be driven by other factors that worsen with rapid modernization processes like 
income inequality. Oslen (1963), Huntington (1968) and Ansani and Daniele (2012) 
indicate that the level of income inequality increases in countries at an early stage of the 
modernization process. This is because the benefits from economic growth are not 
distributed equally across the population. However, at the late stage of modernization 
the level of income inequality decreases. Huntington (1968) points out to another 
channel that increases the level of income equality at early stages of modernization. The 
author indicates that rapid economic growth increases the inflation rate that exceeds the 
increases in wage level. All control variables have the expected significant sign except 
level of democracy, gross tertiary enrolment and urban growth rate. 
Model 4 examines the variation in political instability associated with the 
percentage of youth bulge in oil countries versus non-oil countries32. Oil countries face a 
higher risk of political instability than non-oil countries, as the oil dummy has a positive 
sign and significant coefficient at the 1% level. Attractiveness of oil rents might 
motivate many parties (including law breakers) to use violence to gain access to oil 
rents as indicated by rent seeking theory. The independent effect of youth bulge 
enhances political instability but their political risk is lower in oil than non-oil countries 
as the interaction term between oil and youth bulge has a negative sign and is significant 
at the 1% level33. Oil rents make the political risk of youth bulge negative and their 
impact on political environment becomes negligent. Despite of a negative coefficient 
for youth bulge in oil countries, political instability should be on an increase given oil 
dummy has strong positive coefficient. A standard deviation decrease in youth bulge in 
oil countries enhances political instability by 0.337 units or 1.5% of one standard 
deviation of political instability34. In contrast, one standard deviation increase in youth 
bulge escalates political instability in non-oil countries by 1.405 units or 5% of one 
standard deviation of political instability35.  
                                                 
32 The model is estimated by introducing an oil dummy and rents from natural resources as a percentage 
of GDP; the sign and significance of o il dummy and its interaction terms are similar to that captured in 
model 4; results not reported. Natural resources rents as a percentage to GDP was dropped from the 
model because the oil dummy was introduced 
33 The model is re-estimated by dropping Norway from o il countries; oil dummy and its interaction with 
youth bulge retain their sign and significance, results not reported. 
34  The independent effect of youth bulge + the coefficient of its interaction with oil dummy = -
0.06*(5.633)(St. dev of youth bulge in oil countries)=0.337 un it Or 1.5% = (0.06*100)/(4.071)  (St . dev of 
political instability in oil countries). 
35  The independent effect of youth bulge (0.184)*(7.635)(St. dev of youth bulge in non-oil 
countries=1.405 unit or 5%= (0.184*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non-oil countries). 
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It might be that the role of youth bulge on political environment in oil countries 
is not independent and goes through other factors such as income distribution pattern, 
institutional quality, fluctuation in oil prices and rapid change in the modernization 
process as suggested by rent seeking theory. Alternatively, it might be that the Dutch 
disease model crowds out women from labor markets (M. Ross et al., 2011) and rapid 
economic growth in some of these countries creates shortages in native labor forces and 
causes more reliance on foreign workers to sustain their economic prosperity. Under 
such conditions the risk of political instability shifts from youth bulge to a high 
percentage of foreign workers among the population in these countries. For example, 
foreign workers make up 44% of the population and 62% of the labor force in oil wealth 
monarchies in the Arabic peninsula. The high percentage of foreign workers in these 
countries creates prospective risk on political environments over the long run, such as 
civil unrest and interference of foreign countries in their internal affairs in order to 
protect the interests of their citizen (Forstenlechner and Rutledge, 2011). Control 
variables have the expected significant sign except level of democracy and urban 
growth rate that have an insignificant expected sign.  
Model 5 examines the impact of youth bulge on political instability in democratic 
countries. Democratic countries are at lower risk of political instability than autocratic 
countries as the democracy dummy has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% 
level. Interestingly, youth bulge constitutes a higher risk on the political environment in 
democratic countries than autocratic countries as the interaction term between youth 
bulge and democratic dummy shows a positive sign and is significant at the 5% level. 
Despite of the positive coefficient of youth bulge in democratic countries, political 
instability should be on a decline as democracy dummy has strong and negative 
coefficient. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge enhances political instability 
in democratic countries by 1.472 units or 7% of one standard deviation of political 
instability36 in comparison with 0.454 units or 1.82% in autocratic countries37.   
It might be that the level of democracy is immature so that it becomes a channel of 
political instability more than stability, especially that this study uses dummy variables 
to group countries into democratic and autocratic countries. However, it is expec ted that 
                                                 
36 The independent effect of youth bulge + the coefficient of its interaction with the dummy of democracy 
=0.196*(7.510)(St. dev of youth bulge in democratic countries)=1.472 unit or 7% = (0.196*100)/(2.948) 
(St. dev of political instability in democratic countries). 
37 The independent effect of youth bulge (0.079)*(7.510)(St.dev of youth bulge in autocratic 
countries=0.454 unit or 1.82%= (0.079*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in autocratic 
countries).  
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adherence to democratic practices vary across these countries. Goldstone (2001) points 
out that either lack of democracy or immature democratic practices ha ve a 
destabilization effect on political environment. Håvard Hegre, Ellingsen, Gleditsch, and 
Gates (2001) point out that coherent democracies and harshly authoritarian states are 
less prone to political instability than intermediate regimes because in democracies 
conflict is settled politically and by repression measurement in authoritarian states. 
Alternatively, free media in democratic countries is able to report youth dissatisfaction 
more than in autocratic countries. On other word, instability in democratic countries 
might reflect the increasing level of media coverage more than the actual risk of 
instability. Instead, democracy offers equal opportunity to all members of the public to 
raise their demands peacefully. However, it might be that a government does not have 
sufficient financial resources to accommodate all public demands so that requirements 
of some segments of society are not met, which in turn can push them to violence. 
There could also be a non-linear relationship between the joint effect of democracy and 
youth bulge, which will be tested in the subsequent non-linear section. Control variables 
have the expected significant sign except gross tertiary enrolment and urban growth that 
have an insignificant negative and positive sign respectively.  
Model 6 investigates the impact of youth bulge on political instability in the 
MENA region. The MENA region faces a higher risk of political instability than non-
MENA regions as its dummy has a positive sign and is significant at the 10% level. 
Many international parties have a strong interest in the region either because of oil 
supplies or its location in the middle of international trade routes. However, youth bulge 
exposes lower political risk in MENA than non-MENA regions as the interaction 
between youth bulge and MENA has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level. 
Despite of the lower risk of youth bulge in MENA region, political instability should be 
on an increase as MENA dummy has strong and positive coefficient.  
The lower risk of youth bulge in the MENA region might be driven by the 
variation in their percentage and the level of political instability across countries in the 
region. One group of countries have a low percentage of youth bulge in comparison 
with the mean percentage of the region but at same time have high level of instability; 
while a second group have a high percentage of youth bulge but a low level of 
instability in comparison with the average score of instability in a region. For example, 
in the MENA region, the average percentage of youth bulge in Lebanon is 29.4% lower 
than the average percentage in the region, which is 32%, but it has a high level of 
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instability (around 11) in comparison with 7.76, the average score of instability in 
region. On the other hand, Syria, Egypt and Tunisia have been going through a period 
of political instability since late 2010. In these countries the percentage of youth bulge 
is higher than the region mean, but the score of instability in the case of Syria and 
Tunisia is less than the region mean and only one score higher in the case of Egypt.  
Alternatively, it might be the role of youth bulge on political instability in the 
region is moderated by other factors. Several authors such as Xenos and Kabamalan 
(2005), Urdal (2006), Marcus et al. (2008) and Barakat and Urdal (2009) suggest that 
the presence of a high percentage of youth bulge in a country does not necessary lead to 
political instability and their adverse impact on political environment is instead 
moderated by their interaction with the prevailing socioeconomic and political 
environment, which will be subsequently tested in this study. Control variables have a 
significant expected sign except for gross tertiary enrolment that has an insignificant 
positive sign.   
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Table 2.2 The Independent Effect of Youth Bulge on Political Instability over the 
Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Political Instability  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
YB 0.251*** 
(0.007) 
0.219*** 
(0.028) 
0.194*** 
(0.034) 
0.184*** 
(0.029) 
0.079 
(0.056) 
0.241*** 
(0.028) 
TYU  0.466** 
(0.209) 
0.355* 
(0.213) 
0.620*** 
(0.203) 
0.421** 
(0.197) 
0.783*** 
(0.184) 
Rents  -0.0437*** 
(0.014) 
-0.050*** 
(0.015) 
  -0.020* 
(0.013) 
TO  -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
GDP growth  -0.328*** 
(0.071) 
-0.344*** 
(0.071) 
-0.308*** 
(0.070) 
-0.316*** 
(0.069) 
-0.326*** 
(0.075) 
RT  -0.026 
(0.046) 
-0.003 
(0.046) 
-0.059 
(0.049) 
 -0.162*** 
(0.053) 
GTE  -0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
Log T.pop   1.269*** 
(0.169) 
1.544*** 
(0.193) 
0.924*** 
(0.201) 
1.146*** 
(0.162) 
1.079*** 
(0.164) 
UGR  0.049 
(0.040) 
0.045 
(0.040) 
0.034 
(0.041) 
0.025 
(0.037) 
0.066*** 
(0.038) 
OECD   0.061 
(0.820) 
   
OCED*YB   -0.065* 
(0.036) 
   
Oil    4.595*** 
(1.751) 
  
Oil*YB    -0.244*** 
(0.070) 
  
Democracy Dummy (DD)     -4.012***   
(1.552) 
 
Democracy Dummy (DD) *YB     .117** 
(0.057) 
 
MENA      11.15* 
(6.178) 
MENA*YB      -0.510*** 
(0.189) 
Constant 0.586*** 
(0.183) 
-3.233** 
(1.481) 
-3.403** 
(1.478) 
-0.325 
(1.778) 
1.029 
(1.661) 
-1.505 
(1.449) 
Adjusted R square 22% 28% 30% 26% 28.00% 37% 
Number of observation 3396 617 617 590 633 617 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one year 
lag of GDP growth as instrument of 
GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent  level, respectively. YB is youth bulge, TYU is rate of total youth unemployment, Rents is rents from natural 
resources, TO is trade openness, GDP growth is GDP annual growth, RT is level of democracy, GTE is gross te rtiary enrolment, 
Log T .pop is logarithm of total population and UGR is urban growth rate  
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2.7  The Empirical Results of the Role of Youth Bulge on Political Instability: 
Non-linear Estimation 
 The lower risk of youth bulge on political environment in the MENA region, oil 
countries and their higher risk in democratic countries suggests that the relationship 
might be non-linear. Hence, the following subsection examines the impact of the 
quadratic term of youth bulge, the joint effect of youth bulge and quadratic term of the 
level of democracy, and the joint effect of youth bulge and quadratic term of rents from 
natural resources on instability.    
2.7.1 The Empirical Results of the Impact of Quadratic Term of Youth Bulge on 
Political Instability  
Although there is some debate in the literature on the percentage of youth bulge 
that increases the risk of political instability; Huntington (1996) suggests when the 
percentage exceeds 20% of total population. The empirical results of the impact of 
quadratic term of youth bulge on instability are shown in Table 2.3.  
Model 7 examines the impact of the non- linear term of youth bulge on instability 
in the panel data. The linear coefficient of youth bulge is positive and significant at the 
1% level suggesting that a higher proportion of youth bulge enhances political 
instability. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge boosts political instability by 
3.241 units or 12% of one standard deviation of political instability38. The quadratic 
term has a significant negative sign; empirical results suggest that the percentage of 
youth bulge enhances instability until it reaches a certain level upon which it has a 
lower destabilization effect on political environment. It might be that when the 
percentage started increasing a country lacked institutional structures to deal with risk 
associated with youth bulge; however, its accumulative experience with such risk leads 
a country to invest in institutional structures. This makes it more responsive to needs 
and requirements of youth bulge so that their threat to stability is eliminated. The 
empirical results confirm the Huntington (1996) argument but are in conflict with the 
results of Urdal (2006) who finds no relationship. Control variables have a significant 
expected sign except the level of democracy and gross tertiary enrolment that have an 
insignificant negative sign and urban growth rate that has an insignificant positive sign.  
                                                 
38  The independent effect of youth bulge 0.493*(6.575)(St. dev of youth bulge in the entire 
sample)=3.241 unit or 12% = (0.493*100)/(4.030) (St. dev of political instability in the entire sample). 
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Model 8 examines the impact of quadratic term of youth bulge on instability in 
OECD countries. The independent effect of youth bulge exposes lower risk on political 
environment in OECD compared to non-OECD countries. The quadratic term of youth 
bulge shows that their political risk decreases as youth bulge percentage increases; 
however, it is higher in non-OECD than OECD countries. Control variables have the 
expected significant sign except youth unemployment, level of democracy, gross 
tertiary enrolment and urban growth rate. 
Model 9 examines the quadratic term of youth bulge on political instability in oil 
countries. As in Model 4, the independent effect of youth bulge exposes lower political 
risk in oil than non-oil countries. The quadratic term has a negative sign and its impact 
is higher in oil than non-oil countries39. It could be that the results for oil countries are 
driven by the level of political instability of some countries, like Norway, that have a 
low percentage of youth bulge and a high level of stability. The model is re-estimated 
by dropping Norway from the oil countries; the independent effect of youth bulge and 
its quadratic term retain their sign and significance in oil countries40. Control variables 
have a significant sign except level of democracy and urban growth rate. 
Model 10 investigates the quadratic term of youth bulge on political instability 
in democratic countries. The independent effect of youth bulge exposes higher political 
risk in democratic than autocratic countries41. The quadratic term has a negative sign 
although it is insignificant in democratic and autocratic countries. Control variables 
have the expected significant sign except gross tertiary enrolment and urban growth 
rate. 
Model 11 investigates the impact of the quadratic term of youth bulge on 
instability in the MENA. The independent effect of youth bulge constitutes lower 
political risk in MENA than non-MENA regions. The quadratic term has a positive sign 
but is not significant in MENA and non-MENA regions. Empirical results suggest that 
the relationship between two variables is non- linear in the region; youth bulge becomes 
a threat to stability once their percentage passes a certain threshold level. Control 
variables have the significant expected sign except gross tertiary enrolment and urban 
growth rate.  
                                                 
39 The model is re-estimated by dropping Norway, o il dummy;  its interaction with youth bulge and youth 
bulge squared retain their sign and significant results not reported. 
40 The results not reported. 
41 The level of democracy is dropped from the model. 
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Table 2.3 The Quadratic Term of Youth Bulge and Political Instability over the 
Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: political instability  
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
YB 0.493*** 
(0.162) 
0.088 
(0.063) 
0.168*** 
(0.054) 
0.084 
(0.073) 
0.252*** 
(0.056) 
YB_SQ -0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.106) 
0.0006 
(0.003) 
OECD  -2.246*** 
(0.435) 
   
OCED*YB  -0.015 
(0.087) 
   
OCED*YB_SQ  0.009 
(0.006) 
   
Oil   -1.806** 
(0.897) 
  
Oil*YB   -0.343*** 
(0.127) 
  
Oil*YB_SQ   -0.021 
(0.016) 
  
DD    -0.880* 
(0.509) 
 
      
DD*YB    0.093 
(0.110) 
 
DD*YB_SQ    -0.0002 
(0.011) 
 
MENA     -3.747*** 
(0.906) 
MENA*YB     -0.607*** 
(0.230) 
MENA*YB_SQ     0.030 
(0.031) 
Constant -5.581*** 
(1.992) 
4.103** 
(1.608) 
5.319*** 
(1.739) 
3.899*** 
(1.087) 
5.436*** 
(1.418) 
Adjusted R square 27% 29% 25% 30% 36% 
Number of observation 617 617 519 625 617 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Wald test (P-value)      
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one year 
lag of GDP growth as instrument of 
GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. All models include all the control variables, which are included in 
model 2; for space restriction only the results of variables of interest are reported. 
2.7.2 The Empirical Results of Joint Effect of Quadratic Term of Level of 
Democracy and Youth Bulge on Political Instability  
 The impact of the independent effect of youth bulge on political instability in 
democratic countries, oil countries and the MENA region is investigated further by 
including the interaction of quadratic term of the level of democracy and youth bulge 
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into the model42; the results are shown in Table 2.443. Past empirical research finds that 
the impact of the level of democracy on instability is non- linear, all other things being 
constant, see for example Håvard Hegre et al. (2001) and Goldstone (2010) who find 
that partial democracy and partial autocracy is positively and significantly associated 
with the onset of civil war; however, there is no impact in full democracy.  
Model 12 introduces the independent effect and quadratic term of the level of 
democracy into the model in panel data. The linear coefficient of the level of democracy 
is negative although not significant; suggesting that a low level of democracy enhances 
political instability. The quadratic term has positive sign; empirical results suggest that a 
low level of democracy enhances instability until it reach a certain level where upon it 
has a higher destabilization effect on political environment. Lack of political channels 
prevents the public from raising their demands peacefully. Furthermore, it is expected 
that at a low level of democracy, basic human rights may be violated. Thus, the absence 
of democratic channels might force the public to use violence to achieve their needs. 
The results confirm the results of past empirical research that the relationship is no n-
linear; however, its impact is different. Urdal (2006) finds a low level of democracy 
enhances instability but at a high level it decreases instability. Youth bulge and control 
variables have the significant expected sign except gross tertiary enrolment and urban 
growth rate that have an insignificant expected sign. 
Model 13 examines the impact of interaction between the quadratic term of the 
level of democracy and youth bulge on instability in the panel data. The independent 
effect of the level of democracy and its quadratic term has a negative and positive sign, 
respectively, but is not significant. The interaction between youth bulge and level of 
democracy and its interaction with the quadratic term of democracy have a positive sign 
but are insignificant. The results suggest that increasing the level of democracy 
enhances the role of youth bulge on political instability; however, their risk becomes 
higher when the level of democracy exceeds a certain threshold level. Democracy forces 
a government to be more responsive to youth bulge needs and requirements; the failure 
to do so enhances political instability. These results are in line with Urdal (2006) who 
finds that the effect of youth bulge is not only stronger in autocratic countries but also in 
most democratic countries. The independent effect of youth bulge has a positive sign 
                                                 
42  The quadratic term of the level of democracy is calculated from Polity IV project data that ranks 
countries in a scale from 0 to 21. 
43 The model is not estimated for OECD and democrat ic countries because they are fu lly  democratic 
countries. 
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but is not significant; control variables have the expected significant sign except gross 
tertiary enrolment and urban growth rate.  
 Model 14 examines the impact of the joint effect between youth bulge and the 
quadratic term of the level of democracy on political instability in oil countries44. The 
independent effect of youth bulge enhances political instability; however their risk is 
lower in oil countries as the interaction term between youth bulge and oil dummy has a 
negative sign although is not significant. The joint effect between youth bulge and the 
level of democracy has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level; however, it 
becomes positive in oil countries as the interaction term between the joint effect and oil 
dummy has a positive sign and is significant at the 1% level. The joint effect between 
youth bulge and quadratic term of democracy has a positive sign and is significant at the 
1% level; but it turns into a negative impact in oil countries as the interaction term 
between the joint effect and oil dummy has a negative sign and is significant at the 10% 
level.  
 The results suggest that democracy produces a different effect on political 
instability in oil and non-oil countries in the presence of youth bulge. In non-oil 
countries, a low level of democracy enhances the political risk of youth bulge; however, 
once it passes a certain level their risk becomes higher. It could be there is imbalance 
between development in political environment and in socioeconomic environment 
(Huntington 1968). In oil countries, the political risk of youth bulge increases as the 
level of democracy increases; however, once it passes a certain level their risk reduces. 
Transition from autocracy to democracy in oil countries enhances political instability 
because democratic practices restrict the political elite from fully controlling oil rents. 
Youth bulge at a low level of democracy might press for more transparency of the 
patterns used to distribute oil rents. The fighting between interested groups and youth 
bulge might lead to instability. Ross (2001) point out that in the absence of democracy, 
the public and rebels experience difficulty in figuring out the level of oil revenues and 
the amounts siphoned out by the political elite. For example, Shambayati (1994) 
indicates that the Iranian revolution in 1979 was partially caused by unequal income 
distribution of oil revenues that raised demand from the public to understand the 
distribution mechanism used to distribute oil revenues. However, at a high level of 
democracy, the public, elite and youth bulge become more adherent to democratic 
                                                 
44 The model is re -estimated by dropping Norway  from oil countries; variables of interest retain their sign 
and significance, the results are not reported. 
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practices so its destabilization effect becomes lower. Youth bulge has an insignificant 
negative sign and control variables have the expected significant sign.  
 Model 15 examines the impact of the interaction between quadratic term of the 
level of democracy and youth bulge on instability in the MENA region. The joint effect 
between youth bulge and democracy has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% 
level. However, it constitutes lower risk in the MENA region as the interaction term 
between MENA and the joint effect has a positive sign although it is not significant. 
The joint effect between youth bulge and quadratic term of democracy has a positive 
sign and is significant at the 1% level; however, it turn into a negative impact in the 
MENA region as the interaction term between MENA and the joint effect has a negative 
sign and is significant at the 10% level. The results suggest that a low level of 
democracy enhances the role of youth bulge on political instability in the MENA region 
until it reaches a certain level where upon youth bulge has a lower destabilization effect 
on political environment. On the other hand, in non-MENA regions it increases the role 
of youth bulge on instability at a low level of democracy; however, once it passes a 
certain level they have a higher destabilization effect on political environment. Ongoing 
instability in some MENA countries that experience instability during the transition 
period from dictatorship to democracy (like Libya) does not support the empirical 
results. Youth bulge and control variables have a significant sign except rents from 
natural resources, gross tertiary enrolment and urban growth rate.   
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Table 2.4 The Joint Effect of Quadratic Term of Level of Democracy and Youth 
Bulge on Political Instability over the Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: political instability  
Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
YB 0.219*** 
(0.033) 
0.047 
(0.054) 
-0.054 
(0.064) 
0.178*** 
(0.064) 
RT -0.027 
(0.217) 
-0.040 
(0.058) 
-0.150** 
(0.063) 
-0.276*** 
(0.049) 
RT_SQ 0.0002 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
0.022** 
(0.010) 
0.026*** 
(0.008) 
YB*RT  0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.030*** 
(0.007) 
-0.037*** 
(0.006) 
YB*RT_SQ  0.002 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.0009) 
Oil   -27.205*** 
(4.651) 
 
Oil*YB   -0.740*** 
(0.182) 
 
Oil*RT   -2.065*** 
(0.421) 
 
Oil*RT_SQ   -0.029** 
(0.014) 
 
Oil*YB*RT   0.078*** 
(0.014) 
 
Oil*YB*RT_SQ   -0.010*** 
(0.003) 
 
MENA    -7.887 
(25.827) 
MENA*YB    -0.198 
(0.904) 
MENA*RT    -0.373 
(2.433) 
MENA*RT_SQ    -0.057* 
(0.033) 
MENA*YB*RT    0.015 
(0.077) 
MENA*YB*RT_SQ    -0.018* 
(0.009) 
Constant -3.557*** 
(1.068) 
2.643*** 
(1.004) 
4.234*** 
(1.268) 
2.820*** 
(0.999) 
Adjusted R square 28% 30% 27% 40% 
Number of observation 617 617 590 617 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
P-value 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one year lag of 
GDP growth as instrument of GDP growth) 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. Variables included in model 2 are included into all models; for 
space restrictions only the results of variables of interest are reported.   
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2.7.3 The Empirical Results of Joint Effect of the Quadratic Term of the Rents 
from Natural Resources and Youth Bulge on Political Instability 
 Past empirical research finds that the impact of rents from natural resources on 
political instability, ceteris paribus, is non- linear 45 .  In this section the joint effect 
between the quadratic term of rents from natural resources and youth bulge on 
instability will be tested; the results are shown in Table 2.546.  
Model 16 examines the impact of the quadratic term of rents from natural 
resources on instability in the panel data. The independent effect of rents from natural 
resources and its quadratic term have a negative sign but are not significant. The results 
suggest that a low level of rents from natural resources enhances political instability 
until it passes a certain level, then it has a lower destabilization effect on political 
environment. Youth bulge and control variables have a significant expected sign except 
the level of democracy, gross tertiary enrolment and urban growth rate that have 
insignificant signs. 
 Model 17 examines the impact of the joint effect of the quadratic term of rents 
from natural resources and youth bulge on instability in the panel data. The independent 
effect of rents from natural resources and its quadratic term retain their sign and 
significance obtained in the previous model. The joint effect between youth bulge and 
rents from natural resources and the joint effect between the quadratic term of rents 
from natural resources and youth bulge have a negative sign but are insignificant. The 
results suggest that their role on political instability is enhanced at a low level of rents; 
however, once it passes a certain level their destabilization effect decreases. Youth 
bulge and control variables have a significant expected sign except level of democracy, 
gross tertiary enrolment and unban growth rate that have insignificant signs. 
  In Model 18 the impact of the joint effect between quadratic term of rents from 
natural resources and youth bulge on instability in the MENA region is examined. The 
so-called Arab spring event in 2010 did not have a uniform impact on political 
environments across all countries in the region. One possible explanation is that wealthy 
oil countries in the region managed to skip the incidence whereas in other countries oil 
wealth is insufficient, leading to severe cases of political instability. The joint effect 
                                                 
45 See for example Bjorvatn and Naghavi (2011) and Collier and Hoeffler (1998)  
46 Quadratic term of rents from natural resources in calculated from its percentage to GDP.  The jo int 
effect will not be tested in OECD or democratic countries because rents from natural resources is only 2% 
in OECD and 3% in democratic countries. 
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between youth bulge and rents from natural resources has a positive sign; however, it 
becomes negative in the MENA region as the interaction effect between MENA and the 
joint effect has a negative sign. The joint effect between youth bulge and quadratic term 
of rents from natural resources has a positive sign and its impact is higher in the MENA 
region. The results suggest that their role on political instability in the MENA region is 
enhanced at a low level of rents; however, once it passes a certain level their 
destabilization effect increases. The results can be attributed to an imbalance between 
growth rate in rents on one hand and the size of population or its growth rate on the 
other hand. At a low level of rents, the level is insufficient to match the needs and 
requirements of the population or increasing demand associated with rapid change in 
population growth rate which leads to instability. The condition worsens with 
continuous increases in youth bulge while oil revenue remained unchanged. The World 
Bank Report published in 2012 presents that in the case of Yemen, where rents from 
natural resources do not match growth rate in population (especially growth rate in 
youth bulge), there is a subsequent fall in living standards across all segments of 
population. Alternatively, it could be that while the contribution of oil to GDP is high, 
its contribution to total government revenue is low because of low oil prices that are 
insufficient to keep pace with past public expenditure. Youth bulge and control 
variables have the expected significant sign except gross tertiary enrolment and urban 
growth rate that are insignificant.   
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Table 2.5 The Joint Effect of Quadratic Term of Rents from Natural Resources 
and Youth Bulge on Political Instability over the Period 1984-2013 
Independent variable Dependent variable: political instability  
Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
YB 0.206*** 
(0.031) 
0.157*** 
(0.045) 
0.199*** 
(0.045) 
Rents -0.021 
(0.025) 
-0.039 
(0.033) 
-0.23 
(0.037) 
Rents_SQ -0.001 
(0.0008) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.002) 
YB*Rents  -0.008 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
YB*Rents _SQ  -0.00003 
(0.0001) 
0.0006 
(0.0004) 
MENA   -3.609*** 
(1.136) 
MENA*YB   -0.535** 
(0.219) 
MENA*Rents   0.044 
(0.082) 
MENA*Rents_SQ   -0.0004 
(0.002) 
MENA*YB*Rents   -0.002 
(0.015) 
MENA*YB*Rents_SQ   0.00004 
(0.0005) 
Constant -3.019* 
(1.745) 
3.018*** 
(1.467) 
5.3922*** 
(1.451) 
Adjusted R square 29% 30% 37% 
Number of observation 617 617 617 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
P-value 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one year lag of GDP 
growth as instrument of GDP growth) 
0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent level, respectively. Variables included in model 2 are included into all models; for space restrictions only the results 
of variables of interest are reported. 
2.8 The Joint Effect between Youth Bulge and Political and Socioeconomic 
Environment 
 Youth bulge in itself can escalate stability in a country with a favorable 
socioeconomic and political environment. Macunovich (2000) and Goldstone (2002) 
indicate that understanding the role of youth bulge on instability requires consideration 
of their interaction with socioeconomic and political environments that lead to 
stabilization or destabilization of the overall political environment. In this section the 
impact of youth bulge on instability moderated by economic growth, youth 
unemployment, the level of democracy, educational attainment and rents from natural 
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resources on instability is tested in the panel data, OECD, oil countries, democratic 
countries and the MENA region. 
2.8.1 The Joint Effect Between Economic Growth and Youth Bulge on Political 
Instability   
 Models 19 to 23 in Table 2.6 examine the impact of the joint effect between 
economic growth and youth bulge on political instability in the panel data, OECD 
countries, oil countries, democratic countries and the MENA region. 
 Model 19 examines the impact of the joint effect between youth bulge and 
economic growth on political instability in the panel data. The independent effect of 
youth bulge has a positive sign and significant coefficient at the 1% level; it suggests 
that youth bulge enhances political instability. The independent effect of economic 
growth has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level, indicating that poor 
economic growth enhances political instability. The joint effect between economic 
growth and youth bulge has a negative sign and is significant at the 5% level. The 
interaction effect of economic growth at the mean percentage of youth bulge 34.915% 
on instability in Sudan is -2.03647. A standard deviation decrease in economic growth at 
the mean percentage of youth bulge escalates instability in Sudan by 12.061 units or 
39% of one standard deviation of political instability48. The interaction effect of youth 
bulge at mean percentage of economic growth 3.435% on instability in Sudan is 0.05549. 
A standard deviation increase in youth bulge at mean percentage of economic growth 
enhances instability by 0.059 units or 1.052% of one standard deviation of political 
instability50. The results indicate that the interaction effect of economic growth has a 
significant impact on political instability; however, the interaction effect of youth bulge 
is not significant. Moreover, economic growth shows a much stronger effect than youth 
bulge at the average value of both these variables.  
The empirical results reveal that, in the case of Sudan, while economic growth 
can reduce the risk of youth bulge on stability, it fails to abolish it. The results support 
                                                 
47It is calcu lated by the coefficient of economic g rowth (-0.64) + [(the coefficient of the joint effect (-
0.040)*(34.915) (mean percentage of youth bulge in Sudan)] =-2.036 
48 One standard deviation decrease in economic growth is its coefficient in interaction term(-
2.036)* (5.922)(St. dev of economic growth in Sudan) =12.061 unit or 39% = (-2.036*100)/ (5.224)(St. 
dev of political instability in Sudan).   
49 It is calcu lated by the coefficient of youth bulge (0.193) + [(the coefficient of the jo int effect (-
0.040)*(3.435) (mean percentage of economic growth in Sudan)] =0.055 
50 One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its coefficient in interaction term (0.055)*(1.073)(St. 
dev of youth bulge in Sudan) =0.059 unit Or 1.052% = (0.055*100)/(5.224)(St. dev of political instability 
in Sudan). 
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one stream of modernization theory that states economic growth has a stabilization 
effect on political environment. Positive economic growth associated with 
modernization increases an individual’s opportunity cost to commit incidences of 
political instability through several channels (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). It determines 
the level of income and economic opportunities in a country as indicated by Blattman 
and Miguel (2010). Similarly, Urdal (2006) points out the moderated effect in the role 
of youth bulge on political instability is increased when income opportunities are 
determined by overall economic performance. The empirical results represent a 
departure from Urdal (2006) who finds a negative sign but no significance between the 
two variables. Control variables have the expected significant sign except the level of 
democracy and gross tertiary enrolment that have an insignificant negative sign. 
 Model 20 examines the impact of the joint effect between economic growth and 
youth bulge on political instability in OECD countries. The independent effect of youth 
bulge exposes risk to political environment, but the risk is lower in OECD countries 
than non-OECD as the interaction term between OECD dummy and youth bulge has a 
negative sign and is significant at the 5% level. The independent effect of economic 
growth has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level. The joint effect has a 
negative sign and is significant at the 1% level; however, it exposes lower risk in OECD 
countries than non-OECD as the interaction term between OECD countries and the joint 
effect has a positive sign. The interaction effect of economic growth at mean percentage 
of youth bulge 20.376% on political instability in OECD countries is -1.54951 .  A 
standard deviation decrease in economic growth at mean percentage of youth bulge 
increases instability in OECD countries by 4.783 units or 68% of one standard deviation 
in political instability52; in comparison with 16 units or 55% in non-OECD countries53. 
The interaction effect of youth bulge at mean percentage of economic growth 3.097 on 
political instability in OECD countries is -0.07654. One standard deviation decrease in 
youth bulge at mean percentage of economic growth enhances instability by 0.384 units 
                                                 
51 The coefficient o f economic growth + [(the coefficient of joint effect + the coefficient of its interaction 
with OECD dummy)(20.376)(mean percentage of youth bulge in OECD)= -1.549 
52  One standard deviation decrease in economic growth is its coefficient in interaction term (-
1.549)* (3.146)(St. dev of economic growth in OECD) =4.873 unit or 68%  = (-1.549*100)/(2.280)(St. dev 
of political instability in OECD). 
53The coefficient of economic growth + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(30.675)(mean percentage of 
youth bulge in  non-OECD)= -2.283. One standard deviation decrease in economic growth  is its 
coefficient in  interaction term (-2.283)*(6.962)(St. dev  of economic growth  in  non-OECD) =16 unit  or 
55% = (-2.283*100)/(4.185)(St. dev of political instability in non-OECD). 
54(The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with OECD)+[(the coefficient of the jo int 
effect+ the coefficient of interaction with OECD dummy)(3.096)(mean percentage of economic growth in  
OECD)= -0.076. 
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or 3.3% of one standard deviation of instability 55 in comparison with 0.150 units or 
0.62% in non-OECD countries 56 . The results indicate that the interaction effect of 
economic growth has a significant impact on political instability in both groups of 
countries; however, the interaction effect of youth bulge is not significant. Moreover, 
economic growth shows a much stronger effect than youth bulge at the average value of 
both these variables. Positive economic performance in both groups of countries 
succeed in making the risk of youth bulge on political environment negligible; however, 
non-OECD countries need to achieve a higher level of economic growth than their 
counterpart OECD countries in order to create employment opportunities that match 
their high percentage of youth bulge. Control variables have the expected significant 
sign except trade openness; however, the levels of democracy, gross tertiary enrolment 
and urban growth have the expected signs but are insignificant.  
 The impact of the joint effect between economic growth and youth bulge on 
instability is examined in democratic countries as shown in Model 21. Youth bulge 
raises the risk of political instability and such risk is higher in democratic than 
autocratic countries. The independent effect of economic growth enhances political 
instability. Economic environment is equally important to stability in democratic and 
autocratic countries. This suggests that factors affecting living standard (such as 
economic growth) are more important than moving from autocracy to democracy. 
Similarly, the joint effect has a negative sign and is significant at the 5% level. The 
interaction effect of economic growth at mean percentage of youth bulge 23.463% on 
political instability in democratic countries is -1.56357. Instability enhances by 6 units or 
53% of one standard deviation of instability with each one standard deviation decrease 
in economic growth58; while it enhances instability in autocratic countries by 15 units or 
42%59. The interaction effect of youth bulge at mean percentage of economic growth 
                                                 
55One standard deviation decrease in youth bulge is its coefficient in  interaction term (-0.076)*(4.784)(St. 
dev of youth bulge in OECD) =0.368 unit or 3.3% = (-0.076*100)/ (2.280)(St. dev of polit ical instability 
in OECD). 
56The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(4.152)(the mean percentage of 
economic growth in non-OECD)= -0.026. One standard deviation decreases in youth bulge is its 
coefficient in  interaction term (-0.026)*(5.628)(St. dev of youth bulge in non-OECD) =0.150 unit  or 
0.62% = (-0.026*100)/(4.185)(St. dev of political instability in non-OECD). 
57The coefficient of economic growth + [(the coefficient of the joint effect + its coefficient in interaction 
with Democratic dummy)(23.463)(mean percentage of youth bulge in democratic countries)= -1.563.  
58 One standard deviation decreases in economic growth is its coefficient in interaction term (-
1.563)* (3.836)(St. dev of economic g rowth in democratic countries)=6 units or 53% = (-
1.563*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of political instability in democratic countries). 
59 The coefficient of economic growth + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(31.682)(mean percentage of 
youth bulge in autocratic countries)= -1.827. One standard deviation decrease in economic growth is its 
coefficient in interaction term (-1.827)*(8.145)(St. dev of economic growth in autocratic countries) =15 
unit or 42% = (-1.827*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of political instability in autocratic countries). 
 80 
3.246% on political instability in democratic countries is 0.057 60 . One standard 
deviation increase in youth bulge at mean percentage of economic growth enhances 
instability in democratic countries by 0.428 units or 2% of one standard deviation in 
instability61 ; in contrast, in autocratic countries one standard deviation reduction in 
youth bulge at mean percentage of economic growth enhances political instability by 
0.327 units or 1.3% of one standard deviation in instability 62. The results indicate that 
the interaction effect of economic growth has a significant impact on political 
instability; however, the interaction effect of youth bulge is not significant. Moreover, 
economic growth shows a much stronger effect than youth bulge at the average value of 
both these variables. Control variables have the expected significant sign except gross 
tertiary enrolment and urban growth rate.  
Model 22 examines the impact of the joint effect between economic growth and 
youth bulge on instability in oil countries. Youth bulge exposes lower political risk in 
oil than non-oil countries. The independent effect of economic growth has a negative 
sign and significant coefficient at the 1% level. Poor economic growth creates pressure 
on political environments in oil and non-oil countries. It reduces the level of taxes and 
employment opportunities in non-oil countries, while in oil countries a combination of 
Dutch disease effect and poor economic growth creates pressure on government to 
interfere further in labor markets and the economic environment. The joint effect has a 
negative sign and is significant at the 5% level, but its risk is lower in oil countries as 
the interaction term between the joint effect and oil dummy has a positive sign. The 
interaction effect of economic growth at mean percentage of youth bulge 31% on 
instability in oil countries is -1.47763. Poor economic growth equivalent to one standard 
deviation escalates instability in oil countries by 12.305 units or 36% of one standard 
deviation of political instability64 in comparison with 9.808 units or 42% of one standard 
                                                 
60  (The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with democratic dummy)+[(the 
coefficient of jo int effect+ its coefficient of interaction with democratic dummy)(3.246)(mean percentage 
of economic growth in democratic countries)= 0.057.  
61 One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its coefficient in interaction term (0.057)*(7.511)(St. 
dev of youth bulge in democratic countries) =0.428 unit or 2% = (0.057*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of political 
instability in democratic countries). 
62 The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(3.958)(the mean percentage of 
economic growth in autocratic countries)= -0.057. One standard deviation decrease in youth bulge is its 
coefficient in interaction term (-0.057)*(5.754)(St. dev of youth bulge in autocratic countries) =0.327 unit  
or 1.311% = (-0.057*100)/(4.396)(St. dev of political instability in autocratic countries). 
63 The coefficient of economic growth  + [(the coefficient  of the joint  effect  + its coefficient in interaction 
with oil dummy)(31)(mean percentage of youth bulge in oil countries)= -1.477. 
64  One standard deviation decrease in economic growth is its coefficient in interaction term (-
1.477)* (8.331)(St. dev of economic growth in o il countries) =12 unit or 36% = (-1.477*100)/ (4.072)(St. 
dev of political instability in oil countries). 
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deviation of instability in non-oil countries65. The interaction effect of youth bulge at 
mean percentage of economic growth 3.967% on instability in oil countries is -0.22066. 
Decreasing youth bulge by one standard deviation enhances instability in oil countries 
by 1.239 units or 5.4% of one standard deviation of instability 67 . In contrast, the 
interaction effect of youth bulge at mean percentage of economic growth on instability 
in non-oil countries is 0.020. Political instability increases by 0.149 units or 0.5% of one 
standard deviation of instability by each one standard deviation increase in youth bulge 
in non-oil countries68. The results indicate that the interaction effect of economic growth 
has a significant impact on political instability; however, the interaction effect of youth 
bulge is not significant. Moreover, economic growth shows a much stronger effect than 
youth bulge at the average value of both these variables 
Economic growth is more important as a determinant of political instability in 
oil countries than non-oil countries. This is because rentier state theory states that 
government in oil countries forms an engine of economic growth that enhances stability 
in its jurisdiction, as indicated by Lipset (1959) as cited by De Mesquita and Smith 
(2009). Unpredictable circumstance like sharp decreases in international oil prices hurts 
governmental ability to act as an engine of economic growth as indicated by Lowi 
(2004), which turns oil from being a source of stability into one of instability. The 
current oil prices negatively affect government revenues in oil countries and 
consequently their ability to stimulate economic growth through high level of 
government expenditure. For example, a low level of government expenditure has a 
broad impact on economic activities in monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula. It has 
adverse impacts on the oil and gas sector, construction companies and related industries, 
banking sectors and educational services. Consequently, governments and privates 
sectors in the region have decreased demand for some professions such as engineers, 
lawyers, bankers and consultants. Furthermore, it increases living costs substantially as 
                                                 
65 The coefficient of economic growth + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(28 .837)(mean percentage of 
youth bulge in non-oil countries)= -1.674. One standard deviation decrease in economic growth is its 
coefficient in interaction term (-1.674)*(5.860)(St. dev of economic growth in non-oil countries) =9.808 
unit or 42% = (-1.674*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non-oil countries). 
66(The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with oil dummy)+[(the coefficient of the 
joint effect + its coefficient in interaction with oil dummy)(3.967)(mean percentag e of economic growth 
in oil countries)= -0.220. 
67  One standard deviation decrease in youth bulge is its coefficient in  interaction term (-
0.220)* (5.633)(St. dev of youth bulge in oil countries) =1.239 unit or 5.4% = (-0.220*100)/ (4.072)(St. 
dev of political instability in oil countries). 
68  The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the joint  effect)(3.537)(mean percentage of 
economic growth in non-oil countries)= 0.020. One standard deviation increase in  youth bulge is its 
coefficient in  interaction term (0.020)*(7.635)(St. dev of youth bulge in  non-oil countries) =0.149 unit  or 
0.5% = (0.020*100)/(3.985)(St .dev of political instability in non-oil countries). 
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governments in the region move to increase governmental fees as one measurement to 
deal with low oil prices (Arabian Business, 2016). While these countries have 
succeeded thus far to cope with low oil prices, in other oil countries such as Russia and 
Venezuela, the adverse impact on their economies has been rapid. These impacts 
include increases of interest rates to defend national currency in Russia, which creates 
further pressure on sluggish economic growth. It has also seen increases in inflation rate 
in Venezuela, which increases living costs (Bowler, 2015). Control variables have the 
expected significant sign except urban growth rate.  
Model 23 examines the impact of the joint effect between economic growth and 
youth bulge on political instability in the MENA region. The independent effect of 
youth bulge enhances political instability; however, their risk is lower in MENA than 
non-MENA regions. The independent effect of economic growth has a negative sign 
and is significant at the 1% level. The joint effect has a negative sign and is significant 
at the 5% level; however, its impact is higher in MENA than non-MENA regions as the 
interaction term between MENA and the joint effect has a negative sign although it is 
not significant. The interaction effect of economic growth at mean percentage of yo uth 
bulge 32% on instability in the MENA region is -2.04669. A standard deviation decrease 
in economic growth in the MENA region sparks instability by 19 units or 47% of one 
standard deviation of instability70; in comparison with 10 units or 41.5% of one standard 
deviation in non-MENA regions 71 . The interaction effect of youth bulge at mean 
percentage of economic growth 5.145% on instability in the MENA region is -0.39672. 
Instability in MENA is enhanced by 1.730 units or 9% of one standard deviation of 
political instability by each one standard deviation decrease in youth bulge 73 . In 
contrast, the interaction effect of youth bulge at mean percentage of economic growth 
                                                 
69 The coefficient of economic growth  + [(the coefficient  of the joint  effect  + its coefficient in interaction 
with MENA region)(32)(mean percentage of youth bulge in MENA countries)= -2.046. 
70 One standard deviation decrease in economic growth is its coefficient in interaction term (-
2.046)* (9.532)(St. dev of economic growth in MENA countries) =19 unit or 47% = (-
2.046*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political instability in MENA countries). 
71 The coefficient of economic growth + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(29.034)(mean percentage of 
youth bulge in non-MENA countries)= -1.651. One standard deviation decrease in economic g rowth is its 
coefficient in interaction term (-1.651)*(6.169)(St. dev of economic growth in non-MENA countries) =10 
unit or 41.5% = (-1.651*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-MENA countries). 
72 (The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with MENA dummy)+[(the coefficient of 
the joint effect+ its coefficient in interaction with MENA dummy)(5.145)(mean percentage of economic 
growth in MENA countries)= -0.396. 
73  One standard deviation decrease in youth bulge is its coefficient in  interaction term (-
0.396)* (4.364)(St. dev of youth bulge in MENA countries) =1.730 unit  or 9%  = (-0.396*100)/ (4.366)(St. 
dev of political instability in MENA countries). 
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on instability in non-MENA regions is 0.07174. Political instability is enhanced in non-
MENA regions by 0.478 or 2% of one standard deviation of political instability by each 
one standard deviation increase in youth bulge75. The results indicate that the interaction 
effect of economic growth has a significant impact on political instability; however, the 
interaction effect of youth bulge is not significant. Moreover, economic growth shows a 
much stronger effect than youth bulge at the average value of both these variables.  
The empirical results of the interaction effect of economic growth on political 
environment in the MENA region suggest that the region can enhance its stabilization 
effect by addressing some restricting factors. These factors are mainly a high level of 
corruption as indicated by Ross et al. (2011) and a high level of economic exclusivity 
that contributed to the fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt as indicated by Shehata 
(2011). By doing so, it might be possible to address the imbalance between economic 
growth and population growth rate, which has been found to be among the highest in 
the world (O'Sullivan et al., 2011) despite of the economic growth in the region over the 
sample period being higher than non-MENA regions. Control variables have the 
expected sign except gross tertiary enrolment; rents from natural resources and trade 
openness have insignificant signs. 
  
                                                 
74  The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the joint  effect)(3.890)(mean percentage of 
economic growth in non-MENA countries)= 0.071. 
75 One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its coefficient in interaction term (0.071)*(6.743)(St. 
dev of youth bulge in non-MENA countries) =0.478 unit or 2%  = (0.071*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political 
instability in non-MENA countries). 
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Table 2.6 The Joint Effect of Economic Growth and Youth Bulge on Political 
Instability over the Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: political instability  
Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 
YB 0.192*** 
(0.029) 
0.185*** 
(0.037) 
0.093 
(0.065) 
0.155*** 
(0.030) 
0.211*** 
(0.029) 
GDP growth -0.640*** 
(0.207) 
-0.714*** 
(0.222) 
-0.624*** 
(0.215) 
-0.578*** 
(0.205) 
-0.606*** 
(0.188) 
Youth bulge*  GDP growth -0.040** 
(0.067) 
-0.051*** 
(0.019) 
-0.038** 
(0.019) 
-0.038** 
(0.016) 
-0.036** 
(0.015) 
OECD  -2.695*** 
(0.629) 
   
OCED*YB  -0.135** 
(0.056) 
   
OECD*YB*GDP growth  0.009 
(0.006) 
   
Oil    -2.797*** 
(0.717) 
 
Oil*YB    -0.259*** 
(0.093) 
 
Oil*YB*GDP growth    0.009 
(0.009) 
 
DD   -0.936** 
(0.462) 
  
DD*YB   0.094 
(0.071) 
  
DD*YB*GDP growth   -0.001 
(0.009) 
  
MENA     -4.082*** 
(1.876) 
MENA*YB     -0.376 
(0.263) 
MENA*YB*GDP growth     -0.009 
(0.037) 
Constant 4.343*** 
(1.691) 
3.758** 
(1.799) 
4.294*** 
(1.207) 
6.656*** 
(1.975) 
6.720*** 
(1.638) 
Adjusted R square 14% 13% 17% 16% 25% 
Number of observation 617 617 625 590 617 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one year 
lag of GDP growth as instrument of 
GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent  level, respectively. Variables included in model 2 are included in all models but the results not reported due to space 
restrictions. 
2.8.2 The Joint Effect of Youth Unemployment and Youth Bulge on Political 
Instability   
 The role of youth bulge on political instability can be moderated by 
unemployment. In this section the joint effect between youth unemployment and youth 
bulge on political instability will be tested in different contexts similarly to the 
previously explored joint effect; the results are shown in Table 2.7. 
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Model 24 examines the impact of the joint effect of youth bulge and 
unemployment on instability in the panel data. The independent effect of youth bulge 
has a positive sign and significant coefficient at the 1% level, suggesting that increasing 
the percentage of youth bulge enhances political instability. Unexpectedly, the 
independent effect of youth unemployment has a negative sign although it is 
insignificant; it suggests that decreases in youth unemployment enhance political 
instability76 . The joint effect has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that a decrease in youth unemployment lower the political risk of youth 
bulge. In a country like Tunisia that has overthrown its dictatorship regime in late 2010, 
the interaction effect of youth unemployment at mean percentage of youth bulge 
32.67% on instability is -3.86177. Instability is enhanced by 0.494 units or 92% of one 
standard deviation of instability for each one standard deviation reduction in youth 
unemployment 78 . The interaction effect of youth bulge at mean percentage of 
unemployment 3.429% on instability in Tunisia is -0.188. Decreasing youth bulge by 
one standard deviation enhances instability by 0.623 units or 4.5% of one standard 
deviation of instability79.  
Unemployment rates in some countries can be negatively associated with 
instability because the government creates public employment to absorb unemployment 
among youth that cannot be created by productive sectors driven by productivity 
considerations. This government action succeeds in eliminating the threat of 
unemployment on the political environment over the short term but it creates a risk of 
political instability over the long term because of financial pressure on public budgets or 
under provision on other sectors or increase in tax level. For example, the wage bill has 
had an adverse impact on Kuwait economic stability over the long run. Stability is 
threatened by the difficulty to meet the wage bill over a long period because of the 
possibility of sharp decreases in oil prices that forms the main source of government 
revenues in the country. Furthermore, the wage level in the government sector creates 
                                                 
76 The model is re-estimated by including the quadratic term of youth unemployment; the linear and 
quadratic term have positive sign but insignificant. Furthermore, it is estimated by including interaction 
between quadratic term of youth bulge and unemployment; however, the linear and quadratic terms have 
negative sign. The results are not reported. 
77 The coefficient of youth unemployment + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(32.67)(mean percentage 
of youth bulge in Tunisia)= -3.861. 
78  One standard deviation decrease in youth unemployment is its coefficient in interaction term (-
3.861)* (0.128)(St. dev of youth unemployment in Tunisia) =0.494 unit  or 92%  = (3.861*100)/ (4.187)(St. 
dev of political instability in Tunisia). 
79 The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(3.429)(mean percentage of youth 
unemployment in Tunisia)= -0.188. One standard deviation decreases in youth bulge is its coefficient in  
interaction term (-0.188)*(3.314)(St. dev of youth bulge in Tunisia) =0.623 unit or 4.5% = (-
0.188*100)/(4.187)(St. dev of political instability in Tunisia). 
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pressure on the productivity sector to increase its level to be in line with its counterpart 
in the governmental sector. This reduces the ability of the sector to contribute to 
economic growth. Additionally, the government continues to satisfy public employees’ 
demand for pay rises, which worsens the situation further (Westall and Hagagy, 2012).  
It could be that in the case of Kuwait, the government succeeds in addressing 
unemployment over the short term at no expense to other sectors because of its wealth 
from oil revenues; however, in some countries with limited financial resources this 
might not be the case. Countries with limited financial resources might absorb 
unemployment through public employment at the expense of investment in sectors that 
feed economic growth (like infrastructure). Furthermore, they might succeed in 
absorbing unemployment among youth who are at working age at the expense of their 
ability to offer educational opportunities to members of the youth bulge who are 
ineligible to join the labor market, shifting the threat on political environment from 
unemployed youth to youth who experience difficulty in finding educational 
opportunities. Control variables have the expected significant sign except trade 
openness, level of democracy, urban growth rate and gross tertiary enrolment that have 
insignificant signs. 
Model 25 examines the impact of the joint effect on political instability in 
OECD countries. The results indicate that youth bulge exposes lower political risk in 
OECD countries than non-OECD countries. The independent effect of youth 
unemployment enhances political instability, but it exposes higher risk in OECD 
countries than non-OECD countries as the interaction term between youth 
unemployment and OECD has a positive and significant sign at the 1% level.  
The joint effect enhances political instability; however, it exposes higher 
political risk in OECD countries than non-OECD as the interaction term between 
OECD and the joint effect has a positive sign and is significant at the 1% level. In other 
words, unemployment enhances the role of youth bulge on political instability and the 
impact is higher in OECD than non-OECD countries. The interaction effect of youth 
unemployment (youth bulge) on political instability is higher in OECD countries tha n 
non-OECD.  The interaction effect of youth unemployment at mean percentage of youth 
bulge 20.376% on instability in OECD countries is 2.583 80 . One standard deviation 
                                                 
80 (The coefficient of youth unemployment + its coefficient in  interaction with OECD dummy)+[(the 
coefficient of the joint effect + its coefficient in interaction with OECD dummy)(20.376)(mean  
percentage of youth bulge in OECD)= 2.583. 
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increase in youth unemployment at mean percentage of youth bulge enhances political 
instability in OECD countries by 1.454 units or 113% of one standard deviation of 
instability 81 . The interaction effect of youth bulge at mean percentage of youth 
unemployment 2.624% on instability in OECD countries is 0.294 82 . Youth bulge 
enhances instability by 1.408 units or 13% of one standard deviation of instability in 
OECD countries when they increase by one standard deviation at mean percentage of 
youth unemployment83.  
The role of youth bulge on political instability is enhanced by unemployment 
and such a role is higher in OECD countries than non-OECD countries. The failure of 
governments in OECD countries to reduce unemployment among youth directly 
enhances political instability. Furthermore, it enhances political instability indirectly by 
increasing the crime rate, which increases public anger towards a government for its 
failure to settle unemployment and its related crime rate issues. Control variables retain 
their sign and significance as captured in the previous model. 
Model 26 examines the joint effect between youth bulge and unemployment on 
instability in oil countries. Oil and non-oil countries face the risk of youth bulge on the 
prevailing political environment; however, the risk is lower in oil than non-oil countries. 
Oil countries are at higher political risk from unemployment than non-oil countries as 
the interaction term between unemployment and oil dummy has a positive sign but is 
not significant.  
The joint effect has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level; however, 
its impact is higher in oil than non-oil countries as the interaction between the joint 
effect and oil dummy has negative sign but is insignificant. In other words, decreasing 
youth unemployment (youth bulge) enhances political instability and the effect is higher 
in oil than non-oil countries. The interaction effect of youth unemployment at mean 
percentage of youth bulge 30.955% on instability in oil countries is -3.9184. Reduction 
                                                 
81  One standard deviation increase in youth unemployment is its coefficient in interaction term 
(2.583)*(0.563)(St.dev of youth unemployment in OECD) =1.454 unit o r 113% = 
(2.583*100)/(2.280)(St. dev of political instability in OECD). 
82(The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with OECD dummy)+[(the coefficient of 
the joint effect + its coefficient in  interaction  with OECD dummy)(2.624)(mean percentage of youth 
unemployment in OECD)= 0.294. 
83 One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its coefficient in interaction term (0.294)*(4.784)(St. 
dev of youth bulge in OECD) =1.408 unit Or 13% = (0.294*100)/(2.280)(St . dev of polit ical instability in  
OECD) 
84  (The coefficient of youth unemployment +its coefficient in interaction with oil dummy)+[(the 
coefficient of the jo int effect + its coefficient in interaction with oil dummy)(30.955)(mean percentage of 
youth bulge in oil countries)= -3.915. 
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in unemployment by one standard deviation at mean percentage of youth bulge 
enhances instability in oil countries by 2.333 units or 96% of one standard deviation of 
instability 85 ; in comparison with 2.033 units or 80% in non-oil countries 86 . The 
interaction effect of youth bulge at mean percentage of unemployment 2.7% on political 
instability in oil countries is -0.39787. One standard deviation decrease in youth bulge at 
mean percentage of unemployment enhances political instability in oil countries by 
2.336 units or 10% of one standard deviation of instability88; in comparison with 0.983 
units or 3.212% in non-oil countries89.  
It might be that oil countries use oil rents to create public employment and 
attract international investors through subsidized fuel prices to start up businesses in 
their jurisdiction. Such effort turns the risk of unemployment and youth bulge negative 
because of shortages in human resources required to sustain economic growth that 
might transfer the political risk to another source like increasing inflation rate. The 
adverse impact of its high rate abolishes government efforts to settle youth bulge and 
unemployment issues. In non-oil countries, full employment indicates that the 
government cannot increase the level of tax income while, government expenditure 
continue to grow. This creates financial pressure on governmental ability to respond to 
important segments of the public, which reduces its chances to be re-elected. Control 
variables have the expected significant sign except the level of democracy and urban 
growth rate that have an insignificant expected sign. 
The impact of youth bulge that experience unemployment on instability is 
examined in democratic countries, with results shown in Model 27. Democratic 
countries face higher risk from youth bulge than autocratic countries. Similarly, the 
political risk of unemployment is higher in democratic than autocratic countries as the 
                                                 
85  One standard deviation decrease in youth unemployment is its coefficient in interaction term (-
3.915)* (0.596)(St. dev of youth unemployment in o il countries) =2.333 unit  or 96%  = (-
3.915*100)/(4.072)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries). 
86 The coefficient of youth unemployment + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(28.837)(mean percentage 
of youth bulge in non-oil countries)= -3.202. One standard deviation decreases in youth unemployment is 
its coefficient in  interaction term (-3.202)*(0.632)(St. dev of youth unemployment in non-oil countries) 
=2.033 unit Or 80% = (3.202*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non-oil countries). 
87 (The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with  oil dummy)+[(the coefficient of the 
joint effect+ its coefficient of interaction with o il dummy)(2.7)(mean percentage of youth unemployment 
in oil countries)= -0.397. 
88 One standard deviation decrease in youth bulge is its coefficient in interaction term (-.397)*(5.633)(St. 
dev of youth bulge in oil countries) =2.336 unit or 10% = (-0.397*100)/(4.072)(St. dev of political 
instability in oil countries). 
89The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(2.736)(mean percentage of youth 
unemployment in non-oil countries)= -0.128. One standard deviation decreases in youth bulge is its 
coefficient in interaction term (-0.128)*(7.635)(St. dev of youth bulge in non-oil countries) =0.983 unit or 
3% = (-0.128*100)/(3.985)(St . dev of political instability in non-oil countries) 
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interaction term between democracy and unemployment has a positive sign and is 
significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the joint effect has a negative sign and is 
significant at the 5% level; however, its impact is lower in democratic than autocratic 
countries as the interaction term between democracy and the joint effect has a positive 
sign although it is not significant. In other words, autocratic countries succeed in turning 
the role of youth bulge moderated by unemployment on political instability into a 
negative; while democratic countries succeed in lowering its impact although some 
effects still exist. The empirical results reveal that the interaction effect of youth 
unemployment at mean percentage of youth bulge 23.463% on political instability in 
democratic countries is 0.434 90 . Political channels exist in democratic countries to 
enable youth to raise their demands peacefully but they are not enough to abolish the 
impact of unemployed youth on political instability. Increasing unemployment by one 
standard deviation at mean percentage of youth bulge escalates political instability in 
democratic countries by 0.251 units or 15% of one standard deviation of instability91. In 
contrast, in autocratic countries each one standard deviation decrease in youth 
unemployment at mean percentage of youth bulge 31.682% enhances political 
instability by 3.99 units or 124% one standard deviation of instability92. The interaction 
effect of youth bulge at mean percentage of unemployment 2.732% on political 
instability in democratic countries is 0.16293. One standard deviation increase in youth 
bulge at mean percentage of unemployment enhances political instability by 1.214 units 
or 5.5% of one standard deviation of political instability in democratic countries94. In 
contrast, the interaction effect of youth bulge is negatively associated with instability in 
autocratic countries; each one standard deviation reduction in youth bulge at mean 
percentage of unemployment 2.696% enhances instability by 2.103 units or 8.4% of one 
                                                 
90 (The coefficient of youth unemployment + its coefficient in interaction with democracy)+[(the 
coefficient of the joint effect+ its coefficient in interaction with democracy)(23.463)(mean percentage of 
youth bulge in democratic countries)= 0.434.  
91 One standard deviation increase in youth unemployment is its coefficient in interaction term 
(0.434)*(0.578)(St. dev of youth unemployment in democratic countries) =0.251 unit o r 15% = 
(0.434*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of political instability in democratic countries). 
92 The coefficient of youth unemployment + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(31.682)(mean percentage 
of youth bulge in autocratic countries)= -5.402 .One standard deviation decreases in youth unemployment 
is its coefficient in interaction term (-5.402)*(0.740)(St. dev of youth unemployment in autocratic 
countries) =3.99 unit or 124% = (5.402*100)/(4.249)(St. dev of political instability in autocratic 
countries). 
93 (The coefficient of youth bulge +its coefficient in interaction with democracy)+[(the coefficient of the 
joint effect+ its coefficient in interaction with democracy)(2.732)(mean percentage of youth 
unemployment in democratic countries)= 0.162. 
94 One standard deviation increases in youth bulge is its coefficient in interaction term (0.162)*(7.510)(St. 
dev of youth bulge in democrat ic countries) =1.214 unit or 5.5% = (0.162*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of 
political instability in democratic countries). 
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standard deviation of instability in autocratic countries95.  The positive sign of the joint 
effect in the democratic context can be explained in that some parties might use 
democratic channels to provoke unemployed youth against a government; such channels 
do not exist in autocratic countries. Control variables have the expected significant sign 
except trade openness, gross tertiary enrolment and urban growth rate.    
Model 28 examines the impact of youth bulge on political instability in the 
MENA region through its interaction with unemployment.  Youth bulge exposes lower 
risk on political environment in the MENA region as the interaction term between youth 
bulge and MENA has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level. Youth 
unemployment exposes higher political risk in MENA than non-MENA regions as the 
interaction term between MENA and youth unemployment has a positive sign and is 
significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, youth bulge, through their interaction with 
unemployment, enhances political instability and the risk is higher in the MENA region 
as the interaction term between the joint effect and MENA region has a positive sign 
and significant coefficient at the 1% level. The interaction effect of youth 
unemployment at mean percentage of youth bulge 31.944% on instability in the region 
is 22.620 96 . Instability increases by 13 units or 518% of one standard deviation of 
political instability by each one standard deviation increase in unemployment in the 
region97 ; while in non-MENA regions reduction in unemployment by one standard 
deviation at mean percentage of youth bulge enhances instability by 0.089 units or 3.5% 
of one standard deviation of political instability98. The interaction effect of youth bulge 
at mean percentage of unemployment 3.049% on political instability in MENA is 1.291. 
Youth bulge increase by one standard deviation at mean percentage of unemployment 
enhances political instability in the region by 6 units or 30% of one standard deviation 
                                                 
95 The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(2.696)(mean percentage of youth 
unemployment in autocratic countries)= -0.365. One standard deviation decreases in youth bulge is its 
coefficient in interaction term (-0.365)*(5.753)(St. dev of youth bulge in autocratic countries) =2.103 unit  
or 8.4% = (0.365*100)/(4.349)(St . dev of political instability in autocratic countries). 
96 (The coefficient of youth unemployment + its coefficient in interact ion with MENA)+[(the coefficient 
of the jo int effect + its coefficient in interaction with MENA)(31.944)(mean percentage of youth bulge in  
MENA countries)= 22.060. 
97 One standard deviation increase in youth unemployment is its coefficient in interaction term 
(22.060)*(0.562)(St. dev of youth unemployment in MENA countries) =13 unit or 518% = 
(22.060*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political instability in MENA countries)  
98The coefficient o f youth unemployment + [(the coefficient  of the jo int effect)(29.034)(mean pe rcentage 
of youth bulge in non-MENA countries)= -0.138. One standard deviation decreases in youth 
unemployment is its coefficient in  interaction term (-0.138)*(0.642)(St. dev of youth unemployment  in  
non-MENA countries) =0.089 un it or 3.5% = (0.138*100)/ (3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-
MENA countries).  
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of political instability99 in comparison with 1.117 units or 4% of one standard deviation 
of political instability in non-MENA regions100.  
Unemployment in the MENA region enhances the role of youth bulge on 
political instability because it prevents an individual from gaining access to some goods 
and services that require permanent income, like housing (Chaaban, 2013). 
Furthermore, in the absence of financial support for the unemployed an individual fails 
to achieve financial independency (Said, 1996). Control variables have the expected 
significant sign except natural resources rents, gross tertiary enrolment and urban 
growth rate. 
  
                                                 
99 (The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with MENA)+[(the coefficient of the 
joint effect+ its coefficient in interaction with MENA)(3.049)(mean percentage of youth unemployment 
in MENA countries)= 1.291. One standard deviation increases in youth bulge is its coefficient in  
interaction term (1.291)*(4.364)(St. dev of youth bulge in MENA countries) =5.637 unit or 30% = 
(1.291*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political instability in MENA countries).  
100 The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(2.691)(mean percentage of youth 
unemployment in non-MENA countries)=0.165. One standard deviation increases in youth bulge is its 
coefficient in interaction term (0.165)*(6.743)(St. dev of youth bulge in non-MENA countries) =1.117 
unit or 4% = (0.165*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-MENA countries).  
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Table 2.7 The Joint Effect of Youth Bulge and Unemployment on Political 
Instability over the Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: political instability  
Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 
YB 0.189*** 
(0.029) 
0.171*** 
(0.034) 
0.164*** 
(0.030) 
0.020 
(0.058) 
0.233*** 
(0.031) 
TYU -0.267 
(0.351) 
-0.769** 
(0.376) 
-0.117 
(0.366) 
-0.872** 
(0.416) 
0.587 
(0.411) 
YB*TYU -0.110*** 
(0.032) 
-0.132*** 
(0.039) 
-0.107*** 
(0.034) 
-0.143** 
(0.071) 
-0.025 
(0.037) 
OECD  -1.030* 
(0.541) 
   
OCED*YB 
 -0.001 
(0.050) 
   
OECD*TYU  2.395*** 
(0.657) 
   
OECD*TYU*YB  0.179*** 
(0.060) 
   
Oil   -1.881** 
(0.832) 
  
Oil*YB   -0.210** 
(0.084) 
  
Oil*TYU   0.226 
(1.482) 
  
Oil*TYU*YB   -0.023 
(0.213) 
  
DD    -0.582 
(0.446) 
 
DD*YB    0.194*** 
(0.058) 
 
DD*TYU    1.752** 
(0.728) 
 
DD*TYU*YB    0.124 
(0.085) 
 
MENA     -5.527*** 
(1.212) 
MENA*YB     -0.737*** 
(0.185) 
MENA*TYU     3.218*** 
(0.965) 
MENA*YB*TYU     0.614*** 
(0.159) 
Constant 4.719*** 
(1.203) 
3.557*** 
(1.293) 
6.745*** 
(1.413) 
5.371*** 
(0.922) 
7.773*** 
(1.335) 
Adjusted R square 31% 33% 30.00% 36% 37% 
Number of observation 617 617 590 625 617 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one year 
lag of GDP growth as instrument of 
GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent  level, respectively. Variables included in model 2 are included in all models but the results not reported for space 
restrictions.  
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2.8.3 The Joint Effect Between the Level of Democracy and Youth Bulge on 
Political Instability 
Empirical results estimated so far find that youth bulge enhances political 
instability in democratic countries, contrary to the expected. In this section the impact of 
the joint effect between level of democracy101 and youth bulge on political instability is 
examined; results are shown in Table 2.8.  
In Model 29 the impact of the joint effect between the level of democracy and 
youth bulge on political instability is examined in the panel data. The independent effect 
of the level of democracy has a negative sign although it is not significant, suggesting 
that decreasing the level of democracy enhances political instability. Youth bulge has 
the expected positive sign and is significant at the 5% level. The joint effect has a 
positive sign and is significant at the 10% level, suggesting that the interaction effect of 
youth bulge is more important than low level of democracy to destabilize the political 
environment. The interaction effect of the level of democracy at mean percentage of 
youth bulge 28% on instability in South Korea is 0.315 102 . Improving the level of 
democracy by one standard deviation at mean percentage of youth bulge enhances 
political instability in South Korea by 1.974 units or 19% of one standard deviation of 
political instability103. The interaction effect of youth bulge at mean score of the level of 
democracy 12.262 on political instability in South Korea is 0.275104 . One standard 
deviation increase in youth bulge at mean score of the level of democracy enhances  
political instability by 1.548 units or 16% of one standard deviation of instability105.   
Modernization theory states that democracy produces stabilization when 
favorable factors are in place among other high level of educational attainment 
otherwise it lead to political instability (Huntington, 1968). However, in the absence of 
a high level of educational attainment it can be assumed that a country is not ready to 
adopt democracy. For example, descriptive statistics show that the score of democracy 
in Pakistan over the sample period is 13.129, higher than the average score of the entire 
                                                 
101 It is measured on a scale from 1 to 21. The model is not estimated for fully democratic countries. 
102 The coefficient of the level of democracy + [(the coefficient of the jo int effect)(28)(mean percentage 
of youth bulge in South Korea)=0.315. 
103 One standard deviation increase in the level of democracy is its coefficient in interaction term 
(0.315)*(6.265)(St. dev of the level of democracy in  South Korea) =1.97 unit  or 19% = 
(0.315*100)/(1.692)(St. dev of political instability in South Korea). 
104The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the jo int effect)(12.262)(mean score of the level of 
democracy in South Korea)=0.275. 
105 One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its coefficient in interaction term (0.275)*(5.628)(St. 
dev of youth bulge in South Korea) =1.548 unit o r 16%  = (0.275*100)/(1.692)(St. dev of political 
instability in South Korea). 
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sample, which is 12.7; however, the level of democracy does not reduce the role of 
youth bulge on political instability in the country106. This is can be noted from its score 
of political instability which is higher than the entire sample 107. It could be because the 
country average gross tertiary enrolment over the sample period is 5% in comparison to 
27% in the entire sample.  
Introducing democracy in countries that lack its requirements and at the same 
time have ethnic and religious diversity as well as  a high percentage of youth bulge 
leads to political instability Lebanon, Iraq and Libya are cases in point. Hegre and 
Nome (2010) point out that when socioeconomic conditions are not suitable, 
introducing democracy may increase the risk of instability. They find a combination of 
high levels of development and democracy has a stabilization effect on political 
environment. Furthermore, they find that low-income democracies and low-income 
autocracies face the same risk of political instability. While this study does not rule out 
the fact that democracy might have a stabilization effect on political environment, it 
emphasizes that it can be introduced only when there is in place favorable economic and 
social environments. Empirically, the results are in line with the findings of Urdal 
(2006) that there is an insignificant negative relationship between the joint effect and 
the risk of armed conflict. Control variables have the expected significant sign except 
urban growth rate and gross tertiary enrolment. 
Model 30 examines the impact of the joint effect between youth bulge and the 
level of democracy on instability in OECD countries. OECD countries face lower risk 
from youth bulge than non-OECD countries. The independent effect of democracy has a 
negative sign although it is not significant; however, its impact turns into a positive sign 
in OECD countries, as the interaction term between democracy and OECD is positive 
but not significant. This suggests that while a low level of democracy enhances 
instability in non-OECD countries, improvement in democracy enhances political 
instability in OECD countries. It could be that increasing the number of parties that 
form a parliament in OECD countries indicates that general agreement on public issues 
becomes more difficult to achieve.  
The joint effect has a positive sign; however, it has a lower impact on political 
instability in OECD countries as the interaction term between OECD countries and the 
                                                 
106 The average percentage of youth bulge in Pakistan is 34.5% in comparison with 28% for the entire 
sample. 
107 Average score of instability in Pakistan is 10 versus 7.58. 
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joint effect has a negative sign although it is not significant. In other words, the 
interaction effect of youth bulge is more important than low level of democracy to 
destabilize the political environment. The interaction effect of the level of democracy at 
mean percentage of youth bulge 20.376% on political instability in OECD countries is 
0.109. One standard deviation increase in the level of democracy at mean percentage of 
youth bulge enhances political instability by 0.559 units or 5% of one standard 
deviation of political instability108; in comparison with 2.272 units or 9% in non-OECD 
countries109. The interaction effect of youth bulge at mean score of democracy 18.642 on 
instability in OECD countries is 0.190. Each one standard deviation increase in youth 
bulge at mean score of democracy enhances instability in OECD countries by 0.909 
units or 8% of one standard deviation of instability110; in comparison with 1.554 units or 
6.5% in non-OECD111.  
The empirical results suggest that OECD countries, which can be regarded as 
mature democracies, and non-OECD countries (which might be regarded as immature 
democracies) can both experience political instability; however, instability takes 
different forms between the two sub-samples. In democratic countries like OECD, 
incidences of political instability can take the form of riots, demonstrations and strikes, 
while in non-OECD countries where the score of democracy is low and the percentage 
of youth bulge is high, they might experience stronger forms of incidences such as 
coups and political assassinations112. Flanigan and Fogelman (1970) argue that there is 
variation in the form of political instability incidences across regions in the world. They 
point out that some regions in the world are more prone to specific forms of political 
                                                 
108  (The coefficient of the level of democracy + its coefficient in  interaction with OECD)+[(the 
coefficient of the jo int effect + its coefficient of interaction with OECD)(20.376)(mean percentage of 
youth bulge in OECD countries)= 0.109. One standard deviation increase in the level of democracy is its 
coefficient in  interaction term (0.109)*(5.458)(St . dev of the level of democracy in  OECD countries) 
=0.599 unit or 5% = (0.109*100)/(2.280)(St. dev of political instability in OECD countries). 
109  The coefficient of the level of democracy + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(30.765)(mean 
percentage of youth bulge in non-OECD countries)= 0.394. One standard deviation increase in the level 
of democracy is its coefficient in  interaction term (0.394)*(5.768)(St. dev of the level o f democracy  in  
non-OECD countries) =2.272 un it or 9% = (0.394*100)/ (4.185)(St. dev of political instability in non-
OECD countries).   
110 (The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with OECD)+[(the coefficient of the 
joint effect+ its coefficient of interaction with OECD)(18.642)(mean score of democracy in  OECD 
countries)= 0.190. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its coefficient in interaction term 
(0.190)*(4.780)(St. dev of youth bulge in OECD countries) =0.909 unit or 8% = (0.190*100)/ (2.280)(St. 
dev of political instability in OECD countries).   
111(The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(10.323)(mean score of democracy 
in non-OECD countries)= 0.249. One standard deviation increase in  youth bulge is its coefficient  in  
interaction term (0.249)*(5.628)(St. dev of youth bulge in non-OECD countries) =1.402 unit or 6% = 
(0.249*100)/(4.185)(St. dev of political instability in non-OECD countries).    
112 The measure of polit ical instability in this research comprises small and large scale incidences of 
instability.  
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instability than others, indicating the case of Latin America where they are more prone 
to socio-political unrest than civil war, while the opposite holds in other regions like 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
The prospective source of political instability between OECD and non-OECD 
countries may be different. The main source of instability in democratic countries is the 
failure of a government to protect the life and property of its citizenry. Failing to do so 
can spark less lethal, small-scale incidences of political instability than in autocratic 
countries (Hegre, 2014). In non-OECD countries, given they are neither consistent 
democracy nor autocracy this might suggest that the prospective source of political 
instability is immature democratic practices. Håvard Hegre et al. (2001) point out that 
moving from autocracy to democracy takes a long time and constitutes a substantial cost 
on the political environment. Control variables have the expected significant sign except 
youth unemployment, gross tertiary enrolment and urban growth rate. 
Model 31 examines the impact of youth bulge on instability in oil countries 
through its interaction with the level of democracy. The independent impact of youth 
bulge exposes lower political risk in oil than non-oil countries as the interaction term 
between youth bulge and oil countries has a negative and significant sign at the 5% 
level. The independent effect of democracy has a negative sign although it is not 
significant; however, it turns into a positive impact in oil countries as the interaction 
term between oil and democracy has a positive sign and is significant at the 1% level. 
The joint effect has a positive sign and a higher impact in oil countries as the interaction 
term between oil and the joint effect has a positive and significant sign at the 1% level. 
In other words, the interaction effect of youth bulge is more important than low level of 
democracy to destabilize the political environment and such effect is substantially 
higher in oil than non-oil countries. The interaction effect of youth bulge at mean score 
of democracy 13.165 on political instability in non-oil countries is 0.183. Increasing 
youth bulge by one standard deviation at mean score of democracy enhances political 
instability in non-oil countries by 1.399 units or 5% of one standard deviation of 
instability113; in comparison with 1.272 units or 5.5% in oil countries114. The interaction 
                                                 
113 The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(13.165)(mean score of democracy 
in non-oil countries)= 0.183. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its coefficient in  
interaction term (0.183)*(7.635)(St. dev of youth bulge in  non-oil countries) =1.399 unit  or 5% = 
(0.184*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non-oil countries).   
114 (The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with oil countries)+[(the coefficient of 
the joint effect+ its coefficient in  interaction with oil countries)(7.211)(mean score of democracy in  oil 
countries)= 0.225. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its coefficient in interaction term 
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effect of the level of democracy at mean percentage of youth bulge 28.837% on political 
instability in non-oil countries is -0.034. One standard deviation decrease in the level of 
democracy in non-oil countries at mean percentage of youth bulge decreases stability by 
0.244 units or 1% of one standard deviation of stability115. In contrast, the improvement 
in the level of democracy at mean percentage of youth bulge 31% breeds instability in 
oil countries. One standard deviation increase in the level of democracy at mean 
percentage of youth bulge enhances instability by 9 units or 35% of one standard 
deviation of instability116.  
The positive association between the joint effect and political instability in oil 
and non-oil countries are driven by different factors. Introducing democracy in the 
presence of youth bulge enhances political instability in oil countries because it restricts 
government ability to use different strategies to stabilize the political environment and it 
provides public channels with which to replace a government for its failure to deal with 
economic and political dysfunctional under the resource curse 117 . Andersen and 
Aslaksen (2013) point out that a government in rentier states stabilizes its political 
environment through low taxation, distribution expenditure and patron-client networks 
between the political elite. Under a democracy, government cannot use oil rents to 
finance patron-client networks or allocate more funds to some segments that exclude 
others without risking its tenure in office. Furthermore, in the presence of a democracy, 
members of the public in oil countries are in a position to discipline a government in an 
election for its failure to address dysfunctional economic and political environments 
associated with the resource curse. Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) find that oil rents are 
associated with stability when measured by duration in office in non-democratic 
countries, but not in democracies. In the absence of patron client networks in 
democratic oil countries, the political elite might use democracies to pit youth bulge 
against a government. Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) point out that competition 
                                                                                                                                               
(0.225)*(5.633)(St. dev of youth bulge in oil countries) =1.272 unit or 5.5% = (0.225*100)/ (4.071)(St. 
dev of political instability in oil countries).   
115 The coefficient o f the level of democracy + [(the coefficient of the joint  effect)(28.836)(mean score of 
youth bulge in non-oil countries)= -0.034. One standard deviation decrease in the level of democracy is 
its coefficient in interaction term (0.034)*(7.110)(St. dev of the level of democracy in non-oil countries) 
=0.244 unit or 1% = (0.034*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non-oil countries).   
116 (The coefficient of the level of democracy + its coefficient in interaction with oil)+[(the coefficient of 
joint effect+ its coefficient in interaction with oil)(31)(mean percentage of youth bulge in oil countries)= 
1.415. One standard deviation increase in the level o f democracy is its coefficient in interaction term 
(1.415)*(6.498)(St. dev of level of democracy in oil countries) =9 unit or 35% = (1.415*100)/ (4.071)(St. 
dev of political instability in oil countries).   
117 The measure of polit ical instability in this study has two components, namely government instability 
and internal conflict.  Government instability comprises several components, including public support to 
government (among others). 
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between political elite to capture oil rents from holding public office reduces the 
incumbent period in office. In non-oil countries, given that the main source of 
government revenue is taxes and they have a higher score of democracy than oil 
countries, a government faces a higher risk of losing public support when it adopts 
policies that do not meet the needs of the majority of the public. Control variables have 
the expected significant sign except trade openness and urban growth rate.   
Model 32 examines the impact of youth bulge on political instability in the 
MENA region through their interaction with the level of democracy. Youth bulge 
enhances political instability and their risk is higher in MENA than non-MENA regions 
as the interaction between MENA and youth bulge has a positive sign but is not 
significant. The independent effect of democracy has a negative sign and is significant 
at the 1% level; however, it exposes lower risk in MENA than non-MENA regions as 
the interaction term between MENA and democracy has a positive but not significant 
sign. In other words, a low level of democracy enhances instability and its impact is 
lower in MENA than non-MENA regions. The joint effect has a negative sign and is 
significant at the 10% level; however, it turns into positive impact on the MENA region 
as the interaction term between MENA and the joint effect has a positive sign and is 
significant at the 1% level. In MENA region, the interaction effect of youth bulge is 
more important than low level of democracy to destabilize the political environment. 
The interaction effect of youth bulge at mean score of democracy 5.489 on political 
instability in MENA is 0.913. Youth bulge enhances political instability through their 
interaction with democracy; one standard deviation increase in youth bulge at mean 
score of democracy escalates political instability in MENA by 4 units or 21% of one 
standard deviation of instability118; in comparison with 1.259 units or 5% in non-MENA 
regions119. The interaction effect of democracy at mean percentage of youth bulge 32% 
on instability in the MENA region is 3.207. Improvement in democracy by one standard 
deviation at mean percentage of youth bulge enhances political instability in MENA by 
                                                 
118(The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with MENA)+[(the coefficient of the 
joint effect+ its coefficient in  interaction with MENA)(5.489)(mean  score of democracy  in  MENA 
countries)= 0.913. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its coefficient in interaction term 
(0.914)*(4.364)(St. dev of youth bulge in MENA countries) =4 unit or 21% = (0.913*100)/ (4.366)(St. 
dev of political instability in MENA countries).   
119 The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(12.269)(mean score of democracy 
in non-MENA countries)= 0.186. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its coefficient in  
interaction term (0.186)*(6.743)(St. dev of youth bulge in non-MENA countries) =1.259 unit or 5% = 
(0.186*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non- MENA countries).   
 99 
14 units or 74% of one standard deviation of instability120. In contrast, improvement in 
democracy in non-MENA regions lowers the adverse impact of youth bulge on political 
environment. Boosting democracy by one standard deviation at mean percentage of 
youth bulge 29.03% enhances stability in non-MENA regions by 3.657 units or 14% of 
one standard deviation of instability121.  
The empirical results suggest that the role of youth bulge on political instability 
in the MENA region is exaggerated by moving towards democracy. It might be that not 
all countries in the region have favorable socioeconomic conditions in order for 
democracy to produce stability as indicated by Hegre and Nome (2010). Descriptive 
analysis at country level in the MENA region shows that countries such as Qatar, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain that have the lowest score of democracy in the region 
are more stable than countries such as Algeria and Yemen that have higher scores in the 
level of democracy.  
Alternatively, it enhances the role of youth bulge on political instability in the 
MENA region because the public does not possess a culture capable of accepting 
political settlement of conflicts associated with democracy and to respect its outcome. 
For example, a political agreement supported by the United Nation and Gulf Co-
operation Council to settle conflict between different domestic interest parties in Yemen 
since late 2010 was violated and pushed these parties to violence in order to enforce a 
new political agreement.  
Another channel that makes introducing democracy in the MENA region lead to 
instability is the presence of strong collectivism culture.  An individual in the region has 
strong motivation to support his family or tribe members at the expense of the public 
interest. Under such conditions, democracy can be a source of instability because 
families or the tribe use it to show their superiority over other families or tribes. Control 
variables have the expected significant sign. 
                                                 
120  (The coefficient of the level of democracy  + its coefficient in interaction with MENA)+[(the 
coefficient of the jo int effect+ its coefficient in interaction with MENA)(32)(mean percentage of youth 
bulge in MENA countries)= 3.207. One standard deviation increase in the level of democracy is its 
coefficient in interaction term (3.207)*(4.304)(St. dev of level o f democracy in MENA countries) =14 
unit or 35% = (3.207*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political instability in MENA countries).   
121  The coefficient of the level o f democracy + [(the coefficient of the jo int effect)(29.03)(mean 
percentage of youth bulge in non-MENA countries)= -0.563. One standard deviation decrease in the level 
of democracy is its coefficient in  interaction term (0.563)*(6.492)(St. dev of the level o f democracy  in  
non-MENA countries) =3.657 unit  or 14% = (0.563*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of polit ical instability in non-
MENA countries).   
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Table 2.8 The Joint Effect of Youth Bulge and Level of Democracy on Political 
Instability over the Period 1984-2013 
Independent variable Dependent variable: political instability  
Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 
YB 0.127** 
(0.060) 
0.115* 
(0.067) 
0.157** 
(0.069) 
0.332*** 
(0.063) 
RT -0.020 
(0.048) 
-0.006 
(0.052) 
-0.092 
(0.058) 
-0.215*** 
(0.056) 
YB*RT 0.012* 
(0.006) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.012* 
(0.006) 
OECD  -2.089*** 
(0.616) 
  
OCED*YB  -0.018 
(0.089) 
  
OECD*RT  0.014 
(0.087) 
  
OECD*YB*RT  -0.008 
(0.012) 
  
Oil   -1.814*** 
(0.555) 
 
Oil*YB   -0.234** 
(0.098) 
 
Oil*RT   0.207*** 
(0.073) 
 
Oil*YB*RT   0.040*** 
(0.011) 
 
MENA    -4.150*** 
(0.757) 
MENA*YB    0.025 
(0.194) 
MENA*RT    0.190 
(0.119) 
MENA*YB*RT    0.113*** 
(0.033) 
Constant 3.100*** 
(1.116) 
2.777** 
(1.196) 
4.667*** 
(1.270) 
3.893*** 
(1.011) 
Adjusted R square 29% 31% 28% 38% 
Number of observation 617 617 590 617 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
P-value 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one year lag of 
GDP growth as instrument of GDP growth) 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent  level, respectively. Variables included in model 2 are included in all models but the results are not reported for space 
restrictions. 
2.8.4 The Joint Effect Between Educational Attainment and Youth Bulge on 
Political Instability   
There is a little agreement on the impact of the independent effect of educational 
attainment measured by different proxies on political instability; the first stream finds a 
positive relationship while the second finds a negative association. In this section the 
role of youth bulge on political instability moderated by educational attainment 
measured by gross tertiary enrolment will be examined; the results are shown in Table 
2.9.  
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In Model 33 the impact of youth bulge moderated by educational attainment on 
political instability is examined in the panel data. The independent effect of youth bulge 
enhances political instability as it has a positive sign and a significant coefficient at the 
1% level. The independent effect of gross tertiary enrolment has a negative sign and is 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that a low level of gross tertiary enrolment 
enhances political instability. The joint effect has a negative sign and is significant at 
the 1% level, suggesting that a low level of gross tertiary enrolment relieves the risk of 
youth bulge on the political environment. The interaction effect of youth bulge at mean 
percentage of gross tertiary enrolment 0.481% on political instability in Malawi is 
0.239. Increasing the percentage of youth bulge by one standard deviation at mean 
percentage of gross tertiary enrolment enhances political instability in Malawi by 0.189 
units or 7.5% of one standard deviation of instability 122 . The interaction effect of 
education at mean percentage of youth bulge 36% on political instability in Malawi is -
0.149. Reducing educational attainment by one standard deviation at mean percentage 
of youth bulge enhances political instability by 0.014 units or 5% of one standard 
deviation of instability in Malawi123.  
It might be that youth bulge with a tertiary education set high expectations in 
term of employment and wages, which if not met, enhances instability (Collier, 2000) 
so that youth bulge without tertiary education have lower expectations. Similarly, a low 
level of gross tertiary enrolment does not create pressure on a government to introduce 
democracy, as suggested by Huntington (1968). Control variables have the expected 
significant sign except the level of democracy and urban growth rate. 
Model 34 examines the impact of the joint effect between youth bulge and 
educational attainment on political instability in OECD countries. The independent 
effect of youth bulge enhances political instability; however, their political risk is lower 
in OECD countries than non-OECD countries. The independent effect of gross tertiary 
enrolment has a negative sign and is significant at the 5% level and its impact is slightly 
higher in OECD countries. The joint effect has a negative sign and is significant at the 
1% level; however, its impact lower in OECD countries as the interaction term between 
                                                 
122 The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(.481)(mean percentage of gross 
tertiary enrolment in Malawi)= 0.239.  One standard deviation increases in youth bulge is its coefficient in  
interaction term (0.239)*(0.780)(St. dev of youth bulge in Malawi) =0.189 unit Or 7.5% = 
(0.239*100)/(3.173)(St. dev of political instability in Malawi).   
123 The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(36)(mean percentage 
of youth bulge in Malawi)= -0.149. One standard deviation decreases in educational attainment is its 
coefficient in  interaction term (0.149)*(.098)(St. dev of educational attainment in Malawi) =0.014 unit  or 
5% = (0.149*100)/(3.173)(St. dev of political instability in Malawi).   
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OECD and the joint effect has a positive sign although it is not significant. Put 
differently, a low level of gross tertiary enrolment reduces the role of youth bulge on 
political instability; however, the impact is lower in OECD than non-OECD countries. 
The interaction effect of youth bulge at mean percentage of educational attainment 40% 
on instability in OECD countries is 0.075. Increasing the percentage of youth bulge by 
one standard deviation at mean percentage of educational attainment enhances political 
instability in OECD countries by 0.358 units or 3% of one standard deviation of 
instability 124 ; in comparison with 0.870 units or 4% of one standard deviation of 
political instability in non-OECD countries 125 . The interaction effect of education at 
mean percentage of youth bulge 20.736% on instability in OECD countries is -0.108. 
Reduction in educational attainment by one standard deviation at mean percentage of 
youth bulge enhances political instability in OECD countries by 2.432 units or 5% of 
one standard deviation of political instability126; in comparison with 3.077 units or 4% 
of one standard deviation of political instability in non-OECD countries127.  
The similarity in the impact of joint effect on instability between OECD 
countries and non-OECD countries may be because the education effect on political 
environment goes through different channels. In OECD countries decreases in gross 
tertiary enrolment reduces the level of government taxes that can be used to finance 
programs allocated to high dependency ratios in these countries. This is because 
education stabilizes the political environment through different channels among others 
increasing the level of taxes by stimulating economic growth (Thyne, 2006).  
Alternatively, it might be that the level of gross tertiary enrolment is far below 
that required to sustain economic growth over the long run in OECD countries. Under 
                                                 
124 (The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with OECD)+[(the coefficient of the 
joint effect+ its coefficient in interaction with OECD)(40)(mean percentage of educational Attainment in 
OECD countries)= 0.076. One standard deviation increases in youth bulge is its coefficient in interaction 
term (0.076)*(4.784)(St. dev of youth bulge in OECD countries) =0.358 unit r 3% = 
(0.075*100)/(2.280)(St. dev of political instability in OECD countries). 
125 The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the jo int effect)(16.747)(mean percentage of gross 
tertiary enro lment in non-OECD)= 0.154. One standard deviation increases in youth bulge is its 
coefficient in  interaction term (0.154)*(5.628)(St. dev of youth bulge in non-OECD) =0.870 unit or 4% = 
(0.154*100)/(4.185)(St. dev of political instability in non-OECD).   
126 (The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment + its coefficient in interaction with OECD)+[(the 
coefficient of the joint effect+ the coefficient of interaction with OECD)(20.376)(mean percentage of 
youth bulge in OECD countries)= -0.108. One standard deviation decrease in educational attainment is its 
coefficient in interaction term (-0.108)*(22.473)(St. dev of gross tertiary enrolment in OECD countries) 
=2.432 unit or 5% = (0.108*100)/(2.280)(St. dev of political instability in OECD countries). 
127  The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(30.765)(mean 
percentage of youth bulge in non-OECD)= -0.165. One standard deviation decrease in educational 
attainment is its coefficient in interaction term (0.165)*(18.642)(St. dev of educational attainment in non-
OECD) =3.077 unit Or 4% = (0.165*100)/(4.185)(St . dev of political instability in non-OECD). 
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such conditions, some OECD countries (such as Germany in 2015) import immigrants 
to substitute shortages in labor forces. This comes at a political cost like the rise of right 
wing parties because immigrants are generally seen to create pressure on socioeconomic 
environments like housing. In non-OECD countries it might be that the percentage of 
youth bulge who are school leavers exceeds the percentage enrolled in tertiary 
education. Hence, education fails to increase an opportunity cost to prevent incidences 
of political instability as suggested by the opportunity perspective. This is in line with 
projections made by modernization theorist Huntington (1968) that education enhances 
political stability in countries with favorable economic condition because it increases an 
individual’s aspirations and expectations. Control variables have the expected 
significant sign except democracy, trade openness and urban growth rate. 
Model 34 examines another perspective channel that might moderate the role of 
youth bulge on political instability in oil countries through interaction with education.  
The independent effect of youth bulge enhances political instability; but it exposes 
lower risk in oil than non-oil countries. The independent effect of gross tertiary 
enrolment has a negative sign; however, it constitutes lower risk in oil countries than 
non-oil as the interaction between oil and gross tertiary education has a positive sign 
although it is not significant. In other words, a low level of gross tertiary enrolment 
enhances political instability and the risk is lower in oil than non-oil countries. The joint 
effect has a negative sign but it becomes positive on political instability in oil countries 
as the interaction term between oil and the joint effect has a positive yet insignificant 
sign. In other words, a low level of gross tertiary enrolment lowers the impact of youth 
bulge on political instability in non-oil countries; while high levels enhance the role of 
youth bulge in oil countries. The interaction effect of youth bulge at mean percentage of 
educational attainment 17.983% on political instability in oil countries is -0.064. 
Decreasing youth bulge by one standard deviation at mean percentage of gross tertiary 
enrolment enhances political instability in oil countries by 0.361 units or 1.5% of one 
standard deviation of instability 128 . The negative sign in the joint effect lowers the 
impact of youth bulge on political instability in non-oil countries; however, they 
continue to pose risk to the political environment. The interaction effect of youth bulge 
at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment 23.72% on instability in non-oil 
                                                 
128(The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with  oil dummy)+[(the coefficient of the 
joint effect+ the coefficient of interaction with oil dummy)(17.983)(mean percentage of educational 
attainment in o il countries)= -0.064. One standard deviation decrease in youth bulge is its coefficient in  
interaction term (0.064)*(5.633)(St.dev of youth bulge in oil countries) =0.361 unit Or 1.5% = 
(0.064*100)/(4.071)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries).  
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countries is 0.135. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge at mean percentage 
of gross tertiary enrolment escalates political instability in non-oil countries by 1.032 
units or 3.4% of one standard deviation of instability 129 . The interaction effect of 
education at mean percentage of youth bulge 31% on instability in oil countries is 
0.105. Each one standard deviation increase in education at mean percentage of youth 
bulge feeds instability by 1.840 units or 2.6% of one standard deviation of political 
instability in oil countries130. The interaction effect of education at mean percentage of 
youth bulge 28.84% on instability in non-oil countries is -0.170. Reduction in gross 
tertiary enrolment by one standard deviation at mean percentage of youth bulge 
enhances instability by 3.919 units or 4% of one standard deviation of instability131.  
The positive association between the joint effect and political instability in oil 
countries can be attributed to imbalance between demand and supply in labor markets 
and the effect of the Dutch disease. As suggested by rentier state theory, these countries 
expand educational opportunities to stabilize the political environment; however, the 
number of educated youth exceeds the number of available employment opportunities. 
For example, Saudi Arabia and Iran are among the oil countries that achieved the 
highest level of gross tertiary enrolment, at 22% and 28% respectively. However, this 
high level does not reduce the political risk in these countries as it remains high in Saudi 
Arabia (around 7) and in Iran (around 9) over the entire sample period (the average in 
oil countries is 7.5). It could be that while educational level improves, labor markets are 
not rewarded132. These countries face a risk of political instability from educated youth 
who experience difficulty in joining the labor market in line with projections by 
modernization theorist Huntington (1968), who attributes instability to the failure of the 
labor market to absorb an increasing number of educated youth bulge. Lack of 
diversification in economic activities in oil countries (as suggested by the Dutch disease 
model) that can accommodate different structures of educational attainment, in addition 
                                                 
129The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the jo int effect)(23.719)(mean percentage of gross 
tertiary enro lment in non-oil countries)= 0.135. One standard deviation increase in  youth bulge is its 
coefficient in  interaction term (0.135)*(7.635)(St. dev of youth bulge in  non-oil countries) =1.032 unit  or 
3.4% = (0.135*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non-oil countries).   
130 (The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment + its coefficient in interaction with oil dummy)+[(the 
coefficient of the jo int effect+ its coefficient of interaction with oil du mmy)(31)(mean percentage of 
youth bulge in oil countries)= 0.105.  One standard deviation increase in educational attainment is its 
coefficient in  interaction term (0.105)*(17.528)(St. dev of g ross tertiary enrolment in oil countries) 
=1.840 unit or 2.6% = (0.105*100)/(4.071)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries).  
131  The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment + [(the coefficient of the jo int effect)(28.84)(mean 
percentage of youth bulge in non-oil countries)= -0.170. One standard deviation decrease in educational 
attainment is its coefficient in interaction term (0.170)*(23.007)(St. dev of educational attainment in non-
oil countries) =3.919 unit or 4% = (0.170*100)/(3.985)(St.dev of political instability in non-oil). 
132 Youth unemployment in Iran is 23% and in Saudi Arabia is 28% in comparison with 17.7% in oil 
countries. 
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to reliance on capital- intensive projects that require highly qualified human resources 
exaggerates the risk of highly educated youth on political environments in oil countries 
because (as suggested by opportunity perspective) these have low opportunity cost.  
The negative relationship between the joint effect and political instability in non-
oil countries can be explained in that the level of education is insufficient to assist a 
government plan to increase its revenue or cut its expenditure; which in turn enhances 
political instability. In non-oil countries where taxes are the main source of government 
revenue public support is highly required to pass bills. Ritzen, Easterly, and Woolcock 
(2000) argue that an educated population are more likely to accept policy reform 
because they understand that the short term cost will be offset by benefits attained over  
the long run. Education increases government revenue and provides it with the 
necessary financial resources to defend anti-government movements. Thyne (2006) 
argues that wealth brought by education increases the level of taxes so that a 
government has financial resources to increase an individual’s opportunity cost to 
commit violence by outspending anti-government movements. Control variables have 
the expected significant sign except level of democracy and urban growth rate. 
Model 35 examines the impact of the joint effect between youth bulge and gross 
tertiary enrolment on political instability in democratic countries. Democratic countries 
are at higher political risk from youth bulge than autocratic countries. The independent 
effect of gross tertiary enrolment enhances political instability but its impact turns 
positive in democratic countries as the interaction term between democracy and gross 
tertiary enrolment has a positive sign and is significant at the 1% level. Democratic 
countries are at higher risk from increasing gross tertiary enrolment than autocratic 
countries. The joint effect has a negative sign although it is not significant; yet it 
exposes lower risk in democratic than autocratic countries as the interaction term 
between democracy and the joint effect has a positive insignificant sign. Put differently, 
a low level of gross tertiary enrolment lowers the role of youth bulge on political 
instability and the effect is lower in democratic than autocratic countries. The 
interaction effect of youth bulge at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment 40% on 
instability in democratic countries is 0.225. Youth bulge feeds political instability in 
democratic countries; one standard deviation increase in youth bulge at mean 
percentage of gross tertiary enrolment enhances political instability in democratic 
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countries by 1.689 units or 7.6% of one standard deviation of political instability133. The 
interaction effect of youth bulge has a negative sign with political instability in 
autocratic countries; their interaction effect at mean percentage of gross tertiary 
enrolment 15.876% on instability is -0.208. For each one standard deviation reduction 
in the percentage of youth bulge at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment 
instability in autocratic countries, there is an enhancement of 1.199 units or 5% of one 
standard deviation of instability 134 . The interaction effect of education at mean 
percentage of youth bulge 23.463% on political instability in democratic countries is -
0.014. One standard deviation decrease in gross tertiary enrolment at mean percentage 
of youth bulge enhances political instability in democratic countries by 0.333 units or 
0.5% of one standard deviation of instability135; in comparison with 4.579 units or 6.5% 
in autocratic countries136.  
The effect of education dominates the impact of the joint effect in autocratic 
countries the failure of government to increase educational opportunities at university 
level has direct and indirect impacts on the role of youth bulge on the prevailing 
political environment. Directly, autocratic regimes are interested in gaining support 
from segments that make up a significant percentage of the population as indicated by 
Brown and Hunter (2004), as is the case in autocratic countries where the percentage of 
youth bulge is higher than 30% of the population. Furthermore, expansion of education 
(all other things constant) satisfies some aspirations of the individual (Huntington, 
1968). Indirectly, it increases prospective income and employment opportunities 
available to youth bulge in the future; consequently, it decreases an individual’s 
                                                 
133 (The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with democratic dummy)+[(the 
coefficient of the joint effect + its coefficient in interaction with democratic dummy)(40)(mean  
percentage of educational attainment in  democratic countries)= 0.225.  One standard deviation increase in  
youth bulge is its coefficient in interaction term (0.225)*(7.511)(St . dev of youth bulge in democratic 
countries) =1.689 unit or 7.6% = (0.225*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of political instability in democratic 
countries).  
134 The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the jo int effect)(15.876)(mean percentage of gross 
tertiary enrolment in autocratic countries)= -0.208. One standard deviation decrease in youth bulge is its 
coefficient in interaction term (-0.208)*(5.754)(St. dev of youth bulge in autocratic countries) =1.199 unit  
Or 5% = (0.208*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of political instability in autocratic countries).   
135 (The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment + its coefficient in interaction with democratic 
dummy)+[(the coefficient of the joint effect+ its coefficient in interaction with democratic 
dummy)(23.463)(mean percentage of youth bulge in democrat ic countries)= -0.014. One standard 
deviation decrease in educational attainment is its coefficient in interaction term (-0.014)*(23.825)(St. 
dev of gross tertiary enrolment in  democratic countries) =0.333 unit or 0.5%  = (0.014*100)/ (2.948)(St. 
dev of political instability in democratic countries).   
136   The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment + [(the coefficient  of the joint effect)(31.682)(mean 
percentage of youth bulge in autocratic countries)= -0.281. One standard deviation decrease in 
educational attainment is its coefficient in interaction term (-0.281)*(16.313)(St. dev of educational 
attainment in autocratic countries) =4.579 unit or 6.5%  = (0.281*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of political 
instability in autocratic countries). 
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opportunity cost. Descriptive statistics of autocratic country Haiti show that its average 
gross tertiary enrolment over the sample period is 1% and its percentage of youth bulge 
is 34%. Haiti has a significantly less stable political environment (average score of 12.5 
in comparison to the average score in autocratic countries of 8.3).  
In democratic countries, low educational opportunities can enhance the role of 
youth bulge on instability. Brown and Hunter (2004) point out that governments in 
democratic countries come under pressure to increase resources available for higher 
education institutions. The authors concluded that governments are more responsive to 
demands raise by higher education institutions compared to other educational levels in 
democratic countries because lobbying group are more organized and have expert 
knowledge. Control variables have the expected significant sign except trade openness 
and urban growth rate. 
Model 38 investigates the impact of youth bulge moderated by gross tertiary 
enrolment on political instability in the MENA region. Youth bulge exposes higher 
political risk in non-MENA than the MENA region. The independent effect of gross 
tertiary enrolment has a negative sign and is not significant; however, it exposes higher 
risk in MENA than non-MENA regions as the interaction effect between MENA and 
gross tertiary enrolment has a negative sign but is not significant. Put differently, a low 
level of gross tertiary enrolment enhances political instability and the impact is higher in  
the MENA than non-MENA regions. The joint effect has a negative sign and is 
significant at the 10% level; however, it turns to a positive impact in the MENA region 
as the interaction term between MENA and the joint effect has a positive sign and is 
significant at the 1% level. In other words, a high level of gross tertiary enrolment 
enhances the role of youth bulge on political instability in the MENA region, while in 
non-MENA a low level reduces their role on political instability. The interaction effect 
of youth bulge at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment 15.579% on political 
instability on the MENA region is 0.329. Each one standard deviation increase in youth 
bulge at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment enhances political instability in 
MENA region by 1.435 units or 7.5% of one standard deviation of instability137 ; in 
comparison with 1.436 units or 5% of one standard deviation of instability in non-
                                                 
137 (The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with MENA dummy)+[(the coefficient 
of the joint effect+ its coefficient in interaction with MENA dummy)(15.579)(mean percentage of 
educational attainment in MENA countries)= 0.329.  One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its 
coefficient in  interaction term (0.329)*(4.364)(St. dev of youth bulge in MENA countries) =1.435 unit  or 
7.6% = (0.329*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political instability in MENA countries).  
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MENA138. The interaction effect of gross tertiary enrolment at mean percentage of youth 
bulge 32% on political instability in the MENA region is 1.136. Each one standard 
deviation increase in gross tertiary enrolment at mean percentage of youth bulge 
enhances political instability in MENA region by 13.588 units or 26% of one standard 
deviation of political instability139. In contrast, the interaction effect of gross tertiary 
enrolment at mean percentage of youth bulge 22.528% on political instability in non-
MENA region is -0.082. Each one standard deviation decrease in gross tertiary 
enrolment at mean percentage of youth bulge enhances political instability in non-
MENA countries by 1.847 units or 2% of one standard deviation of instability140.  
The positive relationship between the joint effect and political instability in the 
MENA region could be attributed to several reasons. Education increases a n 
individual’s expectations in term of income and employment opportunities; however, 
labor markets may not be rewarding (Collier, 2000). This is because of a skills 
mismatch between skills attained and skills required by the labor market. Huntington 
(1968) points out that education has a destabilization effect on the political environment 
when the supply of educated youth exceeds the demand of the labor market or there 
exists such a skill mismatch. Pissarides and Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2006) point out 
that the educational system in the MENA region is geared towards satisfying public 
sector needs; consequently, it increases pressure on educational institutions and an 
increasing number of youth who are queuing for employment in the sector. 
Furthermore, in the absence of political channels that might offer a release of the 
political risk of youth bulge, it is expected that the political situation will only become 
more exaggerated. Ross et al (2011) point out that a high level of educational attainment 
enhances political awareness among youth; however, institutional structure is not 
developed enough to accommodate such a change, in line with projections made by 
modernization theorist Huntington (1968). Control variables have the expected 
significant sign except rents from natural resources and urban growth rate. 
                                                 
138 The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the jo int effect)(22.478)(mean percentage of gross 
tertiary enro lment in non-MENA countries)= 0.213. One standard deviation increase in  youth bulge is its 
coefficient in interaction term (0.213)*(6.743)(St. dev of youth bulge in non-MENA countries) =1.436 
unit or 5% = (0.213*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-MENA countries). 
139(The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment + its coefficient in interaction with MENA dummy)+[(the 
coefficient of the joint effect+ its coefficient in interaction with MENA dummy)(32)(mean percentage of 
youth bulge in  MENA countries )= 1.136. One standard deviation increase in educational attainment is its 
coefficient in interaction term (1.136)*(11.962)(St. dev of gross tertiary enrolment in MENA countries) 
=1.136 unit or 26% = (1.136*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political instability in MENA countries).   
140 The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(29)(mean percentage 
of youth bulge in non-MENA countries)= -0.082. One standard deviation decrease in educational 
attainment is its coefficient in interaction term (-0.082)*(22.528)(St. dev of educational attainment in  
non-MENA countries) =1.847 unit or 2%  = (-0.082*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-
MENA countries). 
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Table 2.9 The Joint Effect of Youth Bulge and Gross Tertiary Enrolment on 
Political Instability over the Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable 
Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 Model 37 
YB 0.241*** 
(0.030) 
0.205*** 
(0.033) 
0.230*** 
(0.034) 
-0.129 
(0.085) 
0.258*** 
(0.031) 
GTE -0.041*** 
(0.015) 
-0.042** 
(0.016) 
-0.054*** 
(0.017) 
-0.153*** 
(0.025) 
-0.025 
(0.016) 
YB*GTE -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
OECD  -1.524*** 
(0.418) 
   
OCED*YB  -0.043 
(0.040) 
   
OECD*GTE*YB  0.0008 
(0.002) 
   
Oil   -2.175*** 
(0.782) 
  
Oil*YB   -.384** 
(0.156) 
  
Oil*GTE   0.005 
(0.102) 
  
Oil*GTE*YB   0.009 
(0.009) 
  
DD    -1.190** 
(0.530) 
 
DD*YB    0.394*** 
(0.095) 
 
DD*GTE    0.162*** 
(0.032) 
 
DD*GTE*YB    0.004 
(0.004) 
 
MENA     -3.039** 
(1.216) 
MENA*YB     -0.552*** 
(0.160) 
MENA*GTE     -0.119 
(0.077) 
MENA*GTE*YB     0.042*** 
(0.014) 
Constant 2.693* 
(1.396) 
1.479 
(1.478) 
3.830** 
(1.549) 
4.479*** 
(1.088) 
5.099*** 
(1.392) 
Adjusted R square 31% 34% 30% 38% 39% 
Number of observation 617 617 590 625 617 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one year 
lag of GDP growth as instrument of 
GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent  level, respectively. Variables included in model 2 are included in all models but the results not reported for space 
restrictions.  
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2.8.5 The Joint Effect Between Rents from Natural Resources and Youth Bulge 
on Political Instability   
 In this section the impact of the joint effect between youth bulge and rents from 
natural resources on political instability is examined; results are shown in Table 2.10141. 
 Model 38 examines the joint effect between rents from natural resources and 
youth bulge on political instability in the panel data. The independent effect of youth 
bulge has the expected positive sign and is significant at the 1% level. The independent 
effect of rents from natural resources has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting that a low level of rents from natural resources enhances political 
instability. The joint effect has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting the interaction effect of rent from natural resources is more important than 
high percentage of youth bulge to destabilize the political environment. The interaction 
effect of youth bulge at mean percentage of rents from natural resources 43.11% on 
political instability in Saudi Arabia is -0.234. One standard deviation decrease in youth 
bulge at mean percentage of rents from natural resources enhances political instability 
in Saudi Arabia by 0.483 units or 8% of one standard deviation of instability142. Rents 
from natural resources in one of the major exporters of crude oil in the world turns the 
threat of youth bulge on stability into a negative, while countries poor in natural 
resources like Lebanon fail to do so. In Lebanon, the interaction effect of youth bulge at 
mean percentage of natural resources 0.018% is 0.153. Each one standard deviation 
increase in youth bulge at mean percentage of natural resources 0.0185% enhances 
political instability by 0.422 units or 2.5% of one standard deviation of instability143. 
The interaction effect of rents from natural resources at mean percentage of youth bulge 
31% on political instability in Saudi Arabia is -0.329. Each one standard deviation 
decrease in rents from natural resources at mean percentage of youth bulge 31% 
enhances political instability in Saudi Arabia by 4.776 units or 12% of one standard 
                                                 
141 Model is not estimated for democratic countries and OECD because rents from natural resources are 
negligent.  
142 The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(43.11)(mean percentage of rents 
from natural resources in Saudi Arabia)= -0.234. One standard deviation decrease in youth bulge is its 
coefficient in interaction term (-0.234)*(2.068)(St. dev of youth bulge in Saudi Arab ia) =0.483 unit  or 8%  
= (0.234*100)/ (2.803)(St. dev of political instability in Saudi Arabia). 
143The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(0.0185)(mean percentage of rents 
from natural resources in Lebanon)= 0.153. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its 
coefficient in interaction term (0.153)*(2.744)(St. dev of youth bulge in Lebanon) =0.422 unit or 2.5% = 
(0.153*100)/(6.053)(St. dev of political instability in Lebanon). 
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deviation of political instability144; in comparison with 0.007 units or 5% in Lebanon145. 
The results are in line with projections made by rentier state theory that the direct and 
indirect distribution channels help a government to eliminate the risk of two typical 
sources of political instability incidences: rivals in the political system and mass anti-
government movements (De Mesquita and Smith, 2009). The research does not identify 
which distribution channels lead to stability because it is beyond the scope of this 
research objective. Control variables have a significant sign except the level of 
democracy, gross tertiary enrolment and urban growth rate. 
 Model 39 examines the impact of the joint effect between rents from natural 
resources and youth bulge on instability in MENA region. Youth bulge exposes higher 
political risk in non-MENA than the MENA region. The independent effect of rents of 
natural resources has a negative insignificant sign and it exposes higher risk in MENA 
than non-MENA regions as the interaction term between MENA and rents has negative 
sign although it is not significant; suggesting the stabilization effect of rents from 
natural resources is higher in MENA than non-MENA regions. The joint effect has a 
negative sign although it is not significant; however, it has a positive impact on political 
instability in the MENA region as the interaction term between the joint effect and 
MENA has a positive sign but is not significant. The interaction effect of youth bulge at 
mean percentage of natural resources 24.66% on political instability in MENA is -
0.276. Decreasing youth bulge at mean percentage of rents from natural resources 
enhances political instability in MENA by 1.208 units or 6% of one standard deviation 
of instability146. In contrast, the interaction effect of youth bulge at mean percentage of 
natural resources 8.582% on instability in non-MENA region is 0.228. One standard 
deviation increase in youth bulge at mean percentage of rents from natural resources 
enhances instability by 1.541 units or 6% of one standard deviation of instability147. The 
                                                 
144  The coefficient of rents from natural resources + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(31)(mean 
percentage of youth bulge in Saudi Arabia)= -0.329. One standard deviation decrease in rents from 
natural resources is its coefficient in interaction term (-0.329)*(14.493)(St. dev of rents from natural 
resources in Saudi Arab ia) =4.776 unit Or 12% = (0.329*100)/(2.803)(St. dev of political instability  in  
Saudi Arabia). 
145 The coefficient of rents from natural resources + [(the coefficient of the jo int effect)(29.335)(mean 
percentage of youth bulge in Lebanon)= -0.315. One standard deviation decrease in rents from natural 
resources is its coefficient in interaction term (-0.315)*(0.023)(St. dev of rents from natural resources in 
Lebanon) =0.007 unit or 5% = (0.315*100)/ (6.053)(St. dev of political instability in Lebanon). 
146(The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with MENA dummy)+[(the coefficient of 
the joint effect+ its coefficient in interaction with MENA dummy)(24.66)(mean percentage of rents from 
natural resources in MENA countries)= -0.276. One standard deviation decrease in youth bulge is its 
coefficient in interaction term (-0.276)*(4.364)(St. dev of youth bulge in MENA countries) =1.208 unit or 
6% = (-0.276*100)/(4.366)(St . dev of political instability in MENA countries).   
147The coefficient of youth bulge + [(the coefficient of the joint effect)(8.582)(mean percentage of rents 
from natural resources in non-MENA countries)= 0.228. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge 
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interaction effect of rents from natural resources at mean percentage of youth bulge 
32% on political instability in MENA is 2.763. One standard deviation increase in rents 
from natural resources at mean percentage of youth bulge enhances political instability 
by 2.763 units or 3% of one standard deviation of instability 148; whereas in non-MENA 
regions each one standard deviation decrease in rents from natural resources at mean 
percentage of youth bulge enhances instability by 0.315 units or 0.6% of one standard 
deviation of instability149.  
 The positive sign of the joint effect in the MENA region might be driven by 
corruption. As rents from natural resources increase, the level of corruption similarly 
increases. This lead to youth bulge in the region believing that what they receive from 
their government less than what they deserve. Hence, they might react violently to 
enforce a pattern of income distribution that achieves more income equality. Control  
variables have a significant sign except urban growth rate and gross tertiary enrolment.  
  
                                                                                                                                               
is its coefficient in interaction term (0.228)*(6.743)(St . dev of youth bulge in non-MENA countries) 
=1.541 unit or 6% = (0.228*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-MENA countries).   
148  (The coefficient of rents from natural resources + its coefficient in interaction with MENA 
dummy)+[(the coefficient of the joint effect+ its coefficient in interaction with MENA dummy)(32)(mean  
percentage of youth bulge in MENA countries)= 0.137. One standard deviation increase in rents is its 
coefficient in interaction term (0.137)*(20.138)(St. dev of rents from natural resources in MENA 
countries) =2.763 unit or 3% = (0.137*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political instability in MENA countries).   
149  The coefficient of rents from natural resources +[(the coefficient of the joint effect (29)(mean 
percentage of youth bulge in non-MENA countries)= -0.024. One standard deviation decrease in rents is 
its coefficient in interaction term (0.024)*(13.343)(St. dev of rents from natural resources in non-MENA 
countries) =0.315 unit  or 0.6% = (0.024*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of polit ical instability in non-MENA 
countries).   
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Table 2.10 The Joint Effect of Youth Bulge and Rents from Natural Resources on 
Political Instability over the period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: political instability  
Model 38 Model 39 
YB 0.154*** 
(0.034) 
0.232*** 
(0.035) 
Rents -0.051*** 
(0.015) 
-0.012 
(0.022) 
YB*Rents -0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.0004 
(0.003) 
MENA  -2.973** 
(1.234) 
MENA*YB  -0.647*** 
(0.277) 
MENA*Rents  -0.031 
(0.034) 
MENA*YB*Rents  0.006 
(0.007) 
Constant 2.914** 
(1.389) 
5.437*** 
(1.427) 
Adjusted R square 30% 37% 
Number of observation 617 617 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 
P-value 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one year lag of GDP 
growth as instrument of GDP growth) 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent  level, 
respectively. Variables included in model 2 are included in all models but the results not reported for space restrictions 
2.9 Sensitivity Analysis  
The final models estimated using the panel data set will be re-estimated using 
fixed effect (period effect) and an alternative proxy of political instability used by Saha 
and Yap (2013) as outlined earlier. The final models of the panel data set that will be re-
estimated are Model 2 that investigates the independent effect of youth bulge on 
political instability; Model 19 that examines the joint effect of youth bulge and 
economic growth on political instability; Model 24 that tests the joint effect of youth 
bulge and unemployment on political instability; Model 29 that explores the joint effect 
of youth bulge and the level of democracy on political instability; Model 33 that 
investigates the impact of youth bulge on political instability moderated by educational 
attainment; and Model 38 that tests the role of youth bulge on political instability 
moderated by rents from natural resources. The results are shown in the appendix. 
Model 2 tests the first hypothesis that countries experiencing a high percentage 
of youth bulge are more likely to experience political instability than countries  that do 
not, ceteris paribus. The independent effect of youth bulge retains its sign and 
significance under fixed effect and an alternative proxy of political instability.  
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Similarly, the coefficient of the control variables, while showing variation under 
alternative estimation techniques and the alternative proxy of political instability, they 
retain their sign and significance captured in Model 2. 
Model 19 examines the second hypothesis that the higher the economic growth 
in a country, the lower the impact of youth bulges on political instability. It retains its 
sign and significance in the fixed effect model and only retains its sign under the 
alternative proxy of political instability. The independent effect of economic growth and 
youth bulge has the expected significant sign in both models. The sign and significance 
of control variables are consistent across the three models except youth unemployment 
(that becomes insignificant with the expected positive sign under the alternative proxy 
of political instability model) and level of democracy (that yields a significant expected 
negative significant sign in the fixed effect model). 
Model 24 investigates the third hypothesis that assumes the higher the rate of 
youth unemployment in countries, the stronger the impact of youth bulge on instability,  
ceteris paribus. It retains its sign and significance only in the fixed effect model and 
retains its sign only in the model of the alternative proxy of political instability. The 
independent effect of youth bulge and youth unemployment retains its sign and 
significance in the fixed effect model and unemployment becomes insignificant with an 
expected positive sign under the model of alternative proxy of political instability. Most 
of the control variables show no variation either in sign or significance across the three 
models. 
  Model 29 examines the fourth hypothesis that assumes the higher the level of 
democracy in countries, the lower the impact of youth bulge on instability. The model 
retains its sign and significance under alternative estimation techniques and the 
alternative definition of political instability. The independent effect of the level of 
democracy retains its sign and significance under the fixed effect model, but under the 
alternative proxy of political instability it turns into an insignificant positive sign. 
Overall, control variables are resilient to change to both estimation method and 
alternative proxy. 
The role of youth bulge on political instability moderated by the level of 
educational attainment (as set out in the fifth hypothesis) is tested in Model 33. The 
hypothesis assumes that the higher the level of educational attainment, the stronger the 
impact of youth bulges on instability. The joint effect between the two variables and 
 115 
their independent effect retain their sign and significance across models. Control 
variables have a similar sign and significance across the three models. 
Model 38 tests the sixth hypothesis that assumes that the higher the rents from 
natural resources, the lower the impact of youth bulge on instability. The joint effect 
between the two variables and their independent effect retain their sign and significance 
across the three models. Control variables show stability in sign and significance across 
the three models except for the level of democracy, urban growth rate and gross tertiary 
enrolment.  
2.10 Conclusion and Discussion   
      Using an unbalanced data set containing 139 countries over a period from 1984 
to 2013, this study investigates the impact of the independent effect of youth bulge 
and their effect moderated by economic growth, unemployment, level of democracy, 
education and rents from natural resources on political instability in panel data 
analysis, OECD countries, oil countries, democratic countries and the MENA region. 
2.10.1 The Independent Effect of Youth Bulge on Political Instability 
The first hypothesis assumes that countries experience high percentages of youth 
bulge are more likely to experience political instability than countries do not, ceteris 
paribus.  
  Empirical results confirm the first hypothesis that a high percentage of youth 
bulge enhances political instability in panel data analysis. However, they expose a 
higher risk in non-OECD countries than OECD countries, in democratic countries than 
autocratic countries and in non-oil countries than oil countries. Interestingly, youth 
bulge shows a lower political risk in the MENA region than non-MENA; contrary to 
different claims that a high percentage of youth bulge in the region led to the so-called 
Arab Spring in late 2010. The higher risk of youth bulge in democratic than autocratic 
countries is in contrast to projections made by modernization theorist Huntington (1968) 
who points out that democracy enhances stability because it offers public political 
channels to raise their demands and settle their disputes peacefully. It might be 
introducing democracy in a country that has unfavorable economic and social 
environment leads to political instability. 
 The lower risk of youth bulge on political instability in oil countries than non-oil 
countries, in MENA region than non-MENA and their higher risk in democratic 
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countries than autocratic countries is further investigated by examining the impact of 
the quadratic term of youth bulge. Empirical results find an unexpected negative sign 
between the quadratic term of youth bulge and political instability in contrast to 
suggestions made by Huntington (1968) and in conflict with Urdal (2006) who finds an 
insignificant positive relationship.  
The independent effect of youth bulge in oil and MENA countries is further 
investigated by examining the joint effect between youth bulge and the quadratic term 
of the level of democracy. In oil countries, the role of youth bulge on political instability 
is enhanced at a low level of democracy; however, once it passes a certain level the 
destabilization effect is reduced. In the MENA region at a low level of democracy, the 
role of youth bulge enhances political instability; but once it exceeds a certain level 
destabilization takes over. 
The independent effect of youth bulge on political instability in the MENA 
region and oil countries is further investigated by examining the joint effect between 
youth bulge and the quadratic term of rents from natural resources on instability; 
however, no relationship is found.  
The empirical analysis could not find a specific percentage of youth bulge that 
makes a country more prone to political instability than other countries. This is in 
contrast to Huntington (1996) who proposes that a country faces higher risk of political 
instability when the percentage of youth bulge exceeds 20% of total population. One 
can argue that there is no such percentage that is applicable to all countries in the world 
because there are many factors influencing the role of youth bulge on political 
instability and determining such a percentage would require considering each country’s 
circumstances individually. Furthermore, even at the country level such a percentage is 
changeable according to the development in socioeconomic and political environments 
of a country. For example, as discussed earlier, a high percentage of youth bulge in 
Germany led to rise of Nazism in the 1940s; yet Germany in the 2000s has an ageing 
population that has led Germany to welcome more than one million refugees in 2015 to 
address this problem. 
2.10.1.1 Contribution  
The chapter provides support that the role of youth bulge on political instability 
cannot be limited to large-scale incidences of political instability like civil war as 
measured by the past empirical literature. Furthermore, it suggests that the threat of 
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youth bulge on political environment is present regardless of their percentage; however, 
there is variation in the scale of their impact on the political environment. This suggests 
that the independent effect provides a general explanation about the role of youth bulge 
on political instability; however, it does not precisely determine the channel(s) that 
enhances their role. This raises the importance of examining their role moderated by 
other factors.  
2.10.2 The joint Effect of Youth Bulge and Economic Growth on Political 
Instability 
The empirical results confirm the second hypothesis that higher economic 
growth lowers the impact of youth bulge on political instability; however, there is 
variation as to its impact on political environments across sub-samples. This is in 
contrast to Urdal (2006) who finds an insignificant negative relationship between the 
joint effect and armed conflict in panel data analysis. The independent effect of 
economic growth across all models has a significant negative sign in line with the 
findings of Alberto Alesina et al. (1996), Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002), Urdal (2006) and Marcus et al. (2008); however, the results are in 
conflict with Goldstone (2010) who finds no relationship. 
2.10.2.1 Contribution  
There is at present only one empirical research carried out by Urdal (2006) who 
examines the impact of the joint effect on political instability measured by armed 
conflict in panel data analysis without considering the heterogeneity in the percentage 
of youth bulge and other independent variables across region in the world. The present 
study finds that the joint effect is a significant matter for political instability in 
advancing economy like OECD countries and developing economies such as in the 
MENA region and oil countries. This is because economic growth determines the level 
of economic opportunities in a country. The results suggest that it is not the absolute 
percentage of youth bulge that constitutes a political risk but the failure of economic 
size or growth rate to satisfy their needs and requirements. Demonstrations that spread 
in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis occurred across a spectrum of countries 
with differing percentages of youth bulge (like Greece) suggesting that economic 
growth has an adverse impact on political environment; however, its impact and nature 
vary. Focusing on armed conflicts as a rare form of political instability ignores the 
influence of the joint effect on other frequent forms of political instability such as 
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demonstrations, riots and strikes. The present study finds a negative and significant 
relationship between the joint effect and political instability in panel data analysis, non-
OECD countries, autocratic countries, non-oil countries and non-MENA region 
2.10.3 The joint Effect of Youth Bulge and Youth Unemployment on Political 
Instability 
The empirical results find support for the third hypothesis that the higher the rate 
of youth unemployment, the stronger the impact of youth bulges on political instability. 
However, the joint effect exposes higher political risk in OECD rather than non-OECD 
countries, democratic than autocratic countries and in MENA than non-MENA region. 
In OECD and democratic countries, political instability might goes through political 
channels by decreasing the popularity of the prevailing government among the public, 
which has an adverse impact on incumbent chances in subsequent elections. In the 
MENA region, the absence of democratic channels escalates the risk of unemployed 
youth to severe conditions of instability in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and 
Syria where the percentage of unemployment among youth is the highest in the region. 
Other countries in the region that have comparable percentages, like Saudi Arabia, 
manage to waive their political risk by taking several financial measures in the wake of 
the so-called Arab Spring.   
The empirical results find no support that unemployment enhances the role of 
youth bulges on political instability in panel data analysis, oil and non-oil countries and 
autocratic countries. It could be that governments reduce unemployment by creating 
public employment. This creates pressure on public finance with adverse impacts on 
funds allocated to other important sectors.   
2.10.3.1  Contribution  
The chapter tests the impact of the joint effect between youth bulge and youth 
unemployment on political instability, which has not been tested before in the empirical 
literature (to the best of the author’s knowledge). There are two empirical studies that 
investigate the independent effect of youth bulge and unemployment but no interaction 
is examined. Bricker and Foley (2013) find that the independent effect of 
unemployment enhances instability, while Goldstone (2010) finds no relationship. 
Furthermore, this chapter finds that youth bulge enhances political instability in the 
MENA region through unemployment, which has not been confirmed by past empirical 
research. It finds that the joint effect has a positive and significant relationship with 
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political instability in OECD countries; however, the impact is substantially lower than 
the MENA region 
2.10.4 The joint Effect of Youth Bulge and Level of Democracy on Political 
Instability 
The fourth hypothesis assumes that the higher the level of democracy in a country, 
the lower the impact of youth bulge on political instability. In contrast, the empirical 
results find that improvement in the level of democracy enhances the role of youth 
bulge on political instability across all sub-samples. Furthermore, it finds that the joint 
effect enhances political instability substantially in the MENA region. Despite the 
similarity of the impact of joint effect on political instability across sub-samples, there 
are variations in its causes and their prospective impacts.  
In OECD and democratic countries the failure of governments to respond to youth 
bulge needs and requirement might spark small-scale incidences of instability such as 
riots, demonstrations and strikes. In oil countries and autocratic countries, democracy 
exposes restrictions on governments to stabilize the political environment through 
patron-client networks, low level of taxes and distribution expenditure. Furthermore, it 
increases political competition amongst the elite to gain access to oil rents by 
destabilizing the political environment through democratic practices. For example, 
introducing democracy to the oil country Kuwait enhanced political uncertainty. This 
arises from frequent forms of new government that occur every one and half years over 
a period from 1961 to 2004 which led to a substantial cost of development processes 
(Al-Ghazali, 2014).  
In the MENA region, it might be that the combination of under developed 
economic environments and social structures are not ready to seek democracy. While 
this study does not rule out the fact that democracy can lower the role of youth bulge on 
political instability, it emphasizes the important of laying down foundations for its 
introduction, such as education and economic level. More importantly, it requires 
creating a culture amongst the public such that the outcome of the democratic process 
should be respected and applied. Additionally, in countries where loyalty to family or 
tribe comes ahead of the state, the government needs to replace such loyalty to state 
before introducing democracy otherwise it becomes source of segmentation in society.   
 The positive association between the joint effect and instability represent a 
departure from the Goldstone (2001) argument that youth bulge turns into violence 
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when youth find it difficult to influence the political system, gain access to elite 
positions and there are insufficient channels in which to raise their demands peacefully. 
Similarly, it is in contrast with the modernization theorist argument made by Huntington 
(1968) that the risk of political instability in a country increases when the political 
system does not have channels to accommodate the civic skills of an educated 
generation. Empirically, this study differs from the finding of Urdal (2006) of an 
insignificant negative relationship between the joint effect and the risk of armed 
conflict. The independent effect of the level of democracy on instability does not hold 
across all models, in conflict with the empirical findings of Collier et al. (2000) and 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who find a negative association between regime type and 
political instability.  
2.10.4.1  Contribution  
This chapter examines the impact of the joint effect on political instability in 
different sub-samples and applies a broad proxy of political instability unlike Urdal 
(2006) who examines it in a panel data analysis using armed conflict as a proxy of 
instability. The use of different sub-samples to examine the joint effect is far superior in 
capturing the impact on instability than a panel data analysis because they take into 
account variations in socioeconomic environment. This is because the benefits of 
democracy required favorable socioeconomic environments; otherwise it leads to 
instability (Hegre and Nome, 2010). Furthermore, the study finds a positive and 
significant relationship between the joint effect and political instability in panel data 
analysis and MENA region. In the MENA region, the results suggest that other factors 
influence youth bulge and that living standards are more important than introducing 
democracy.  
2.10.5 The joint Effect of Youth Bulge and Level of Educational Attainment on 
Political Instability 
The fifth hypothesis assumes that the higher the level of educational attainment, 
the stronger the impact of youth bulges on instability. The empirical results confirm the 
hypothesis in the MENA region and oil countries.  
Oil countries rely on distribution expenditure among other expanding 
educational opportunities to stabilize their political environment, as suggested by rentier 
state theory without considering the requirements of their labor market. The ir labor 
markets are dominated by oil industries that require few highly qualified human 
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resources as suggested by the Dutch Disease model. The risk of educated youth with 
university level attainment on instability is higher than youth with education less than 
university degree level. Modernization theorist Huntington (1968) points out that the 
higher the educational attainment among the unemployed, the stronger the 
destabilization effect on the political environment.  
In the MENA region, rentier state theory and the Dutch Disease model are 
applicable to many countries because they are rentier countries. There is also another 
issue associated with education in the region, which is the existence of a skills mismatch 
between the skills attainted from the educational system and those required by labor 
markets, leading to different scenarios in countries rich in natural resources and 
countries poor in natural resources. In countries rich in natural resources like 
monarchies in the Arabic Peninsula, governments continue to absorb educated youth 
into the public sector while the private sector continues to be dominated by expatriate 
workers. This has an adverse impact on these governments’ efforts to diversify 
economic activities by consuming much needed public resources to create public 
employment. These resources could be allocated to specific sectors to promote 
economic growth in the long run. Furthermore, they deprive their economies from the 
financial resources remitted annually by expatriate workers in the private sector to their 
home country. In resources-poor countries, the skills mismatch reduces their ability to 
diversify their economic activities in order to reduce pressure on government to act as 
an employer of last resort.  
This positive joint effect in the MENA region and oil countries is in line with 
Urdal (2006) who finds an insignificant positive relationship between the joint effect of 
youth bulge and education on armed conflict and a significant positive relationship with 
the onset of terrorism, riot and violent demonstration.   
 In other contexts such as OECD countries, democratic countries and panel data 
analysis, the joint effect is negative. In OECD countries it might be that decreasing 
gross tertiary enrolment has a downward effect on collected taxes needed to stimulate 
economic growth and to meet expenditures for care of ageing populations in these 
countries. In democratic countries, the failure of democratic government to respond to 
pressures created by lobby groups to expand educational opportunities at university 
level leads to further instability. 
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The independent effect of gross tertiary enrolment is negatively associated with 
instability across most of the models in line with the findings of Alesina and Perotti 
(1996), Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Barakat and Urdal (2009); but is against the 
findings of Winckler (2002), Goldstone (2002) and Urdal (2006) who find that increases 
in the level of education increases the level of political instability; lastly the results are 
in conflict with Goldstone (2010) who finds no relationship. This is in contrast to the 
modernization theorist argument by Huntington (1968) that a high level of educational 
attainment leads to democracy, or otherwise to instability. 
2.10.5.1 Contribution 
This chapter examines the impact of the joint effect on political instability under 
different circumstances using a broader concept of political instability. It also uses an 
alternative measure of political instability. This is unlike Urdal (2006) who pooled 
countries without considering variation between them in percentage of youth bulge and 
level of educational attaintment. The descriptive statistics of the two variables show 
there is a significant variation in the two variables across all sub-samples. Urdal (2006) 
used armed conflict as his dependent variable, which might be considered as an 
infrequent incidence of instability as discussed earlier in this chapter. Urdal (2006) also 
uses another proxy of political instability that measures small-scale instability; however, 
it has been criticised for its bias towards countries that have high interests in Western 
agendas as discussed earlier. The present study finds a negative and significant 
relationship between the joint effect and political instability in panel data analysis and 
non-oil countries. Furthermore, it finds that the joint effect has a positive and significant 
relationship with political instability in the MENA region.     
2.10.6 The joint Effect of Youth Bulge and Rents from Natural Resources 
Attainment on Political Instability 
The sixth hypothesis assumes that the higher the rents from natural resources, 
the lower the impact of youth bulges on instability. The empirical results confirm the 
hypothesis in a panel data analysis. The reliance on non-tax revenue gives a government 
flexibility to arrange funds in response to the sudden threat of youth bulge on political 
environments, especially in countries where they have accumulated reserves from oil 
rents. Such flexibility might not exist in countries reliant on tax revenues. This is 
because increased taxes might increases dissatisfaction among the public, especially 
when living costs are beyond their means. Furthermore, increasing taxes might go 
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through long procedures either to pass bills in parliament in democratic countries or by 
preparing the public to receive such increases in autocratic countries in order to 
eliminate its adverse impact on public satisfaction. The empirical results of this study 
are in line with rentier state theory that assumes rents from oil have a strong 
stabilization effect on political environment.  
In the MENA region the joint effect has a positive relationship with instability. 
It could be that while oil rents increase it does not meet youth bulge requirements. Oil 
rents consumed by a high level of corruption or that is invested in patron-client 
networks while educated youth experience unemployment enhances instability. A 
government failure to distribute part of oil rents voluntarily to satisfy youth bulge 
requirements provides youth with motivation to enforce distribution by violent means in 
line with projection made by rent seeking theory.  
The independent effect of rents from natural resources on instability is in line 
with empirical results found by Ross (2001), Sandbakken (2006) and Ross et al. (2011) 
who find a negative relationship between rents and political instability; however, it goes 
against the empirical literature on rent seeking as found by Isham et al. (2005) and 
Taydas and Peksen (2012) who find a positive relationship between rents and 
instability. Similarly, it is against other empirical studies that find no relationship 
between the two variables such as Fearon and Laitin (2003), Blattman and Miguel 
(2010), Goldstone (2010) and Bricker and Foley (2013). 
2.10.6.1 Contribution 
The chapter examines the impact of the joint effect on political instability that 
(to the best of the author’s knowledge) has not been tested before in empirical research. 
Past empirical research examines the independent effect of rents from natural resources 
without examining its interaction with youth bulge on instability in rentier states. It 
finds a negative and significant relationship between the joint effect and political 
instability in panel data analysis.  
 The six hypotheses in this chapter test prospective channels of instability in the 
MENA region, which (again, to the best of the author’s knowledge) forms the first 
empirical research to consider the role of youth bulge on instability in the region 
moderated by other factors.   
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2.11 Future Research   
Future research concerning is necessary to examine the independent effect of 
youth bulge on instability in countries where the percentages of youth bulge is similar 
yet they display variations in socioeconomic and political environment. For example, 
while countries in the MENA region have a similar percentage of youth bulge, 
monarchies in the Arabic Peninsula have stable environments, some of which is 
equivalent to levels in fully developed countries. However, these monarchies fall behind 
developed countries in other areas like level of democracy and bureaucratic quality. 
What factors contribute to their stability? Is there a relatively small population size in 
these monarchies compared to other countries in the region? Or are there economic 
opportunities that continue to attract people from around the globe to work and live 
there? These questions are left for future research to explore.   
The role of youth bulge on political instability moderated by economic 
environment suggests several clear directions for future research. One interesting area is 
the role of youth bulge on political instability moderated by entrepreneurship. The 
importance of the sector can be seen from its ability to absorb a sizable fraction of the 
labour force, unlike the industrial sector. The latter sector needs less labour because of 
technology advancement that has led to less need for human resources. Similarly, the 
service sector hires more human resources than other sectors; it would be interesting to 
study the variation of political instability between countries with similar percentages of 
youth bulge with differing sizes of service sectors. 
The empirical results find no support that unemployment enhances the role of 
youth bulges on political instability in panel data analysis, oil and non-oil countries and 
autocratic countries. This chapter offers several explanations for such results, which 
need to be verified by future research. One possible research area is the impact of 
unemployment at different educational levels on political instability. Unemployed youth 
with primary education might or might not be more risky to political environments than 
youth with university level education. In other words, what is the impact of different 
levels of education on the role of unemployed youth on political instability?        
The joint effect between democracy and youth bulge on instability also requires 
further investigation. It might be that the absence of democracy in countries with a high 
percentage of youth bulge is offset by the availability of economic opportunities and 
abundance of employment. For example, countries in the MENA region have a high 
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percentage of youth bulge and a low level of democracy; however, monarchies in the 
Arabic Peninsula do not experience the instability of other countries in the region. What 
factors explain the variation in the impact of joint effect on political instability under 
these two different conditions? 
The mismatch between education and economic opportunities enhances political 
instability in countries as projected by modernization theory. Turning education from 
threat to opportunity requires further investigation in the areas of skills match and 
education quality. High levels of educational attainment can be masked by poor quality 
or mismatch with labour market requirements. Investigation into the role of youth bulge 
on political instability in countries with high quality educational systems versus poor 
quality systems can help to address the weakness in the educational system and the 
failure of the labour market to absorb youth with a university-education. Alternatively, 
future research can investigate their impact on instability in countries that include 
developing civic skills into the educational curriculum versus countries that do not. 
2.12  Policy Implications  
Overall, empirical results show that socioeconomic and political factors 
moderate the role of youth bulge on the prevailing political environment. Hence, public 
policy needs to create a favorable economic environment and educational system that 
matches its requirements in order to turn youth bulge from demographic curse into 
demographic dividends.  
Policy makers need to place more emphasis on education that can stabilize the 
political environment directly by providing youth with civic skills that make them less 
violent, and indirectly by stimulating economic growth. Directly it equips youth with 
civic skills that make them rely on discussion to settle their disputes (rather than 
violence) so that one of the key requirements of democracy is achieved. Indirectly, it 
stimulates economic growth by providing labor markets with youth that have different 
educational levels. Failing to do so leads to a skills mismatch between supply and 
demand of human resources that forces a government to act as employer of last resort or 
re-qualify youth to match labor market requirements, otherwise their threat on political 
environment increases. While public employment offer a quick response to the youth 
bulge issue, circumstances in some countries might restrict its use, such as insufficient 
financial resources. Countries that have insufficient financial resources may select to 
continue to enlarge the public sector by decreasing wage levels, its growth or 
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depreciating their currency to meet expected wages. Under such conditions they shift 
political risk from youth to other areas such as increasing the level of corruption. This 
has an adverse impact on all country-specific aspects over the long run.  
Policy makers should not expand educational opportunities to release the threat 
on the political environment over the short run, especially when labor markets are not 
rewarding. This has several adverse consequences on political environment over the 
long run. It decreases education quality, especially when the allocated resources do not 
keep pace with the sharp increase in educational opportunities. It relieves their risk on 
stability over the short run but renews their risk over the long run, and may even make 
the risk stronger once youth complete their study and find it difficult to  join the labor 
market.    
Policy makers need to boost economic growth in labor-intensive sectors such as 
services and entrepreneurship. In some countries where youth bulge makes up a high 
percentage of the population like the MENA region, the entrepreneurship sector is 
underdeveloped for several reasons; mainly insufficient finance for start ups and 
cumbersome administration procedures. Addressing these obstacles can achieve dual 
objectives for the region. First, it helps to create employment opportunities. Second, it 
creates a new culture in a society that employment is not the sole responsibility of a 
government and that each individual is responsible to find his/her way in the labor 
market. Policy makers need to develop diversification in service activities that tend to 
absorb an increasing number of job seekers. Developing one service sector over another 
may put economic growth, and in turn stability, at risk. For example, Egypt and Tunisia 
face difficulties in boosting economic growth in the aftermath of the regime change in 
2011 because of their heavy reliance on tourism that requires a high level of stability. 
One possible service sector that contributes to long run economic growth as found by 
empirical research is a high level of integration with international markets as measured 
by trade openness. Hence, policy makers need to address obstacles hinder ing trade 
openness and develop infrastructure to boost it. By doing so, government and the 
country as a whole reap the benefits. The government benefits by increasing its revenue, 
which can be reallocated to eliminate the risk of specific factors that contribute to 
political instability such as low educational attainment. Economic diversification 
brought by trade openness reduces pressure on government to act as an employer of last 
resort. Such diversification produces demand on human resources at different 
educational structures; consequently, it directs the public to areas of study with the 
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highest potential endowment. This contributes to a reduction in unemployment observed 
in some countries because of skills mismatch. In some countries that do not have 
manufacturing based products, they can specialize in re-exporting trade to other 
countries. In summary, policy makers can reduce the role o f youth bulge by creating a 
combination of an attractive economic environment and educational system that 
satisfies the needs of such an environment.   
          One prospective channel to reduce unemployment resulting from poor domestic 
economic growth is encouraging youth bulge to start e-commerce projects. Such 
projects connect domestic youth entrepreneurs to costumers with different needs and 
requirements at a worldwide level. This helps to mitigate the influence of the prevailing 
domestic economic environment in the role of youth bulge on instability.    
 Public policy needs to consider a country’s unique circumstances to succeed in 
addressing the role of youth bulge on political instability. Policy that pays off in other 
countries might not provide comparable dividends in other countries. For example, 
some countries in the MENA region achieve high levels of educational attainment yet 
suffer from a skills mismatch problem. These countries need to reform their educational 
system to match skills required by labor markets. Other countries in the region have low 
educational attainment, so their priority should be increasing the number and quality of 
educational opportunities. 
 The level of democracy can mitigate the risk of youth bulge causing political 
instability when a country has attributes such as a high level of economic development 
and a high level of educational attainment. Introducing democracy to offset the adverse 
impact of poor economic development on the political environment can lead to a severe 
case of political instability. Hence, policy makers need to prioritize economic and 
political factors according to their importance to the political environment. Achieving 
economic development and high levels of educational attainment prior to 
democratization enhances the probability that democracy will not case an outbreak of 
political instability.  Policy makers should be aware that, by its very nature, democracy 
needs a long period of time to consolidate. Mature democracy requires a change in 
attitudes both among voters and decision makers within institutions.   
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Chapter 3 
Does Corruption Enhance Political Instability? 
3.1  Introduction  
A high percentage of youth bulge in a country creates pressure on economic and 
political opportunities. The presence of corruption can cause further deterioration in the 
availability of these opportunities. This is because corruption has adverse implications 
for macroeconomic stability, foreign direct investment, entrepreneurship and 
governmental regulation. In addition, it can increase the level of suffering among poor 
people who find it difficult to gain access to public goods and services without paying 
bribes, as indicated by the World Bank (2000). To summarize the adverse impact of 
corruption on a society Transparency International (TI) (2015) comments that “public 
sector corruption is so much more than missing money. It is about people’s lives”. 
The annual bribery worldwide is estimated to total around one trillion US 
dollars. This estimation includes only corruption in the form of bribes paid by private 
agents to public officials and does not include other forms of corruption such as 
embezzlement and theft of public funds. Although embezzlement is not included in the 
estimation it can be a serious problem when corruption is widespread in a country. TI 
estimates public funds embezzled by the Suharto regime in Indonesia to be somewhere 
between US$15-35 billion. Similarly, embezzled funds by Marcos in the Philippines, 
Mobutu in Zaire, and Abacha in Nigeria are estimated to be around US$5 billion each 
(Kaufmann, 2005). Given the devastating impact of corruption, it has garnered 
significant attention from international organizations and policy makers worldwide. The 
political consequences of corruption received further attention with the onset of the so-
called Arab spring in late 2010 in the MENA region, which can be partially attributed to 
widespread corruption in some countries in the region.  
Empirical and theoretical research on the consequences of corruption explores 
its impact mainly on the economy150, government performance or public welfare151 .  
There are only a few empirical studies that explore its independent effect on the level of 
political instability. Fjelde (2009) points out that there is no systemic empirical 
investigation that explores the impact of corruption on the level of political instability. 
                                                 
150 See for example and Wei and Sh leifer (2000), Habib and Zurawicki (2002), Ketkar, Murtuza and 
Ketkar (2005), Méon and Sekkat (2005). 
151 See appendix for past empirical work on the consequences of corruption. 
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Neudorfer and Theuerkauf (2014) indicate that there are few empirical studies that 
explore the impact of corruption on the level of political instability using a large number 
of countries and covering an extended period of time.  
Past empirical literature is twice as likely to explore the determinants of 
corruption rather than its consequences as indicated by Judge, McNatt, and Xu (2011). 
Two empirical studies only examine the impact of the independent effect of corruption 
on the level of political instability; namely, Damania, Fredriksson and Mani (2004) and 
Mo (2001). However, their main focus is not on investigating the impact of the 
independent effect of corruption on political instability. This means that they did not 
provide an explanation of the nature of the relationship between these two variables. 
Damania et al. (2004) aim to identify the circumstances that lead to persistence of 
corruption and policy distortion in certain political regimes. They find that a high level 
of political instability reinforces this tendency. Mo (2001) aims to identify the 
transmission channel that links corruption with poor economic growth. Mo finds that 
the political instability channel accounts for 53% of the negative effect of corruption on 
economic growth. This is certainly significant and warrants further study. 
There is debate in the literature about the impact of the independent effect of 
corruption on political instability. The first view assumes it has a destructive impact on 
the political environment while the second view states that it enhances stability. 
Amundsen (1999) illustrates its stabilization effect in Southeast Asian countries and its 
destabilization effect in some African countries. One possible explanation is the impact 
of corruption on the political environment is moderated by other factors such as youth 
bulge, youth unemployment and education. The importance of the moderation effect 
comes from its potential to explain how corruption may increase the level of political 
instability or how it forms an alternative to reform as indicated by Huntington (1968) 
and Leys (1965). Although there are several studies that point out to the importance of 
the joint effect between corruption and the above factors, there is little empirical 
research that tests for it (Farzanegan, Reza and Witthuhn, 2014). Only one empirical 
study investigates the impact of corruption on political instability moderated by youth 
bulge. Farzanegan et al. (2014) test the impact of the joint effect of corruption and youth 
bulge on political instability and they find a significant positive relationship.  
This chapter aims to extend the tentative initial forays in the literature by 
examining the consequences of corruption; more precisely, its impact on political 
instability. To this end, it examines empirically the independent effect of corruption on 
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political instability. This study is distinct from Damania et al. (2004) and Mo (2001) in 
several important aspects. First, the main focus of the present study is to examine the 
direct effect of corruption rather than its indirect effect through other channels. Damania 
et al. (2004) investigate the judicial efficiency channels that link political instability to 
high levels of corruption. Similarly, Mo (2001) aims to identify the channels that link 
corruption with poor economic growth.  
Second, this study uses a longer data set that covers a period from 1984 to 2013 
unlike the previous studies. Damania et al. (2004) examine the effect using a cross 
sectional data set covering a period from 1997 to 1999. This short time period has been 
criticized because it is insufficient in capturing the causal relationship that runs from 
independent to dependent variables. Adsera, Boix, and Payne (2003) argue that the 
annual variation in corruption score in a country may be related to specific scandals or 
electoral episodes more than actual behavior. Montinola and Jackman (2002) point out 
that such variation is high, especially in countries experiencing political reform. In such 
circumstances variation in corruption score may be due to measurement error related to 
high levels of reporting of corruption scandals associated with democracy instead of 
actual behavior. Similarly, Goldsmith (1999) indicates that new democratic systems 
experience high levels of corruption because of high levels of reporting of corruption 
scandals.  
Third, this study takes the novel step of investigating the influence of corruption 
in the role of youth bulge on political instability. It will further extend the sparse 
literature in the political consequences of corruption by examining its effect moderated 
by other factors. This is unique from Farzanegan et al. (2014) who examine only the 
joint effect of corruption with youth bulge on political instability. The present study is 
distinct because it measures youth bulge as the ratio of youth aged 15-24 years old to 
population aged 15 and older unlike Farzanegan et al. (2014) who measure it as the 
number of population aged 17-25 years old as a percentage of the working age 
population (15-64 years old). Additionally, it uses a longer data set spanning 1984 to 
2013 in comparison with the data the set used by the previously mentioned study that 
covers a period from 2002 to 2012. Furthermore, the present study examines the 
prospective channels that link corruption and political instability through labor markets 
and education. Thus, it forms an entirely novel and powerful means of analysis of the 
effects of corruption on political instability by considering a spectrum of influencing 
factors. 
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Moreover, this study differs from past empirical research that investigates the 
independent and the joint effect of corruption on political instability in its choice of data 
set and analysis approach. It uses a measurement of corruption from the International 
Country Guide Risk (ICGR) that capture its political risk 152 . The data set measures 
political and bureaucratic corruption; however, it gives more emphasis to the former. 
Political corruption is the main focus of theoretical argument in corruption as indicated 
by Fjelde and Hegre (2014). Political corruption exposes higher risk to the political 
environment than bureaucratic corruption through its adverse impact on public 
investment projects that improve public welfare (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998). ICGR 
measures the political risk of corruption rather than its level (Lambsdorff, 2007). This 
overcomes the influences of culture and religion that might influence the strength or 
weakness of the relationship between corruption and political instability (Eckstein, 
1988). For example, in some cultures it is not a threat to the political environment 
because it is seen as “grease in the wheel” more than “sand in the wheel” (Goldsmith 
1999). The data set used in this study considers the four forms of political corruption, 
namely market, patronage, nepotism, and crisis (Johnston, 1986). Another difference 
between this study and previous research is that it measures political instability using an 
aggregate index of internal conflict and government stability from ICGR. Mo (2001) 
measures political instability in the form of annual political assassinations per million 
and number of revolutions per year; both observations are averaged over the sample 
period. These are rare incidences of political instability, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Farzanegan et al. (2014) measure political risk of corruption using the World 
Governance Indicators. Damania et al. (2004) measure it as the likelihood that a 
government will be destabilized or overthrown using an index constructed by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). In addition, this study examines the 
independent and the joint effect of corruption on political instability based on OECD 
countries, level of democracy, oil revenue and MENA region, which are expected to 
influence the relationship between corruption and political instability. These sub-
divisions show significant variation in the percentage of youth bulge, corruption and 
other determinants of political instability. The final distinction between this study and 
the prior studies is that it examines the independent effect of corruption in countries 
based on their score of corruption, income level and the percentage of youth bulge. It 
investigates the impact of youth bulge moderated by corruption on political instability at 
                                                 
152Damania et al. (2004) and Mo (2001) measure it  using a corruption index from TI while Farzanegan, 
Reza and Witthuhn (2014) utilize World Governance Indicators from the World Bank.  
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each level of corruption. It further explains the impact of youth unemployment and 
corruption in countries with corruption above the average value versus countries with 
less than the average value. In short, it forms a comprehensive study on political 
corruption.   
The main hypothesis of this study is that the independent effect of corruption 
enhances political instability. Furthermore, corruption exaggerates the impact of gross 
tertiary education, youth bulge and unemployment on political instability. These 
hypotheses will be examined by using unbalanced panel data based on observations 
from 139 countries covering a period from 1984 to 2013. Additionally, it will 
investigate the impact on political instability in OECD, democratic, oil and MENA 
countries. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a review of the 
literature; Section 3.3 explores the link between corruption and political instability; 
Section 3.4 discusses the link between youth bulge, corruption and political instability; 
Section 3.5 outlines the models, data and methodology; Section 3.6 provides the 
measurement of corruption; Section 3.7 outlines the estimation strategy; Section 3.8 
gives the estimation results; Section 3.9 provides the sensitivity analysis; Section 3.10 
provides a discussion and conclusion; Section 3.11 posits future research and Section 
3.12 provides policy implications.  
3.2 Literature Review: The Effect of Corruption  
The following section provides a brief overview of the independent effect of 
corruption on political instability and its moderated effect by other factors that lead to 
reduce economic opportunity in a society.  
3.2.1 The Effect on Political Instability 
Although corruption is a political factor, it has a negative impact on a society 
(O'Sullivan et al., 2011). Corruption, through its adverse impact on a government’s 
financial and non-financial performance, reduces a government’s ability to provide 
sufficient quality and quantity of public goods and services. This creates a favorable 
environment for political instability. 
A high level of corruption has adverse impacts on a government’s financial and 
non-financial performance. In financial performance, corruption negatively affects 
public expenditure and revenues. Public expenditure tends to favor sectors that increase 
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the opportunities of rent seeking at the expense of sectors that aim to create public 
goods and services that contribute to the political survival of a government (Amundsen, 
1999). Henderson and Singer (2000) indicate that public expenditure tends to be 
allocated to sectors that increase the opportunities of rent seeking activities like military 
expenditure in countries with high levels of corruption. Empirical research supports the 
positive association between corruption and misallocation of public expenditure. In 
panel data analysis Gupta, De Mello, and Sharan (2001) find a significant positive 
relationship between corruption and military expenditure as measured by military 
expenditure as a ratio of GDP. In the case of public revenues, a high level of corruption 
decreases the level of government revenues.  Friedman , Johnson , Kaufmann , and 
Zoido-Lobaton (2000) find in cross sectional analysis that government size (measured 
by the percentage of taxes to general revenue) tends to be small in a country with a high 
level of corruption because many firms prefer to operate underground to avoid poor 
bureacratic quality. Mauro (1997) indicates that corruption increases lost taxes in the 
form of tax evasion or tax exemption. Tanzi and Davoodi (1998) find in panal data 
analysis that corruption reduces the level of government revenue as a percentage of 
GDP even when controlling for per capita GDP. In non financial government 
performance, Nice (1986) indicates that political debate in a country with a high level of 
corruption is dominated by charges and counter charges of corruption incidences that 
come at the expense of development policies that aim to benefit society.  
The waning of government performance in the face of a high level of corruption 
produces several consequences on sustainable development and public welfare. Public 
expenditure tends to favor sectors that are economically and socially unproductive such 
as rent seeking and private goods at the expense of sectors that contribute to sustainable 
development such as health and education. Underproviding in these sectors hurts the 
public, especially these who cannot substitute these goods and services from private 
providers. Empirical research confirms the negative association between lack of 
provision of the developmental sector and the level of corruption. Gupta, Davoodi, and 
Tiongson (2000) find in cross sectional analysis that a high level of corruption has 
adverse effects on provision indicators of health care and education sectors. Mauro 
(1997) finds in panel data analysis a significant negative relationship between 
expenditure on education and health on one side and the level of corruption on the 
other. Similarly, Mauro (1997) finds a significant negative relationship with expenditure 
on transfer payments, social insurance, and welfare payments; however, the relationship 
does not hold when GDP per capita is introduced into the model. This under provision 
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on education harms economic growth over the long run because empirical research into 
the determinants of economic growth find that education is an engine for long term 
economic growth as shown by Barro (1992) and Levine and Renelt (1992) as cited by 
Gupta et al. (2000). Furthermore, Gupta et al. (2001) and Li, Xu, and Zou (2000) find in 
panel data analysis that corruption is negatively related to different measurements of the 
level of economic development such as GDP per capita, gross secondary enrolment and 
urbanization rate.  
A high level of corruption increases the level of income inequality in a country. 
It increases income inequality because misallocation of public expenditure leads to 
inefficient quality and quantity of public goods and services, making them available 
only to members of the public who can pay bribes or who have personnel connections 
as indicated by Taydas, Peksen, and James (2010). Significant resources are required to 
involve in corruption. These resources are excellent personal connections, exclusive 
knowledge of government operations and the funds required to offer bribes and hire 
legal assistance in the case of being caught (Nice, 1986). Furthermore, private agents 
can misallocate public resources for their own benefit (Ansani and Daniele, 2012). 
Empirical research confirms the positive association between corruption and income 
inequality. Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme (2002) find in panel data analysis a 
significant positive relationship. They estimate that one standard deviation153 increase in 
the level of corruption increases GINI cofficients by 11%. Gyiman-Brempong (2002) 
finds in panel data analysis of some African countries a significant positive relationship  
and the result is robust to changes in estimation techniques. Li et al. (2000) find that 
corruption explains a large proportion of variation in income inequality across 
countries. Gupta et al. (2000) find in panel data analysis a significant negative 
relationship between corruption and income growth of the bottom 20% of the 
population. The association between the two variables tend to enhance each other so 
that a country falls prey to a vicious circle of income inequality and corruption, as found 
by Jong-Sung and Khagram (2005) who find in panel data analysis that corruption 
reproduces existing income inequalities because it provides the public with justification 
to continue corruption activities.  
Supply shortage of quantity and quality of public goods and services resultant 
from a high level of corruption may lead to political instability for several reasons. First, 
it signals a state weakness to manage and control a society; as consequence, opportunity 
                                                 
153 One standard deviation in corruption is three points in  the scale of ten points. 
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theory assumes an individual’s opportunity cost to commit political instability 
incidences decreases (Taydas et al., 2010). Second, it reduces public trust on the 
political regime because of its failure to provide sufficient quantity and quality of 
welfare enhancing public goods and services (Taydas et al., 2010). For example, Azam 
(2001) attributes much of the political instability incidences in Africa to government 
failure to deliver public goods that are needed by the public. Similarly, Gupta et al. 
(2001) and Li et al. (2000) indicate that under provision in the developmental sector 
(such as education and health care) increases the risk of political instability over the 
long run. The public distrust of government performance leads them to resist any 
governmental plan to expand its operation on the basis that it will constitute yet another 
method to conceal corruption transactions (Nice, 1986).  This increases the risk of 
political instability as a result of political and economic dissatisfaction amongst the 
public (Taydas et al., 2010). Such risk is higher in autocratic countries than democratic 
ones because the public in the former might rely on violence to demonstrate their 
dissatisfaction; whereas, in the latter the public can discipline corrupted politicians in 
elections (Andvig et al., 2001). The empirical research confirms a positive association 
between the level of evaluation of state capacity and the level of trust of the political 
system and civil servants. Anderson and Tverdova (2003) find in panel data analysis a 
significant positive relationship and conclude that desperate conditions can lead the 
public towards radical system change. Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer (1998) and Mischler 
and Rose (2001) find in panel data analysis 154  a significant negative relationship 
between the level of corruption and political support to a regime. However, in both 
studies the relationship does not hold when an alternative definition of political support 
is used. Carmignani (2009) finds in panel data analysis that institutional quality 
measured by an index of economic freedom from the Fraser institution has a significant 
negative relationship with the level of political instability. However, the relationship 
does not hold when alternative definitions of institutional quality are used. Lastly, 
corruption has a negative impact on other basic needs of the public such as personal 
safety. Englehart (2009) finds that corruption has a significant negative relationship 
with the level of human rights and personal security, which forms one of the basic needs 
that a competent government should ensure. 
3.2.2 The Effect on Economic Growth  
There are two views regarding the impact of corruption on economic growth. 
                                                 
154 Comprising countries from Eastern and Central Europe. 
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The first view states that it has a beneficial impact on economic growth (“Grease in the 
Wheel”) while the second suggests it has an adverse impact on economic growth (“Sand 
in the Wheel”) (Seligson, 2002).  
Corruption has a devastating effect on a country’s economic growth under the 
“Sand in the Wheel” view. It produces its negative impact on economic growth through 
a mismatch between the growth rate of public revenue and public expenditure that leads 
to under provision of some sectors that feeds long run economic growth. The effect is 
similar in countries that rely on non-tax revenue or tax revenue. In countries where 
public expenditure is financed from non-tax revenue like natural resources rents, the 
curse of natural resources theory offers an explanation about its adverse impact on 
economic growth. A government in rentier state responds to pressure created by 
different rent seeking groups organized around ethnic, religious and geographic lines by 
increasing the level of current expenditure to finance  different forms of income 
distribution. Over the long run, windfall income does not match the growth rate of 
public expenditure, leading to low capital expenditure and low rate of return to 
investment, ultimately causing a low level of economic growth (Lane and Tornell, 
1996). Increasing the level of public expenditure in countries reliant on tax revenues 
leads to an increase in the level of taxation on productive sectors. This reduces the 
desire to produce and leads to low public revenues. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1990) find in panel data analysis that a high level of corruption increases the level of 
taxation on productive sectors. Alesina and Rodrick (1991) find in panel data analysis 
that government increases in the level of taxation on productive sectors in order to 
address income inequality caused by a high level of corruption, which leads to low 
economic growth. 
A high level of corruption has further adverse effects on economic growth 
through allocation of capital expenditure, its quality and its return rate. Allocation of 
capital expenditure across different sectors is highly discretionary, unlike current 
expenditure that reflects past commitments. Such decisions affect both the returns from 
new projects and returns from existing infrastructure. New infrastructure might have 
low returns because decisions were made based on the expected payoff for a decision 
maker rather than its rate of return to the economy. The expected payoff leads to 
allocation of more funds to new projects and fewer resources will be allocated to 
existing projects to keep them in good condition, causing the rate of return to fall even 
further. Allocating fewer resources for maintenance and operation is one strategy used 
by corrupted officials to let existing projects deteriorate such that they reach a point 
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where they need to be rebuilt again, allowing officials an opportunity to extract even 
more rents (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998). Gyiman-Brempong (2002) finds in panel data 
analysis comprising a group of African countries that corruption decreases the 
productivity of existing resources and the level of investment in physical capital. There 
are several empirical studies that investigate the relationship between the composition 
of public expenditure and the level of corruption. Mauro (1997) finds no relationship 
between the two variables in panel data analysis. Mauro (1997) indicates that the quality 
of the data set might fail to establish such a relationship. In contrast, Tanzi and Davoodi 
(1998) find in panel data analysis a significant positive relationship between corruption 
and capital expenditure, even when controlling for per capita GDP. Also, they find that 
corruption has a significant negative relationship with operation and maintenance 
expenditures. 
A high level of corruption produces its adverse effect on economic growth by 
increasing the feasibility of rent seeking activities at the expense of productive sectors 
like entrepreneurship. Murphy et al. (1990) find in panel data analysis that corruption in 
the form of rent seeking has an adverse effect on economic through different channels. 
First, it absorbs labour and other resources available for productive sectors such as 
entrepreneurship. This deprives the economy from benefits associated with widespread 
entrepreneurship sectors because most talented entrepreneurs are attracted by rent 
seeking activities. Second, it reduces entrepreneurs’ motivation to start up their 
businesses because corrupt officials might claim part of future returns from their 
investment (Mauro, 1997). Third, corruption reduces the level of entrepreneurship in a 
country by increasing the land GINI coefficient so that entrepreneurs lack collateral 
assets with which to gain access to the required funds to start up a new business (Li et 
al., 2000). Fourth, corruption decreases entrepreneurship because it can be used by 
existing producers of goods and services to prevent new competitors from entering the 
market (Jain, 2001). O'Sullivan et al. (2011) summarize the adverse impact of 
corruption on the entrepreneurship sector in the MENA region. They indicate that a 
combination of a high level of barriers that prevent the establishment of small and 
medium enterprises and unfair competition practices leads to a high level of corruption 
that drives talent from the entrepreneurship sector. This leads to sluggish economic 
growth and increass unemployment to 25% in the region.  
The adverse effect of corruption on economic growth filters through several 
other transmission channels. It decreases economic growth by increasing uncertainty in 
investment environments, as found empirically by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro 
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(1997). Uncertainty increases because it is considered as a form of tax, but with a 
pernicious nature, as indicated by Mauro (1997). The author indicates that it is paid 
before delivering the promised services and goods without any guarantees that the 
agreement will be honored after the bribe is paid. It leads to sluggish economic growth 
through its adverse impact on trade policy and institution quality as found empirically 
by Leite and Weidmann (1999). They claim that improving the current trade liberalism 
of Venezuela to the level of Chile was associated with a reduction in its level of 
corruption; consequently, it increased its GDP annual growth by 1%. O'Sullivan et al. 
(2011) illustrate the adverse impact of corruption on economic growth in the MENA 
region. They indicate that a high level of corruption in the region hinders investment 
decisions of productive sectors that in turn prevent it from playing an important role as 
an engine of economic growth.  
Several strategies are suggested to fight corruption, one of which is 
privatization. Privatization may reduce the level of government involvment in the 
economic environment that contributed to (among other factors) the high level of 
corruption in some countries. However, in countries that have a high level of corruption, 
privatization fails to reduce the level of corruption; on the contrary, it increases the level 
of corruption. Jain (2001) indicates that it reduces rent-seeking opportunities associated 
with discretionary powers of public agents but its process can be a prospective source of 
corruption in a country that experiences a high level of corruption. The process 
increases rent seeking opportunities available to public officials who have unrestricted 
discretionary powers to use the available information to capture large rents. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994) find that theoretically privatization does not improve efficiency in a 
country experiencing a high level of corruption. The adverse impact of corruption on 
privatization can be summarized in the MENA region as follows. Ross et al. (2011) 
indicate that a high level of corruption, patronage and lack of motivation and continuity 
characterize the process in low and middle growth economies such as Egypt, Yemen 
and Tunisia. As a result, it fails to establish a private sector that can play its prospective 
role in the economy as an engine of economic growth and employer. Furthermore, it 
fails to distribute benefits equally across the population so that income and wealth 
inequality increase, especially among the middle class and socially and economically 
grieved youth. Shehata (2011) indicates that the causes that led to the fall of the 
Mubarak regime in Egypt in 2010 were an increasing level of corruption and economic 
exclusion. As a result, the economic growth achieved in the region over the past 
decades has not led to an increase in GDP per capita. This indicates that economic 
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growth in the region has not matched population growth. For example, the average 
economic growth over the period from 2000 to 2010 was 4.8% while GDP per capita 
growth was only 2.5%. The gap between the two growth rates is considered among the 
highest in the world, below only sub-Saharan Africa (O'Sullivan et al., 2011). 
The “Grease in the wheel” thesis adopted by the Queuing model and Auction 
model presents an alternative view of the economic impact of corruption. It states that 
corruption has a beneficial effect on economic growth by increasing efficiency. The 
Queuing model presented by Lui (1985) assumes that bureaucrats allocate licenses to 
private agents who queue for them. Allocation is made efficiently to an agent who is 
willing to pay a bribe in order to avoid a waiting period (Lui, 1985). The model states 
that corruption offers a channel to overcome cumbersome regulatio ns, especially in 
developing countries. Similarly, Leff (1964) argues that corruption helps to overcome 
pre-existing rules and regulations; consequently, it improves social welfare and helps to 
increase the wage level of badly paid public officials. The Auction model presented by 
Beck and Maher (1986) builds upon the views of modernization theorist Huntington 
(1968) and Leff (1964) who indicate that the private agent may apply either bribe or 
bidding to win an auction. The model assumes that bribe and bidding are isomorphic; 
consequently, the most efficient supplier will win the auction (Beck  and Maher, 1986).  
Several authors challenge the assumptions made by the two models. Tanzi 
(1998) indicates that the experience of the developing world shows that suppliers who 
need the work more than the most efficient pay the bribe. Rose-Ackerman (1978) cited 
by Mauro (1995) argues that the positive effect of corruption cannot be limited to 
desirable economic areas. Opponents of corruption back up their view with empirical 
evidence. Mauro (1995) finds in panel data analysis that corruption reduces investment 
rate and economic growth even in countries with poor institutional quality. Kaufmann 
and Wei (1999) find in panel data analysis a significant positive relationship between 
the level of corruption and time spent by international managers with bureaucra ts, 
which rules out the corruption efficiency point of view.    
Other views argue that the negative or positive effect of corruption on economic 
growth depends on its nature. It has an adverse impact only when it is unpredictable and 
opportunistic155 otherwise it has a positive effect. Gyiman-Brempong (2002) argues that 
disorganized and decentralized corruption patterns in many African countries may be 
                                                 
155 See for example Shliefer and Vishny (1993), Amundsen (1999) and Lambsdorff (2006). 
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the reason behind their poor economic growth. Campos, Lien, and Pradhan (1999) find 
empirically that corruption with low predictability and highly opportunistic has a 
negative impact on economic growth. They present the case of countries in eastern Asia 
that succeeded in achieving high economic growth despite their high level of corruption. 
The authors attributed this to high predictability and low opportunistic cost of 
corruption in comparison with the nature of corruption in other developing countries. 
Similarly, Li et al. (2000) find in panel data analysis that the deleterious effect of 
corruption on economic growth in Asia is less significant than other regions in the 
world. For example, they estimate that one standard deviation increase in the level of 
corruption in Asia decreases economic growth by 0.14%; whereas, it reduces economic 
growth by 1.8% elsewhere. The World Bank (1997) cited by Lambsdorff (2006) finds in 
panel data analysis that at certain levels of corruption, when the nature of corruption is 
predictable and not opportunistic, it is associated with a high investment rate.  
3.3 The Nexus between Corruption and Political Instability: An Overview 
Several explanations are offered to explain the variation in the level of 
corruption across both time and different countries. These explanations group the 
determinants of corruption into political, economic, and social factors. Modernization 
theorist Huntington (1968) argues that the process of modernization breeds corruption; 
consequently, it might lead, with specific conditions, to political instability. Huntington 
determines three such factors. First, it changes public perception towards basic values of 
a society because of integration with other countries in the world. As a result, the public 
judges the norm in their society in light of newly gained ideas, norms and standards 
brought by integration with other countries in the world. Behaviors and norms that are 
acceptable and legitimate based on a society’s valuation may become corrupted and 
unacceptable based on new ideas gained from international integration. Second, it 
creates new sources of wealth and power among different groups in a society. Some of 
these groups may find it difficult to join political systems through legitimate channels, 
so they use corruption to gain access to the system. The level of new sources of wealth 
and power in relation to available political opportunities determines the level of 
corruption. Its level increases when the growth in economic opportunities exceeds 
development in the political environment. Amundsen (1999) and Tavares (2005) find 
that economic reform leads to a high level of corruption when economic opportunities 
increase yet accountability measurement continues to be underdeveloped. Third, it is 
associated with expansion of government authority and increase in the number of 
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activities subject to governmental regulations. Huntington (1968) suggests increasing 
state capacity in the form of high quality law enforcement as one possible strategy to 
curb corruption associated with modernization. 
In the political economy literature the direction and the nature of the relationship 
between corruption and political instability is controversial; however, there is general 
agreement that there is a relationship between the two variables. In the direction of 
causation, Treisman (2000) in a comprehensive study of the determinants of corruption 
includes political instability as predictor of corruption; however, the author does not 
rule out the possibility of the reverse relationship that runs from corruption to political 
instability. The author indicates that while a high level of political instability may 
increase opportunities for corruption, a high level of corruption might increase the risk 
of demonstration, strike, and even external invasion. This produces two streams in 
literature. The first stream assumes that causation runs from corruption to political 
instability and the second stream assumes that causation runs from political instability 
to corruption. The nature of relationship between the two variables likewise has two 
different views: the first view assumes it is positive as suggested by the theory of 
distributive corruption while the theory of extractive corruption states it is negative. 
The first stream in the literature assumes that causation runs from corruption to 
political instability. Under this stream, corruption through its detrimental effect on 
public expenditure, economic growth, income inequality and public welfare increases 
the economic and political dissatisfaction amongst the public so that they are more 
likely to stand against a government. Few empirical studies investigate the impact of 
corruption on the level of political instability, whether directly or indirectly. Goldstone 
et al. (2010) investigate the direct causation and find no relationship. The result might 
be attributed to the proxy used to measure the level of political instability156. One can 
argue that these incidences are the exception rather than common incidences of political 
instability. Taydas et al. (2010) investigate the relationship between three dimensions of 
state capacity, namely law and order, corruption, bureacratic quality and instituational 
quality157 on the one hand and political instability in the form of civil war on the another 
hand, and they find a significant positive relationship between corruption and political 
instability. Other empirical literature examines the indirect relationship between 
corruption and the level of political instability. Mo (2001) examines the indirect 
                                                 
156 It measures it in the form of civil war, radical change, genocides and politicides . 
157 Sum of corruption, law and order and bureaucratic quality .  
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relationship between corruption and political instability 158  via human capital 
accumulation as a prosepctive channel that links corruption to political instability. Mo 
(2001) finds in a political instabillity model a significant positive relationship between 
the level of corruption and political instability; however, the model has few control 
variables159. Damania et al. (2004) find no direct relationship between corruption and 
political instability160  but they find an indirect relationship via judicial efficiency161 . 
Other empirical research examines the impact of other dimensions of instituational 
quality on the level of political instability. Marcus et al. (2008) examine the impact of 
the rule of law on the level of political instability using the Conflict Barometer data set. 
They find a significant negative relationship; however, the relationship does not hold 
when different estimation techniques are used. Similarly, Bricker and Foley (2013) 
examine the impact of the rule of law on the level of political instability and find a 
significant negative relationship between the two variables. 
The second stream in the empirical literature assumes that causation runs from 
political instability to corruption. This stream has two conflicting views regarding the 
nature of the relationship between the two variables. The first view assumes it is 
positive and the second assumes it is a negative relationship. Treisman (2000) indicates 
that a high level of political instability makes politicians more opportunistic because 
they will only stay in office for a short period; consequently, they will try to accumulate 
large rents during their term in office. In contrast, a high level of political stability offers 
politicians time to build business relationships with potential suppliers using bribes and 
then leverage these relationships to generate rents. This stream produces more empirical 
studies than the first stream. Leite and Weidmann (1999)162, Adsera et al. (2003)163 and 
Pellegrini (2011)164 empirically find a significant positive relationship between the level 
of political instability and the level of corruption. Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) 
165 find an insignificant positive relationship. Elbahnasawy and Revier (2012)166 find a 
                                                 
158 Political instability measures the possibility that political activity , either organized or individual, is 
associated with violence.  
159 GDP per capita, political right and total population. 
160 Political instability is defined as the likelihood that a government will be overthrown or destabilized 
by violent or non-violent means. 
161 It measures perception of incidences of vio lent and non-violent crime, the quality o f judicial system 
and law enforcement.  
162 Political instability is measured in terms of annual coups and revolutions . 
163 Political instability is defined as the likelihood a government will be overthrown or destabilized by 
violent or non-violent means. 
164 Political instability is defined as the average number of “veto players” changes in the political system 
in each year. 
165 Political instability is defined as the average number of leader per year.  
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significant negative relationship; however, the relationship does not hold to change s of 
model specifications. Treisman (2000) finds no relationship but does not rule out the 
possibility of the reverse causation that runs from corruption to political instability167. 
There is a general agreement among economists that corruption is “Sand in the 
Wheel” whereas among political analysts the nature of the relationship is less clear. 
Although “Sand in the Wheel” is an economic concept referring to the adverse impact 
of corruption on economic growth and efficiencies, it can be extended to cover the 
adverse impact of corruption on political environments as to whether it smooths or 
hinders the political system. Huntington (1968) argues that the failure of corruption to 
reduce public pressure on a government leads to political instability. Similarly, Leys 
(1965) argues the failure of corruption to bring all segments of society together leads to 
political instability. Given that the impact of corruption on the level of political 
instability is controversial, literature in political economy adopts two views: the first 
view presented by the theory of distributive corruption assumes a positive relationship 
between the two variables while the second view presented by the theory of extractive 
corruption assumes a negative relationship (Seligson, 2002). Both theories build their 
arguments based on the nature of corruption that spreads in a country. Corruption leads 
to political instability when it is uncontrolled, unpredictable and opportunistic, 
otherwise it leads to political stability. Amundsen (1999) argues that uncontrolled and 
unrestricted corruption undermines legitimacy of institutions and states because it 
reduces the quantity and quality of public services and goods offered to public. 
The theory of distributive corruption represents the view that corruption leads to 
political instability. The theory builds its argument based on the nature of the state-
society relationship. There is a high risk of political instability when a state is the 
weaker party in the relationship. The weak state comes under the control of different 
interest groups who exert pressure and bribes to influence state capacity in order to 
make private gains leading to a negative impact on public goods such as education, 
health services, social services and state protection (Amundsen, 1999). Mauro (1993) 
cited by Mauro (1997) offers another explanation called “strategic complementarity” 
which presents a type of corruption that is over-opportunistic. According to this view, 
politicans who have formed a government set up their own bribe collection system. In 
                                                                                                                                               
166 Political instability is measured using political stability and  absence of violence index f rom the World 
Bank Governance Indicators Database. 
167 Political instability is defined in the study as an average number of leaders per year over a period from 
1980 to 1993.  
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the case that the bribe rate is high, this leads to poor economic performance; 
consequently, the whole government is less likely to stay in office for an extended time.  
The theory of extractive corruption presents the view that corruption lead to 
political stability. The theory assumes that the state is the stronger party in the state-
society relationship. A state has a strong control over economic policies both through 
formal or informal channels of accumulation, redistribution and consumption of public 
resources. In such conditions the state has strong control over who benefits from 
corruption, how much and from what type of corruption, so that state institutions will 
not suffer from corruption because it is predictable and widely accepted by businessmen 
and the public. A strong state can keep the level of corruption high and stable or it can 
reduce it to low level and maintain similar benefits as well. This type of corruption is 
used as an efficient strategy to gain loyalty because a state decides who will get rich 
from corruption and it has the power to remove individual players in the case of non-
loyalty to the prevailing political regime (Amundsen, 1999).  
There are several causal observations and empirical studies confirming the 
stabilization effect of corruption in autocratic countries. Becquart-Leclercq (1989) 
argues that corruption in a country with authoritarian traditions provides a channel of 
free movements and distribution of public resources among groups in a society that 
otherwise would not have  access in the absence of corruption. Johnston (1986) 
indicates that corruption in land reform policy in Morroco has helped the political 
regime to survive. Medard (1991) cited by Arriola (2009) indicates that the Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny regime in the Ivory Coast introduced a semicompetitive election in 
1980 to remove strong rivals who established independent patronge during their long 
term in office and replace them with new and cheaper clients. Widner (1992) cited by 
Arriola (2009) indicates that Daniel Arap Moi in Kenya made the political system more 
restricted by controlling the distribution of public resources by controlling Parliament. 
This strategy helped him to form a strong ally and at the same time remove any 
politicans who did not show loyalty to his regime. Fjelde and Hegre (2014) find in panel 
data analysis that highly corrupted autocratic and hybrid political regimes are more 
stable than their counterparts with low levels of corruption.  
Corruption is used to stabilize the political environment in democratic countries; 
however, its frequency and level is lower than its counterparts perceived in autocratic 
countries. Manzetti and Wilson (2007) present several corruption scandals that occurred 
in democratic countries such as Germany, Japan, France and Italy in the 1990s. 
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Corruption is used in democratic countries to smooth the political process and as a 
strategy to eliminate political arivals. Leys (1965) indicates that different forms of 
corruption are required in democratic countries in order to integrate a multitude of 
different interests and groups into the political system. Political elites use client network 
channels to control economic and political resources to eliminate rivals and to continue 
to stay in power. Manzetti and Wilson (2007) find in panel data analysis that corrupt 
governments in democratic countries continue to stay in office by using its client 
networks to increase its political support. In contrast, other empirical studies argue and 
find that corruption leads to political instability in democratic countr ies even with the 
existance of large interest groups keen to maintain the level of political stability. Fjelde 
and Hegre (2014) find in panel data analysis that democratic regimes with a low level of 
corruption are more stable than their siblings with high levels of corruption. Clapham 
(1982) cited by Arriola (2009) indicates that while this type of corruption may succeed 
over a short to medium run, in order to maintain the level of political stability over the 
long run this may lead to a high risk of political instability because of the imbalance 
between the level and growth rate of public resources and the growth of demand s made 
by the growing number of interest groups.  
Curse of natural resources theory examines the impact of corruption on the level 
of political instability in rentier state, reaching two conflicting views regarding its 
impact. The first stream presented by oil rent-seeking, distributional inequality and 
greed assumes that the relationship is positive, whereas the second stream presented by 
Rentier State Theory assumes it is a negative relationship. Oil rent-seeking assumes a 
positive relationship because of several factors, among which is a high level of 
corruption and rent-seeking activities that reduce state capacity. This leads a 
government to experience difficulty in dealing with opposition movements as indicated 
by Fearon and Laitin (2003). Weakened state capacity leads to poor economic 
performance; consequently, it negatively affects government revenues as argued by 
Collier and Hoeffler (2005). Fjelde (2009) finds in panel data analysis a significant 
positive relationship between the level of corruption and the level of political instability 
(measured by civil war) controlling for standard determinants of political instability.  
Similarly, Neudorfer and Theuerkauf  (2014) find in panel data analysis a significant 
positive relationship between corruption and risk of political instability (measured by 
ethnic war). Bjorvatn and Farzanegan (2015) find in panel data analysis a significant 
positive relationship between corruption and internal conflict. 
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 In contrast, rentier state theory assumes that corruption leads to a high level of 
political stability. Smith (2004) indicates that extensive patron client network s and a 
high level of corruption helps to achieve a high level of political stability in some rentier 
states. Herb (1999) illustrates the case of monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula that 
succeed in maintaining high levels of political stability for several reasons, one of which 
is the patron client network. As a result, the overall society prefers to involve in rent-
seeking activities rather than alliance building and political unrest. This leads to high 
corruption and creates a strong resistance from different interest groups to reform 
agendas that aim to give equal opportunities to all of the population (Sandbakken, 
2006). Fjelde (2009) indicates that corruption-based patronge in rentier state succeeds in 
maintaining a high level of political stability by creating vast stakeholders in the 
political regime. The vast network of stakeholders makes coordination to create 
opposition inefficient. Fjelde (2009) finds in panel data analysis that the interaction term 
between corruption and oil production has a significant negative relationship with 
armed conflict onset. Fjelde (2009) argues that a high level of corruption leads to 
political instability only in countries with no access to non-tax income. Fjelde illustrates 
the case of Haiti in 1989, Sierra Leone in 1991, Liberia in 1989 and Uganda in 1994. 
These countries are poor in non-tax revenue and have a high level of corruption that 
leads to armed conflict. Similarly, Neudorfer and Theuerkauf  (2014) find in panel data 
analysis that in countries rich in natural resources the risk of political instability 
increases slowly with an increasing level of corruption but the magnitude is small. 
Bjorvatn and Farzanegan (2015) find in panel data analysis no relationship between the  
interaction term of corruption and rents from natural resources and risk of political 
instability.  
3.4 Corruption, Youth Bulge, and Political Instability: Theory 
A high percentage of youth bulge in a country enhances political instability 
when socioeconomic and political environments fail to satisfy their needs. The cohort 
hypothesis states that their fortune decreases because they create downward pressure on 
employment prospects and wages. This decreases their opportunity cost and they 
become more likely to commit political instability incidences (Macunovich, 2000). 
Azeng and Yogo (2013) argue that the probability that youth bulge will join terrorist 
organizations increases when employment opportunties cannot keep pace with the 
number of youth job seekers. In a similar vein, Campante and Chor (2012) indicate that 
abundant employment opportunities in a country prevent youth from devoting their time 
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and effort to political instability incidences. Azeng and Yogo (2013), in panel data 
analysis of 24 developing countries, find no relationship between youth unemployment 
and the level of political instability. However, youth unemployment has a significant 
positive relationship with political instability when lag of youth unemployment is used 
as an instrument. The relationship holds under alternative proxies of political instability. 
Azeng and Yogo (2013) do not examine the impact of the joint effect of corruption and 
youth unemployment on the level of political instability. Campante and Chor (2012) 
find in panel data analysis that unemployment rate has a significant positive relationship 
with the level of political instability measured by the change of head of state or chief 
excutive over five years.  Employment offers youth bulge a channel in which to advance 
their life in different aspects. Chaaban (2013) argues that unemployment in the MENA 
region prevents youth from access to housing and other goods and services that require 
permanent income for procurement. This partially contributed to the onset of the so-
called Arab Spring in late 2010.     
Corruption is found empirically to increase the level of grievance and decrease 
the level of economic and political opportunities in a country. It has an adverse impact 
on the labor market by increasing the level of taxation on productive sectors to finance 
rent seeking activities. As result, these sectors might prefer to operate in an unofficial 
economy with adverse impacts on long-term economic growth. This reduces 
employment opportunities and wage levels in a country (Le Billon, 2003). It has an 
adverse impact on public expenditure on development sectors like education that further 
contribute to economic growth (Mauro, 1998) and increase an individual’s opportunity 
by expanding income-earning opportunities (Collier, 2000). Corruption in some 
instances has a stabilization effect when it is an alternative to reform as argued by 
Huntington (1968); however, in other instances it has a destabilization effect when only 
several interest groups control it. The increasing number of marginalized groups in 
society relies on violence to gain access to economic rents controlled by these interest 
groups. The absence of criteria that determines the distribution of its benefits across 
different groups increases competiton among these groups. The competiton can turn 
into violence when some groups have military means with which to challenge a 
government. It further enhances political instability when bribes influence the 
democratic process through vote buying which makes each party involved in election 
reliant on violence to defend their position (Le Billon, 2003).  
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The pressure created by youth bulge on the socioeconomic and political 
environment is further exaggerated in the presence of a high level of corruption in a 
country. Farzanegan, Reza, and Witthuhn (2014) indicate that the risk of political 
instability is heightened in a country in the presence of a high level of corruption and a 
high percentage of youth bulge that creates pressure on labor markets and economic and 
political environments. Such risk is an outcome of a high percentage of youth bulge, 
corruption and the existence of groups to organize their effort. The risk enhances when 
youth bulge believe that the corrupted government fails to address their economic and 
political exclusiveness (Hollander and Byun, 2012). Opposition movements use 
corruption accusation and scandals to organize the abundant aggrieved youth bulge to 
act against the political regime under the justification to address their economic and 
political grievances that are increased by the high level of corruption (Le Billon, 2003). 
The participation of youth bulge in action against a government is highly possible in 
light of their nature that makes them more likely to participate in political instability 
incidences compared to older people. First, they have a strong desire to instigate 
change, which makes them more prone to demonstrations, riots, and different 
incidences of political instability (Huntington, 1968). Second, they can be influenced by 
different ideas and stories; consequently, they are more likely to stand against a 
government (Goldstone, 2001). Today, the internet makes it easy to disseminate 
different corruption scandals among educated and less fortunate youth to provoke them 
into taking action against a political regime. Third, they have few responsibilities 
towards family so that they can commit their time and effort to risky political instability 
incidences (Goldstone, 2001) especially when they face unemployment and poverty, 
which makes their recruitment cheaper (Urdal, 2006).  
A high level of educational attainment in the presence of a high level of 
corruption is expected to enhance political instability through economic and political 
channels. Economically, the failure of labor markets (all other things being constant) to 
meet educated youth expectations of alternative income opportunities decreases the 
educated youth opportunity cost to commit political instability incidences (Urdal, 
,2004). High levels of corruption reduce employment opportunities further. This 
enhances political instability when such conditions occur amidst high levels of 
educational attainment168. Politically, knowledge and civic skills attainted by high levels 
of educational attainment enhances political instability in democratic and autocratic 
                                                 
168 See for example Barro (1992), Levine and Renelt (1992), Gupta et al. (2000), Li et al. (2000) and 
Gupta et al. (2001). 
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countries. In democratic countries the level of associated transparency puts a 
government operation under public scrutiny. Furthermore, political channels give the 
public a means to punish corrupted officials. Treisman (2000) points out that a high 
level of educational attainment helps the public to distinguish between public and 
private roles. This restricts a government’s ability to use public resources freely because 
the public can punish the observed misuse of it. In autocratic countries the political 
system does not offer channels to accommodate the civic skills produced by education 
nor to fight corruption politically (Huntington, 1968). Under such conditions, youth 
bulge might rely on violence to press for reform.    
 In light of the previous discussion, this chapter will test the independent effect of 
corruption and its interaction with youth bulge, unemployment and educational 
attainment on political instability as following hypotheses show. The empirical analysis 
will include youth unemployment, youth bulge, rents from natural resources, trade 
openness, GDP annual growth, level of democracy, gross tertiary enrolment, logarithm 
of total population and urban growth rate as control variables to support the hypotheses, 
the expected sign of the corruption and control variables are shown in the table 3.1. 
𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠1 : Countries with a  high level of corruption are more likely to 
experience political instability incidences than countries that do not. 
𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠2: The more corrupt a country, the stronger the impact of youth 
bulge on the level of political instability. 
𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠3: The more corrupt a country, the stronger the impact of youth 
unemployment on the level of political instability. 
𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠4: The  more corrupt a country, the stronger the impact of a high 
level of gross tertiary enrolment on the level of political instability. 
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Table 3.1 the Expected Sign Between Political Instability and Independent 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Political Instability  
Independent Variables Expected Sign with Political Instability  
Percentage of people (both sexes) aged 15-24 to population aged 
15 years and older (Yb) 
Positive 
Total youth unemployment (TYU) Positive 
Natural resources rents as percentage of GDP (Rents) Negative 
GDP annual growth (GDP growth) Negative 
Logarithm of total population (Log T.pop) Positive 
Level of democracy (RT) Negative 
Trade openness (TO) Negative 
Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary, both sexes (%) (GTE) Positive 
Urban annual growth rate (UGR) Positive 
Youth bulge * Corruption Positive 
Gross tertiary enrolment*Corruption Positive 
Total youth unemployment *Corruption Positive 
3.5 Model, Data and Methodology  
The four hypotheses discussed above are tested empirically using unbalanced panel 
data for 139 countries for the period 1984 to 2013.  
3.5.1 Model Specification  
3.5.1.1  The Independent Effect of Corruption on Political Instability 
      The base model discussed in the previous chapter is modified to incorporate the 
corruption variable, which is as follows:  
𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑒𝑐𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡      …………(3.1) 
Where: 
PS is political instability 
Corr is corruption level  
Pol is political vector including level of democracy  
Eco is economic vector including economic growth rate, trade openness, total youth unemployment and 
natural resources.  
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Socio is social vector including urban growth rate, gross tertiary enrolment, youth bulge, and logarithms 
of total population.169 
3.5.1.2  Models of the Joint Effect of Corruption with Other Factors  
Hypotheses 2 - 4 aim to examine the impact of corruption on political instability 
moderated by youth bulge, total youth unemployment, and gross tertiary education. 
 The model is estimated to capture the joint effect of corruption and youth bulge 
on political instability: 
𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝑌𝑏)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 ∗ 𝑌𝑏)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑒𝑐𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡   ……..  
(3.2) 
Where: 
PS is political instability 
Yb is youth bulge 
Corr is corruption level  
Yb*Corr is the joint effect of youth bulge and corruption 
Pol is political variables as determined in equation (3.1) 
Eco is economic variables as determined in equation (3.1) 
Socio is social variables as determined in equation (3.1) 
The model aims to capture the partial effect of youth bulge (corruption) on the level 
of political instability as follows: 
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡/d𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 𝑌𝑏𝑖𝑡    ……………………………(3.2a) 
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡/d𝑌𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡   …………………………….(3.2b) 
When 𝐵3 > 0 in equation (3.2a) a one point increase in the corruption index 
increases the risk of political instability with higher percentage of youth bulge. 
Similarly, equation (3.2b) implies that one percentage increase in youth bulge increases 
the risk of political instability with higher level of corruption. 
The second joint effect is corruption and total youth unemployment, which will 
replace the joint effect of youth bulge and corruption in equation (3.2) as follows: 
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡/d𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽4 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑌𝑈𝑖𝑡    ……………………………(3.2c ) 
                                                 
169 Descriptive statistics are shown in appendix B in the Chapter 2. 
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d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡/d𝑇𝑌𝑈𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡  …………………………….(3.2d) 
 If 𝐵3 > 0 in equation (3.2c) then a one point increase in the corruption index 
increases the risk of political instability with higher rate of youth unemployment. 
Similarly, a one-percentage increase in total youth unemployment increases the risk of 
political instability with higher level of corruption. 
The third joint effect is corruption and gross tertiary enrolment, which will 
replace the joint effect of youth bulge and corruption in equation (3.2) as follows: 
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡/d𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽6 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡   ……………………………(3.2e ) 
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡/d𝐺𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽2 + 𝛽3  𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡.  …………………………….(3.2f) 
 If 𝐵3 > 0 in equation (3.2e) then a one point increase in the corruption index 
increases the risk of political instability with higher level of educational attainment. 
Similarly, a one-percentage increase in educational attainment increases the risk of 
political instability with higher level of corruption. 
3.6 Measures of Corruption 
This study measures the level of corruption using the International Country 
Guide Risk (ICGR) index developed by the Political Risk Services Group. The data set 
measures the level of corruption on a scale of six, where a low score suggests a high 
level of corruption and a high score indicate as low level of corruption. In this study, the 
score is re-scaled so that a high score indicates a high level of corruption and a low 
score suggests a low level of corruption. The data set considers two types of corruption, 
namely bureaucratic and political; however, it is more concerned with the latter than the 
former. Bureaucratic corruption measures financial corruption in term of demands of 
financial benefits to gain government products and services such as export and import 
licenses, tax assessments, police protection, and loans. Political corruption measures 
corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservation, secret party 
funding and suspicious relationships between businesses and politics.   
The ICGR corruption index, like others indices (such as the Transparency 
International and World Bank), measures the perceived level of corruption rather than 
its actual level; however, there is high correlation among these indices, which gives 
high credibility and reliability to their measurements. The ICGR data set has three 
advantages in comparison with other data sources. First, it has a long time period and 
country coverage. Second, it considers the two types of corruption, namely bureaucratic 
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and political corruption, with more attention paid to the latter that forms the main focus 
of theoretical arguments in corruption (Fjelde and Hegre, 2014). Political corruption 
more than bureaucratic corruption is seen to produce more adverse effects on different 
aspects of a society because it distorts the decision-making process associated with 
public investment projects that improve public welfare as indicated by Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1998). Third, it measures the level of corruption associated with the risk of 
political instability, not its level itself, as indicated by Lambsdorff (2007), which fits the 
objective of this study. This addresses a theoretical difficulty associated with the impact 
of political culture in shaping public perception towards corruption, which might 
contribute to the strength or weakness of the relationship between corruption and 
political instability (Eckstein, 1988). For example, corruption in some cultures does not 
increase the risk of political instability because it is common and an acceptable norm. In 
such cultural settings corruption might be seen as  “grease in the wheel” more than 
“sand in the wheel”. The direct payment to public officials makes them more helpful 
and helps to overcome cumbersome bureaucracy (Goldsmith 1999). It also considers 
another difficulty regarding the impact of religious traditions on the level of corruption. 
Some religious traditions create social attitudes towards social hierarchy. In hierarchical 
religions such as Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam, an individual gives priority 
to family interests over other parties’ interests or the state as indicated by Treisman 
(2000). Therefore, different forms of rent seeking activities in some societies are 
acceptable because they are seen by the public as a form of respecting family values. 
Fourth, this definition considers the four forms of corruption indicated by Johnston 
(1986). These are market, patronage, nepotism and crisis. The level of political 
instability associated with each form depends on the number of suppliers and 
stakeholders involved. 
Figure 3.1 shows the corruption level across different regions of the world. The 
MENA region (as expected) along with Northern Africa, Southern Asia, Western 
Africa, Southern Africa and Central Asia have the highest levels of corruption 
associated with political risk, whereas Northern America and Oceania are among the 
lowest. Figure 3.2 shows the level of corruption in OECD vs. non-OECD, oil vs. non-
oil and democratic vs. autocratic countries; as expected OECD countries enjoy a low 
level of corruption across all sub-samples while autocratic countries and oil countries 
have the highest levels of corruption.  
 154 
The control variables included in the model that explore the relationship 
between corruption and political instability are similar to those used in Chapter 2.  
Figure 3.1 Corruption Level across the World  
 
 Figure 3.2 Corruption Level across Different Contexts 
 
3.7 Estimation Strategy 
 This chapter outlines the estimation strategy used, which is similar to that of 
Chapter 2. The model will be estimated using panel data, OECD countries, oil countries, 
, democratic countries and the MENA region to capture the independent effect of 
corruption on political instability and its effect moderated by youth bulge, youth 
unemployment, and education.  
 The sub-samples show variation in the level of corruption, youth bulge and gross 
tertiary enrolment while the variation in unemployment rate is insignificant. OECD 
countries perform well in controlling the level of corruption (with an average score of 
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3.44 over the sample period). Similarly, there is significant variation in the percentage 
of youth bulge between OECD and non-OECD countries. The average percentage over 
the sample period in OECD countries is 20% versus 31% in non-OECD countries. This 
captures the impact of youth bulge on political instability moderated by the level of 
corruption under two scenarios. The first scenario is low score of corruption and low 
percentage of youth bulge (presented by OECD countries) and the second is a high 
score of corruption and high percentage of youth bulge (illustrated by non-OECD 
countries). Furthermore, there is a significant variation in gross tertiary enrolment 
between the two sub-samples. In OECD countries, the average gross tertiary enrolment 
over the sample period is 40% in comparison to 16.74% in non-OECD countries. In 
other words, OECD countries show a low level of corruption and a high level of 
educational attainment than its non-OECD counterparts where the corruption level is 
high and educational attainment is low. High level of educational attainment equips the 
public with knowledge and skills required to observe corrupted transactions. Some 
control variables show variation between the two sub-samples as mentioned in the 
descriptive statistics in Chapter 2.  
 The second sub-sample is created to capture the independent effect of corruption 
and its moderated effect on political instability in democratic and autocratic countries170. 
The score of corruption and youth bulge show differences between democratic and 
autocratic countries. In democratic countries the average score of corruption and youth 
bulge is 2.227 and 23% respectively; while in autocratic countries the average score of 
corruption is 3.62 and the percentage of youth bulge is 32%. Corruption can occur in 
autocratic and democratic countries; however, its extent and frequency is lower in 
democratic countries. Furthermore, using corruption to stabilize the political 
environment in democratic countries needs to consider the interests of both the public 
and interest groups. Additionally, it is expected that its adverse impact on the public in 
democratic countries is less than in autocratic countries; however, the public in 
democratic countries are expected to be less tolerant towards it. In autocratic countries, 
some authors like Huntington (1968) argue that it might form an alternative to reform. 
The impact of the joint effect aims to verify the argument of Huntington (1968) that 
corruption is an alternative to reform in autocratic countries. In democratic countries, 
although the percentage of youth bulge is small and corruption is limited, this study 
aims to capture whether satisfying interest groups comes at the expense of youth bulge 
                                                 
170 Criteria used to create sub-samples are mentioned in section 2.5 in the Chapter 2. 
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requirements or vice versa. Democratic countries perform better in educational 
attainment than autocratic countries (the average over the sample period is 40% in 
democratic countries vs. 15.876% in autocratic countries). Education in the presence of 
corruption enhances political instability because it equips the public with knowledge 
and civic skills with which to monitor a government operation. Does a low level of 
educational attainment exaggerate or release the impact of a high level of corruption on 
political instability in autocratic countries? Similarly, does the high level of educational 
attainment enhance or deescalate the adverse impact of a low level of corruption on 
political instability in democratic countries? This is explored in subsequent models. 
 The independent effect of corruption and its joint effect on political instability 
are examined in oil and non-oil countries171. Although there is no significant difference 
in the percentage of youth bulge, corruption, unemployment and gross tertiary 
enrolment between the two groups, the use of oil rents might produce the political effect 
of corruption through different channels. The average score of corruption and the 
percentage of youth bulge in non-oil countries are 2.939 and 28% respectively, while in 
oil countries these values are 3.6 and 30% for corruption and youth bulge respectively. 
However, oil rents enable governments to turn a blind eye to rent seeking activities 
without taxing the public. Furthermore, governments in oil countries can pacify the 
public through distribution expenditure like education. Under such conditions the 
government satisfies public needs and private interests simultaneously. On the other 
hand, in non-oil countries the public might suffer from its adverse impact twice, both 
through their living expenses and continuing rises in taxes. Alternatively, they might 
please public interest at the expense of private interests or vice versa so that the political 
outcome of corruption differs. The average gross tertiary enrolment in non-oil and oil 
countries is 28% and 22.5% respectively; however, it might be that in oil countries the 
percentage exceeds the labor market’s requirements and creates pressure on autocratic 
systems in these countries. Rentier state theory argues that one channel to stabilize the 
political environment is expansion of educational opportunities; however, the 
domination of government on the economic environment and the weak private sector 
make it difficult to generate sufficient employment opportunities to absorb educated 
youth. What is the effect of educational attainment in the presence of corruption on 
political instability in oil and non-oil countries? Educational attainment creates pressure 
on autocratic regimes in oil countries (their average score in the Polity IV project is 7.7 
                                                 
171 Criteria used to classify countries as oil and non-oil are discussed in section 2.5 in the Chapter 2. 
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in comparison with 14 in non-oil countries). Does increasing the level of educational 
attainment alter the impact of corruption on political instability in oil countries? This is 
examined in subsequent models. 
 The so-called Arab spring in late 2010 in the MENA region can be attributed to 
several factors. This study examines the independent effect of corruption and its joint 
effect on political instability.  Following Collier and Hoeffler (2002), this study 
examines the determinants of political instability focusing on corruption and its 
moderated effect on it. The independent effect of corruption and its joint effect with 
youth bulge, unemployment and gross tertiary enrolment are tested one by one. The 
2SLS is used to estimate the models to account for possible endogeneity issue. The test 
shows that GDP annual growth is endogenous so that one-year lag of GDP annual 
growth is used as instrument because of the difficulty to find an appropriate external 
instrument 172 . Sensitivity analysis is carried out by fixed effect (period) and an 
alternative measure of political instability adopted from Saha and Yap (2013) and 
alternative measure of corruption from Transparency International.  
 Fixed effect (period effect) is selected over cross section effect because 
independent variables are a time variant and cross section effect is considered by 
including dummy variables. The fixed effect is selected over random effect to account 
for possible correlation between independent variables and omitted variables, mainly 
between corruption and culture, religious traditions and legal origin that have been 
found empirically to influence the level of corruption. Saha et al. (2016) indicate that 
fixed effect absorbs the correlation between independent variables and omitted variables 
as long as they are time invariant.  
 Alternative measures of political instability aim to check the sensitivity of the 
empirical results. Furthermore, it aims to check whether corruption has a broad impact 
on political instability as measured by an alternative proxy or whether its impact is 
limited to internal conflict and government stability (the main measure used in this 
research). 
 The alternative measure of corruption from TI aims to capture the robustness of 
the results to changes in the index. This is because each index is constructed based on 
different methodology (Lambsdorff (2007). Furthermore, indices are constructed based 
                                                 
172 Endogeneity test and the validity of of year lag of GDP economic g rowth are given in appendix D 
table D2.1 
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on subjective assessment by experts or the public, which increases the probability of 
bias. To check that the empirical results of this chapter are not affected by bias in the 
measurement of corruption, the TI index is used for sensitivity analysis. The index 
reduces bias by constructing its composite index by gathering information from multiple 
sources.  
 This research uses heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard 
error to reduce the effect of heteroskedasticity on the empirical results. The method 
does not assume homoskedasticity and it does not require knowledge about or 
functional form of heteroskedasticity such as weighted least squares. Furthermore, it 
does not need to go through arbitrary transformation of independent variable or 
computer stimulation (Hayes & Cai, 2007). This method addresses the effect of 
autocorrelation on t-statistics and p-value without needing to go through trial and error 
methods (Gujarati, 2014).    
3.8 Empirical Results  
 This section discusses the results of regression analysis in the investigation of 
the independent and joint effect of corruption with youth bulge, unemployment and 
educational attainment on political instability. 
3.8.1 The Independent Effect of Corruption on Political Instability 
Models 1 to 5 in Table 3.2 show the empirical results of the impact of the 
independent effect of corruption on political instability in panel data, OECD countries, 
oil countries, democratic countries and the MENA region. Model 2 from Chapter 2 is 
used as the base model. Corruption is included in the model alongside youth bulge and 
other determinants of political instability; the results are shown in Model 1, Table 3.2.   
Model 1 examines the impact of corruption on political instability in panel data. 
The independent effect of youth bulge has the expected positive sign and significant 
coefficient at the 1% level, suggesting that youth bulge enhances political instability. 
Similarly, the independent effect of corruption has the expected positive sign and 
significant coefficient at the 1% level, indicating that corruption escalates the risk of 
political instability. Introducing corruption to the model decreases the coefficient of 
youth bulge slightly and the adjusted R-square does not show improvement in 
comparison to Model 2 in Chapter 2. The political risk of corruption is illustrated in the 
case of Egypt where the Mubarak regime was overthrown in 2011. Increasing 
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corruption by one standard deviation boosts instability by 0.219 units or 11% of one 
standard deviation of instability173. Egypt could enjoy the level of political stability of 
Norway when it successfully reduces its current level of corruption by 1050% 174 . 
Control variables have significant and expected signs except trade openness and urban 
growth rate. 
Model 2 examines the impact of corruption on political instability in OECD 
countries. The coefficient of the OECD dummy has a negative sign although it is not 
significant, suggesting that OECD countries face lower political instability risk than 
non-OECD countries. The coefficient of the interaction term between the OECD 
dummy and corruption is negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating that an 
increase in corruption increases political instability; however, the effect is less in OECD 
countries than non-OECD countries. In other words, the level of development in OECD 
countries ameliorates the effect of corruption on political instability so that it exposes 
lower risk on political environment in OECD countries than non-OECD countries. 
Increasing corruption by one standard deviation in non-OECD countries sparks political 
instability by 0.393 units or 9% of one standard deviation of political instability175 while 
it increases by 0.017 units or 0.482%176 in OECD countries.  
The results indicate that corruption does occur in developed countries like 
OECD countries; however, its impact on political instability is not that pervasive. It is 
expected that in these countries corruption take the form of political more than 
bureaucratic corruption that aims to satisfy strong interest groups such as the media, 
which can form public perceptions toward a government. Manzetti and Wilson (2007) 
indicate it is used in democratic countries to smooth political process and as strategy to 
eliminate political arivals. It is expected to have an impact on political environments 
through political channels rather than violence. Control variables retain their sign and 
significance except youth unemployment with an insignificant expected sign. 
                                                 
173The coefficient of corruption*(0.675)(its St. dev in Egypt) = 0.219 unit, or 11% =(0.325*100)/(2.935) 
(the standard deviation of political instability in Egypt). 
174 The difference in average score of instability in both countries (8.026-4.611)/(0.325)(coefficient of 
corruption)*100=1050%. 
175  The coefficient of corruption* (1.099) (its St. dev in non-OECD)= 0.393 unit, or 9% 
=(0.358*100)/(4.185) (St. dev of political instability in non-OECD). 
176 (The coefficient of corruption + its coefficient in OECD)=-0.011*(1.617) (its standard deviation in 
OECD)=0.017 unit or 0.482%=(0.011*100)/(2.280) (the standard deviation of political instability in  
OECD).   
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 In Model 3 the independent effect of corruption on political instability is 
examined in democratic countries177. Democratic countries face lower risk of political 
instability than autocratic countries as the coefficient of democracy dummy has  a 
negative sign although is not significant. The independent effect of corruption enhances 
political instability; however, it exposes lower political risk in democratic countries than 
autocratic countries, as the interaction coefficient between democracy and corruption is 
negative but not significant. Increasing the level of corruption in autocratic countries 
reduces political stability by 0.425 units or 10%178 of one standard deviation of political 
instability in comparison to 0.344 units or 8.5% in democratic countries179. 
 Corruption serves different objectives in democratic and autocratic countries and 
produces different consequences on the political environment. In democratic countries 
one of the objectives is integrating a multitude of different interests and groups into the 
political system (Leys, 1965). However, characteristics of democracy such as free 
media and political instruments to discipline corrupted politicans turn corruption into a 
destablizing factor when it is discovered by the public. Fjelde and Hegre (2014) find in 
panel data analysis that democratic regimes with low levels of corruption are more 
stable than those with high levels of corruption. In autocratic countries, a key objective 
is to provide benefits to powerful interest groups at the expense of the public who might 
not get the opportunity to be involved in corrupted activities. The adverse impact of 
corruption on different aspects of a country and absence of political channels to 
discipline corrupted officials lead to severe conditions of instablity. Anderson and 
Tverdova (2003) find in panel data analysis a significant positive relationship between 
the two variables and conclude that desperate conditions can lead the public towards a 
radical change of system. Youth bulge and control variables have a significant sign 
except gross tertiary enrolment and urban growth rate that yield an insignificant 
negative and positive sign, respectively.    
Model 4 investigates the impact of the independent effect of corruption on 
political instability in the MENA region. The MENA region faces higher risk of 
political instability than non-MENA regions as the coefficient of MENA dummy has a 
positive sign although is not significant. The independent effect of corruption enhances 
                                                 
177 The continuous proxy of democracy is replaced by dummy of democracy. 
178  The coefficient of corruption* (0.995) (its St . dev in autocratic countries)= 0.425 unit, or 10% 
=(0.428*100)/(4.349) (St. dev of political instability in autocratic countries). 
179(The coefficient of corruption + its coefficient in  democratic countries)=0.252*(1.368) (its St. dev in 
democratic countries)=0.344 unit or 8.5%=(0.252*100)/(2.948) (the St. dev of political instability in  
democratic countries).    
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political instability; however, its political risk is lower in the MENA region than non-
MENA as the coefficient of the interaction term between corruption and MENA dummy 
has a negative sign and is significant at the 5% level. The MENA region faces lower 
risk of political instability than non-MENA region by 1.906 units or 56% of one 
standard deviation of political instability 180  when corruption increases by a standard 
deviation.  
It might be corruption in the MENA region creates a common interest between 
the public and governments so that its destabilization effect is lower. In the absence of 
political channels to fight corruption and repression measurements that might be used 
for public anti-corruption campaigns, the public may be more concerned about reaping 
potential benefits than fighting the government. Correspondingly, the failure of some 
governments in the region to improve living standards of their citizens leads 
governments to tolerate some level of corruption; consequently, the political risk is 
reduced as the public gains benefits from it. This is in line with Huntington (1968) who 
argues that corruption offers the public a channel in which to integrate the political and 
economic system. Furthermore, the author points out that corruption has a stabilization 
effect because it reduces public pressure on a government. In general, control variables 
retain their sign and significance. 
Model 5 examines the impact of the independent effect of corruption on political 
instability in oil countries181. The independent effect of corruption enhances political 
instability; however, it exposes lower political risk in oil countries, as the interaction 
coefficient between oil and corruption is negative and significant at the 1% level. A 
standard deviation increase in corruption in non-oil countries exposes higher risk on the 
political environment than oil countries by 0.519 units or 10% of one standard deviation 
of political instability182.  
The variation in the impact of corruption on the public can explain its lower 
destabilization effect in oil versus non-oil countries. In non-oil countries the public 
suffers from a high level of corruption through its adverse impact on their living 
standards and continuing rises in taxes to finance its activities, which further 
deteriorates such standards. In oil countries, oil rents offer governments financial 
                                                 
180 (The coefficient of corruption+ its coefficient in MENA countries)=(-2.438)*(0.782) (its St.dev in 
MENA countries)=1.906 unit Or 56%=(2.438*100)/(4.366) (the St.dev of polit ical instability in  MENA 
countries)    
181 Continuous proxy of rents from natural resources is replaced by oil dummy. 
182  The coefficient of corruption* (1.354) (its St. dev in non-oil countries)= 0.519 unit , or 10% 
=(0.384*100)/(3.985) (the St. dev of political instability in non-oil countries). 
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resources with which to finance patron client networks without taxing the public and it 
mitigates its adverse impact on the public through distribution expenditure on 
education, health services and other sectors to pacify the public as suggested by rentier 
state theory (De Mesquita and Smith, 2009). Fjelde (2009) claims that corruption 
exposes lower political risk in oil than non-oil countries. Furthermore, the author 
supports this claim with several anecdotal cases such as Haiti in 1989, Sierra Leone in 
1991, Liberia in 1989 and Uganda in 1994, all of which are poor in non-tax revenue and 
have a high level of corruption that leads to armed conflict.    
Model 1 is further examined to elucidate the independent effect of corruption on 
political instability in different sub-samples183. It is examined in countries where the 
score of corruption is equal to or less than 3 (the average score of corruption over the 
sample period) versus countries where the score is higher than 3184. In both sub-samples 
it has the expected positive sign; however, it is only significant in countries where the 
score of corruption is less than or equal to 3185. It might be that the public in countries 
where corruption is more than 3 becomes used to it because of cultural effects or they 
have no means to fight it. For example, a Transparency International report published in 
2016 about corruption in Morocco points out that only 10% of 1200 participants in its 
annual survey reported corrupt transactions to the designated authority. They are 
negligent to do so because they believe that no action will be taken or they are afraid of 
the negative consequences of reporting (Al-Jazeera, 2016). The model is re-tested in 
countries based on their level of income; the independent effect of corruption in all sub-
samples has an insignificant expected positive sign. It is then re-estimated based on the 
percentage of youth bulge for countries with a percentage between 24% to 31.42% and 
countries with a percentage more than 31.42%. The independent effect of corruption has  
an insignificant opposite sign in the former sub-sample and a significant expected 
positive sign in the latter sub-sample and youth bulge has a significant expected sign in 
the former sub-sample only.  
                                                 
183 Results not reported. 
184 The percentage of youth bulge in the first sub-sample is 25% amongst the population and in the second 
sub-sample it is 30%. 
185 It is estimated in a sub-sample of countries where corruption scores 1,2,4,5,6; the independent effect of 
corruption has a significant expected positive sign in the sub-sample with a low level of corruption.  
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Table 3.2 The Independent Effect of Corruption on Political Instability over the 
Period from 1984 to 2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Political Instability  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
YB 0.184*** 
(0.028) 
0.157*** 
(0.028) 
0.168*** 
(0.033) 
0.180*** 
(0.028) 
0.132*** 
(0.030) 
TYU 0.365* 
(0.215) 
0.327 
(0.214) 
0.384* 
(0.205) 
0.679*** 
(0.190) 
0.486** 
(0.220) 
Rents -0.042*** 
(0.014) 
-0.050*** 
(0.014) 
-0.045*** 
(0.014) 
0.022 
(0.017) 
 
TO -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
GDP growth -0.343*** 
(0.071) 
-0.352*** 
(0.071) 
-0.343*** 
(0.806) 
-0.306*** 
(0.067) 
-0.356*** 
(0.077) 
RT -0.004 
(0.046) 
0.003 
(0.046) 
 -0.151*** 
(0.052) 
-0.048 
(0.051) 
Corruption 0.325*** 
(0.095) 
0.358** 
(0.172) 
0.428 
(0.483) 
0.203** 
(0.092) 
0.384*** 
(0.092) 
GTE -0.011* 
(0.005) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.025*** 
(0.007) 
Log T.pop 1.124*** 
(0.168) 
1.434*** 
(0.204) 
1.120*** 
(0.172) 
1.070*** 
(0.157) 
0.843*** 
(0.201) 
UGR 0.015 
(0.043) 
0.045 
(0.042) 
0.011 
(0.787) 
0.029 
(0.043) 
0.013 
(0.044) 
OECD  -0.235 
(0.498) 
   
OECD*Corruption  -0.369** 
(0.176) 
   
DD   -0.061 
(1.957) 
  
DD*Corruption   -.0176 
(0.491) 
  
MENA    4.619 
(4.806) 
 
MENA*Corruption    -2.642** 
(1.300) 
 
Oil     0.464 
(0.822) 
Oil*Corruption     -0.827*** 
(0.279) 
Constant -2.290* 
(1.490) 
-3.076**   
(1.528) 
-2.253 
(2.434) 
-0.400 
(1.423) 
0.831 
(1.801) 
Adjusted R square 28% 30% 29% 38% 25% 
Number of observation 617 617 625 617 590 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one year lag 
of GDP growth as instrument of GDP 
growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. YB is youth bulge, TYU is rate of total youth unemployment, Rents is rents from natural resources, TO is trade 
openness, GDP growth is GDP annual growth, RT is level of democracy, GTE is gross tertiary enrolment, Log T.pop is logarithm of 
total population and UGR is urban growth rate.  
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3.8.2 The Joint Effect of Corruption and Youth Bulge on Political instability 
Models 6 to 10 in Table 3.3 investigate the impact of youth bulge on political 
instability moderated by the level of corruption in different contexts. As mentioned 
earlier the interrelationship between youth bulge, corruption and political instability can 
go through several channels among other is unhappy interest groups from their gain 
from corruption provoke desperate youth bulge to act against political regime. 
In Model 6 the joint effect between corruption and youth bulge on political 
instability is investigated in panel data. The independent effect of corruption and youth 
bulge retains its sign and significance. The joint effect has the expected positive sign but 
is not significant, suggesting that corruption enhances the impact of youth bulge on 
political instability. For example, the interaction effect of youth bulge at mean score of 
corruption 3.316 on political instability in Tunisia is 0.207. Each one standard deviation 
increase in youth bulge at mean score of corruption deteriorates stability in Tunisia by 
0.686 units or 5% of one standard deviation of political instability186. The interaction 
effect of corruption at mean percentage of youth bulge 32.67 on political instability in 
Tunisia is 0.615; almost double the independent effect of corruption captured in Model 
2. When corrupted transactions increase by one standard deviation at mean percentage 
of youth bulge it boosts political instability in Tunisia by 0.268 units or 15% of one 
standard deviation of political instability187.  
The existence of a high percentage of youth bulge living in desperate living 
conditions in the presence of corruption enhances their role on political instability when 
they find a party able to organize their effort to act against a government. A high level 
of corruption hurts government ability to provide sufficient quantity and quality of 
welfare-enhancing public goods and services. Its high level indicates a state weakness to 
manage and control a society; as a consequence, opportunity theory assumes an 
individual’s opportunity cost to commit political instability incidence decreases (Taydas 
et al., 2010). Interest groups who are dissatisfied over their meager gains from 
corruption activities can organize youth against a government. The gains are expected to 
                                                 
186 The coefficient of youth bulge (0.184) + the coefficient of the jo int effect (0.007)*(3.316) (mean score 
of corruption in Tunisia) =0.207.  One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its coefficient in the 
joint effect  (0.207)* (3.315) (St. dev of youth bulge in Tunisia)= 0.686 unit or 5%= (0.207*100)/(4.187)( 
St. dev of political instability in Tunisia).  
187  The coefficient of corruption (0.387) + the coefficient of the joint effect (0.007)*(32.678) (mean 
percentage of youth bulge in Tunisia) =0.615. One standard deviation increases in corruption is its 
coefficient in the joint effect  (0.615)* (0.437) (St. dev of corruption in Tunisia)= 0.268 unit or 15%= 
(0.615*100)/(4.187)(Standard deviation of political instability in Tunisia). 
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vary across interest groups because of variation in factors that determine its benefits 
across interest groups. These factors include the level of personal connection and 
exclusive knowledge of government operations as indicated by Nice (1986). Le Billon 
(2003) indicates that competition between interest groups over corruption proceeds 
enhances instability especially when one or more groups  possess military means to 
challenge a government. Furthermore, the author points out that opposition movements 
can use corruption accusations and scandals to organize youth bulge against a 
government under justifaction of addressing their political and economic needs. The 
joint effect enhances political instability because corruption proceeds may also provide 
financial means to some interest groups to challenge a government. Medard (1991) cited 
by Arriola (2009) indicates that the Félix Houphouët-Boigny regime in the Ivory Coast 
introduced a semicompetitive election in 1980 to remove strong rivals who established 
independent patronge during their long term in office and replaced them with new and 
cheaper clients.  Control variables retain their sign and significance. 
The joint effect between corruption and youth bulge on political instability is 
further investigated using different sub-samples based on the level of corruption and the 
percentage of youth bulge to determine the score of corruption that leads to political 
instability188. It finds that a dummy of corruption at score six has a significant positive 
sign; however, its interaction with youth bulge has an insignificant negative sign. Other 
dummies have an insignificant positive sign.   
In Model 7 the impact of the joint effect of corruption and youth bulge on 
political instability is examined in OECD and non-OECD countries. The joint effect 
between corruption and youth bulge in non-OECD countries has a negative sign 
although it is not significant. Furthermore, the joint effect has a positive sign and is 
significant at the 10% level in OECD countries. In other words, the role of youth bulge 
on political instability in the presence of corruption is higher in OECD countries than 
non-OECD countries. A standard deviation increase in youth bulge at mean score of 
corruption 3.4 enhances political instability in non-OECD countries by 0.476 units or 
2% of one standard deviation of political instability189 in comparison with 0.929 units or 
                                                 
188 The results are not reported. 
189 The coefficient of youth bulge (0.173) + the coefficient of the joint effect (-0.026)*(3.4) (mean score 
of corruption in non-OECD) =0.085. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its coefficient in  
the joint effect  (0.085)*  (5.628) (St.dev of youth bulge in  non-OECD)= 0.476 unit  or 2%= 
(0.085*100)/(4.185)( St. dev of political instability in non-OECD). 
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8.5% of one standard deviation of political instability in OECD countries 190 . The 
interaction effect of corruption at mean percentage of youth bulge 30.765% on political 
instability in non-OECD countries is -0.611. Political instability escalates by 0.671 units 
or 15% by each one standard deviation decrease in corruption in non-OECD countries191 
while each one standard deviation increase in corruption at mean percentage of youth 
bulge enhances political instability by 1.524 units or 58% of one standard deviation of 
political instability in OECD countries192. 
 The public in OECD countries is less tolerant of corruption and has appropriate 
political channels with which to discipline politicians compared to non-OECD countries 
where corruption in some countries is the norm and they have neither a political channel 
to discipline politicians nor military means to change government 193 . Alternatively, 
using corruption as a strategy to stabilize the political environment in democratic 
countries like OECD countries is more difficult than for autocratic countries. This is 
because under democracy a government represents the society in general and some 
policies that aim to benefit some interest groups might come at the expense of others. 
The failure of corruption to satisfy the majority in democratic countries leads to political 
instability even with the existence of large interest groups with interests in maintaining 
the level of political stability.  Fjelde and Hegre (2014) find in panel data analysis that 
democratic regimes with low levels of corruption are more stable than those with high 
levels of corruption. Control variables retain their sign and significance except youth 
unemployment that becomes insignificant with an expected positive sign. 
Model 8 examines the role of youth bulge on political instability moderated by 
corruption in democratic environments194. The joint effect between corruption and youth 
                                                 
190 [The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with OECD]+[(the coefficient of the 
joint effect +its coefficient in interaction with OECD)*(1.444)(mean score of corruption in  
OECD)]=0.194. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its coefficient in the jo int effect   
(0.194)* (4.784) (St. dev of youth bulge in OECD)= 0.929 unit or 8.5%= (0.194*100)/(2.280)(St . dev of 
political instability in OECD). 
191 The coefficient of corruption (0.189) + the coefficient of the jo int effect (-0.026)*(30.765) mean 
percentage of youth bulge in non-OECD =0.611. One standard deviation decrease in corruption is its 
coefficient in the joint effect  (0.611)* (1.099) (St.dev of corruption in non-OECD)= 0.671 unit or 15%= 
(0.611*100)/(4.185)(Standard deviation of political instability in non-OECD).  
192[The coefficient of corruption + its coefficient in interaction with OECD]+[(the coefficient of the joint 
effect +its coefficient in interaction with OECD)*(20.376)(mean percentage of youth bulge in 
OECD)]=1.327. One standard deviation increase in corruption is its coefficient in the joint effect   
(1.327)* (1.161) (St. dev of corruption in OECD)= 1.524 unit  or 58%= (1.327*100)/(2.280)(St. dev of 
political instability in OECD). 
193 The model is re-estimated by dropping Greece, Hungary, Italy, Po land, Mexico and Turkey where 
score of corruption is more than twice the joint effect and retains its sign and significance; results not 
reported. 
194 Continuous proxy of the level of democracy replaced by dummy of democracy. 
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bulge has a positive sign and is significant at the 5% level. However, the interaction 
term between democracy and the joint effect is negative and significant at the 5% level. 
It suggests that a high level of corruption enhances the role of youth bulge on political 
instability; however, the risk is lower in democratic than autocratic countries. Increasing 
the percentage of youth bulge at mean score of corruption 2.23 increases political 
instability in democratic countries by 1.375 units or 6% of one standard deviation of 
political instability195 in comparison with 3.65 units or 15% in autocratic countries196. 
The interaction effect of corruption at mean percentage of youth bulge 23.463 on 
political instability in democratic countries is -0.099. Each one standard deviation 
decrease in corruption lowers stability by 0.136 units or 3.4% of one standard deviation 
of political instability 197 . In contrast, the interaction effect of corruption at mean 
percentage of youth bulge 31.68% on political instability in autocratic countries is 6.54. 
The level of political instability increases by 6.500 units or 150% of one standard 
deviation of political instability for each one standard deviation increase in corruption at 
mean percentage of youth bulge198.  
The impact of the joint effect on political instability is lower in democratic than 
autocratic countries. In democratic countries public support is more rewarded than the 
support of interest groups. A government that satisfies interest groups at the expense of 
public needs and requirements lowers its length of tenure in office. Fjelde and Hegre 
(2014) point out that accommodating private interests is less rewarded in democratic 
countries because political support is gained from the majority. The failure to gain 
public support can be used by the opposition to organize youth to act against the 
government. Treisman (2000) points out that political competition in democracy exerts 
                                                 
195 [The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with democratic countries]+[(the 
coefficient of the joint effect +its coefficient in interaction with democrat ic countries)*(2.227)(mean  
score of corruption in  democratic countries )]=0.183. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its 
coefficient in the joint effect  (0.184)*(7.511) (St. dev of youth bulge in democratic countries)= 1.375 
unit or 6%= (0.184*100)/(2.948)(Standard deviation of political instability in democratic countries). 
196 The coefficient of youth bulge (-0.079) + the coefficient of the joint effect (0.197)*(3.621) mean score 
of corruption in autocratic countries =0.634.  One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its 
coefficient in the joint effect  (0.634)* (5.754) (St. dev of youth bulge in autocratic countries)= 3.649 unit  
or 15%= (0.634*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of political instability in autocratic countries). 
197 [The coefficient of corruption + its coefficient in interaction with democratic countries]+[(the 
coefficient of the joint effect +its coefficient in interaction with democratic countries)*(23.473)(mean  
percentage of youth bulge in democratic countries)]=-0.099. One standard deviation decrease in 
corruption is its coefficient in the joint effect  (-0.099)*(1.368) (St. dev of corruption in democratic 
countries)= 0.136 unit  or 3.4%= (0.099*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of political instability  in  democratic 
countries).  
198 The coefficient of corruption (0.299) + the coefficient of the jo int effect (0.197)*(31.682) (mean 
percentage of youth bulge in autocratic countries) = 6.54.  One standard deviation increase in corruption is 
its coefficient in the joint effect  (6.54)* (0.994) (St. dev of corruption in autocratic countries)= 6.5 unit or 
150%= (6.54*100)/(4.349)( St. dev of political instability in autocratic countries).   
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downward pressure on the level of corruption. Alternatively, some authors argue that 
corruption has a stabilization effect in democratic countries because it integrates 
different interests and groups into the political system (Leys, 1965) or when the 
incumbent sets public economic policies to eleminate political rivals and stay in office 
(Manzetti and Wilson, 2007). This might be a source of political instability in the 
presence of youth bulge because dissatisfied interest groups or those whose interests are 
negatively affected from incumbent policies have strong interest in provoking youth 
bulge to act against the incumbent. In autocratic countries the adverse impact of youth 
bulge on political environment in the presence of corruption is higher than democratic 
countries. It might be that youth bulge have no equal opportunity to involve themselves 
in corruption like powerful interest groups and they suffer from its adverse impact on 
their living standards. Widner (1992) cited by Arriola (2009) indicates that Daniel Arap 
Moi in Kenya used public resources to form allies among politicans. Under such 
conditions, corruption fails to provides channels of free movement and distribution of 
public resources among groups in society and there is no alternative channel to do so 
(Becquart-Leclercq, 1989). This motivates youth bulge to rely on violence to press for 
reform. Huntington (1968) argues that the failure of corruption to reduce public pressure 
on a government leads to political instability. Control variables have a significant 
expected sign except gross tertiary enrolment and urban growth rate that have 
insignificant negative and positive signs, respectively.   
Model 9 examines the impact of the joint effect between corruption and youth 
bulge on political instability in the MENA region. The joint effect has a positive sign 
although it is insignificant; however, it exposes higher risk in MENA as the interaction 
term between the joint effect and MENA dummy has a positive sign and significant 
coefficient at the 1% level. In other words, the MENA region is at higher risk of 
political instability than non-MENA regions due to the presence of a high percentage of 
youth bulge alongside a high level of corruption. The interaction effect of youth bulge at 
mean score of corruption 3.509 on political instability in the MENA region is 1.283. 
Each one standard deviation increase in the percentage of youth bulge at mean score of 
corruption enhances political instability in the region by 5.59 units or 29% of one 
standard deviation of political instability199 while it increases by 1.995 units or 7% in 
                                                 
199[The coefficient of youth bulge + its coefficient in interaction with MENA reg ion]+[(the coefficient of 
the joint effect + its coefficient in interaction with  MENA region)*(3.509)(mean  score of corruption in  
MENA reg ion)]=1.283. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its coefficient in the jo int effect   
(1.283)* (4.364) (St.dev of youth bulge in MENA region)= 5.59 unit or 29%= (1.283*100)/ (4.366)(St. 
dev of political instability in MENA region). 
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non-MENA regions200. The interaction effect of corruption at mean percentage of youth 
bulge 31.94% on political instability in MENA is 13.839. Political instability increases 
by 10.822 units or 317% of one standard deviation of political instability by each one 
standard deviation increase in corruption at mean percentage of youth bulge in the 
region201 while it increases by 1.682 units or 31% in non-MENA regions202.  
The presence of a high percentage of youth bulge in the MENA region creates 
pressure on the socioeconomic environment and the presence of a high level of 
corruption in the region further deteriorate already poor conditions. Furthermore, a low 
level of democracy fails to offer political channels in which to raise their demands 
peacefully nor to screen out their needs. Additionally, youth bulge lack the required 
financial resources to become involve in corrupted transactions. All these factors 
together provide a favorable environment for some interest parties to organize their 
effort against governments, such as the Muslim brotherhood movement in Egypt. The 
movement played a vital role in organizing youth bulge effort against the Mubarak 
regime in late 2010. Control variables retain their sign and significance.  
Model 10 investigates the impact of the joint effect between corruption and 
youth bulge on political instability in oil countries 203 . The joint effect between 
corruption and youth bulge enhances political instability; however, it exposes lower risk 
on the political environment in oil countries as the interaction term between the joint 
effect and oil dummy has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level. Non-oil 
countries face a higher risk of political instability than oil countries, enhanced by 1.674 
units or 6% of one standard deviation of political instability when the percentage of 
youth bulge increases by a standard deviation at mean score of corruption204. Similarly, 
                                                 
200The coefficient of youth bulge (0.217) + the coefficient of the joint effect (0.027)*(2.949) mean score 
of corruption in non-MENA countries =0.296. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its 
coefficient in the jo int effect  (0.296)* (6.743) (St. dev of youth bulge in non-MENA countries)= 1.995 
unit or 7%= (0.296*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-MENA countries).  
201[The coefficient of corruption + its coefficient in  interaction with MENA countries]+[(the coefficient 
of the joint effect +its coefficient in interaction with MENA countries)*(31.944)(mean percentage of 
youth bulge in MENA countries)]=13.839.  One standard deviation increase in corruption is its coefficient 
in the joint effect   (13.839)*(0.782) (St. dev of corruption in MENA countries)=10.822 unit or 317%= 
(13.839*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political instability in MENA countries).  
202 The coefficient of corruption (0.414) + the coefficient o f the jo int effect (0.027)*(29.03) (mean 
percentage of youth bulge in non-MENA countries)= 1.197. One standard deviation increases in 
corruption is its coefficient in the jo int effect   (1.197)* (1.405) (St. dev of corruption in non-MENA 
countries)= 1.682 unit o r 31%= (1.197*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-MENA 
countries).    
203 Continuous proxy of rents from natural resources is replaced by oil dummy. 
204The coefficient of youth bulge (0.140) + the coefficient of the joint effect (0.027)*(2.939) mean score 
of corruption in non-oil countries =0.219. One standard deviation increase in youth bulge is its coefficient 
in the joint effect  (0.219)* (7.635) (St. dev of youth bulge in non-oil countries)= 1.674 unit or 7%= 
(0.219*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non-oil countries).  
 170 
non-oil countries face a higher risk of political instability than oil countries by 1.851 
units or 34% of one standard deviation of political instability when corruption increases 
by a standard deviation at mean percentage of youth bulge205.  
In oil countries, the influence of corruption in the role of youth bulge on political 
instability is lower than non-oil countries. Oil rents is an attractive income source to 
many interest groups (Smith, 2004), however the low level of democracy does not offer 
alternative political channels to public office (Sandbakken, 2006). Therefore, 
governments in these countries tolerate some level of corruption in the form of patron-
client networks to reduce the political risk of some interest groups (Smith, 2004). 
Similary, they succeed in reducing the political risk of youth bulge through different 
forms of distribution expenditure as stated by rentier state theory. From general reading 
of the author of this PhD thesis, some oil countries in the MENA region experienced 
youth bulge demonstrations in the aftermath of the so-called the Arab spring event in 
late 2010. Their requirements were more employment and educational opportunties and 
an effective anti-corruption strategy. These countries increase employment and 
educational opportunties which reduces anti-corruption demand. The government 
succeeds in eliminating their risk on political environment and maintains its extensive 
patron-client network at the same time. Control variables have a significant sign except 
the level of democracy and urban growth rate 
  
                                                 
205  The coefficient of corruption (0.590) + the coefficient of the joint effect (0.027)*(28.8) (mean 
percentage of youth bulge in non-oil countries)= 1.367. One standard deviation increase in corruption is 
its coefficient in the joint effect  (1.367)* (1.354) (St. dev of corruption in non-oil countries)= 1.851 unit  
or 34%= (1.367*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non-oil countries).    
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Table 3.3 The Joint Effect of Youth Bulge and Corruption on Political Instability 
over the Period from 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Political Instability  
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
YB 0.184*** 
(0.029) 
0.173*** 
(0.034) 
-0.079 
(0.103) 
0.217*** 
(0.029) 
0.140*** 
(0.029) 
Corruption 0.387* 
(0.229) 
0.189 
(0.304) 
0.299 
(0.416) 
0.414** 
(0.211) 
0.590*** 
(0.230) 
Corruption*YB 0.007 
(0.020) 
-0.026 
(0.031) 
0.197** 
(0.093) 
0.027 
(0.018) 
0.027 
(0.020) 
OECD  -1.674*** 
(0.408) 
   
OECD*YB  -0.038 
(0.042) 
   
OECD*Corruption  0.303 
(0.406) 
   
OECD*Corruption*YB  0.067* 
(0.039) 
   
DD   -0.516 
(0.574) 
  
DD*YB   0.280*** 
(0.102) 
  
DD*Corruption   -0.211 
(0.460) 
  
DD*Corruption*YB   -0.205** 
(0.096) 
  
MENA    -1.483* 
(0.900) 
 
MENA*YB    -.758*** 
(0.119) 
 
MENA*Corruption    -3.185*** 
(0.566) 
 
MENA*Corruption*YB    0.493*** 
(0.145) 
 
Oil     0.411 
(0.820) 
Oil*YB     -0.019 
(0.091) 
Oil*Corruption     -3.161* 
(0.953) 
Oil*YB*Corruption     -.354*** 
(0.096) 
Constant 3.743** 
(1.466) 
3.053* 
(1.601) 
3.946***   
(1.153) 
4.710*** 
(1.352) 
4.924*** 
(1.601) 
Adjusted R square 29% 31% 34% 39% 30% 
Number of observation 617 617 625 617 590 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one year 
lag of GDP growth as instrument of 
GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesises. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5  % and 1% level, respectively. All 
models include all the control variables that are included in Models in Table 3.2 (results are not reported). For space restriction only the results of 
variables of interest is reported.  
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3.8.3 The Joint Effect of Corruption and Youth Unemployment on Political 
Instability 
Models 11 to 15 in Table 3.4 examine the impact of the joint effect of corruption 
and youth unemployment on political instability. 
The impact of the joint effect of corruption and youth unemployment on 
political instability is examined on panel data in Model 11. The independent effect of 
youth unemployment enhances political instability as it has the expected positive sign 
but is not significant. Similarly, the independent effect of corruption has the expected 
positive sign and is significant at the 1% level. The joint effect between the two 
variables, contrary to expectations, has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% 
level 206 . This suggests that a decreased level of corruption and low rate of 
unemployment enhances political instability. In a country like Ethiopia where the score 
of corruption is high, the interaction effect of youth unemployment at mean score of 
corruption 3.79 on political instability is -2.077. Decreasing youth unemployment by 
one standard deviation at mean score of corruption enhances political instability by 
2.528 units or 38%207. The interaction effect of corruption at mean percentage of youth 
unemployment 2.422% on political instability in Ethiopia is -0.986. Decreasing the 
level of corruption by one standard deviation in Ethiopia enhances political instability 
by 0.443 units or 18% of one standard deviation of political instability208.  
The proxy used in this study to measure corruption considers political corruption 
and bureaucratic corruption; however, more attention is given to former. It might be that 
the level of political corruption is low but bureaucratic corruption is high. Under such a 
scenario, companies might prefer to operate underground to avoid cumbersome 
bureaucratic procedures and consequently, labor forces are absorbed by underground 
sectors. Friedman  et al. (2000) find in cross sectional analysis that government size 
measured by the percentage of taxes to general revenue tends to be small in countr ies 
with a high level of corruption because many firms prefer to operate underground to 
                                                 
206 The model is re-estimated by including the interaction term between quadratic term of corruption and 
youth unemployment. The linear interaction of corruption and non -linear interaction with youth 
unemployment have a significant negative sign. 
207 The coefficient o f youth unemployment (0.167) + the coefficient of the joint effect ( -0.504)*(3.790) 
(mean score of corruption in  Ethiopia) =-2.077. One standard deviation decrease in  youth unemployment 
is its coefficient in the joint effect  (-2.077)* (1.217) (St . dev of youth unemployment in Ethiopia)= 2.528 
unit or 38%= (2.077*100)/ (5.395)(St. dev of political instability in Ethiopia). 
208 The coefficient of corruption (0.234) + the coefficient of the joint effect (-0.504)*(2.422)(mean rate of 
youth unemployment in  Ethiopia)=-0.986. One standard deviation decrease in corruption is its coefficient 
in the joint effect  (-0.986)* (0.448) (St. dev of corruption in Eth iopia)= 0.442 unit or 18%= (-
0.986*100)/(5.395)(St. dev of political instability in Ethiopia).   
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avoid poor bureaucratic quality. The flourishing underground economy constitutes tax 
lost from an individual and corporate income. Consequently, it makes it difficult for a 
government to provide sufficient quality and quantity of public goods and services. This 
shifts the political risk from unemployed youth to the failure of government to meet 
public expectations. Alternatively, a country may reach full employment and youth 
could turn their pressure on government to address other needs 209. Youth bulge and 
control variables have a significant sign except urban growth rate and the level of 
democracy.  
The impact of the joint effect is further investigated by creating two sub-samples 
based on the average score of corruption (which is 3 over the sample period)210. The first 
sub-sample includes countries where the average score in corruption is less than or 
equal to 3 and the second sub-sample has a value more than 3. The joint effect in both 
sub-samples has an insignificant negative sign. 
Model 12 investigates the impact of the joint effect on political instability in 
OECD countries. The joint effect of corruption and youth unemployment has a negative 
and significant coefficient suggesting that decreasing corruption and a low rate of 
unemployment enhances political instability. However, it has a positive impact in 
OECD countries as the interaction term between OECD and the joint effect has a 
positive sign and is significant at the 1% level. In other words, the negative sign of the 
joint effect on political instability becomes positive in OECD countries. Each one 
standard deviation increase in youth unemployment at mean score of corruption 1.444 
enhances political instability in OECD countries by 0.714 units or 56% of one standard 
deviation of political instability211. In non-OECD countries, decreasing unemployment 
by a single standard deviation at mean score of corruption enhances political instability 
in non-OECD countries by 1.655 units or 59% of one standard deviation of political 
instability 212 . Similarly, the interaction effect of corruption exposes higher risk on 
                                                 
209 The impact of the joint effect is further investigated in one period lag of corruption, one period lag of 
unemployment and the joint effect of quadratic term of corruption and unemployment; the joint effect 
between corruption and unemployment retain its sign and  significance across all models; the results are 
not reported. 
210 Results are not reported.  
211 [The coefficient of youth unemployment + its coefficient in interaction with OECD]+[(the coefficient 
of the joint effect +its coefficient in interaction with OECD )*(1.444)(mean score of corruption in 
OECD)]=1.269. One standard deviation increase in youth unemployment is its coefficient in the jo int 
effect  (1.269)* (0.563) (St. dev of youth unemployment in OECD)= 0.714 unit or 56%=  
(1.269*100)/(2.280)(St. dev of political instability in OECD).  
212 The coefficient of youth unemployment (-0.175) + the coefficient of the joint effect (-0.662)*(3.4) 
(mean score of corruption in non-OECD) =-2.426. One standard deviation decrease in youth 
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political environments in OECD than non-OECD countries. Each one standard 
deviation increase in corruption at mean percentage of unemployment 2.624% enhances 
political instability in OECD countries by 0.075 units or 3% of one standard deviation 
of political instability213. In non-OECD countries, each one standard deviation decrease 
in corruption at mean percentage of unemployment enhances political instability by 
1.796 units or 39% of one standard deviation of political instability214.  
In general, OECD countries experience less political instability than their 
counterpart non-OECD countries; however, the level of corruption and youth 
unemployment in some OECD countries is equivalent to that perceived level in some 
non-OECD countries. For example, there is no significant difference in the level of 
corruption in Italy, Mexico, and Turkey (their average score is 2.8, 3.4 and 3.3 
respectively) than its level in their counterpart non-OECD countries (the average score 
in these countries is 3.4). The presence of corruption in the previously mentioned 
OECD countries enhances the risk of political instability in the presence of unemployed 
rates of 3.37%, 2% and 2.85% in Italy, Mexico and Turkey, respectively. Overall, the 
average unemployment rate over the sample period is similar between OECD countries 
2.65% and non-OECD countries 2.77%. Despite the low level of corruption in OECD 
countries, negligent increases in its level amidst high youth unemployment can increase 
unemployed youth dissatisfaction that enhances political instability. For example, in its 
coverage of 2016 prospects for the Abbott government in South Australia, the 
Australian Broadcast Center (ABC, 2015) reported that support of local industries and 
jobs formed the main strategy used by the government to increase public support.  
The negative joint effect in non-OECD countries suggests that these countries 
take extraordinary action to reduce unemployment such as creating public employment. 
This action reduces the political risk of unemployment; however, it creates other 
sources of political risk from financial pressures to meet wage bills (Stevenson, 1992) 
and pressures from those searching for employment and lobbying to create more public 
                                                                                                                                               
unemployment is its coefficient in  the joint effect  (2.426)* (0.682) (St. dev of youth unemployment in  
non-OECD)= 1.655 unit or 59%= (2.426*100)/(4.185)(St. dev of political instability in non-OECD). 
213 [The coefficient of corruption + its coefficient in interaction with OECD]+[(the coefficient of the joint 
effect +its coefficient in interaction with OECD)*(2.624)(mean percentage of unemployment in  
OECD)]=0.06. One standard deviation increase in corruption is its coefficient in the joint effect  (0.06)*  
(1.161) (St. dev of corruption in OECD)= 0.075 unit or 3%= (0.06*100)/(2.280)(St. dev of political 
instability in OECD). 
214  The coefficient of corruption (0.198) + the coefficient of the joint effect (-0.662)*(2.768) (mean 
percentage of unemployment in  non-OECD) =-1.634. One standard deviation decrease in corruption is its 
coefficient in the joint effect  (-1.634)* (1.099) (St. dev of corruption in non-OECD)= 1.796 unit o r 39%= 
(1.634*100)/(4.185)(St. dev of political instability in non-OECD). 
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employment opportunities. All of these force governments to create more employment 
opportunities to stabilize the political environment as indicated by Gelb, Knight, and 
Sabot (1991). Meeting financial pressures and continuing to create public employment 
forces a government to take financial measures such as freezing salary growth or 
allowing currency to depreciate as indicated by Stevenson (1992). The adverse impact 
of these measures on standards of living of public employees and a low level of 
corruption to assist their income culminates in anger against the government. Youth 
bulge and control variables retain their sign and significance. 
The impact of the joint effect on political instability in democratic environments 
is examined in Model 13215. The independent effect of youth unemployment enhances 
political instability and exposes higher risk in democratic than autocratic countries as 
the interaction term between democracy and youth unemployment has a positive sign 
although it is not significant. Corruption constitutes a higher risk on political 
environment in democratic than autocratic countries as the interaction term between 
democracy and corruption has a positive sign but is not significant. Furthermore, the 
joint effect has a negative sign and significant coefficient at the 1% level; however, its 
impact is lower in democratic countries as the interaction term between democracy and 
the joint effect has a positive sign and is significant at the 1% level. Put differently, the 
impact of youth unemployment on political instability moderated by corruption is 
higher in democratic than autocratic countries. The interaction effect of youth 
unemployment at mean score of corruption 3.621 on political instability in autocratic 
countries is -4.404. Decreasing unemployment by one standard deviation at mean score 
of corruption escalates political instability in autocratic countries by 3.259 units or 
101% of one standard deviation of political instability216 while in democratic countries 
each one standard deviation increase in youth unemployment at mean score of 
corruption 2.227 produces further risk of political instability by 0.468 units or 28% of 
one standard deviation of political instability217. The interaction effect of corruption at 
                                                 
215 Continuous proxy of the level of democracy is replaced by dummy of democracy. 
216 The coefficient o f youth unemployment (0.422) + the coefficient of the joint effect ( -1.333)*(3.621) 
(mean score of corruption in  autocratic countries) =-4.404. One standard deviation decrease in youth 
unemployment is its coefficient in the jo int effect  (-4.404)* (0.740) (St . dev of youth unemployment in  
autocratic countries)= 3.259 un it or 101%= (4.404*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of polit ical instability in  
autocratic countries). 
217  [The coefficient of youth unemployment + its coefficient in interaction with democratic 
countries]+[(the coefficient of the joint effect +its coefficient in interaction with democratic 
countries)*(2.227)(mean score of corruption in democratic countries)]= 0.811. One standard deviation 
increase in youth unemployment is its coefficient in the joint effect  (0.811)*(0.578) (St. dev of youth 
unemployment in  democratic countries)= 0.468 unit  or 28%= (0.811*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of political 
instability in democratic countries).  
 176 
mean percentage of unemployment 2.696 on political instability in autocratic countries 
is -3.651. Each one standard deviation decrease in corruption at mean percentage of 
unemployment increases political instability by 3.628 units or 84% of one standard 
deviation of political instability 218  whereas each one standard deviation increase in 
corruption at mean percentage of unemployment enhances political instability in 
democratic countries by 0.015 units or 0.373% of one standard deviation of political 
instability219. 
 In autocratic countries the negative sign of the independent effect of corruption 
makes the impact of the joint effect negative. It might be that these countries absorb 
unemployment in their security forces; however, financial pressures to meet their wages 
forces governments to decrease the wage level or to take other financial measures with 
adverse impacts on living standards. The adverse impact of wage bills on economic 
growth leads to a low level of economic opportunities such that private agents have no 
interest in paying bribes. Furthermore, employment in security forces does not offer 
abundant rent seeking opportunities, or they may be offer negligent amount in 
comparison with other posts such as tax collectors or posts in the customs department. 
A combination of poor living standards of employees in security forces and low levels 
of corruption to assist their legal wages enhances political instability. Youth bulge and 
control variables retain their sign and significance.  
The impact of youth unemployment moderated by corruption on political 
instability in the MENA region is examined in Model 14. The independent effect of 
youth unemployment enhances political instability; however, it exposes lower risk in 
the MENA region as the interaction term between MENA and youth unemployment has 
a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the independent effect of 
corruption enhances political instability; however, it turns into  a negative sign in the 
MENA region as the interaction term between corruption and MENA has a negative 
sign and is significant at the 1% level. The joint effect between the two variables has a 
                                                 
218  The coefficient of corruption (-0.057) + the coefficient of the joint effect (-1.333)*(2.696) (mean 
percentage of unemployment in autocratic countries) =-3.651. One standard deviation decrease in 
corruption is its coefficient in the joint effect  (3.651)* (0.994) (St. dev of corruption in autocratic 
countries)= 3.628 unit o r 84%= (3.651*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of political instability in autocratic 
countries). 
219 [The coefficient of corruption + its coefficient in interaction with democrat ic countries]+[(the 
coefficient of the joint  effect  + its coefficient in  interaction with democratic countries)*(2.732)(mean  
percentage of unemployment in democratic countries)]=0.011. One standard deviation increase in 
corruption is its coefficient in the joint  effect   (0.011)*  (1.368) (St. dev of corruption in  democratic 
countries)= 0.015 unit or 0.373%= (0.011*100)/ (2.948)(St. dev of polit ical instability in  democratic 
countries). 
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negative sign; however, it has a positive impact in the MENA region, as the interaction 
term between MENA and the joint effect is positive and significant at the 1% level. In 
other words, corruption enhances the adverse impact of unemployment on political 
environment and it is more risky in the MENA than non-MENA regions. The 
interaction effect of unemployment on political instability in the MENA region at mean 
score of corruption 3.509 is 31.385. The MENA region faces extra risk of political 
instability by 17.606 units or 719% of one standard deviation of political instability 
when unemployment among its youth increases by one standard deviation at mean score 
of corruption220; in contrast, the level of stability worsens by 0.176 units or 7% of one 
standard deviation of political instability in non-MENA regions when unemployment 
decreases by one standard deviation at mean score of corruption 221 . The interaction 
effect of corruption on political instability in the MENA region at mean percentage of 
unemployment 3.049% is 24.505. Each one standard deviation increase in corruption at 
mean percentage of unemployment intensifies political instability by 18 units or 551% 
of one standard deviation of political instability in the region222; in contrast, stability 
deteriorates by 0.828 units or 15% of one standard deviation of political instability for 
each one standard deviation decrease in corruption in non-MENA regions223.  
A high level of corruption and absence of checks and balances224 in the MENA 
region lead to significant adverse impacts on different aspects, one of which is sectors 
expected to generate employment opportunities. Its high level in the region prevents 
governments from reducing their involvement in the economic environment. Ross et al. 
(2011) indicate privatization is characterized by a high level of corruption, patronage 
                                                 
220[The coefficient of youth unemployment + its coefficient in  interaction w ith MENA countries]+[(the 
coefficient of the jo int effect +its coefficient in  interaction with MENA countries)*(3.509)(mean score of 
corruption in MENA countries)]=31.385. One standard deviation increase in youth unemployment is its 
coefficient in the joint effect  (31.385)*(0.561) (St. dev of youth unemployment in  MENA countries)= 
17.606 unit or 719%= (31.385*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political instability in MENA countries).   
221 The coefficient o f youth unemployment (0.548) + the coefficient of the joint ef fect (-0.279)*(2.949) 
mean score of corruption in non-MENA countries =-0.275. One standard deviation decrease in youth 
unemployment is its coefficient in the jo int effect  (-0.275)* (0.643) (St . dev of youth unemployment in  
non-MENA countries)= 0.176 unit or 7%= (-0.275*100)/ (3.977)(St. dev of polit ical instability in non-
MENA countries).  
222 [The coefficient of corruption + its coefficient in interaction with MENA countries]+[(the coefficient 
of the joint effect +its coefficient in interaction with MENA countries)*(3.049)(mean percentage of 
unemployment in  MENA countries)]=24.052. One standard deviation increase in  corruption is its 
coefficient in the joint effect  (24.052)* (0.782) (St. dev of corruption in MENA countries)= 18 unit or 
551%= (24.052*100)/(4.366)( St. dev of political instability in MENA countries). 
223  The coefficient of corruption (0.161) + the coefficient of the joint effect (-0.279)*(2.691) (mean 
percentage of unemployment in non-MENA countries) =-0.589. One standard deviation decrease in 
corruption is its coefficient in the joint effect  (-0.589)* (1.405) (St. dev. of corruption in non-MENA 
countries)= 0.828 unit or 15%= (-0.589*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-MENA 
countries). 
224 The average score of democracy in the region is 5 in comparison with 14 in non -MENA regions. 
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and lack of motivation and continuity, especially in low and medium size economies 
such as Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia. This prevents the establishment of a strong private 
sector that can be an engine of economic growth and consequently generate 
employment. This decreases per capita income growth and creates mounting pressure 
on governments to act as employer of last resort; otherwise, political instability 
increases.  
Corruption has an adverse impact on already poor economic environments in the 
region. It increases uncertainty in economic environment and its high level in the region 
hinders investment decisions of productive sectors. It also has an adverse impact on 
sectors that can absorb a substantial number of human resources and are capable of 
feeding economic growth, like entrepreneurship. A combination of high barrier levels 
preventing the establishment of small and medium enterprises and unfair competition 
practices breeds a high level of corruption that drives talent away from the 
entrepreneurship sector (O'Sullivan et al., 2011). This leads to sluggish economic 
growth and increases unemployment to 25% in the region. Poor economic environments 
that fail to meet expectations raised by a high level of educational attainment in the 
region (the average in the region over the sample period is 19% versus 27% in non-
MENA) are expected to lead to political instability in the region. This is because 
unemployment deprives youth in the region from gaining access to housing and other 
goods and services that require permanent incomes for their procurement and are 
necessary for establishment of families (Chaaban, 2013). Youth bulge and control 
variables have a significant sign except rents from natural resources, gross tertiary 
enrolment, and urban growth rate.     
Model 15 examines the impact of the joint effect on political instability in oil 
countries. Oil countries face higher political risk from unemployment than non-oil 
countries as the interaction term between oil and unemployment has a positive sign but 
is insignificant. The independent effect of corruption enhances political instability; 
however, it constitutes lower risk in oil countries as the interaction term between oil and 
corruption has a negative sign and is significant at the 5% level. The joint effect has a 
negative sign and is significant at the 1% level and it is impact is substantially higher in 
oil countries. In other words, a low level of corruption and unemployment enhances 
political instability and the effect is substantially higher in oil countries than non-oil 
countries. The interaction effect of unemployment on political instability in oil countries 
at mean score of corruption 3.627 is -5.74. Reduction in the rate of unemployment by 
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one standard deviation at mean score of corruption enhances political instability by 
3.421 units or 141% of one standard deviation of politica l instability225;while it only 
increases by 0.660 units or 26% of one standard deviation of political instability in non-
oil countries 226 . The interaction effect of corruption on political instability in oil 
countries at mean rate of unemployment 2.7% is -6.192. Decreasing corruption by a 
standard deviation at mean rate of unemployment enhances political instability by 6.575 
units or 152% of one standard deviation of political instability227 in comparison with 
1.307 units or 24% of one standard deviation in non-oil countries228.  
The negative sign of the joint effect in oil and non-oil countries suggests that an 
economy might reach full employment and that there is a shortage in human resources 
in the labor market. Competition over human resources drives their recruitment costs 
up, which in turn increases the inflation rate in a country. Hence, economists suggest 
that some level of unemployment is required within the economy so that full 
employment does not have adverse impacts on economic growth. High inflation rate 
have adverse impacts on private sector productivity and living standards of the public 
which hurts economic stability and consequently, political stability (Hubbard, 2011). It 
reduces the profitability of productive sectors that in turn decreases public revenue, 
especially in non-oil countries. Furthermore, full employment prevents youth from 
seeking further education or vocational training. This might be a prospective source of 
political instability over the long run as a result of changes in economic structure that 
produce new requirements for some qualifications while past qualifications no longer fit 
with the new economic structure. Control variables have a significant sign except for 
the level of democracy and urban growth rate. 
                                                 
225  [The coefficient of youth unemployment + its coefficient in interaction with oil dummy]+[(the 
coefficient of the joint effect +its coefficient in interaction with oil dummy)*(3.627)(mean score of 
corruption in oil countries)]=-5.74. One standard deviation decrease in youth unemployment is its 
coefficient in the joint effect  (5.74)*(0.595) (St. dev of youth unemployment in oil countries)= 3.421 unit  
or 141%= (5.74*100)/(4.072)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries). 
226 The coefficient of youth unemployment (0.318) + the coefficient of the jo int effect  (-
0.463)* (2.939)(mean score of corruption in non-oil countries) =-1.042. One standard deviation decreases 
in youth unemployment is its coefficient in the jo int effect  (-1.042)* (0.633) (St. dev of youth 
unemployment in non-oil countries)= 0.660 unit or 26%= (-1.042*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political 
instability in non-oil countries).   
227[The coefficient of corruption + its coefficient in interaction with oil dummy]+[(the coefficient of the 
joint effect +its coefficient in interaction with oil dummy)*(2.7)(mean percentage of unemployment in oil 
countries)]=-6.192. One standard deviation decrease in corruption is its coefficient in the joint  effect   
(6.192)* (1.62) (St. dev of corruption in oil countries)= 6.575 unit  or 152%= (6.192*100)/ (4.072)(St. dev 
of political instability in oil countries). 
228  The coefficient of corruption (0.300) + the coefficient of the joint effect (-0.463)*(2.736) (mean 
percentage of unemployment in non-oil countries) =-0.966. One standard deviation decrease in corruption 
is its coefficient in the jo int effect  (-0.966)* (1.354) (St. dev of corruption in non-oil countries)= 1.307 
unit or 24%= (-0.966*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non-oil countries). 
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Table 3.4 The Joint Effect of Youth Unemployment and Corruption on Political 
Instability over the Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Political Instability  
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
YB 0.168*** 
(0.028) 
0.154*** 
(0.029) 
0.155*** 
(0.033) 
0.186*** 
(0.029) 
0.122*** 
(0.029) 
TYU 0.167 
(0.224) 
-0.175 
(0.357) 
0.422 
(0.735) 
0.548*** 
(0.226) 
0.318 
(0.223) 
Corruption 0.234*** 
(0.088) 
0.198 
(0.181) 
-0.057 
(0.410) 
0.162* 
(0.091) 
0.300*** 
(0.084) 
Corruption*TYU -0.503*** 
(0.121) 
-0.662*** 
(0.206) 
-1.333*** 
(0.461) 
-0.279** 
(0.124) 
-0.463*** 
(0.128) 
OECD  -1.183*** 
(0.319) 
   
OECD*TYU  1.411*** 
(0.458) 
   
OECD*Corruption  -0.194 
(0.198) 
   
OECD*Corruption*TYU  0.685*** 
(0.238) 
   
DD   -0.865 
(0.552) 
  
DD*TYU   0.516 
(0.789) 
  
DD*Corruption   0.224 
(0.417) 
  
DD*Corruption*TYU   1.276*** 
(0.464) 
  
MENA    1.106  (1.603)  
MENA*Corruption    -8.813*** 
(2.562) 
 
MENA*TYU    -6.801*** 
(1.630) 
 
MENA*Corruption*TYU    11.005*** 
(3.083) 
 
Oil     -0.593 
(0.712) 
Oil*Corruption     -1.421** 
(0.586) 
Oil*TYU     0.754 
(1.118) 
Oil*Corruption*TYU     -1.415* 
(0.731) 
Constant .372 
(1.407) 
-.491 
(1.442) 
1.099 
(1.318) 
2.073 
(1.372) 
3.645** 
(1.464) 
Adjusted R square 31% 33% 34% 38% 30% 
Number of observation 617 617 625 617 590 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1  
 P-value ( the validity test of one year lage of  
GDP growth as instrument of GDP growth)  
0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5 % and 1 %, level respectively. All 
models include all the control variables, included in models in Table 3.2 (results are not reported). For space restrictions only the results of variables of 
interest are reported.   
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3.8.4 The Joint Effect of Corruption and Gross Tertiary Enrolment on Political 
instability 
 Models 16 to 20 in Table 3.5 examine the impact of the joint effect of corruption 
and gross tertiary enrolment on political instability in panel data, OECD countries, 
democratic countries, oil countries, and the MENA region. 
 Model 16 investigates the impact of the joint effect on political instability in 
panel data set. The independent effect of corruption has a positive sign and is significant 
at the 1% level. The independent effect of gross tertiary enrolment has a negative sign 
and is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that a low level of gross tertiary enrolment 
enhances political instability. The joint effect has a negative sign and is significant at 
the 5% level. It indicates that a low level of gross tertiary enrolment reduces the impact 
of corruption on political instability. The interaction effect of corruption on political 
instability at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment 21.623% is 0.334. Increasing 
the level of corruption by one standard deviation at mean percentage of gross tertiary 
enrolment enhances political instability by 0.424 units or 8% of one standard deviation 
of political instability229. The interaction effect of gross tertiary enrolment at mean score 
of corruption 3.022 on instability is -0.06. Each one standard deviation reduction in 
gross tertiary enrolment at mean score of corruption escalates political instability by 
1.307 units or 1.5% of one standard deviation of instability230.  
 The empirical results suggest that a low level of educational attainment in a 
country decreases the adverse impact of corruption on political environment. Low 
educational attainment indicates that the public lacks the knowledge and civic skills to 
observe corruption activities. Knowledge is required because corruption flourishes in 
some sectors that require specific knowledge, like military expenditure. Henderson and 
Singer (2000) indicate that public expenditure in corrupted countries is typically 
allocated to military expenditure. Its low level does not produce civic skills that create 
pressure on a government to move to democracy; and consequently increased public 
scrutiny on government operation (Truex, 2011). Its low level prevents the public from 
                                                 
229 The coefficient of corruption (0.572)- coefficient of joint effect (-0.011)*(21.62) mean percentage of 
gross tertiary enrolment 0.334. One standard deviation increase in the coefficient of corruption in the jo int 
effect (0.334)*(1.353) (St. dev of corruption) = 0.424 unit  or 8%= (0.334*100)/(4.030)(St. dev of political 
instability).  
230 The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment (-0.027)- coefficient of joint effect (-0.011)*(3.022) mean 
score of corruption -0.06. One standard deviation decrease in the coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment in  
the joint effect  (-0.06)*(21.699) (St. dev of gross tertiary enro lment) =1.307 unit  or 1.5%=  
(0.06*100)/(4.030)(St. dev of political instability). 
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distinguishing between public and private roles. This frees government operations from 
public scrutiny required to notice and punish corrupted officials (Treisman, 2000). 
Descriptive statistics from the data set used in this research shows that the average 
educational attainment in the Congo Democratic Republic is 3.5% (versus 27% in the 
entire data set) and it forms the region containing the most corrupted countries in the 
world. On other hand, Finland is among the highest countries worldwide in terms of 
educational attainment and the level of corruption. In summary, a low level of 
educational attainment makes it easier for the political elite to be involved in corruption 
activities. Insufficient civic skills fail to create pressure on governments to introduce 
democracy that would make them accountable to the public. Youth bulge and control 
variables have a significant sign except level of democracy and urban growth rate.  
 The impact of gross tertiary enrolment moderated by corruption on political 
instability in OECD countries is examined in Model 17. The joint effect has a negative 
sign and is significant at the 1% level; however, its impact is lower in OECD countries 
as the interaction term between the joint effect and OECD dummy has a positive sign 
and is significant at the 10% level. In other words, a low level of gross tertiary 
enrolment lowers the impact of corruption on political instability; however, its impact is 
lower in OECD countries than non-OECD countries. A high level of gross tertiary 
enrolment makes the interaction effect of corruption a negligent, negative impact on 
political instability in OECD countries. The interaction effect of corruption at mean 
percentage of gross tertiary enrolment 40.22% on political instability in OECD 
countries is -0.064. Reduction by one standard deviation in corruption at mean 
percentage of gross tertiary enrolment enhances political instability in OECD countries 
by 0.074 units or 3% of one standard deviation of political instability231 while in non-
OECD countries increasing corruption by one standard deviation at mean percentage of 
gross tertiary enrolment moves political instability upwards by 0.247 units or 5% of one 
standard deviation of instability232. The interaction effect of gross tertiary enrolment at 
mean score of corruption 1.444 on political instability in OECD countries is -0.017. 
Each one standard deviation decrease in gross tertiary enrolment at mean score of 
                                                 
231[The coefficient of corruption + its coefficient in interaction with OECD]+[(the coefficient of the joint 
effect +its coefficient in interaction with OECD)*(40.222)(mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment in  
OECD)]=-0.064. One standard deviation decrease in corruption is its coefficient in the joint  effect   
(0.064)* (1.161) (St. dev of corruption in OECD)= 0.075 unit  or 3%= (0.06*100)/ (2.280)(St. dev of 
political instability in OECD).  
232  The coefficient of corruption (0.527)- the coefficient of joint effect (-0.018)*(16.737) (mean 
percentage of gross tertiary enrolment in non-OECD countries) =0.225. One standard deviation increase 
in corruption is coefficient of interaction term  (0.225)*(1.099) (St . dev of corruption in non-OECD 
countries)= 0.247 unit or 5% (0.225*100)/(4.185)(St. dev of political instability in non-OECD countries). 
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corruption increases political instability by 0.389 units or 0.745% of one standard 
deviation of instability 233  in comparison with 1.544 units or 2% in non-OECD 
countries234.  
 Analysis of descriptive statistics at country level in OECD countries shows that 
improvement in educational attainment has a downward pressure on the level of 
corruption, which in turn deescalates political instability. For example, comparing 
Canada and Italy’s performance in educational attainment, corruption, and political 
instability shows that Canada is among the highest performing countries in terms of 
gross tertiary enrolment worldwide (the average over the sample period is 80%), its 
corruption score (the average is 0.465) and political instability (the average is 4.8). On 
the other hand, Italy’s performance is 46%, 2.8, and 7 in gross tertiary enrolments, 
corruption and political instability, respectively. There is variation in the impact of the 
two variables on political instability across OECD countries based on the level of 
democracy. The level of democracy might drive the variation across these countries. For 
example, in Poland where the level of democracy is less than the average in OECD 
countries (17 vs. 20 in OECD) the country performs the worst in gross tertiary 
enrolment (43% vs. 49% in OECD), corruption (2.4 vs. 1.444 in OECD) and political 
instability (7 vs. 5.4 in OECD). The interrelationships between education, corruption 
and political instability are influenced by several factors in addition to the level of 
democracy like level of economic development. Youth bulge and control variables 
retain their sign and significance. 
 The impact of the joint effect on political instability is examined in democratic 
countries in Model 18. The independent effect of corruption enhances political 
instability; however, it exposes a lower risk in democratic than autocratic countries. 
Similarly, a low level of gross tertiary enrolment enhances political instability, but its 
effect is lower in democratic countries as the interaction term between gross tertiary 
enrolment and democracy dummy has a positive sign and is significant coefficient at the 
5% level. The joint effect has a positive sign although it is insignificant; however, it has 
                                                 
233 [The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment + its coefficient in interaction with OECD]+[(the 
coefficient of the jo int effect +its coefficient in interaction with OECD)*(1.444)(mean score of corruption 
in OECD)]=-0.017. One standard deviation decrease in  gross tertiary enrolment  is its coefficient in  the 
joint effect  (-0.017)* (22.474) (St . dev of gross tertiary enrolment in OECD)= 0.389 unit or .745%=  
(0.017*100)/(2.280)(St. dev of political instability in OECD).   
234The coefficient of gross tertiary enro lment (-0.025)- the coefficient of joint effect (-0.018)*(3.4) (mean 
score of corruption in non-OECD countries)= -0.0828. One standard deviation decrease in gross tertiary 
enrolment is coefficient of interaction term  (-0.0828)*(18.642) (St. dev of gross tertiary enrolment in  
non-OECD countries)= 1.544 unit  or 2%= (-0.0828*100)/(4.185)(St. dev of polit ical instability in non-
OECD countries).  
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a negative impact in democratic countries as the interaction term between the joint 
effect and democracy has a negative sign but is not significant. In other words, the 
impact of gross tertiary enrolment on political instability modera ted by corruption is 
higher in autocratic than democratic countries. The interaction effect of corruption at 
mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment 40% on political instability in democratic 
countries is 0.232. Democratic countries face extra risk of instability by 0.317 units or 
8% of one standard deviation of instability when its level of corruption increases by one 
standard deviation at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment235 in comparison with 
0.463 units or 11% of one standard deviation in autocratic countries 236. The interaction 
effect of education on political instability at mean score of corruption 2.227 in 
democratic countries is -0.008. Political instability increases by 0.201 units or 0.273% 
of one standard deviation of political instability for each one standard deviation 
decrease in gross tertiary enrolment 237  in comparison with 0.995 units or 1.4% in 
autocratic countries238.  
 In autocratic countries, the interaction effect of corruption dominated the joint 
effect. In these countries, the theory of distributive corruption states that a low level of 
democracy leads to full control by interest groups over government policies. These 
groups direct government policies and resources to sectors offer ing rent-seeking 
opportunities at the expense of developmental sectors that contribute to government 
survival (Amundsen, 1999). Corruption links the level of gross tertiary enrolment and 
political instability through economic growth channels. Corruption has adverse impacts 
on economic growth, which in turn reduces employment opportunities. This is because 
public funds are biased towards sectors that enhance rent-seeking opportunities at the 
                                                 
235[The coefficient of corruption + its coefficient in interaction with democratic dummy]+[(t he coefficient 
of the joint effect +its coefficient in interaction with democratic dummy)*(40)(mean percentage of gross 
tertiary enro lment in democrat ic countries)]=0.232.  One standard deviation increase in corruption is its 
coefficient in the joint effect  (0.232)*(1.368) (St. dev of corruption in democratic countries)= 0.317 unit  
or 8%= (0.232*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of political instability in democratic countries).  
236 The coefficient of corruption (0.386)- the coefficient of joint effect (0.005)*(15.876) (mean percentage 
of gross tertiary enrolment in autocratic countries) =0.465. One standard deviation increase in corruption 
is coefficient of interaction term  (0.465)*(0.994) (St. dev of corruption in autocratic countries)= 0.463 
unit or 11% (0.465*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of political instability in autocratic countries). 
237 [The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment + its coefficient in interaction with democratic 
dummy]+[(the coefficient of the joint effect +its coefficient in interaction with democratic 
dummy)*(2.227)(mean score of corruption in democratic countries)] -0.008. One standard deviation 
decrease in gross tertiary enrolment is its coefficient in the jo int effect  (-0.008)*(23.825) (St. dev of gross 
tertiary enrolment in democrat ic countries)= 0.201 unit or 0.273%= (-0.008*100)/(2.948)(St . dev of 
political instability in democratic countries). 
238The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment (-0.079)- the coefficient of joint effect (0.005)*(3.62) (mean 
score of corruption in autocratic countries)= -0.061. One standard deviation decrease in gross tertiary 
enrolment is coefficient of interaction term  (-0.061)*(16.313) (St. dev of gross tertiary enrolment in  
autocratic countries)= 0.995 unit or 1.4%= (-0.061*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of political instability in  
autocratic countries).   
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expense of sectors that feed economic growth (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998). It decreases 
economic growth via increases in uncertainty of investment environments as found 
empirically by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1997). It further leads to sluggish 
economic growth through its adverse impact on trade policy and institution quality as 
found empirically by Leite and Weidmann (1999). Increasing gross tertiary enrolment 
amidst high levels of corruption reduces an individual’s opportunity cost to commit  
violence239.  
 In democratic countries, the joint effect is dominated by the impact of the 
independent effect of gross tertiary enrolment, suggesting that a low level of enrolment 
lowers the adverse impact of corruption on political environment. This is because 
corruption in democratic countries is more likely to take the form of use of public 
economic policies by the incumbent to eliminate political rivals, as indicated by 
Manzetti and Wilson  (2007). This form of corruption requires knowelge that enables an 
individual to evaluate relative feasibility and potential impacts on different aspects of 
society. The negative sign of the joint effect enhances the adverse impact of low levels 
of gross tertiary enrolment on political instability in democratic countries, although the 
impact is negligent. Low level of educational attainment decreases public support to a 
government through several channels. It prevents the ready provision of qualified 
human resources required by the level of economic development as stated by Wagner 
law (Martinez-Vazquez & Yao, 2009). Shortage in qualified human resources reduces 
public support to a government because it reflects needs and requirements of different 
age groups among the population. Its low level deprives a society from the benefits of 
stimulating economic growth. Poor economic growth also deprives a government from 
increasing its tax revenue (Taydas and Peksen, 2012), which reduces its ability to 
enhance public welfare. Low educational attainment and poor economic growth 
prevents a country from reducing the level of poverty in society (Thyne, 2006). This 
increases pressure on governments to respond to high levels of income inequality and 
poverty by taking measures such as creating public employment. A government is then 
forced to use implicit and inefficient distribution measures like public employment over 
other explicit and efficient distribution channels to target specific segments of a society 
(Robinson and Verdier, 2002) in order to avoid political opposition associated with the 
latter distribution channels as indicated by Alberto Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (2000). 
The negative consequences of a low level of educational attainment prevent a 
                                                 
239 See for example Barro (1992), Levine and Renelt (1992), Li, Xu,andZou (2000), Gupta, Davoodi and 
Tiongson (2000), Gupta, De Mello and Sharan (2001).  
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government from creating a common interest between the public and government that 
enhances stability under the concept of a consensually strong state. This concept argues 
that a stabilization of the political environment requires creating common benefits 
between a state and society. Common benefits make it more likely for the public to 
tolerate a government’s strength measured by high taxes as long as a substantial 
percentage of it is used to create sufficient public goods and services (Acemoglu, 2005). 
Youth bulge and control variables retain their sign and significance.   
 The impact of the joint effect on political instability in the MENA region is 
examined in Model 19. The independent effect of corruption enhances political 
instability; however, it exposes lower risk in the MENA region as the interaction term 
between the joint effect and MENA dummy has a negative sign and is significant at the 
1% level. The independent effect of low gross tertiary enrolment exposes higher risk on 
political environment in the MENA rather than non-MENA region as the interaction 
term between MENA and gross tertiary enrolment has a negative sign and is significant 
at the 5% level. The joint effect has a negative sign although it is not significant, yet it 
turns into a positive sign and is significant in the MENA region as the interaction term 
between the joint effect and MENA has a positive sign and is significant at the 5% 
level. In other words, the adverse impact of a high level of gross tertiary enrolment on 
political environment moderated by corruption is higher in the MENA region. The 
interaction effect of corruption at mean percentage of gross tert iary enrolment 15.579% 
on instability in the MENA region is -0.707 (the independent effect of corruption in 
MENA is -3.76). Each one standard deviation decrease in corruption at mean 
percentage of gross tertiary enrolment enhances instability by 0.553 units or 16% of one 
standard deviation of instability240. In non-MENA regions each one standard deviation 
increase in corruption at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment 22.478% enhances 
instability by 0.279 units or 5% of one standard deviation of instability241. Similarly, a 
high level of corruption enhances the adverse impact of an increasing level of gross 
tertiary education on political instability in MENA. The interaction effect of education 
at mean score of corruption 3.509 on instability in the MENA region is 0.515. 
                                                 
240[The coefficient of corruption + its coefficient in interaction with MENA dummy]+[(the coefficient of 
the joint effect +its coefficient in interaction with MENA dummy)*(15.589)(mean percentage of gross 
tertiary enrolment in MENA countries)]=-0.707. One standard deviation decrease in corruption is its 
coefficient in the joint effect  (0.707)*(0.782) (St. dev of corruption in MENA countries)= 0.553 unit or 
16%= (0.707*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political instability in MENA countries). 
241The coefficient of corruption (0.401)- the coefficient of joint effect (-0.009)*(22.478) (mean percentage 
of gross tertiary enrolment in non-MENA countries) =0.198. One standard deviation increase in 
corruption is coefficient of interaction term  (0.198)*(1.405) (St. dev of corruption in non-MENA 
countries)= 0.279 unit or 5% (0.198*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-MENA countries).  
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Instability is enhanced by 6.163 units or 12% of one standard deviation of instability by 
each one standard deviation increase in gross tertiary enrolment at mean score of 
corruption242 whereas reduction in gross tertiary enrolment by one standard deviation at 
mean score of corruption enhances instability in non-MENA region by 0.958 units or 
1% of one standard deviation of instability243. 
  The interaction effect enhances the impact of education on political instability 
in the MENA region. In the MENA region a high level of corruption has an adverse 
impact on the economic environment, which in turn affects employment opportunities. 
As a result, the growth rate in educational attainment in the region exceeds employment 
opportunities (Chaaban, 2013). Furthermore, the weak growth rate in labor- intensive 
sectors like entrepreneurship fails to generate alternative employment opportunities 
(O'Sullivan et al., 2011). Politically, the low level of democracy in the region does not 
offer political channels to satisfy aspirations raised by educational attainment as argued 
by Huntington (1968) nor to fight corruption politically. Education in the region lowers 
the impact of the independent effect of corruption on political environment. This 
suggests that the Huntington (1968) argument (that corruption is an alternative of 
reform) varies according to the level of economic development. Corruption has 
stabilization effect at low level of educational attaintment; however, as its level 
improves it turns into destablization.  Generally, youth bulge and control variables 
retain their sign and significance. 
 Model 20 investigates the impact of the joint effect on political instability in oil 
countries. The independent effect of corruption enhances political instability; however, 
oil countries are at lower risk from corruption as the interaction between oil dummy and 
corruption has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level. The independent effect 
of gross tertiary enrolment has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level; 
however, it exposes lower risk in oil countries as the interaction term between gross 
tertiary enrolment and oil dummy has a positive sign although it is not significant. In 
other words, decreasing gross tertiary enrolment enhances political instability; however, 
                                                 
242[The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment + its coefficient in interaction with MENA dummy]+[(the 
coefficient of the jo int effect +its coefficient in interaction with MENA dummy)*(3.509)(mean score of 
corruption in  MENA countries)]=0.515.  One standard deviation increase in gross tertiary  enrolment  is its 
coefficient in the joint effect (0.515)*(11.962) (St. dev of gross tertiary enrolment in MENA countries)= 
6.163 unit or 12%= (0.515*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political instability in MENA countries). 
243 It is calculated as gross tertiary enrolment coefficient  (-0.016)- the coefficient of joint effect (-
0.009)* (2.948) mean score of corruption in non-MENA countries= -0.043. One standard deviation 
decrease in gross tertiary enrolment is coefficient of interaction term  (-0.043)*(22.528) (St. dev of gross 
tertiary enrolment in non-MENA countries)= 0.958 unit or 1%= (-0.043*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of political 
instability in non-MENA countries).   
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the risk is lower in oil than non-oil countries. The joint effect has a negative sign and 
significant coefficient at the 1% level; however, it has a positive impact in oil countries 
as the interaction term between oil and the joint effect has a positive sign and is 
significant at the 10% level. Put differently, the impact of a high level of gross tertiary 
enrolment on political instability moderated by corruption is higher in oil than non-oil 
countries. The interaction effect of corruption on political instability in oil countries at 
mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment 17.98% is 0.865. Each one standard 
deviation increase in corruption at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment 
enhances political instability in oil countries by 0.919 units or 21% of one standard 
deviation of political instability244 in comparison with 0.433 units or 8% of one standard 
deviation of political instability in non-oil countries245. The interaction effect of gross 
tertiary enrolment on political instability in oil countries at mean score of corruption 
3.627 is 0.426. Each one standard deviation increase in gross tertiary enrolment at mean 
score of corruption feeds political instability by 7.468 units or 10.5% of one standard 
deviation of political instability246 while in non-oil countries each one standard deviation 
decrease in educational attainment at mean score of corruption increases political 
instability by 1.957 units or 2% of one standard deviation of instability247.  
 The positive joint effect enhances the impact of education and corruption on 
political instability in oil countries. Increasing the level of educational attainment in oil 
countries creates pressure on the political system and labor markets, which in turn 
enhances instability. It increases pressure on already deteriorated labor markets because 
of the effect of the Dutch Disease model that leads to oil sector domination of economic 
activities and a high level of government involvement in the economic environment. 
                                                 
244[The coefficient of corruption + its coefficient in interaction with oil dummy]+[(the coefficient of the 
joint effect +its coefficient in interaction with oil dummy)*(17.98)(mean percentage of gross tertiary 
enrolment in oil countries)]=0.865. One standard deviation increase in corruption is its coefficient in the 
joint effect  (0.865)*(1.062) (St. dev of corruption in oil countries)= 0.919 unit or 21%=  
(0.856*100)/(4.072)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries). 
245The coefficient of corruption (0.676)- the coefficient of jo int effect (-0.015)*(23.72) (mean percentage 
of gross tertiary enrolment in non-oil countries) =0.320. One standard deviation increase in corruption is 
coefficient of interaction term  (0.320)*(1.354) (St . dev of corruption in  non-oil countries)= 0.433 unit  or 
8% (0.320*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non-oil countries).  
246 [The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment + its coefficient in interaction with oil dummy]+[(the 
coefficient of the joint effect +its coefficient in interaction with oil dummy)*(3.627)(mean score of 
corruption in o il countries)]=0.426.  One standard deviation increase in  gross tertiary enrolment  is its 
coefficient in the joint effect (0.426)*(17.527) (St. dev of gross tertiary enrolment in oil countries)= 7.468 
unit or 10.5%= (0.426*100)/ (4.072)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries). 
247  It is calculated gross tertiary enrolment coefficient  (-0.041)- the coefficient of joint effect (-
0.015)* (2.939) (mean score of corruption in non-oil countries)= -0.085. One standard deviation decrease 
in gross tertiary enrolment is coefficient of interaction term  (-0.085)*(23) (St. dev of gross tertiary 
enrolment in  non-oil countries)= 1.957 unit or 2%= (-0.085*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in  
non-oil countries).   
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The weak role of productive sectors in creating employment opportunities place a 
government under pressure to absorb educated youth in public employment (Sachs and 
Warner , 1997) in order to stabilize the political environment (Gelb et al., 1991) 
otherwise risk of instability increases. It increases pressure on the autocratic political 
system that lacks appropriate channels to accommodate the civic skills of educated 
youth. This creates pressure on government to move towards democracy; however, this 
would constitute significant restriction on governmental ability to use oil rents freely. 
Such restriction prevents governments from financing patron client networks that 
contribute to the stability of its political environment as suggested by rentier state theory 
(Smith, 2004). Furthermore, transparency associated with democracy restricts the ability 
of the ruling elite to allocate funds for their own consumption. Ross (2012) states that 
the public in oil countries experience difficulty in figuring out the actual level of oil 
rents and the amount siphoned out from public coffers by the ruling elites. Hence 
repression measures might be considered as an alternative to democracy in dealing with 
educated youth.  
 In non-oil countries, the joint effect is dominated by the independent negative 
effect of gross tertiary enrolment that lowers the adverse impact of corruption on 
political environment. The destabilization effect might filter through a reduction in 
government revenues, its failure to introduce financial measures to improve public 
finances and its failure to offer alternative opportunities to rent seeking. A low level of 
educational attainment has an adverse impact on stimulating economic growth, which 
reduces the level of government taxes. Thyne (2006) argues that wealth brought by 
education increases the level of taxes so that a government has financial resources with 
which to increase an individual’s opportunity cost to commit violence by outspending 
the anti-government movement. It creates obstacles before a government in introducing 
financial measures to improve public finance. Ritzen et al. (2000) argue that an 
educated population is more likely to accept policy reform because they understand that 
the short-term cost will be offset by benefits attained over the long run. A low level of 
collected taxes restricts a government’s ability to satisfy the interests of lobbyist groups, 
and poor economic growth resulting from low educational attainment fails to reduce the 
pressure on a government through offering alternative channels for rent seeking. Graeff 
and Mehlkop (2003) argue that a free economy breeds rent seeking opportunities and 
corruption because private agents might consider paying bribes to step ahead of their 
competitors. Control variables retain their sign and significance.  
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Table 3.5 The Joint Effect of Gross Tertiary Enrolment and Corruption on 
Political Instability over the Period from 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Political Instability  
Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
YB 0.154*** 
(0.031) 
0.129*** 
(0.032) 
0.145*** 
(0.036) 
0.169*** 
(0.031) 
0.108*** 
(0.033) 
Corruption 0.572*** 
(0.151) 
0.527*** 
(0.192) 
0.386 
(0.468) 
0.401*** 
(0.153) 
0.676*** 
(0.159) 
GTE -0.027*** 
(0.009) 
-0.025** 
(0.010) 
-0.079** 
(0.031) 
-0.016* 
(0.010) 
-0.041*** 
(0.011) 
Corruption*GTE -0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.029) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.015*** 
(0.005) 
OECD  -1.614*** 
(0.389) 
   
OECD*GTE  0.012 
(0.014) 
   
OECD*Corruption  -0.430** 
(0.190) 
   
OECD*Corruption*GTE  0.014* 
(0.008) 
   
DD   -1.205** 
(0.612) 
  
DD*GTE   0.075** 
(0.031) 
  
DD*Corruption   -0.074 
(0.506) 
  
DD*Corruption*GTE   -0.007 
(0.029) 
  
MENA    -1.133 
(1.393) 
 
MENA*Corruption    -4.161*** 
(1.121) 
 
MENA*GTE    -0.153** 
(0.066) 
 
MENA*Corruption*GTE    0.204** 
(0.097) 
 
Oil     -1.371 
(0.968) 
Oil*Corruption     -2.022*** 
(0.929) 
Oil*GTE     0.020 
(0.079) 
Oil*Corruption*GTE     0.138* 
(0.084) 
Constant -0.883 
(1.607) 
-1.368 
(1.627) 
-0.044 
(1.489) 
0.0031 
(1.495) 
2.026 
(1.705) 
Adjusted R square 30% 32% 30% 39% 28% 
Number of observation 617 617 625 617 590 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLSl 
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one year 
lag of GDP growth as instrument of 
GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. All 
models include all control variables included in models in Table 3-2 (results are not reported). For space restriction only the results of variables of 
interest are reported.  
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3.9 Sensitivity Analysis  
 The independent effect of corruption examined in Model 1, the joint effect 
between corruption and youth bulge tested in Model 6, the joint effect between 
corruption and unemployment investigated in Model 11 and the joint effect between 
corruption and educational attainment tested in Model 16 will be estimated using an 
alternative proxy and estimation technique. They are estimated using an alternative 
proxy of political instability adopted from Saha and Yap (2013), an alternative proxy of 
corruption from Transparency International (TI)248 and fixed effect (period effect) to 
carry out robustness analysis249.  
  The independent effect of corruption tested in Model 1 retains its sign and 
significance across all models estimated using the alternative proxy of political 
instability and corruption and when models are estimated using fixed effect. 
 The joint effect of corruption and youth bulge tested in Model 6 holds its sign in 
fixed effect and alternative proxy of political instability. The joint effect yields an 
insignificant negative sign when the model is estimated using an alternative proxy of 
corruption.  
  The impact of youth unemployment moderated by corruption on political 
instability examined in Model 11 holds its sign and significance in the fixed model and 
alternative proxy of political instability. The joint effect yields an insignificant expected 
positive sign when the model is estimated using an alternative proxy of corruption. 
 The impact of corruption on instability moderated by educational attainment set 
in the fifth hypothesis retains its sign and significance across all models. 
3.10 Conclusion and Discussion 
This chapter examines the independent effect of corruption on political 
instability and its moderated impact through youth bulge, youth unemployment and 
gross tertiary enrolment using an unbalanced panel data that contains 138 countries 
from 1984 to 2013. Furthermore, it investigates the independent and joint effect of 
corruption on political instability in OECD countries, democratic countries, oil 
countries, and the MENA region.   
                                                 
248 The original scale is re-scaled so that a high score indicates a high level of corruption and vice versa. 
249 Results are located in the appendix. 
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3.10.1 The Independent Effect of Corruption on Political Instability 
The first hypothesis assumes that increasing the level of corruption in a country 
enhances instability. The empirical results confirm the hypothesis; however, there is 
variation in its impact on political instability across the examined sub-samples.  
This study finds that the independent effect of corruption has an adverse impact 
on political stability in panel data analysis. The results hold when the models are 
estimated using alternative estimation techniques and stand up to alternative definitions 
of political instability and corruption. It can lead to political instability when a 
government is the weaker party in the state-society relationship as stated by the theory 
of distributive corruption. In this scenario, interest groups influence financial and non-
financial decisions of a government. This has an adverse impact on economic growth 
and quantity and quality of public goods and services. Alternatively, it might be its 
nature that turns it into a destructive force on political environment, as stated by 
strategic complementarity view. The view states it is destructive when each member of 
the incumbent set its own bribe system that leads to political instability. The empirical 
results are in line with empirical research that uses alternative proxies of political 
instability and corruption. It is also in line with empirical research that measures 
political instability in the form of the onset of civil war and armed conflict among others 
(Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). Furthermore, the present study is in line with empirical 
research that investigates the impact on political instability measured by public support 
to political regimes like Rose et al. (1998). Additionally, it supports empirical research 
that uses alternative proxies of corruption such as law and order like Marcus et al. 
(2008) who find a significant negative relationship between law and order and political 
instability. The empirical results give no support to another stream of theoretical and 
empirical literature that state it has a stabilization effect on political environment, such 
as the theory of extraction corruption. Empirically, the present study is in conflict with 
empirical research that finds an increasing level of corruption reduces political 
instability like Manzetti and Wilson (2007). 
The independent effect of corruption enhances political instability; however, its 
impact is lower in OECD than non-OECD countries. In democratic countries like 
OECD countries some form of corruption is required to stabilize the political 
environment by satisfying different needs of electorates as argued by Manzetti and 
Wilson (2007) and Leys (1965); however, its impact on different aspects of society is 
not equivalent to that realized in non-OECD countries. Furthermore, corrupted 
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transactions in OECD countries lead to political instability through political channels 
when discovered by the public. The results confirm the finding of Fjelde and Hegre 
(2014) that democratic regimes with a low level of corruption are more stable than those 
with a high level of corruption. However, it represents a departure from the findings of 
Manzetti and Wilson (2007) that corrupt governments in democratic countries continue 
to stay in office by using its client network to increase political support.  
Increasing corruption level enhances political instability in autocratic and 
democratic countries; however, its impact is lower in democratic countries. The 
destabilization effect of corruption on political environment goes through different 
channels in mature and immature democracy. In mature democrac ies, government needs 
to balance between private and public interests when it uses corruption to stabilize the 
political environment. Giving weight to one interest over another enhances political 
instability. Fjelde and Hegre (2014) find in panel data analysis that democratic regimes 
with low levels of corruption are more stable than those with high levels of corruption. 
In immature democracies, failure to reduce level of corruption enhances political 
instability. Rose et al. (1998) find that a high level of corruption in a democratic country 
decreases political support to the prevailing political regime and increases support for 
an alternative autocratic regime. In the same vein, Seligson (2002) finds in panel data 
analysis comprising some countries in South America that corruption undermines the 
legitimacy of the democratic system. Regardless of the level of democracy, the use of 
corruption to stabilize the political environment pays off over the short to medium run; 
however, it increases political instability over the long run. Clapham (1982) cited by 
Arriola (2009) indicates political instability increases over the long run as a result of 
imbalance between the level and growth rate of public resources and the growth in 
demand made by the growing number of interest groups. Corruption in autocratic 
countries enhances instability when it has a destructive effect on public living standards 
and they cannot gain involvement in its activities. The destabilization effect of 
corruption in autocratic countries does not support empirical research that finds it has 
stabilization effect (see, for example, Medard 1991, Widner, 1992 cited by Arriola, 
2009 and Johnston 1996).   
Corruption enhances political instability; yet it constitutes a lower threat on 
political environment in the MENA than non-MENA regions. The relationship filters 
through different channels in countries rich and poor in natural resources in the MENA 
region. In countries rich in natural resources like monarchies in the Arabic peninsula, 
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governments abolish the possibility of establishing common ground between interest 
groups and the public to act against a government. This happens by offering oil rents to 
interest groups through extensive patron-client networks and distribution expenditure 
directed to pacify the public (De Mesquita and Smith, 2009). Corruption in countries 
poor in natural resources relieves pressure on government to instigate reform as argued 
by Huntington (1968). In authoritarian countries it provides a channel of free 
movements and distribution of public resources across groups in a society where 
otherwise there would be no access in the absence of corruption (Becquart-Leclercq, 
1989). However, political risk still exists, from among other reasons, competition over 
its proceeds or unequal opportunities available to the public to be involved in 
government decisions.    
Corruption enhances political instability; however, it exposes lower risk in oil 
than non-oil countries. Oil rents and a low level of democracy in rentier states give 
government the ability to freely finance patron-client networks without needing to 
increase taxes on the public to finance the network (Smith, 2004). The empirical results 
in oil countries are in line with empirical research that finds a positive relationship 
between the two variables such as Fjelde (2009) 250  and Neudorfer and Theuerkauf  
(2014)251. The results represent a departure from the empirical finding of Fjelde (2009) 
that the joint effect of corruption and oil production has a negative and significant 
relationship with the onset of armed conflict. However, it can enhance instability when 
oil rents are controlled by one segment while others are prevented from gaining access 
to it. Ross et al. (2011) argue that oil rents enhance instability when it exists in a region 
with pre-existing ethnic or religious grievances. In non-oil countries the source of 
political instability will be a combination of the adverse impact of corruption and rent 
seeking activities on public living standards and an increasing level of taxation on the 
public, which further deteriorate their living standards. Fjelde (2009) claims that the 
political risk of corruption is higher in non-oil countries than oil countries. The author 
supports this claim with several anecdotal cases such as Haiti in 1989, Sierra Leone in 
1991, Liberia in 1989 and Uganda in 1994; these countries are poor in non-tax revenue 
and have high levels of corruption that leads to armed conflict.  
                                                 
250 The author measures instability in form of civil war 
251 The author measures instability in form of ethnic war  
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3.10.1.1 Contribution 
This study examines the independent effect of corruption on political instability 
in panel data, OECD countries, oil countries, democratic countries, and the MENA 
region over the period from 1984-2013. It is distinct from other research in the nexus of 
corruption and instability in several aspects. It uses a proxy of corruption that measures 
its political risk and uses a broad proxy of political instability. It examines the impact on 
political environment unlike past empirical literature that measures its impact on 
economic growth, government performance and public welfare. It examines impact on 
political environment in sub-samples that show variation in the level of corruption, the 
percentage of youth bulge and socioeconomic and political environment. By doing so it 
examines several arguments about the stabilization and destabilization effect of 
corruption under different environments. It shows that corruption has a destabilization 
effect; however, several factors play an important role in lowering its impact, such as 
source of public revenue and the level of democracy. Furthermore, it might have a 
stabilization effect over the short run; however, it is causes an accumulated adverse 
effect that enhances political instability over the long run. It finds that corruption has a 
positive and significant relationship with political instability in panel data analysis, non-
OECD countries and non-oil countries. 
3.10.2 The Joint Effect between Corruption and Youth Bulge on Political 
Instability 
The role of youth bulge on political instability moderated by the level of 
corruption is examined in Model 6. In general, the empirical results confirm the 
hypothesis yet there is variation in the impact of the joint effect across sub-samples.  
The empirical results from panel data analysis support the second hypothesis 
that the impact of youth bulge on political instability is stronger in corrupted countries.  
The joint effect enhances instability because corruption intensifies pressure created by 
youth bulge on the socioeconomic environment. The situation worsens when relatively 
few interest groups control corruption gains and youth bulge have no access at all. This 
motivates youth bulge to consider violence as a means to gain access to its economic 
benefits (Le Billon, 2003).  
Corruption enhances the role of youth bulge on political instability and its 
impact is higher in OECD countries than non-OECD countries. In OECD countries the 
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failure of government to respond to public concerns over the level of corruption or the 
requirements of youth bulge enhances political instability.  
Youth bulge exposes lower risk on political environment in the presence of 
corruption in democratic than autocratic countries. Similarly, they expose lower risk on 
the political environment in oil than non-oil countries. Their role on political instability 
is enhanced by a high level of corruption in the MENA region. The positive joint effect 
in MENA and autocratic countries could be the result of unequal distribution of its 
economic proceeds across segments of the public. This arises when its benefits are fully 
controlled by relatively few interest groups and youth bulge has no means with which to 
gain part of these benefits. Similarly, the source of government income determines who 
bears its cost. Oil rents offer a source for government to stabilize its political 
environment through patron client networks without taxing the public while it continues 
to absorb youth in educational institutions and public employment. On the other hand, 
youth bulge in non-oil countries causes government to bear its cost twice through under 
provision in some sectors like education and leads to continual increases in taxes on 
productive sectors to finance its activities, which negates its ability to generate 
employment opportunities. In democratic countries, a high level of political competition 
brought by democracy reduces its impact on political instability. The positive sign of 
the joint effect is in line with the findings of Farzanegan et al. (2014) who find a 
significant positive relationship between interaction term and the level of political 
instability252 . The positive relationship in the MENA region is in line with several 
arguments that indicate that a high level of corruption in the region enhanced the impact 
of youth bulge on the so-called the Arab spring in late 2010. This is in line with 
arguments made by Sommers (2011) that a corrupted country faces a high risk of 
political instability in the presence of a high percentage of youth bulge because 
corruption further deteriorates already poor conditions.  
3.10.2.1Contribution 
 This study investigates the impact of youth bulge moderated by corruption on 
political instability in different sub-samples, over an extended time period, with an 
alternative proxy of corruption, political instability and youth bulge. This is far more 
                                                 
252 Farzanegan, Reza and Witthuhn (2014) measure youth bulge as the proportion of the population aged 
17-25 years old to population aged 15-64 years old and political instability measured using the World 
Governance Indicators . 
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extensive than Farzanegan et al. (2014) who examine the impact of joint effect in panel 
data analysis  that covers the period from 2002 to 2012. Furthermore, this study 
examines anecdotal observations that link youth bulge and political instability in the 
MENA region through corruption. It finds that corruption produces its impact on 
political instability in the region through its interaction with youth bulge, as is the case 
in OECD countries, democratic and autocratic countries. It shows that corruption 
enhances the role of youth bulge on political instability under different situatio ns; 
however, for different reasons. In some countries where their percentage is low they 
might be driven by a low of level of tolerance for corrupted transactions. In other 
instances, they are driven by its adverse impact on public living standards. Additionally, 
it shows that the joint effect between corruption and youth bulge provides more 
explanations about the impact of corruption on political environment than only its 
independent effect. The present study finds that the joint effect has a positive and 
significant relationship with political instability in OECD countries, democratic and 
autocratic countries and in the MENA region. 
3.10.3 The Joint Effect between Corruption and Youth Unemployment on Political 
Instability 
The empirical hypothesis confirms the third hypothesis that corruption enhances 
the role of unemployed youth on political instability; however, the risk is higher in 
OECD countries than non-OECD countries, democratic than autocratic countries and 
MENA region than non-MENA region. Corruption has an adverse impact on different 
aspects of society, one of which is labor markets. Its effect travels through different 
channels across these sub-samples such that when unemployed youth believe that a high 
level of corruption prevents them from finding employment opportunities, they will act 
against a government. Sommers (2011) point out that instability is enhanced when 
youth bulge believes that the corrupted government fails to address their economic and 
political exclusiveness.   
Interestingly, the joint effect has a negative sign in oil and non-oil countries and 
panel data analysis; this suggests that a low level of corruption lowers the impact of 
unemployed youth on political instability. It could be that a government succeeds in 
reducing the level of political corruption in a country as a source that exaggerates the 
role of unemployed youth on political instability. However, its low level enhances the 
political risk of dissatisfied interest groups with their interests unmet by government.  
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3.10.3.1Contribution 
To best of the author’s knowledge there are no empirical studies investigating 
the impact of the joint effect between corruption and unemployment on political 
instability under different sub-samples. This study shows that when corruption prevents 
youth from employment as a path that satisfies financial independency and other 
objectives, it turns into a destabilization factor regardless of the level of democracy. 
Furthermore, this study examines the effect of corruption on an important need of youth 
bulge that determines an individual’s opportunity cost to be involved (or not) in 
incidences of political instability. It finds that the joint effect between corruption and 
youth unemployment has a positive and significant relationship with political instability 
in the MENA region and OECD countries; however, the impact is substantially high in 
the MENA region. 
3.10.4 The Joint Effect between Corruption and Gross Tertiary Enrolment on 
Political Instability 
The fourth hypothesis assumes that the more corrupt a country, the stronger the 
impact of a high level of gross tertiary enrolment on political instability. The empirical 
results confirm the hypothesis in autocratic countries, MENA region and oil countries. 
In these countries, the effect filters through the labor market and the level of democracy. 
The low level of democracy does not offer political channels to educated youth to use 
their civic skills to fight corruption politically. Furthermore, a low level of democracy 
enhances the adverse impact of corruption on different aspects of society, among which 
is economic growth that reduces employment opportunities available for educated 
youth.  Corruption that prevents educated youth from joining labor markets and 
insufficient political channels with which to fight such injustices might push youth to 
rely on violence to press for reform.      
 The joint effect has a negative sign in OECD countries and non-OECD 
countries, democratic countries, panel data analysis and non-oil countries, suggesting 
that a low level of corruption and low level of gross tertiary enrolment lower political 
stability. It might be that in these countries financial pressure restricts governments 
from providing public goods like education and private services for interest groups so 
that political instability ensues.  
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3.10.4.1Contribution  
The joint effect between corruption and gross tertiary enrolment on political 
instability investigated in this study is to best of the author’s knowledge a novel 
contribution to the empirical literature in panel data analysis, OECD countries, 
democratic countries, oil countries, and the MENA region. It identifies another 
important channel that links corruption to political instability. It shows the importance 
of democracy to lower the impact of the interaction effect of the two  variables on 
political instability. Furthermore, it shows that democracy offers educated youth 
channels with which to fight corruption politically; however, in the absence of such 
channels they might rely on radical change to do so. It finds that the joint effect between 
corruption and gross tertiary enrolment has a positive and significant relationship with 
political instability in the MENA region and oil countries.   
3.11 Future Research  
The empirical results suggest several directions for future research. The lower 
effect of the independent effect of corruption and its joint effect with youth bulge, youth 
unemployment and gross tertiary education on political instability under some sub-
samples require further investigation.  
The lower impact of the independent effect of corruption on political instability 
in oil and MENA countries needs further investigation. One possible explanation is that 
governments in these countries realize that satisfying interest groups has a higher 
immediate stabilization effect than meeting the requirements of youth bulge. In the 
absence of dissatisfied interest groups there is no party interest in supporting youth 
bulge against a government. From the general reading of the author, the Egyptian 
government has for an extended period of time denied the political right of the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement. In wake of public demonstrations against the Mubarak regime 
in late 2010, the movement organized and supported desperate youth bulge against the 
regime. The movement succeeded to win the first presidential election after Mubarak. 
Other governments in the region realized the importance of some interest groups such as 
religious figures to create positive attitudes among the public towards a government. 
Religious tradition in the region constitutes an important element of political economy. 
In the wake of the so-called Arab Spring in late 2010, religious figures in the public 
issued a statement that demonstration and strike against the government is prohibited 
from a religious point of view. Future research might investigate the relationship 
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between corruption and political instability using proxies that measure the relative 
satisfaction of interest groups.  
The lower impact of the joint effect between corruption and youth bulge in oil 
than non-oil countries despite the explanation offered in this study needs further 
investigation. Future work might investigate the impact of the joint effect on instability 
in countries based on oil production per capita or oil reserve per capita. It might be that 
its impact on instability is different in countries with higher values in these two proxies 
than countries with low values. Countries rich in these proxies can satisfy public and 
private interest while those displaying poor results in these proxies might consider 
which party’s interest is more important to political instability. Alternatively, it might 
investigate the impact of the joint effect between corruption and repression on political 
environment.   
In the relationship between corruption and labor markets, future research could 
investigate its impact on instability under different scenarios. It could examine the 
impact of the joint effect between a high level of corruption and unemployment and the 
joint effect between a low level of corruption and high unemployment. It may 
investigate its impact using alternative proxies of unemployment such as unemployment 
to total labor force. 
Regarding the impact of education on political instability moderated by the level 
of corruption, future research could investigate the impact of each educational level on 
political instability moderated by the level of corruption. Alternatively, it can 
investigate the joint effect between education quality such as country performance in 
math and science worldwide. This is because some authors such as Eicher, García-
Peñalosa, and van Ypersele (2009) argue that education enhances the level of corruption 
because the educational system in some instances equip youth with skills to involve in 
rent seeking instead of productive activities.      
Future research can further investigate the independent impacts of corruption 
and its joint effect on instability in countries where corruption is the norm versus 
countries where it is uncommon. Alternatively, it is possible to investigate the variation 
of the level of political instability based on the type of corruption, such as petty 
corruption versus grand corruption.  
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3.12 Policy Implications  
Political and bureaucratic corruption is driven by different factors. A high level 
of perceived bureaucratic corruption in some countries might be a response to poor 
living standards that forces the public to become involved in its activities. Political 
corruption aims to establish common interest between the ruling elite and interest 
groups. Strategies to fight both types of corruption require strong political will. This is 
the outcome of political leadership that understands that the long-term benefits of a low 
level of corruption greatly outweigh the short-term benefits associated with a high level 
of corruption. Furthermore, it requires a unique approach to each determinant. 
Improving public living standards is the first step in reducing bureaucratic 
corruption. It is required to set a plan for economic reform with the aim to diversify 
economic activities. Diversification contributes to reducing the level of corruption 
through several channels. It expands economic opportunities available to the public so 
that they will seek education that enhances their gains from the attractive economic 
environment. Diversification reduces the level of corruption by offering an opportunity 
to private agents to move between different sectors when they are forced to pay bribes 
in a specific sector. Taxes generated from economic growth provide a government with 
financial resources to improve other sectors such as education and housing. From 
general reading of the author of this thesis, the Chinese government has set plans worth 
$150 billion to establish new villages for poor Chinese until 2020. Benefits brought by 
economic reform establish common interests between government, the public and 
interest groups.  
Policy makers need to set a plan for political reform to likewise reduce political 
corruption. This reform should take place in parallel with economic reform. This is 
because some empirical research finds that the level of corruption increases when 
political reform falls behind economic reform. Political reform that aims to establish 
consolidated democracy, not procedural democracy, is required to fight corruption. 
Procedural democracy that gives some room for free expression in the absence of 
checks and balances and other measures required to discipline politicians can increase 
the risk of political instability. This type of democracy informs the public about 
corruption scandals in the absence of punishment and only increases public 
dissatisfaction with their living standards, making them likely to stand against a 
government when they successfully organize collective action. 
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Policy makers need to increase both the predictability and clarity of bureaucratic 
procedures. They need to set clear and precise defin itions of corrupted transactions. The 
importance of such definitions emerges from the fact that the public within a single 
country can perceive corruption differently. For example, some members of the public 
consider a transaction to be corrupted when money changes hand (but otherwise not); 
however, corrupted transactions come in many different shapes and sizes. Policy makers 
need to consider automation of government activities, especially for some factors that 
reduce the level of corruption over the medium to long term. Automation will reduce 
human interference that has been found to be associated with a high level of corruption. 
Furthermore, it eliminates the adverse effect of culture on anti-corruption strategies in 
countries where corruption is deeply rooted in a society. 
Policy makers need to enhance the role of an individual and a community in 
fighting corruption. An individual role can increase through educational system with 
aim to create an edge between public and private right associated with public post. 
Increasing transparency in allocation of public expenditure enhance the role of 
community in fighting corruption through providing the required information to 
evaluate the efficiency of public expenditure and such expenditure is allocated to the 
best interest of community.   
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Chapter 4 
Does a Large Government Size Play a Crucial Role in Subsiding Political 
Instability? 
4.1 Introduction 
 Government plays an important role in preventing incidences of political 
instability associated with a highly youthful population distribution (youth bulge). It 
achieves this by taking a proactive approach through creating socioeconomic and 
political conditions that help to turn youth bulge from a demographic curse to 
demographic dividends. Alternatively, when a government fails to create such an 
environment, it is forced to take a reactive approach in response to mismatches between 
rapid changes in the percentage of youth bulge and the prevailing socioeconomic and 
political environment. Among other reactive approaches is enlargement of its size and 
expansion of its role in order to compensate for poor performance by creating public 
employment in response to youth unemployment, high levels of educational attainment 
combined with a lack of graduate entry- level positions, poor economic growth, and 
rapid urban growth rates. Failure to address these factors has the potential to enhance 
the role of youth bulge as a causal factor of political instability.  
 Here it is useful to consider some causal historical observations. The rise of 
Nazism in Germany in the 1930s is partly attributed to young people who experienced 
difficulty in finding employment (Urdal, 2004). Shambayati (1994) argues that Iran 
experienced rapid urban growth in the years preceding the Islamic revolution in 1979, 
which caused accumulated pressure on educational and employment opportunities. 
Similarly, the Algerian armed conflict in 1992253 is attributed to a youth bulge where the 
young experienced difficulty in finding employment, educational and housing 
opportunities (Trends, 2001). A government might consider expanding its role by 
increasing its expenditure on education as an alternative policy to deal with 
unemployment and rapid changes in urban growth rate. Expenditure on education can 
be used to rehabilitate unemployed youth to seek re-employment or as alternative means 
of employment in order to waive their risk on political environment temporarily. Some 
governments in the MENA region like the monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula 
protected themselves from the adverse effects of the so-called the Arab Spring in late 
                                                 
253 The armed conflict  between the Algerian government and various Islamic groups began in 1991 and 
ended in 2002. 
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2010 by creating massive public employment and expanding educational opportunities 
for youth.  
 Given the important role of government to lower the impact of socioeconomic 
environment and youth bulge on political instability, the current empirical literature 
moves from opportunity and grievance perspectives to explain its determinants in 
lowering such risk. Taydas and Peksen (2012) point out that there is little agreement on 
the main causes of political instability; however, there is some consistency in the 
literature on the role of government in stabilizing the political environment. Commonly, 
the empirical literature tends to measure its role in the form of coercive strength (Mason 
and Fett, 1996). Much of the literature measures the impact of a state’s military strength 
on preventing political instability (see, for example, Mason and Fett, 1996 and Balch, 
Lindsay and Enterline, 2000). More recently, other aspects of its role (including 
administrative and bureaucratic roles) are well explored (see, for instance, Morrison 
2009, Taydas et al. 2010 and Bricker and Foley, 2013). However, surprisingly few 
empirical studies measure government role in the form of financial expenditure. Taydas 
and Peksen (2012) invesigate the independent effect of disaggregate and aggregate 
expenditure on education, health and social security as well as government consumption 
at the onset of armed conflict, using a data set which covers a period from 1975 to 2005 
in 156 countries. Higashijima, Singh, and Bodea (2014) examine the independent effect 
of  total public expenditure, military expenditure and social expenditure (education, 
health and social security) on the onset of armed conflict in oil countries based on their 
oil and gas value per capita using a data set of 148 countries over a period from 1960 to 
2009.  
 This study aims to expand the work begun by Taydas and Peksen (2012) and 
Higashijima et al. (2014) concerning the role of government on the form of financial 
expenditure on political instability. It examines the independent effect of government 
size and its role on political instability as well as the joint effect of government size and 
the joint effect of government role on political instability. It differs from Taydas and 
Peksen (2012) and Higashijima et al. (2014) in several aspects. First, it uses a broader 
measure of political instability that considers minor and major scales of political 
instability unlike the previously mentioned studies that measure armed conflict, which 
may not capture the impact of government size and role on political instability. This is  
because in the condition of armed conflict, it is expected that military expenditure will 
increase with adverse impacts on government size and role.  
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 Second, the study examines the impact of the joint effect of government role and 
the joint effect of government size on political instability. The joint effect rather than 
the independent effect can establish the causal relationship between the government size 
and role on the one hand and political instability on the other hand. It could be that a 
government size and role are both large yet they fail to meet public needs and 
requirements. For example, Singapore, Khazhstan and Switzerland have a smaller 
government size than the Congo Democratic Republic, Liberia and Lebanon 254 yet the 
former countries are more stable255. It might be that government size and role ceteris 
paribus in the Congo Democratic Republic, Liberia and Lebanon fail to address poor 
peformance in some determinants of political instability. In other words, government 
size and role, especially in developing countries, can be large because it is used to create 
private goods and services rather than addressing the prevailing poor socioeconomic 
environment that can lead to political instablity.  
 Third, this study examines the impact of government size and role on political 
instability in countries based on the percentage of youth bulge, the level of democracy, 
oil countries and MENA region. These sub-samples are created to capture the variation 
in the impact of government size because of the failure to meet requirements of age 
structures within the population or because of poor quality of government size and role. 
More importantly, the study aims to capture whether in some instances enlargement of 
government size and role to address poor socioeconomic environment leads to political 
instability. This is because they create financial pressure on a government that requires 
introduction of suitable financial measures. Some of these measures may deteriroate the 
living standards of public employees while the socioeconomic environment continues to 
consitute political risk. 
 The first sub-sample the study will create is based on the percentage of youth 
bulge, as it is expected that the distribution of the age structure of the population may 
influence the type of government expenditure. In countries where there is a high 
percentage of young people it is expected that a government will allocate more funds 
for job creation and education, while in countries where the percentage of senior 
citizens is high more funds will be allocated to areas that serve this age group.  
                                                 
254 The data set used in the present study shows that the average government size in Singapore is 10% to 
GDP, Khazhstan 12% to GDP and Switzerland 11% to GDP, while its size in the Congo Democratic 
Republic is 16% to GDP , Liberia 15.4% to GDP and Lebanon 15.4%.  
255 Average score of political instability in Singapore is 3.68, Khazhstan 3.04 and Switzerland 2.5, while 
its size in the Congo Democratic Republic is 12.7, Liberia 12 and Lebanon 11.5. 
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 The second sub-example this study will use is based on the political regime type 
(democratic and autocratic countries) to capture its influence on the effectiveness of the 
independent effect of government size and role as well as its interaction with 
socioeconomic factors on political instability. There is no significant difference between 
government size and role between democratic and autocratic countries 256 ; however, 
there is a difference in the level of political instability 257. In other words, government 
size and role can create different outcomes between democratic and autocratic 
countries. Size and role may be large in both sub-samples yet displays a higher 
stabilization effect in democratic countries than autocratic countries. This is because the 
public in democratic countries has political channels with which to question a 
government when it fails to meet their needs and requirements. On the other hand, it 
might be large in autocratic countries yet it leads to destabilization. This might suggest 
that the government size and role is sufficient; however, there might be other factors 
that prevent the stabilization effect.  
 The third sub-example that the study will use is oil and non-oil countries in 
order to examine the impact of government size and role on political instability based 
on the source of government revenue. It might reveal that there is variation in the 
stabilization effect of government size and role between oil and non-oil countries. This 
is because in non-oil countries stabilization of political environment might require non-
financial measures like tax cuts rather than enlarging a government’s size or role; while 
in oil countries in the absence of tax hikes, government size and role might have a 
stabilization effect. In the MENA region media reports and commentators claim that 
governments are highly involved in their economic environment and serve as main 
providers of goods and services. This sub-sample aims to examine the effect of 
government size and role to lower the impact of socioeconomic environment on 
political instability.  
 Based on the previous propositions, the hypotheses of this study are as follows. 
Firstly, enlargement of government size and role enhances political stability. The 
second hypothesis is that a large government size lowers the impact of unemployment 
on political instability. The third hypothesis states that the impact of corruption on 
political instability is stronger in countries with a large government size. The fourth 
                                                 
256 The data set used in the present study shows that the average government size in democratic countries 
is 17% to GDP, while in autocratic countries it is 15% to GDP. 
257 The average score of political instability in autocratic countries is 8, while in democratic countries it is 
6. 
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hypothesis is that enlargement of government size lowers the impact of a high level of 
educational attainment on political instability. The fifth hypothesis argues that 
enlargement of government size lowers the adverse impact of trade openness on 
political environment. The sixth hypothesis states that enlargement of government size 
lowers the impact of rapid urban growth rate on political instability. The seventh and 
eight hypotheses assume that enlargement of government role lowers the impact of 
unemployment and urban growth rate on political instability. These hypotheses are 
examined using panel data analysis, countries where the percentage of youth bulge is 
more than 30% and less than 30%, democratic countries, oil countries and the MENA 
region. 
 This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents a review of the 
literature; Section 4.3 outlines the determinants of government size and political 
stability, Section 4.4 explores the effects of expenditure on education and political 
stability; Section 4.5 gives brief overview about the consequences of oversized 
government; Section 4.6 examines government size and its role on political instability; 
Section 4.7 presents the empirical model, data and methodology; Section 4.8 outlines 
the estimation strategy; Section 4.9 presents the empirical results concerning the 
independent effect of government size on political instability; Section 4.10 presents the 
empirical results concerning the impact of the joint effect of government size and other 
factors on the level of political instability; Section 4.11 presents the empirical results 
concerning the joint effect of government role and unemployment rate on political 
instability; Section 4.12 presents the empirical results concerning the joint effect of 
government role and urban growth rate on political instability; Section 4.13 presents the 
sensitivity analysis; Section 4.14 discusses and concludes; Section 4.15 suggests future 
research and Section 4.16 explores policy implications. 
4.2 Literature Review 
This section will begin by giving a brief overview of a common proxy for 
government role used in the literature, which is its military role in protecting its political 
environment. This study argues that reliance on military forces does not prevent, 
eliminate or terminate political instability because it does not settle its causes. In the 
following there is a brief overview of the factors that drive government size in 
democratic countries and oil countries. The study provides the alternative explanation 
that its size grows in response to international integration or level of economic 
development. Under all conditions its size and role are used to stabilize the political 
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environment through compensating for poor performance in other factors or as a 
response to rapid changes in some factors. The study presents the adverse impacts of 
enlarging government size on other aspects of society. 
4.2.1 Government Role and Political Instability  
Current literature concerning civil unrest shifts its focus from investigating the 
determinants of political instability as suggested by opportunity and grievance 
perspectives to the role of government in preventing, eliminating and terminating 
instability incidences under the so-called state capacity concept. The role of government 
under state capacity is conceptualized and measured by its military strength, 
bureaucratic/administrative quality, and political institutional coherence and quality. 
Outstanding performance in these dimensions has a stabilization effect on the political 
environment in a country. Empirical research that investigates the role of government 
on the level of political instability mainly measures it in terms of military strength and 
there is limited empirical research that investigates other dimensions of government 
role. The relationship between military strength and stability is confirmed empirically 
(see, for example, Mason and Fett, 1996, and Balch, Lindsay and Enterline, 2000). 
Although the empirical research confirms the association between these two variables258, 
one can argue that the military role of a government cannot prevent political instability 
from the onset of the first instance, nor does it reduce its time frame or increase the 
potential to terminate it. This is because it does not settle factors contributing to its 
onset such as economic or political factors, or related to the cost associated with 
reliance on military forces, which will be discussed later.    
The military role of government increases military expenditure at  the expense of 
expenditure on some sectors that contribute to stability, like education. Henderson and 
Singer (2000) indicate that it has a crowded out effect on welfare expenditure such as 
education, health services, and other social services that target overall society. This 
prevents education from producing its stabilization effect on political environment via 
boosting long-term economic growth and developing civic skills that make an 
individual more reliant on discussion instead of violence to settle disputes. Barakat and 
Urdal (2009) find empirically that a country with a high level of educational attainment 
faces low risk of political instability. 
                                                 
258 It is measured political instability as dependent variable mainly in the form of war. 
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The military role of government enhances the level of corruption and rent 
seeking activities associated with military expenditure. Henderson and Singer (2000) 
indicate that a high military role offers abundant opportunities for corruption and rent 
seeking activities. Gupta et al. (2001) find a significant positive relationship between 
corruption and military expenditure measured by military expenditure as a ratio of GDP. 
Corruption and rent seeking have adverse impacts on public policy. Its high level forces 
a government to adopt sub-optimal policies because it comes under the influence of 
different interest groups (Persson and Svensson, 1990). The military option to settle 
political dispute creates a state of uncertainty in the political environment that is 
considered a favourable environment for corruption and rent seeking. Pellegrini (2011) 
find that a high level of political instability is associated with a high level of corruption 
because politicans believe they will stay in office for short time  and so aim to maximise 
their personal benefits. 
A high level of corruption and rents seeking reduces the level of public revenue 
and leads to poor economic growth. This has an adverse impact on government ability 
to enforce stability through military forces and it further decreases the level of 
employment in a country. Svensson (1998) find that poor institutional quality forces 
firms to operate in an informal economy, which in turn reduces the level of tax 
collection and prevents a government from carrying out its duties efficiently. It has an 
adverse effect on economic growth through its effect on efficient allocation of resources 
for a society (Le Billon, 2003). A high level of corruption in a country that has a high 
level of military expenditure leads to poor economic growth. Pieroni and d'Agostino 
(2009) find  in panel data analysis that the joint effect between corruption and military 
expenditure has an adverse effect on economic growth.  
The negative consequences of a high level of corruption and military 
expenditure enhance the risk of political instability. This is because they increase the 
level of grievance and decreases an individual’s opportunity cost though decreasing the 
level of employment resultant from poor economic growth  (Looney and McNab,2008). 
Dunne and Tian (2015) find empirically that corruption has an adverse effect on 
economic growth; the results hold across low, middle and high- income countries. 
Farzanegan et al. (2014) indicate that a country with a high percentage of youth bulge 
experiences pressure on labor markets, economic and political environments, and that 
corruption might further deteriorate already poor conditions. Collier (2000) specifies 
that according to the opportunity perspective it is expected that an individual will join a 
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rebellion movement when there is widespread poverty and unemployment across a 
society.   
The military role of a government might have a stabilization effect in the short 
to medium term, however it enhances the chance of political instability incidences in the 
future and increases uncertainty in the political environment. This is because the 
military option does not settle factors that contributed to the onset of instability 
incidences in the first place. Smith (2004) indicates that a country with a history of 
political instability is more likely to experience political instability in the future. Collier 
(2007) cited by Polachek and Sevastianova (2012) indicate that past conflict increases 
the probability of recurring future conflict because a country engages in a vicious circle 
of political instablity and poor economic growth. The military option increases 
uncertainty in the political environment, which discourages investment (see, for 
example, Barro, 1992 and Alberto Alesina et al. (1996). Polachek and Sevastianova 
(2012) find in panel data analysis that conflicts have adverse effects on all aspects of the 
economy in a country, and that the impact varies across countries based on their wealth 
and polity. Figure 4.1 shows the level of political instability in selected countries where 
the score is above 3.5 from 1984 to 2013259. These countries succeed in improving their 
stability at the beginning of the period before reaching its lowest point in the late 1990s; 
however in recent years the level of instability is recovering. 
Figure 4.1 The Level of Political Instability in Selected Countries from 1984 to 
2013 
 
The military role of government to stabilize the political environment can lead to 
a vicious circle of political instability where instability breeds more instability. Falling 
                                                 
259 Colombia, Sudan, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Indonesia, Israel, India, Uganda and Ethiopia.  
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in such a condition is attributed to a variation in interests across groups involved in the 
conflict, fighting strategies and through its adverse effect on economic growth. The 
difference in interests makes some involved groups push towards political settlement 
while others may prefer to continue with violence (Rudloff and Findley, 2016). For 
example, the failure to reach political settlement in the ongoing condition of political 
instability in Syria (since 2011) is partially attributed to different interests across 
involved opposition groups (that are estimated to be around one thousand) (BBC, 2013). 
This creates a state of ongoing instability because of the fighting strategy used by 
rebellion groups. Hultquist (2013) finds that a government with strong military 
capability experiences difficulty in crushing rebellion even when the rebellion may be 
relatively small because of particular fighting strategies used by the rebellion like 
guerrilla warfare. 
4.3 Determinants of Government Size and Political Stability 
This section presents factors that drive government size in oil countries and 
democratic countries. Alternatively, its size might be driven by needs and requirement 
such as high level of integration with international markets or  the level of economic 
development.  
4.3.1 Government Size, Rents from Natural Resources and Political Stability  
The Dutch disease model, rent seeking model and rentier state theory explain 
factors that drive a government size in oil countries. Although each model attributes the 
size of government to different factors, there is a general agreement that the final 
objective is stabilization of the political environment. Higashijima et al. (2014) indicate 
that a government’s size in oil countries (both democratic and autocratic) succeeds in 
stabilizing the political environment. 
Under the Dutch disease model, governments in oil countries enlarge their size 
by creating public employment to address imperfection in the labor market. These 
imperfections are created because the natural resources sector drives away intensive 
labor and technology resources from other economic sectors like manufacturing. This 
leads to a negative impact on employment distribution across different economic 
sectors, so that a government creates public employment to absorb labor forces (Sachs 
and Warner, 1997). Said (1996) documents cases of rentier states in the Arabic 
Peninsula where governments tend to offer highly compensated public sector 
employment for their citizens. The author indicates that in 1992 a government sector in 
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oil- rich country Kuwait employed 91% of the Kuwaiti labor force; however, this trend 
declined in 1980 with a subsequent slump in the economy resulted from low oil prices. 
As a result, oil countries enjoy a high level of political stability because they creates a 
middle- income group that is financially dependent on the government to make their 
living (Sandbakken, 2006).    
Rent seeking theory assumes that public employment in oil rich countries is one 
form of rent seeking in the labor market that aims to stabilize the political environment. 
A government responds to pressure created by interest groups organized around ethnic, 
religious and geographic lines by creating massive public employment (Lane and 
Tornell, 1996). Gavin (1993) illustrates the case of Nigeria where public employment 
from 1973 to 1983 increased while employment in all sectors decreased. The author 
indicates that this is a strategy used by the government to stay in office and eliminate 
threats from its rivals. A similar case is observed in copper-dependent Zambia, where 
president Kenneth Kaunda in 1972 banned political parties and offered employment 
opportunities to members of the United National Independence Party in order to secure 
power and access to copper income. Such responses to pressuring groups leads to a high 
level of corruption and creates strong resistance from different interest groups to a 
reform agenda that gives equal opportunities to the entire population such that the 
overall society prefers to remain involved in rent-seeking activities rather than alliance 
building and political unrest (Sandbakken, 2006). 
Rentier state theory argues that oil countries stabilize the political environment 
through several forms of distribution expenditure, which among others includes creating 
public employment (Sandbakken, 2006). Public employment enhances stability because 
it prevents instability caused by greediness as indicated by rent seeking theory (Smith, 
2004). Oil resources are non-tax revenue, and as such it is generally difficult for citizens 
and rebels to figure out how much oil resources the government actually has and how 
much the ruling elites can siphon out from the public coffers (Ross, 2012). In this 
context, rebels may overestimate the value of the state. Signaling via government size 
could lower rebels’ perception about the value of the state (as a prize going to a small 
number of elites rather than a large group) and their expectation that they will be able to 
grab a high state prize pending successful insurgency. This should result in fewer 
incentives to take up arms, and more readiness to cooperate with the government  
(Higashijima et al., 2014). Empirically, Basedau and Lay (2009) find that rentier states 
that are wealthier in term of oil production per capita than their counterparts increase 
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the level of political stability by devoting massive financial resources to distribution 
purposes. 
4.3.2 Government Size, Wagner Law and Political Stability  
The economic hypothesis or what is called Wagner law states that a government 
size grows to respond to new needs and requirements produced by the level of 
economic development (Martinez-Vazquez and Yao, 2009). It grows to satisfy needs 
produced by population growth rate, a high level of dependent groups, unemployment 
rate, income, urbanization and educational attainment. A high percentage of dependency 
ratio260 among the population forces a government to enlarge its size to satisfy the health 
care needs of senior citizens and educational services of the population aged 15 and 
under (Lee, 1993). A high level of educational attainment ceterus paribus increases the 
demand for employment opportunities, which in turn enlarges government size. A high 
level of rural-urban migration increases demand on infrastructure and education (Kraay 
and Van Rijckeghem, 1995). The failure of a government size to grow in response to 
such needs increases the risk of political instability because it creates a sense of 
inequality that might drive aggrieved public to step up against a government (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 2003). Azam (2001) argues that that much of the political instability 
incidences in Africa are caused by a government failure to respond to public needs. 
4.3.3 Government Size, The level of International Integration and Political 
Stability  
Social insurance and the economic hypothesis state that a government size tends 
to grow in countries highly integrated with international markets. A government ’s size 
is used to stabilize the political environment through stabilization of its macroeconomic 
condition. The sector is used as a buffer against risk brought by international factors or 
to counteract the income and consumption fluctuations faced by families in the 
economy (Rodrik, 2000).  Peacock and Wiseman (1963) cited by (Lee, 1993) indicate 
that a high level of integration with international markets measured by level of trade 
openness increases a country’s exposure to international economic crises. In such an 
open economy a government tends to have a large government size to eliminate the 
level of restriction on macroeconomic management brought by a high level of 
integration. Cameron (1978) indicates that a high level of integration has advantages 
                                                 
260 It is measured by the percentage of population aged 15 years and under or the percentage of population 
aged 65 years old and older. 
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and disadvantages. An advantage is that it feeds the domestic economic growth, which 
in turn increases employment rate and increases funds available for capital investment 
during boom periods. A disadvantage is that it restricts the effectiveness of 
macroeconomic policies because policy makers lose the ability to manage aggregate 
demand and control inflation as a result of a high level of integration between their 
domestic economy and international markets. Rodrick (2000) points out those countries 
with a high level of international integration such as Barbados, Botswana and Mauritius 
have large public sectors. Furthermore, the author indicates that countries that depend  
heavily on exporting natural resources tend to have a large public sector as buffer 
against economic risk that can be caused by fluctuations in their prices. 
4.3.4 Government Size, Democracy and Political Stability  
Political and economic hypotheses assume that a government size in democratic 
countries serves both political and economic objectives. Enlargement of government 
size using an implicit and inefficient distribution channel like public employment is 
selected over other explicit and efficient distribution channels to target specific 
segments of a society (Robinson and Verdier, 2002) in order to avoid political 
opposition associated with latter distribution channels (Alberto Alesina et al., 2000). 
The size continues to grow because of unemployment and lobbying for the creation of 
more public employment opportunities. A government responds to such pressure by 
creating more public employment opportunities for the sake of political stability (Gelb 
et al., 1991). 
Politically, government size enlarges to improve re-election prospects and 
because of political inclusion. Darby, Li, and Muscatelli (2004) indicate that in modern 
democracies where government change is peaceful and follows pre-defined electoral 
procedures, political uncertainty is associated with government myopia. The myopia 
takes place when a government enlarges its size using inefficient distribution channels 
like public employment to increase its re-election prospects. Its size enlarges as a result 
of democracy that increases the level of political inclusion that gives all segments in a 
society the opportunity to express their needs and requirements efficiently (Lindert, 
2004) cited by Grassi (2014). Furthermore, democracy strengthens the negotiation 
power of labor unions and political parties that escalates pressure on government to 
enlarge its size in response to their requirements (Bradley et al., 2003). There is 
overwhelming empirical and theoretical literature that the size of a government is used 
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strategically to gain votes and satisfy supporting constituencies in democratic countries 
(Carmignani, 2009). 
Government size increases in democratic countries to further serve economic 
objectives such as income inequality and ethnic fractionalization. Grassi (2014) 
indicates that a government in democratic countries tends to enlarge in order to enhance 
the level of income quality and improve the living standards of some ethnic groups. 
Alberto Alesina et al. (2000) find empirically that employment in public sectors in some 
American cities is driven by the level of income inequality and ethnic 
fractionalization261. Alberto Alesina, Danninger, and Rostagno (1999) find empirically 
that public employment in Italy is used as a subsidy from the wealthy northern region to 
the less wealthy southern region. They estimate that one half of wage bills in the 
southern region can be considered as a subsidy. By doing so a government maintains 
and increases its popularity among the public which in turn increase the probablity of 
re-election (Alesina et al., 1999; Robinson and Verdier, 2002). 
 Government size is used strategically in autocratic countries. It is used in to 
form political alliances in order to reduce the risk of being overthrown (Darby et al., 
2004). Public employment in both democratic and autocratic countries is considered as 
a form of clientelism and patronage where politicians offer patronage in exchange for 
votes or political support (Robinson and Verdier, 2002) 
4.4 Expenditure on Education and Political Stability 
A second policy option available to a government to stabilize the political 
environment is via creating public goods and services, amongst other expenditure on 
education. Expenditure on education brings stabilization at the level of the individual 
and at country level. At the level of the individual it increases the opportunity cost for 
an individual to commit instability incidences by broadening their prospective earning 
and employment opportunities. Also, it decreases the level of income inequality, one 
factor that determines the level of grievance in a society. Furthermore, it equips an 
individual with civic skills that makes it more likely for an individual to prefer settling 
disputes through discussion rather than violence. At the country level, it provides 
human resources required for economic growth, which in turn increases the level of 
wealth in a society and provides a government with financial resources that can be used 
                                                 
261 Other empirical studies that investigate the impact of income inequality and ethnic fractionalizat ion 
are Meltzer and Richards (1983) and Easterly (1997) respectively.   
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to develop further other public goods and services. Expenditure on education can be 
seen in this regard to create common benefits between a government and the public 
under the concept of a consensually strong state as indicated by Acemoglu (2005). The 
author points outs that a stabilization of the political environment requires creating 
common benefits between a state and society. Common benefits make the public 
tolerate a government’s strength as measured by high taxes as long as a substantial 
percentage of these funds are used to create sufficient public goods and services. By 
doing so, a government successfully eliminates the risk of instability associated with 
insufficient educational opportunties. Knack and Keefer (1995) indicate that political 
instability is symptomatic of a state failure to provide public goods and services.  
Public goods and services (in general) and education in particular show the 
public that a government is concerned about public prosperity which positively 
influences their perception towards a government and their interaction with it. Taydas 
and Peksen (2012) indicate that government can increase an individual’s opportunity 
cost by stimulating economic development through a high level of expenditure in some 
sectors, including education.  This enhances public popularity and support to a 
government. Porta et al. (1996) indicate that public co-operation is higher in regions of 
Italy where a government is perceived by the public as being efficient. Therefore, risk 
of political instability is reduced as found by Fjelde and De Soysa (2009) that a high 
level of government expenditure on public goods and services is associated with low 
probability of large and small incidences of political instability.   
 Expenditure on education increases an individual’s opportunity cost and 
decreases the level of grievance in a society. It increases an individual’s opportunity 
cost by broadening their prospective employment and earning opportunity as indicated 
by Chu, Davoodi, and Gupta (2000) which in turn makes rebel entrepreneurs a less 
feasible option. Richards (2003) cited by Thyne (2006) argue that the failure of Sierra 
Leone to invest in education increased the number of children who joined rebellion 
groups. Investment in education decreases the risk of political instability caused by a 
high level of grievance in a society by stimulating economic development and social 
and political equality (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). In contrast, low expenditure on 
education enhances the level of grievance such as a high level of poverty and income 
inequality, which in turn increases the risk of political instability (Thyne, 2006). 
  Education enhances social and political stability by changing personal attitudes. 
Heyneman (2003) indicates that the stabilization effect of education goes through four 
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channels. First, it clarifies the right and obligation of citizenship as well as punishment 
in case of violation. Second, it brings different segments of society together and 
encourages them to work peacefully. Third, it provides equal opportunity for all 
citizens. Fourth, it combines the different interests and objectives of different groups 
under common citizenship.  
 Education assists governments in carrying out their working plans and provides 
them with financial resources to eliminate the risk of instability. Ritzen et al. (2000) 
argue that an educated population is more likely to accept policy reform because they 
understand that the short-term cost will be offset by benefits attained over the long run. 
It provides a government with the necessary financial resources to defend anti-
government movements. Thyne (2006) argues that wealth brought by education 
increases the level of taxes so that a government has financial resource s to increase an 
individual’s opportunity cost to commit violence by outspending anti-government 
movements.  
Empirical research confirms the positive association between educational 
attainment and stability (see, for example, Alesina and Perotti 1996, Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004 and Barakat and Urdal, 2009). The stabilization effect of education on 
political environment is noted in democratic and autocratoc regimes. Brown and Hunter 
(2004) argue that several studies examine the impact of regime type on education 
expenditure in Latin America. The authors find that autocratic regimes spend less on 
education and experience more civil war than democratic regimes with high levels of 
expenditure on education. The authors indicate that the stabilization effect of education 
in autocratic regimes is achieved by stimulating economic development that gives 
legitimacy to the regime.   
4.5 Consequences of Oversized Government   
Although enlargement of government size lowers the impact of some factors on 
political instability, it has adverse impacts on some aspects of society. Past empirical 
research examines the impact of its size mainly on economic growth262 and institutional 
quality263.  
                                                 
262 See for example Bergh and Henrekson (2010) that summarizes research on government size and its 
implications for economic growth. 
263 Comprise of law and order, corruption and bureaucratic quality. 
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There is little agreement in the literature on the nature of the relationship 
between a government’s size and institutional quality. The first stream states it is 
negative and assumes that it is the government rather than the bureaucracy that is 
corrupted. The root cause of poor institutional quality such as a high level of corruption 
is a high level of government interference in economic environment and over-staffing in 
the public sector. Governmental interference without logic increases the level of 
corruption in a country (Montinola and Jackman, 2002) as a result of over-regulation, 
restrictions, and increasing the number of activities subject to governmental regulation 
(Huntington, 1968). These reflect the level of restrictions on economic environment 
(Pellegrini, 2011) and are considered by the public as a form of inefficiency in 
institutions and policies that aims to increase rent-seeking opportunities available to the 
bureaucracy264 (see, for example, Tanzi 1994, Fisman and Gatti 2000 and Montinola and 
Jackman 2002). This governmental interference in economic activities diminishes the 
role of the private sector in labor markets and turns a government into an employer of 
last resort. Under such conditions government size continues to grow in order to absorb 
the unemployment rate, leading to overstaffing which in turn might have an adverse 
impact on morale and wage levels in the public sector. Jaimovich and Rud (2014) point 
out that creating massive public employment opportunities in Argentina increased the 
level of corruption because employees lacked the required skills or experienced a skills 
mismatch. Stevenson (1992) indicates that pressure on a government to absorb 
unemployment resulting from acting as an employer of last resort forces it to freeze 
wages, wage growth, or allow the real wage level to deteriorate. This has an adverse 
effect on employee morale, which in turn pushes them to assist their legal wage via 
other illegal ways like bribery. Several empirical studies confirm the negative 
association between government size and institutional quality (see, for example, Goel 
and Nelson 1998, Treisman 2000 and Ali and Isse 2003).        
The second stream in the literature states that the relationship between 
institutional quality and government size is positive, using Scandinavian countries as an 
illustrative example 265. This positive association is attributed to several factors. Large 
governments have sufficient financial resources to promote checks and balances and 
accountability measures as indicated by Kotera, Okada, and Samreth (2012). Friedman  
et al. (2000) argue that corrupt governments tend to be small because of a combination 
                                                 
264 See Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005).    
265 See La Porta et al. (1999) and Billger and Goel (2009).  
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of onerous bureaucracy, high levels of corruption and a weak legal system that pushes 
firms underground and that correspondingly leads to a fall in government consumption. 
Montinola and Jackman (2002) indicate that a large government size might be driven by 
high levels of wages in the public sector, which makes public employees less likely to 
seek illegal payments, such that the level of corruption decreases. Husted and Estudios 
(1999) argue that the size of government can be large in a country where a government 
has a high level of public acceptance. Pellegrini (2011) indicates that while a 
government intervention reveals the level of restriction on the economy, it might 
indicate that there is a high level of expenditure on sectors that reduce the level of 
corruption such as education and health services. Empirical research confirms the 
positive association between the two variables although it is albeit weak (see, for 
example, Fisman and Gatti, 2002, Montinola and Jackman, 2002 and Adsera et al., 
2003). Adsera et al. (2003) estimate that an increase in government consumption by 7% 
is associated with a reduction in the level of corruption by 0.2 points in a scale of 6.   
The last stream in the literature suspects the existence of any relationship 
between a government’s size and institutional quality and offers several explanations to 
support its view. Gelb et al. (1991) indicate that government size breeds corruption and 
rent seeking in a country with an ill- functioning economy or where there is weak 
political accountability. Rose-Ackerman (2007) argues that the quality of government 
bureaucracy is more important in determining the level of corruption than its 
intervention methods or its size. Some authors like Garen and Trask (2005) indicate that 
the proxy used to measure government size influences the relationship. The authors 
indicate that government size is measured exclusively in the literature using 
governmental expenditure; however, such measurements ignore other non-budgetary 
measurements so that their impact on the level of corruption outweighs the influence of 
budgetary measurements. Non-budgetary measurements include state ownership of 
enterprises, price control and restrictions on competition. They conclude from time 
series analysis that budgetary measurements give only a partial picture about its 
relationship with other variables. Alternatively, Montinola and Jackman (2002) suggest 
measuring government size by the number of public employees to capture its effect on 
the level of corruption. Lambsdorff (2007) suggests investigating the impact of specific 
types of expenditure (like redistributive expenditure) on the level of corruption rather 
than government expenditure. Empirically, some empirical research fails to establish a 
relationship between the two variables (see, for example, Husted and Estudios, 1999, 
Sandholtz and Gray, 2003 and Elbahnasawy and Revier, 2012). 
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Oversized public sectors have adverse effects on long-term economic growth by 
increasing current expenditure at the expense of capital expenditure. The latter 
expenditure is required to stimulate productivity in the private sector and increase the 
level of employment opportunities as indicated by Algan, Cahuc, and Zylberberg 
(2002). Schiavo-Campo, De Tommaso, and Mukherjee (1997) point out that empirical 
research in growth finds that there is a negative association between the level of 
government consumption and long run economic growth rate.  
4.6 Impact of Government Size and Role on Political Instability: Theory 
            The main theory in this research is that a government enlarges its size or 
expands its role in order to eliminate the risk of political instability from factors 
suggested by opportunity and grievance perspectives. A government can enlarge its size 
by creating public employment to absorb unemployed youth under tight economic 
condition or as response to rapid change in urban growth rate or to react to high levels 
of educational attainment. Enlargement of its size might have adverse impacts on other 
aspects, such as enhancing the level of corruption. This is because its size increases in 
some instances based on non-productive and inefficient considerations. A government 
might decide to increase its expenditure on education as an alternative policy to enlarge 
its size to respond to rapid urban growth rate and a high rate of unemployment. 
Enlargement of government size and expansion of its role might strengthen 
stability in a country because it shows the public a government’s commitment to deal 
with poor performance of some aspects in a country. Expenditure on education, among 
other welfare expenditure, shows the public that a government cares about their living 
standards and that it devotes financial resources to improve it (Taydas and Peksen 
(2012). Enlargement of government size by creating public employment to target less 
fortunate segments of society or to meet the needs and requirements of urbanization 
helps to buy off opposition movements and less fortunate segments of  society so that a 
long-term interest between a government and the public is established (Fjelde and De 
Soysa, 2009). This enhances a government’s popularity among the public because it 
successfully addresses factors leading to their dis-satisfaction (Robins, 2012). On the 
other hand, the failure of a government to enlarge its size or to expand its role indicates 
a weakness of the state’s ability to manage and control a society; as a consequence, 
opportunity theory assumes an individual’s opportunity cost to commit political 
instability incidences decreases. Furthermore, it increases political and economic 
dissatisfaction among the public which reduces public trust for the political regime 
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(Taydas et al., 2010). Such risk is higher in autocratic than democratic countries 
because the public in the former might rely on violence to demonstrate their 
dissatisfaction whereas in the latter the public can discipline politicians with poor 
performance in elections (Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Sissener, and Søreide (2001). 
Anderson and Tverdova (2003) find in panel data analysis a significant positive 
association between the level of evaluation of state capacity and the level of trust for the 
political system and conclude that desperate conditions can lead the public toward 
radical change of a system. 
A government can enlarge its size to absorb unemployment among youth or 
expand its role to address low employment and educational opportunities. History 
partially attributes some incidences of instability to shortages in employment and 
educational opportunities. For example, Trends (2001) indicates that successful coups in 
Turkey in 1970 and 1980 are attributed partially to low educational and employment 
opportunities available for youth. Several factors force a government to enlarge its size 
to absorb unemployment. The failure of the private sector to create employment 
opportunities (Robinson and Verdier, 2002) and a weak or absent temporary 
unemployment benefits system forces a government to create public employment to 
address imperfections in the labor market (see, for example, Alesina et al., 1999 and 
Robinson and Verdier, 2002). By doing so, a government succeeds in eliminating the 
risk of unemployment and some related factors like income inequality on political 
environment, as found by empirical research that public employment in some instances 
is used by a government to deal with income inequality or other forms of inequality 
(see, for example, Alesina et al. 1999, 2000). Alternatively, a government might 
consider expanding its role by increasing expenditure on education to address shortages 
of educational and employment opportunties. Expanding its role can mitigate the 
adverse impact of unemployment on the political environment resulting from skill mis-
match or changes in labour market requirements. Riddell and Song (2012) find that the 
probability of re-employment is enhanced among unemployed youth when they seek 
further education at secondary and post-secondary level. Furthermore, expenditure on 
education can enhance stability through increasing an individual’s opportunity cost and 
boosting long-term economic growth. According to the opportunity perspective, 
education increases an individual’s opportunity cost to join a rebellion movement by 
increasing his/her value in the labor market and expanding their prospective income-
earning opportunities (Collier, 2000a). A government’s expenditure on education feeds 
long-term economic growth and helps to create the perception among the public that the 
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government prefers stability rather than instability. Li et al. (2000) and Gupta et al. 
(2001) indicate that expenditure on education enhances stability over the long run by 
increasing economic growth and consequently, employment opportunities. The 
empirical literature has found education to be among the determinants of economic 
growth (see, for example, Barro, 1992 and Levine and Renelt, 1992 cited by Gupta et 
al., 2000). In contrast, low education attainment leads to poor economic growth, which 
in turn increases the unemployment rate in a country.    
A government uses its size to create public employment in response to high levels 
of educational attainment that exceed demand in the labour market or because of skills 
mismatch with the requirements of the labour market. Alesina et al. (2000) indicate that 
a government size tends to grow with the corresponding level of educational 
attaintment. Gelb et al. (1991) indicate that creating public employment in some 
countries is used to absorb university graduates, and in some instances is protected and 
expanded gradually, like in Latin America. By accommodating educated youth in public 
posts a government addresses the destabilization effect of education on political 
environment resulting from high educational attainment in a country that experiences 
low employment opportunties. Collier (2000) indicates that on the one hand education 
increases an individual’s opportunity cost to join a rebellion movement by increasing 
his/her value in the labour market and expanding their prospective income-earning 
opportunities. On the other hand, education increases the risk of political instability 
when the educated person’s expectations of employment opportunities and associated 
financial benefits are not met. This decreases an individual’s opportunity cost and it 
becomes more likely for them to join rebellion movements.  
A government also enlarges its size or expands its role because of a high urban 
growth rate that creates pressure on labour markets, educational institutions and 
infrastructure and to meet needs and requirements of the level of economic 
development. Growth rate of urbanization that exceeds the growth rate of employment 
and educational opportunities increases the level of grievance and consequently, 
increases the level of political instability (Urdal, 2006). Ross et al. (2011) cites the case 
of MENA to show that rapid change in urban growth rate enhances the unemployment 
rate. In other instances its size enlarges and its role expands in response to new needs 
and requirements produced by the level of economic development according to Wagner 
law (Martinez-Vazquez and Yao, 2009). A high level of rural-urban migration increases 
demands on infrastructure, education and employment opportunities (Kraay and Van 
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Rijckeghem, 1995). All these factors create pressure on government to expand its role, 
size (or both together) to decrease its adverse impact on political environment. The 
failure of government to accommodate growing demand on employment and 
educational opportunities created by rapid growth in urban population depreciates living 
standards, which leads to public dissatisfaction that might turn into instability (Turchin, 
2013). 
 Government might further consider enlarging its size to eliminate the risk of a 
high level of integration with international markets on the political environment 
according to the social insurance and economic hypothesis (Rodrik, 2000).   
Enlargement of government size is expected to increase the level of corruption as 
a result of pressure on government to continue creating public employment and non-
merit recruitment. A government might respond to pressure to create public 
employment or financial pressure to meet wage bills by freezing wages, wage growth, 
or allowing the real wage level to deteriorate, with adverse impacts on the living 
standards of employees that leads them to consider bribery to assist their wages 
(Stevenson, 1992). The level of corruption increases because enlargement of 
government size in some instances is driven by political, nepotism and patronage 
considerations rather than merit-based criteria (Tanzi, 1998). A combination of a high 
level of corruption and lack of qualified human resources sustains poor bureaucratic 
quality through increasing the demand on public sector posts that are associated with a  
high opportunity for rent seeking. Tanzi (1998) indicates that in some countries there is  
a high level of competition to apply for poorly paid jobs with high potential for rent 
seeking opportunities such as jobs in taxes and customs sectors. Svensson (1998) 
indicates that when corruption is widespread, institutionalized employees in private 
sectors leave their jobs to work in public posts from which they can generate extra 
illegal income. A combination of the adverse impacts of corruption on different aspects 
of society and oversized public sector reduces public living standards that in turn 
enhances political instability. 
 In light of the previous discussion, this chapter will test the independent effect of 
government size and its interaction with unemployment, corruption, educational 
attainment, trade openness and urban growth rate on political instability as following 
hypotheses show. It also tests the independent effect of the expenditure on education 
and its interaction with unemployment and urban growth rate on political instability. All 
models used in empirical analysis will include youth unemployment, rents from natural 
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resources, trade openness, GDP annual growth, level of democracy, gross tertiary 
enrolment, logarithm of total population and urban growth rate as control variables to 
support the hypotheses, the expected sign of the government size, expenditure on 
education and control variables are shown in the table 4.1. 
𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠1 : Countries with a larger government size are less likely to 
experience political instability. 
𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠2: The larger the size of government in a country, the lower the 
impact of unemployed youth on the political instability. 
𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠3: The larger  the size of a government in a country, the larger the 
impact of corruption on the level of political instability. 
𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠4: The larger the size of government in a country, the lower the 
impact of high gross tertiary enrolment on the political instability. 
 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠5: The larger the size of a government in a country the lowers the 
impact of trade openness on the political instability. 
          𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠6: The larger the size of a government in a country, the lower the 
impact of urban growth rate on the political instability. 
        𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠7 :  Countries with a larger government role are less likely to 
experience political instability. 
        𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠8: The larger the role of a government in a country, the lower the 
impact of unemployment on the political instability. 
        𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠9: The larger the role of a government in a country, the lowers the 
impact of urban growth rate on the political instability. 
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Table 4.1 The Expected Relationship Between Political Instability and 
Independent Variables 
Variable Expected sign with Political instability  
Government size (GS) Negative 
Government role (GR) Negative 
GS*TYU Negative 
GS*Corr Positive 
GS*GTE Negative 
GS*TO Positive 
GS*UGR Negative 
GR*TYU Negative 
GR*UGR Negative 
Total youth unemployment (TYU) Positive 
Trade openness (TO) Negative 
GDP annual Growth (GDP) Negative 
Rents from natural resources (Rents) Positive/ Negative 
Level of democracy (RT) Negative 
Corruption (Corr) Positive 
Gross tertiary enrolment (GTE) Positive 
Urban growth rate (UGR) Positive 
Log of total population (log T.pop) Positive 
 
4.7 Empirical Model, Data and Methodology  
 The nine hypotheses set earlier will be examined empirically using unbalanced 
panel data from 1984 to 2013.   
4.7.1 Model Specification: The Independent Effect of Government Size and 
Government Role on Political Instability  
The model of the independent effect of government size on the level of political 
instability will be estimated using the following empirical model:  
𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐺𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑒𝑐𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖 )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜)𝑖𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡       …………(4.1) 
Where: 
PS is political instability 
GS is government size 
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Eco is economic variables that comprise rents from natural resources, total youth unemployment, trade 
openness, and economic growth. 
Poli is political variables that comprise level of democracy and corruption. 
Socio is social variables that comprise logarithms of total population, gross tertiary enrolment, and 
urbanization growth rate. 
The independent effect of government role on the level of political instability 
will be examined by replacing government size in equation (4.1) with government role: 
𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐺𝑅)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑒𝑐𝑜 )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡      …………(4.2) 
4.7.2 Model Specification: The Joint Effect of Government Size and other 
Factors on the Level of Political Instability 
 The second to ninth hypotheses will examine the impact of the joint effect 
between government size and other determinants of political instability included in the 
model. Each joint effect will be included and tested individually.  
𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐺𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑒𝑐𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖 )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝐺𝑆 ∗ 𝑇𝑌𝑈)𝑖𝑡 +
 𝑒𝑖𝑡      …………(4.3) 
The first joint effect between government size and youth unemployment on 
instability will be captured as 𝛽5  in the empirical model (4.3). Its impact on the level of 
political instability will be captured as follows: 
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  / d𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽1  +𝛽5𝑇𝑌𝑈𝑖𝑡      (4.3a)  
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  / d𝑇𝑌𝑈𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽2  +𝛽5 𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡    (4.3b)  
 When 𝛽5 < 0 in equation (4.3a) a one percentage increase in government size 
yields greater reduction in the risk of political instability with a higher rate of 
unemployment. Similarly if 𝛽5 < 0 in equation (4.3b), then a one percentage point 
increase in unemployment rate yields greater reduction in the risk of political instability 
with larger government size. 
 The joint effect between government size and corruption will replace the 
previous joint effect in the empirical model (4.3). It will capture its effect on political 
instability as follows:  
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  / d𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽1  +𝛽5 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡          (4.3c)  
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  / d𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽3  +𝛽5 𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡      (4.3d)  
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 When 𝛽5 > 0 in equation (4.3c) then one percentage enlargement in government 
size yields greater risk of political instability in a country with a higher level of 
corruption. Similarly, if 𝛽5 > 0 in equation (4.3d) then a one point increase in the leve l 
of corruption yields greater risk of political instability in a country with larger 
government size. 
The joint effect of government size and gross tertiary enrolment on the level of 
political instability will be examined as follows: 
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  / d𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽1  +𝛽5 𝐺𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡     (4.3e)  
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  / d𝐺𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽4  +𝛽5 𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡      (4.3f)  
When 𝛽5 < 0 in equation (4.3e) a one percentage increase in government size 
yields greater reduction in the risk of political instability in a country with a higher level 
of gross tertiary enrolment. Similarly if 𝛽5 < 0 in equation (4.3d), then a one percentage 
point increase in gross tertiary enrolment yields greater reduction in the risk of political 
instability in a country with larger government size.  
The joint effect of government size and trade openness on the level of political 
instability will be examined as follows: 
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  / d𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽1  +𝛽5 𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡                   (4.3g)  
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  / d𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽2  +𝛽5 𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡                 (4.3h)  
When 𝛽5 > 0 in equation (4.3g) then one percentage enlargement in government 
size yields greater reduction in the risk of political instability in a country with a lower 
level of trade openness. Similarly, when 𝛽5 > 0  in equation (4.3h), then a one 
percentage increase in trade openness yields greater reduction in the risk of political 
instability when a country has a smaller government size. 
The joint effect of government size and urban growth rate on the level of 
political instability will be examined as follows: 
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  / d𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽1  +𝛽5 𝑈𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡  (4.3i)  
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  / d𝑈𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽4  +𝛽5 𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡 (4.3j)  
When 𝛽5 < 0 in equation (4.3i) a one percentage increase in government size 
yields greater reduction in the risk of political instability in a country with a higher rate 
of urban growth. Similarly if 𝛽5 < 0 in equation (4.3j), then a one percentage point 
increase in urban growth rate yields greater reduction in the risk of political instability 
in a country with a larger government size. 
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4.7.3 Model Specification: The Joint Effect of Government Role with Youth 
Unemployment and Urban Growth Rate on the Level of Political Instability 
The first joint effect between government role and youth unemployment on 
instability will be captured by 𝛽5  in the empirical model (4.2). Its impact on the level of 
political instability will be captured as follows: 
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  / d𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽1  +𝛽5 𝑇𝑌𝑈𝑖𝑡      (4.2a)  
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  / d𝑇𝑌𝑈𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽2  +𝛽5 𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡     (4.2b)  
When 𝛽5 < 0 in equation (4.2a), a one percentage increase in government role 
yields greater reduction in the risk of political instability in a country with a higher 
percentage of youth unemployment. Similarly, when 𝛽5 < 0 in equation (4.2b) a one 
percentage increase in youth unemployment yields greater reduction in the risk of 
political instability in a country with a larger government role. 
The second joint effect between government role and urban growth rate on 
instability will be captured by 𝛽5  in the empirical model (4.2). Its impact on the level of 
political instability will be captured as follows: 
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  / d𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽1  +𝛽5 𝑈𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡      (4.2c)  
d𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  / d𝑈𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽4  +𝛽5 𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡     (4.2d)  
When 𝛽5 < 0 in equation (4.2c), a one percentage increase in government role 
yields a greater reduction in the risk of political instability in a country with a high 
urban growth rate. Similarly, when 𝛽5 < 0   in equation (4.2d) a one percentage increase 
in urban growth rate yields greater reduction in the risk of political instability in a 
country with a larger government role. 
4.7.4 Data Description  
In this study two proxies are used to measure government capacity to eliminate 
the risk of political instability. These proxies stem factors that contribute to government 
capacity, namely government size and government role. The literature suggests several 
proxies to measure government size. In this study government size is measured as the 
ratio of general government final consumption to GDP266. This ratio includes current 
                                                 
266This study considers using alternative measurements of government size, such as total public sector 
employment (it includes employment in governmental o rganizat ions and publicly owned organizations) 
to total employment (in  public and private sectors). Furthermore, it  considers the ratio of wage bills to 
government revenue or to expenditure or to national gross domestic products or the percentage of public 
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government expenditure of all goods and services includ ing employees’ compensation. 
Furthermore, it includes all expenditure on national security and defense. The proxy is 
log transformed; data is collected from the World Development Indicators.  
Figure 4.2 shows government size across different world regions267. It shows that 
regions can be categorized into three groups according to their government size: regions 
with government size from 10% to less than or equal 15%; more than 15% to less than 
or equal 20%; and more than 20% to GDP. Regions falling in the first group (between 
10% to 15%) include Northern Africa, South East Asia, South Asia, Central America, 
South America, South Africa and the Caribbean. Only North Europe spends more than 
20% of GDP while the remaining regions in the world fall in the second group.  
Figure 4.2 Government Size Across the World 
 
The second measurement is government expenditure on education as a proxy of 
government role. It is measured as the general government expenditure on education as 
percentage to GDP (current, capital and transfers). The variable is log-transformed; the 
data is collected from the World Bank Development Indicators. Figure 4.3 shows 
expenditure on education across different regions of the world. It shows that Northern 
Africa has the smallest government role. Regions in the world can be categorized into 
regions spending less than 2% on education and regions spending more than 2%. The 
latter group comprises the European continent (except the southern part), MENA, 
Eastern and Middle Africa, Caribbean, Oceania, Northern America and Micronesia, 
Melanesia and Polynesia.  
                                                                                                                                               
employees to total population. However, the quality and time and country coverage restrict s using any of 
these in the empirical analysis.  
267 Descriptive statistics are located in the appendix. 
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Figure 4.3 Government Role Across the World 
 
Other variables used in the empirical analysis are similar to the variables used in 
the second and third chapters. 
4.8 Estimation Strategy  
 This study aims to investigate the influence of government size and its role on 
the role of youth bulge on instability in countries with different percentages of youth 
bulge, which is considered as a latent variable across all sub-samples. The study creates 
dummy variables for democratic countries, oil countries, countries where the percentage 
of youth bulge is more than 30% and countries where their percentage is less than or 
equal to 30% and the MENA region268. These dummies capture variation in variables 
included in the model and at the same time maintain a sufficient number of observations 
under each dummy to carry out the empirical analysis. Furthermore, these dummies take 
into account the impact of latent variables that are not captured by variables included in 
models that might turn youth bulge into either demographic dividends or curse.    
Government size and role show insignificant differences between democratic and 
autocratic countries as Figure 4.4 shows; however, there is significant variation in the 
percentage of youth bulge and some independent variables between these two groups of 
countries. The percentage of youth bulge in democratic countries is 23% while in 
autocratic countries the percentage is more than 30%. Furthermore, there is a significant 
difference in factors increasing government size and its role between the two groups 
such as urbanization growth rate and gross tertiary enrolment; however, there are 
                                                 
268 Readers are advised to refer to Section 2.5 in Chapter 2 for criteria used to group countries into oil and 
non-oil and democratic and autocratic countries.  
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insignificant differences in other variables such as trade openness and unemployment269. 
In addition, democratic countries perform better in the level of corruption than 
autocratic countries, which is an indirect measure of the quality of government size270. 
In some instances, increasing the level of public employees does not indicate that public 
services are delivered efficiently and sufficiently because corruption sets the criteria for 
delivering public services. Alternatively, it might be that a government size enlarges 
because of ghost workers. Reuters News Agency reports that there are fifty thousand 
ghost soldiers in the Iraqi army that prevent the army from providing security services 
efficiently and that contributed to its collapse to Islamic State fighters (Reuters, 2014).  
  The oil dummy aims to capture the impact of government size and it role on 
instability in oil and non-oil countries. Although its size and role are almost similar 
between the two groups as shown in Figure 4.4, there are important differences between 
the two groups. Oil countries do not need to increase or expand taxation in order to 
finance government size and role, in contrast to non-oil countries. In non-oil countries, 
enlargement of government size and role entails increasing and expanding the level of 
taxation on productive sectors (as discussed earlier). Under such a scenario a 
government might succeed in settling the adverse impact of some factors on the political 
environment at the expense of economic growth and creation of employment 
opportunities. A high level of taxation on the productive sector forces companies to 
operate underground, which hurts public finance and employment opportunities over the 
long run. Non-oil countries perform better in the level of democracy than oil countries271 
that might have an impact on allocation of public resources across sectors. Similarly, the 
level of corruption is better in non-oil countries, which might have an influence on the 
quality of government size and role. There is also variation between the two groups in 
some factors that determine government size and role such as urban growth rate and 
gross tertiary enrolment272. 
The impact of government size on instability is examined in countries where the 
percentage of youth bulge is less than or equal to 30% and in countries where the 
percentage is more than 30%. Figure 4.5 shows a significant difference between the two 
groups in some variables. One important variation can be noted in government size 
between the two groups: a country where the percentage of youth bulge is more than 
                                                 
269 From descriptive analysis in the second chapter. 
270 From descriptive analysis in the third chapter. 
271 From descriptive analysis in the second chapter. 
272 From descriptive analysis in the third chapter. 
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30% has smaller government size. Similarly, other factors that determine government 
size such as education and the level of democracy are higher in countries where the 
percentage of youth bulge is less than 30%. 
 Figure 4.4 Government Size and Role Under Different Contexts 
 
Figure 4.5 Political Instability and Independent Variables in Countries Based on 
the Percentage of Youth Bulge 
 
The last sub-sample is for the MENA region that aims to capture the impact of 
government size and role on instability in the region. The empirical results in the second 
and third chapters show that poor performance in some factors like employment feeds 
instability in the region. In this chapter the role of government and its size on political 
instability in the region is investigated in order to capture its capacity to offset the 
adverse impact of rapid change in some aspects of socioeconomic and political context 
on political environment in the region. 
In this study the empirical models will be estimated using 2SLS because of two 
way causation between economic growth and instability as discussed in the second 
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chapter. The endogeneity test shows that GDP annual growth is endogenous. One-year 
lag of GDP annual growth is used as an instrument due to the difficulty of finding an 
appropriate external instrument 273 . The impact of youth unemployment, corruption, 
education, trade openness, and urban growth rate on political instability moderated by 
government size will be tested individually. Similarly, the impact of youth 
unemployment and urban growth rate on political instability moderated by government 
role will also be tested individually.  
Robustness analysis is carried out using an alternative estimation technique 
(fixed period effect), an alternative measure of political instability adopted from Saha 
and Yap (2013) and an alternative measure of government consumption from the 
Heritage Foundation. Fixed effect (period) is considered rather than unit effect because 
independent variables are time variant. Furthermore, fixed effect is selected over 
random effect to account for possible correlation between independent variables and 
omitted variables. The alternative measure of political instability aims to capture the 
variation in effect between the measure used in this study and the broader measure 
considered by Saha and Yap (2013). The alternative measure of government size from 
the Heritage Foundation aims to capture the effect using an alternative method to 
calculate government consumption. 
This study uses heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard error to 
reduce the effect of heteroskedasticity on the empirical results. This method does not 
assume homoskedasticity and it does not require knowledge about or functional form of 
heteroskedasticity like weighted least squares. Furthermore, it does not need to go 
through arbitrary transformation of independent variables or computer stimulation 
(Hayes and Cai, 2007). This method addresses the effect of autocorrelation on t-
statistics and p-value without needing to go through trial and error methods (Gujarati, 
2014).  
4.9 Empirical Results: The Independent Effect of Government Size on Political 
Instability 
Models 1 to 6 in Table 4.2 test the impact of government size on political 
instability under different sub-samples. Figure 4.6 shows that there is a negative 
                                                 
273 Endogeneity test and the validity of of year lag of GDP economic g rowth are given in appendix D 
table D2.1.  
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association between the two variables. It suggests that a government can lower political 
risk by enlarging its size. 
Model 1 examines the impact of the independent effect of government size on 
political instability in panel data. The coefficient of government size is negative and 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that a large government size reduces political 
instability. Political stability is enhanced in Sudan by 0.614 units or 34% of one 
standard deviation of political instability by each one standard deviation enlargement in 
government size 274 . Sudan needs to enlarge its current government size by 337% to 
improve its level of political stability to the average level of the entire sample 275 . 
Descriptive statistics show that the average annual growth of government size in Sudan 
over the sample period is 2.16% whereas the average annual growth of one important 
segment in the population, youth bulge, is 3.6%. The analysis, all other things being 
constant, reveals that the growth in size of a government does not keep pace with the 
growth rate of youth bulge. Further analysis at country level shows that countries where 
the average annual growth in government size is less than the growth rate in youth bulge 
face a higher risk than countries where annual growth size is higher than youth bulge. 
Political instability increases when government fails to enlarge its size in response to 
public needs and requirements. It also enhances when a government is a sole provider of 
goods and services in a country. Taydas et al. (2010) point out that a government failure 
to enlarge its size to respond to public needs increases their political and economic 
dissatisfaction which enhances political instability. Control variables have a significant 
sign.  
                                                 
274 The coefficient of the government size *(0.347) (its St. dev in Sudan) = 1.771 unit or 34% of one 
standard deviation of political instability by dividing (1.771*100)/ (5.224) (St. dev of polit ical instability 
in Sudan). 
275 The difference of the average score of polit ical instability in Sudan and the average score of the entire 
sample/ the coefficient of a government size [(13.555-7.580) /1.771]*100=337%. 
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Figure 4.6 Political Instability and Government Size over the period 1984-2013 
 
The impact of government size is further investigated in countries where the 
percentage of youth bulge is equal to or less than 30% and countries where their 
percentage is more than 30%; the results are shown in Models 2 and 3, respectively. The 
independent effect of government size has a negative coefficient; however, it is only 
significant and its coefficient substantially higher in countries where the percentage of 
youth bulge makes up more than 30% of total population. Enlargement of government 
size in this group of countries lowers political instability by 1.268 units or 64% of a 
standard deviation of political instability276 in comparison with 0.106 units or 10% in 
countries where their percentage is less than or equal to 30%277. The results suggest that 
a government can play a major role in stabilizing the political environment in countries 
where youth bulge is more than 30%, all other things being constant. It could be that in 
these countries enlargement of government size achieves dual objectives: it addresses 
youth bulge requirements and it improves quantity and quality of public goods and 
service available in a country.  
The impact of government size on political instability is estimated in two sub-
samples where the percentage of youth bulge is more than 30%. These sub-samples 
have different government sizes: countries with a government size above the sample 
average of 2.588 and countries where its size is below the average). The results find that 
size has a positive sign and is significant in countries where its size is below the 
average; this suggests that government size grows but does not reach the level required 
                                                 
276 The coefficient of the government size *(0.451) (its St. dev in countries where youth bulge make up 
more than 30%) = 1.268 unit or 64% = (2.813*100)/(4.388) (the St. dev of political instability in this 
group of countries). 
277 The coefficient of the government size *(0.342) (its St. dev in countries where youth bulge make up 
less than 30%) = 0.106 unit or 10% = (0.311*100)/(3.072) (the St . dev of political instability in this group 
of countries) 
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to stabilize the political environment. On the other hand, its negative and insignificant 
sign in countries above average size suggests that enlargement brings stability278. 
Model 4 examines the impact of government size on political instability in oil 
countries 279 . The independent effect of government size has a negative sign and is 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the enlargement of its size lowers the level of 
political instability; however, its stabilization effect is higher in oil than non-oil 
countries as the interaction term between oil and government size has a negative sign 
although it is not significant. Enlargement of government size in oil countries lowers the 
risk of political instability by 0.791 units or 51% of a standard deviation of political 
instability280 in comparison with 0.646 units or 39% in non-oil countries281.  
The importance of government size to stabilize political environment in oil and 
non-oil countries is driven by different factors. In oil countries, a government needs to 
enlarge its size for several reasons, which among others includes mitigating the adverse 
impact of the Dutch disease on labour markets. The disease absorbs intensive labour 
and resources from non-oil sectors (Sachs and Warner, 1997). Hence, a government 
needs to enlarge its size in response to failure of the labour market to absorb job 
seekers. In non-oil countries, the public expects government to enlarge its in response to 
their needs and requirements as a means of return of their taxes. Such needs are 
produced by the level of economic development, as stated by the Economic hypothesis 
or what is called Wagner law (Martinez-Vazquez and Yao, 2009). The failure to do so 
enhances political instability directly and indirectly. The shortage in quantity and 
quality of public goods and services has a direct impact on political instability. 
Indirectly, it might increase tax evasion and reduce public acceptance of increases in tax 
level, which in turn has a negative impact on a government’s ability to exercise its 
duties. Acemoglu (2005) points out that common benefits make it more likely for the 
public to tolerate a government’s strength measured by high taxes as long as a 
substantial percentage of it is used to create sufficient public goods and services. 
Control variables retain their sign and significance except level of democracy. 
                                                 
278 Results not reported. 
279 Rents from natural resources are replaced by oil dummy. 
280 The coefficient of a government size + its coefficient in o il countries= -2.073*(0.382)(St. dev of a 
government size in oil countries)= 0.791 unit or 51% ( -2.073*100)/(4.072)(St. dev of political instability 
in oil countries). 
281 The coefficient of a government size*(0.413)(St. dev of a government size in non-oil countries)= 
0.646 unit or 39% (-1.566*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non-oil countries). 
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Model 5 investigates the impact of government size on political instability in 
democratic countries. The independent effect of government size has a negative sign 
and significant coefficient at the 5% level, suggesting that enlargement of government 
size lowers the level of political instability. Government size is equally important in 
stabilizing the political environment in democratic and autocratic countries; however, its 
stabilization effect is lower in democratic than autocratic countries.  This indicates that 
democratic practices are insufficient to offset the impact of small government size on 
political instability. Enlargement of government size by a standard deviation in 
autocratic countries stabilizes political environment by 1.006 units or 53% of one 
standard deviation of instability282 while in democratic countries it enhances political 
stability by 0.269 units or 27% of political instability283.  
The lower impact of government size on political stability in democratic than 
autocratic countries may be due to a high level of political inclusion in democratic 
countries. Political inclusion provides equal opportunity to all segments of society to 
express their needs and requirements (Lindert, 2004). Under such conditions a 
government is in a position to screen their needs and prioritize them according to their 
importance to the public. This might reveal that while enlargement of government size 
is important to some sectors in the population, cutting taxes may be more important for 
other sectors. Hence, in democratic countries enlargement of government size alongside 
alternative policy options enhances political stability. In autocratic countries, 
enlargement in size reduces pressure created by the public on government to introduce 
democracy. Darby et al. (2004) indicate that government size is used in autocratic 
countries to create political alliances in order to reduce the risk of being overthrown. 
From general reading of the author of this study, the public in autocratic monarchies in 
the Arabian Peninsula in the wake of the so-called the Arab Spring in late 2010 raised 
several demands, such as installing constitutional monarchies and more employment 
opportunities. Governments enlarged their size in response to employment demands, 
which abolished public demand to move to constitutional monarchies. In general, 
control variables retain their sign and significance. 
The impact of government size on political instability in the MENA region is 
investigated in Model 6. The independent effect of government size has a negative 
                                                 
282 The coefficient of a government size*(0.437)(St. dev of a government size in  autocratic countries)= 
1.006 unit or 53% (-2.303*100)/(4.348)(St. dev of political instability in autocratic countries). 
283The coefficient of a government size + its coefficient in democratic countries= -0.806*(0.334)(St . dev 
of a government size in democrat ic countries)= 0.269 unit  or 27% (-0.806*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of 
political instability in democratic countries).  
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coefficient suggesting that the enlargement of its size lowers the level of political 
284instability; but its stabilization effect is negligent in the MENA region . Governments 
in the MENA region lower the risk of political instability by 0.028 units or 2% of one 
standard deviation of political instability when government size is enlarged by a 
standard deviation285 in comparison with 0.349 units or 21% in non-MENA region286.  
The weak stabilization effect of government size on political environment in the 
MENA region might be because some governments in the region take financial 
measures to continue enlarging government size. Stevenson (1992) indicates that some 
governments freeze wages, wage growth, or allow the real wage level to deteriorate in 
order to continue enlarging its size. For example, from the author’s general reading, 
recently the Egyptian government announced that it might take several measures, one of 
which is to downsize its government sector because of difficulties in meeting employees 
salaries. Furthermore, it announced that former governments in the country were 
hesitant to take such measures in order to avoid prospective outrage from the public. It 
could be that the size of government in the MENA region reaches the level that has a 
low marginal effect on political environment.   
                                                 
284 The model is re-estimated by dropping monarchies in the Arabic Peninsula and the results retain their 
sign and significant; the results are not reported. 
285The coefficient of a government size + its coefficient in MENA countries= -0.088*(0.329)(St. dev of a 
government size in MENA countries)= 0.028 unit or 2% (-0.088*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political 
instability in MENA countries).   
286 The coefficient of a government size*(0.416)(St. dev of a government size in non-MENA countries)= 
0.349 unit or 21% (0.839*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-MENA countries). 
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Table 4.2 The Independent Effect of Government Size on Political Instability over 
the Period 1984-2013 
Independent variable Dependent variable: Political instability  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
TYU 0.743*** 
(0.195) 
1.180*** 
(0.157) 
-0.876 
(0.704) 
0.759*** 
(0.195) 
0.715*** 
(0.184) 
0.986*** 
(0.181) 
Rents -0.039*** 
(0.014) 
-0.036* 
(0.021) 
-0.028 
(0.025) 
 -0.025** 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
TO -0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
GDP growth -0.294*** 
(0.071) 
-0.193*** 
(0.072) 
-0.519 
(0.330) 
-0.316*** 
(0.076) 
-0.261*** 
(0.071) 
-0.225*** 
(0.069) 
Government Size -1.771*** 
(0.512) 
-0.310 
(0.545) 
-2.812** 
(1.418) 
-1.566*** 
(0.508) 
-2.303** 
(0.923) 
-0.839 
(0.530) 
RT -0.120*** 
(0.047) 
-0.167*** 
(0.160) 
-0.044 
(0.086) 
-0.125*** 
(0.045) 
 -0.278*** 
(0.064) 
GTE -0.044*** 
(0.006) 
-0.035*** 
(0.006) 
-0.046 
(0.040) 
-0.045*** 
(0.007) 
-0.036*** 
(0.005) 
-0.041*** 
(0.006) 
Log.T pop 0.845*** 
(0.220) 
0.946*** 
(0.202) 
0.591 
(1.024) 
0.770*** 
(0.226) 
0.890*** 
(0.216) 
0.812*** 
(0.214) 
UGR 0.113*** 
(0.042) 
0.107** 
(0.043) 
0.045 
(0.120) 
0.096** 
(0.045) 
0.074* 
(0.039) 
0.116*** 
(0.040) 
Oil    -0.347 
(4.987) 
  
Oil*Government size    -0.507 
(1.767) 
  
DD     -5.778** 
(2.822) 
 
DD*Government size     1.497 
(1.040) 
 
MENA      -7.129 
(4.604) 
MENA*Government size      0.751 
(1.651) 
Constant 10.864*** 
(2.747) 
5.048* 
(2.823) 
18.621** 
(8.893) 
10.770*** 
(2.747) 
10.557*** 
(2.817) 
10.245*** 
(2.606) 
Adjusted R square 22% 25% 30% 21% 27% 31% 
Number of observation 580 484 97 583 589 580 
Estimation method 2sl 
Sample  Countries 
youth bulge 
<=30% 
Countries 
youth bulge 
>30% 
   
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one 
year lag of GDP growth as 
instrument of GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. TYU is rate of total youth unemployment, Rents is rents from natural resources, TO is trade openness, GDP 
growth is GDP annual growth, RT is level of democracy, GTE is gross tertiary enrolment, Log T.pop is logarithm of total 
population and UGR is urban growth rate. 
4.10 Empirical Results: The Impact of the Joint Effect of Government Size and 
other Factors on the Level of Political Instability  
Government size can eliminate the adverse impacts of some factors on political 
environment. Its size can be enlarged to respond to poor economic performance and 
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imperfections in labor markets that increase unemployment rates. It may play a role in 
mitigating the impact of a high level of educational attainment on instability by creating 
public employment to absorb educated youth. It might enlarge to relieve  the pressure of 
rapid urban growth rate that creates a shortage of employment opportunities and public 
services.  Government size shows that it can have a stabiliza tion effect on political 
environment through mitigating the adverse impact of some determinants of political 
instability.     
4.10.1 The Impact of the Joint Effect between Government Size and Total Youth 
Unemployment on the Level of Political Instability 
Models 7 to 12 in Table 4.3 examine the impact of youth unemployment on 
political instability moderated by government size. 
Model 7 examines the impact of youth unemployment on political instability 
moderated by government size in panel data. The independent effect of government size 
has the expected negative sign and significance, suggesting that enlargement of 
government size lowers political instability. The independent effect of youth 
unemployment has the expected positive sign and significant coefficient at the 1% level 
suggesting that increasing youth unemployment enhances political instability. For  
example, increasing the unemployment rate by a standard deviation in Tunisia 
deescalates political stability by 0.086 units or 16% of a standard deviation of political 
instability287. The joint effect between total youth unemployment and government size 
has a positive sign and is significant at the 1% level. Put differently, the interaction 
effect of unemployment is more important than small government size to destabilize the 
political environment. For example, the interaction effect of government size on the 
level of political instability in Egypt at mean rate of unemployment 3.257 is 3.734288. 
Expansion of government size at mean rate of unemployment by a standard deviation 
enhances political instability by 0.948 units or 127% of one standard deviation of 
political instability289. The interaction effect of unemployment on the level of political 
instability in Egypt at mean percentage of a government size 2.606% is 4.757 290 . 
                                                 
287 The coefficient of unemployment*(0.129)(St. dev of unemployment in Tunisia)= 0.086 unit or 16% 
=(0.670*100)/(4.187)(St. dev of political instability in Tunisia). 
288  The coefficient of a government size + [(the coefficient of the joint effect*(3.257) (mean rate of 
unemployment in Egypt)]=3.734. 
289  It is calculated (3.734)*(0.254)(St . dev of a government size in  Egypt)=0.948 unit or 127%= 
(3.734*100)/(2.939)(St. dev of political instability in Egypt). 
290 The coefficient of unemployment + [(the coefficient of the interaction term*(2.606)(mean percentage 
of a government size in Egypt)]=4.757. 
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Increasing unemployment among youth by a standard deviation at mean percentage of 
government size deescalates stability in Egypt by 0.666 units or 162% of one standard 
deviation of political instability291.  
The results of the joint effects suggest that the effect of unemployment rate 
dominates the impact of the joint effect. It might be that absorbing unemployment in the 
public sector creates public attitudes that prefer public over private employment. This 
creates educational preferences towards field study that enhances an individual’s 
probability to gain public employment over private (Alesina et al, 2000). As a result, 
there is continual pressure on government to absorb educated unemployed youth in the 
public sector (Stevenson, 1992). The failure of government to create public employment 
to respond to such pressure leads to political instability (Gelb et al., 1991). In some 
countries like monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula, the majority of employees in the 
private sector are expatriate workers while indigenous citizens choose voluntarily to be 
unemployed, waiting for public employment. The public’s preference for public 
employment has been shown in the wake of the so-called Arab spring in late 2010 when 
some governments in the region created massive public employment in response to 
public demands for employment opportunities. Many indigenous citizens quit their 
private posts to seek public employment. This creates difficulty in the private sector 
over the short-term in dealing with a sudden shortage of human resources in the market 
(Forstenlechner and Rutledge, 2011) 
Models 8 and 9 investigate the impact of the joint effect of government size and 
youth unemployment on political instability in countries where the percentage of youth 
bulge is equal to or less than 30% and countries where their percentage is more than 
30% respectively. The joint effect has an insignificant negative sign in countries where 
youth bulge is less than 30%, suggesting the interaction effect of government size is 
more important than unemployment to destabilize the political environment. In 
countries where their percentage is more than 30% the joint effect has a positive sign 
and is insignificant. The results suggest that the interaction effect of unemployment is 
more important than small government size to destabilize the political environment. 
Enlargement of government size at mean rate of unemployment produces the opposite 
effect on political environment in the two sub-samples. In countries where their 
percentage is less than or equal to 30%, a standard deviation enlargement of 
                                                 
291  It is calcu lated (4.757)*(0.14)(St. dev of unemployment in Egypt)=0.666 unit o r 
162%=(4.757*100)/(2.939)(St. dev of political instability in Egypt). 
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government size constitutes a reduction in political instability by 0.252 units or 24% of 
one standard deviation of stability 292 . On the other hand, in countries where their 
percentage is more than 30%, a standard deviation enlargement of government size at 
mean rate of unemployment 2.654% enhances instability by 0.886 units or 45% of one 
standard deviation of instability293 . The interaction effect of unemployment at mean 
percentage of government size enhances political instability in both sub-samples; 
however, its impact is substantially higher in countries where the percentage of youth 
bulge is more than 30%. One standard deviation increase in unemployment at mean 
percentage of government size enhances political instability by 2.482 units or 75% of 
one standard deviation of political instability in countries with more than 30% of youth 
bulge294 in comparison with 0.471 units or 25% in countries where their percentage is 
less than 30%295.  
The relationship between political instability (measured in x-axis) and 
government size and youth unemployment (measured in y-axis) in countries where their 
percentage among the population is more than 30% is shown in Figure 4.7. This figure 
shows that government size and youth unemployment are positively correlated with the 
level of political instability but that this relationship is not very obvious. Furthermore, 
while both unemployment and government size continues to grow, the former variable 
grows more. Alternatively, it might be that in these countries enlargement of 
government size comes at the expense of its investment in sectors that feed economic 
growth. As a result, governments continue to act as employer of last resort. However, 
over the long run this creates difficulty in the creation of more public employment and 
places governments under financial pressure. Algan et al. (2002) point out that 
enlargement of government size increases the current expenditure at the expense of 
                                                 
292The coefficient of government size  + [(the coefficient of the joint effect*(2.719) mean percentage of 
youth unemployment in countries where the percentage youth bulge less than 30%)]=-0.737. One 
standard deviation enlargement in government size is (-0.737)(0.342)(St. dev of a government size in  
these countries)= 0.252 unit  or 24%= (0.737*100)/(3.077)(St. dev of political instability in these 
countries). 
293 The coefficient of government size  + [(the coefficient of the joint effect*(2.654) mean percentage of 
youth unemployment in countries where the percentage youth bulge is more than 30%)]=1.964. One 
standard deviation expansion in government size is (1.964)(0.451)(St. dev of a government size in these 
countries)= 0.886 unit or  45%= (1.964*100)/(4.388)(St. dev of political instability in these countries). 
294 The coefficient of unemployment + [(the coefficient of the joint effect*(2.588) mean percentage of 
government size in countries where the percentage youth bulge more than 30%)]=3.291. One standard 
deviation increases in unemployment is (3.291)(0.754)(St. dev of unemployment in  these countries)= 
2.482 unit or 75%= (3.291*100)/(4.388)(St. dev of political instability in these countries). 
295The coefficient of unemployment + [(the coefficient of the joint effect*(2.789) mean percentage of a 
government size  in countries where the percentage youth bulge less than 30%)]=0.778. One standard 
deviation increases in unemployment is (0.778)(0.605)(St. dev of unemployment in  these countries)= 
0.471 unit or 25%= (0.778*100)/(3.077)(St. dev of political instability in these countries).  
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capital expenditure. The latter expenditure is required to stimulate productivity in the 
private sector and subsequently create employment opportunities.  
In countries where their percentage is less than or equal to 30%, the relationship 
between political instability (measure in x-axis) and government size and youth 
unemployment (measured in y-axis) is shown in Figure 4.8. The relationship between 
the two variables and political instability is not obvious. Given that the average 
percentage of youth bulge in these countries is 21.5%, enlargement of government size 
lowers the impact of unemployment among youth and it satisfies needs and 
requirements of other segments of the population. According to Wagner law, a 
government enlarges its size to respond to unemployment and needs and requirements 
produced by the economic situation.  
Figure 4.7 Government Size, Youth Unemployment, and Political Instability in 
Countries with more than 30% of Youth Bulge among Population over the period 
from 1984-2013 
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Figure 4.8 Government Size, Youth Unemployment, and Political Instability in 
Countries with equal to and less than 30% of Youth Bulge among Population over 
the period from 1984-2013 
 
Model 7 is re-estimated for two sub-samples where the percentage of youth 
bulge is more than 30%: in the first sub-sample the government size is less than the 
sample mean of the entire data set and in the second sub-sample its size is more than the 
sample mean. In the first sub-sample the joint effect has an insignificant negative effect 
while in the second sub-sample it has an insignificant positive effect296.  
 Model 10 examines the impact of the joint effect of government size and youth 
unemployment on the level of political instability in oil countries 297. The independent 
effect of youth unemployment enhances political instability; however, it exposes lower 
political risk in oil countries, as the interaction term between oil and total youth 
unemployment is negative although insignificant. Although oil rents offer flexibility to 
responses to unemployment; unemployment risk continues to exist in oil and non-oil 
countries. The joint effect between youth unemployment and government size has a 
positive impact on political environment. However, its impact is lower in oil than non-
oil countries as the interaction effect between oil and the joint effect is negative 
although not significant. In other word, the interaction effect of unemployment is more 
important than small government size to destabilize the political environment; but, the 
effect is lower in oil than non-oil countries. The interaction effect of unemployment at 
mean government size is more risky in non-oil countries than oil countries. A standard 
deviation increase in youth unemployment increases the risk  of political instability in oil 
                                                 
296 Results not reported. 
297 Continuous proxy of natural resources is replaced by oil dummy. 
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countries by 1.769 units or 76% of a standard deviation of political instability 298  in 
comparison with 3.102 units or 123% of one standard deviation of political instability in 
non-oil countries299. Similarly, the adverse impact of enlarging the government size on 
political environment to absorb unemployment is substantially higher in non-oil than oil 
countries. Expansion of government size at mean rate of unemployment enhances 
political instability in oil countries by 0.300 units or 19% of one standard deviation of 
instability300 in comparison with 1.275 units or 78% in non-oil countries301.  
The positive association between the joint effect and political instability in oil 
and non-oil countries goes through different channels; however, it has similar causes, 
i.e. continuing pressure on governments to create more public employment. In non-oil 
countries enlargement of government size to absorb youth unemployment might be 
associated with increasing taxes on productive sectors with adverse impacts on 
economic growth that filter through several channels. Bergh and Henrekson (2010) 
point out that under so-called endogenous growth theory, enlargement of government 
size has an adverse impact on economic growth through increases in taxes and lower 
levels of investment on the productive sector such as infrastructure. It crowds out 
private sector investment on physical capital and human resources, which restrains 
long-term economic growth. In oil countries, oil rents partially reduce the adverse 
impact of large government size on economic growth; however, its adverse impact still 
exists. It leads to a low level of economic growth because of the imbalance in growth 
rate between different forms of distribution and public income which in turn reduces the 
rate of return to investment (Lane and Tornell, 1996). Large government size is linked 
                                                 
298 The independent coefficient of youth unemployment + its interaction with oil dummy= 0.150 + [(The 
coefficient of joint effect between youth unemployment and government size + its interaction with oil 
dummy =1.092*(2.714) (mean percentage of a government size in oil countries)=3.114. One standard 
deviation increase (3.114)*(0.568)(St. dev of youth unemployment in oil countries)=1.769 unit or 76% = 
(3.114*100)/(4.07)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries). 
299The independent coefficient of youth unemployment + [(The coefficient of jo int effect between youth 
unemployment and government size 1.565*(2.681) (mean percentage of a government size in non-oil 
countries)=4.932. One standard deviation increase (4.932)*(0.629)(St. dev of youth unemployment  in  
non-oil countries)=3.102 unit or 123% = (4.932*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non-oil 
countries). 
300 The independent coefficient of government size + its interaction with oil dummy= -2.228 +[(The 
coefficient of joint effect between youth unemployment and government size + its interaction with oil 
dummy =1.092*(2.729) (mean percentage of youth unemployment in oil countries)= 0.752. One standard 
deviation expansion in government size (0.752)*(0.396)(St. dev of government size in oil 
countries)=0.297 unit or 19% = (0.752*100)/(4.07)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries ). 
301 The independent coefficient of government size + [(The coefficient of joint  effect  between youth 
unemployment and government size (1.565)*(2.744) (mean percentage of youth unemployment in non -oil 
countries)=3.125. One standard deviation expansion in government size (3.125)*(0.396)(St. dev of 
government size in non-oil countries)=1.275 unit or 79% = (3.125*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political 
instability in non-oil countries). 
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to poor economic growth in both groups through the human resources channel. It drives 
human resources away from the private sector and increases their wage levels in a 
country (Bergh and Henrekson, 2010). In summary, in both groups of countries, 
enlargement of government size produces further pressure on governments to create 
more public employment. The adverse impact on economic growth forces a government 
to continue to act as employer of last resort. The failure to do so enhances instability.  
Model 11 examines the impact of the joint effect of youth unemployment and 
government size on political instability in democratic countries 302 . The independent 
effect of government size has a negative coefficient suggesting that enlargement of 
government size lowers the level of political instability. Furthermore, the effect of 
government size is more effective in lowering political instability in democratic than 
autocratic countries. The independent effect of youth unemployment enhances political 
instability; however, it exposes higher political risk in democratic countries, as the 
interaction coefficient between democracy and total youth unemployment is positive 
and has a significant coefficient at the 5% level. The joint effect between total youth 
unemployment and government size has a positive sign and significant coefficient at the 
5% level; however, it turns into a negative impact in democratic countries as the 
interaction term between democracy and the joint effect has a negative sign and is 
significant at the 5% level. In other words, the interaction effect of unemployment is 
more important than small government size to destabilize the political environment in 
autocratic countries; while, it is vice versa in democratic countries. Democratic 
countries succeed through government size to turn the risk of unemployment on 
political instability to be almost negligent. Increasing the rate of youth who experience 
unemployment by a standard deviation at mean size of government enhances political 
instability by 0.132 units or 8% in democratic countries303 in comparison with 3.759 
units or 117% of one standard deviation of instability in autocratic countries 304 . 
Similarly, government size addressing unemployment breeds stability in democratic 
                                                 
302 The proxy of democracy from IV Polity Project is replaced by democratic dummy. 
303 The independent coefficient of youth unemployment + its interaction with democracy dummy= 1.294 
+ [(the coefficient of jo int effect between youth unemployment and government size +  its interaction with 
democracy dummy =-0.38*(2.804) (mean percentage of government size in  democratic countries)=0.228. 
One standard deviation increase (0.228)*(0.579)(St. dev of unemployed youth in democratic 
countries)=0.132 unit or 8% = (0.228*100)/(2.948)( St. dev of polit ical instability in democratic 
countries). 
304The independent coefficient of youth unemploy ment + [(the coefficient of jo int effect  between youth 
unemployment and government size (1.966)*(2.616) (mean percentage of government size in autocratic 
countries countries)=5.080. One standard deviation increase  (5.080)*(0.74)(St. dev of youth 
unemployment in autocratic countries)=3.759 unit or 117%= (5.080*100)/(4.349)(St.  dev of political 
instability in autocratic countries).  
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countries whereas it has a destabilization effect in autocratic countries. Enlargement of 
government size by a standard deviation at mean rate of unemployment enhances 
stability in democratic countries by 0.777 units or 71% of one standard deviation of 
instability305. In contrast, its enlargement in autocratic countries by a standard deviation 
deteriorates stability by 1.874 units or 98% of one standard deviation of political 
instability306.  
In democratic countries the effect of government size dominates the impact of 
the joint effect on political instability. It might be that in these countries enlargement of 
government size addresses unemployment and related issues such as income inequality 
and ethnic fractionalization that contribute to stabilizing the political environment. 
Grassi (2014) indicates that government in democratic countries tends to enlarge to 
enhance the level of income equality and improve the living standards of some ethnic 
groups. In autocratic countries it might be that government size continues to grow yet 
public employment is available for specific interest groups not the public in general. 
Weiner (1967) cited by Robinson and Verdier (2002) illustrates unequal access to 
public employment in India. The author points out that a personal relationship gives an 
individual access to public employment. This is because not all members of the public 
possess factors that help them to be part of interest groups. Turner and Young (1985) 
cited by Robinson and Verdier (2002) indicate that public employment is one form of 
clientelism and is built based on several factors, such as interest exchange and more 
importantly and frequently based on kinship and ethnic relationships. Control variables 
retain their sign and significance except urban growth rate that turns into an 
insignificant positive sign.    
Model 12 examines the impact of the joint effect on political instability in the 
MENA region. The independent effect of government size has a negative coefficient, 
suggesting that enlargement of its size lowers the level of political instability. 
Additionally, the size is more effective in stabilizing the political environment in the 
                                                 
305The independent coefficient of government size + its interaction with democracy dummy= -1.06 +[(the 
coefficient of joint effect between youth unemployment and government size +  its interaction with 
democracy dummy =-0.380*(2.732) (mean percentage of unemployed youth in democratic countries)=-
2.098. One standard deviation enlargement of government size (-2.098)*(0.334)(St. dev of a government 
size in democrat ic countries)=0.7 or 71% = (-2.098*100)/(2.948)( St. dev of political instability  in  
democratic countries). 
306  The independent coefficient of a government size + [(the coefficient of the joint effect between 
government size and youth unemployment)*(2.696)(mean percentage of youth unemployment in  
autocratic countries)]=4.288. One standard deviation enlargement in a government (4.288)*(0.437)(St. 
dev of a government size in autocratic countries)=1.874 unit o r 98%= (4.288*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of 
political instability in autocratic countries). 
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MENA region than non-MENA region as the interaction between government size and 
the MENA dummy is negative although not significant. The independent effect of youth 
unemployment enhances political instability; however, it constitutes a higher political 
risk in MENA countries, as the interaction coefficient between MENA and total youth 
unemployment is positive but insignificant. Moreover, the joint effect between total 
youth unemployment and government size has a positive sign and its impact is 
substantially higher in the MENA region. It indicates that the interaction effect of 
unemployment is more important than small government size to destabilize the political 
environment and the effect is substantially higher in MENA than non-MENA region. 
The interaction effect of unemployment on political instability at mean percentage of 
government size is stronger in the MENA than non-MENA region. Increasing 
unemployment by one standard deviation at mean percentage of government size 
enhances political instability in MENA by 7.540 units or 321% of one standard 
deviation of political instability307  in comparison with 2.844 units or 111% in non-
MENA308. The interaction effect of government size enhances political instability in the 
MENA and non-MENA region. Enlargement of government size by one standard 
deviation at mean rate of unemployment enhances political instability by 3.435 units or 
239% of a standard deviation of political instability in MENA 309  while it enhances 
instability in non-MENA region by 1.295 units or 79%310.  
A combination of the economic environment and labor market force government 
in the MENA region to continue to act as employer of last resort. A high level of 
government involvement in the economic environment leads to a weak private sector. 
Consequently, government dominates the labor market as the private sector finds it 
                                                 
307 The independent coefficient of youth unemployment + its interaction with MENA dummy= 1.982 
+[(the coefficient of interaction between youth unemployment and government size  + its interaction with 
MENA =4.202*(2.858) (mean percentage of government size in MENA)=13.991. One standard deviation 
increase (13.991)*(0.539)(St. dev of youth unemployment in MENA countries)=7.541 unit or 320% = 
(13.991*100)/(4.366)(standard deviation of political instability in MENA countries).   
308 The independent coefficient of youth unemployment + [(the coefficient of joint effect between youth 
unemployment and a government size*(2.666) (mean  percentage of a government size in non -
MENA)=4.443. One standard deviation increase (4.443)*(0.640)(St. dev of youth unemployment in non- 
MENA countries)=2.844 unit or 111% = (4.443*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-
MENA countries).   
309 The independent coefficient of a government size + its interaction with MENA dummy= -2.471 +[(the 
coefficient of interaction between youth unemployment and government size + its interaction with 
MENA =4.202*(3.703) (mean rate o f unemployment in MENA)=10.441. One standard deviation increase 
(10.441)*(0.329)(St. dev of government size in MENA countries) =3.435 unit or 239% = 
(10.441*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political instability in MENA countries).   
310 The independent coefficient of government size + [(the coefficient of interaction between youth 
unemployment and a government size*(2.7) (mean percentage of unemployment in non-MENA)=3.135. 
One standard deviation increase (3.135)*(0.413)(St. dev of a government size in non- MENA countries)= 
1.295 unit or 79% = (3.135*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-MENA countries).    
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difficult to offer equivalent wages to the public sector. The wage levels in the public 
sector in the region are one third higher than their counterparts in the private sector 
(Schiavo-Campo et al., 1997). High expectations set by the unemployed in terms of 
working conditions and wage levels (Algan et al., 2002) creates public attitudes that 
prefer public over private unemployment (Alesina et al., 2000). Pressure is further 
intensified on government to act as employer of last resort in the absence of, or a weak 
temporary unemployment benefits system (Alesina et al., 1999). Said (1996) 
summarizes that a high level of government involvement in the economic environment, 
labor market, higher wage level in the public sector and absence of temporary 
unemployment benefits forces governments in the MENA region to act as employer of 
last resort. Governments in the region can neither ignore unemployment nor can they 
continue enlarging government size. The latter can lead to political instability through 
several channels as mentioned earlier. Control variables retain their sign and 
significance except rents from natural resources that becomes insignificant.  
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Table 4.3 The Joint Effect between Government Size and Youth Unemployment on 
the Level of Political Instability over the Period 1984-2013 
Independent 
variables 
 
Dependent variable: Political instability  
 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
TYU 0.670*** 
(0.201) 
1.200*** 
(0.172) 
-0.609 
(0.756) 
0.737*** 
(0.209) 
-0.061 
(0.483) 
0.893*** 
(0.195) 
Government Size -1.372*** 
(0.493) 
-0.327 
(0.552) 
-2.035 
(1.498) 
-1.169** 
(0.508) 
-1.012 
(0.801) 
-0.464 
(0.561) 
Government 
size*TYU 
1.568*** 
(0.606) 
-0.151 
(0.507) 
1.507 
(1.195) 
1.565** 
(0.613) 
1.966** 
(0.791) 
1.333** 
(0.582) 
Oil    -1.383** 
(0.583) 
  
Oil*Government 
size 
   -1.059 
(1.529) 
  
Oil*TYU    -0.587 
(0.565) 
  
Oil*Government 
size*TYU 
   -0.471 
(2.215) 
  
DD     -1.542*** 
(0.322) 
 
DD*Government 
size 
    -0.048 
(0.909) 
 
DD*TYU     1.355** 
(0.541) 
 
DD*Government 
size*TYU 
    -2.346** 
(0.920) 
 
MENA      -5.421*** 
(1.592) 
MENA*Government 
size 
     -2.007 
(7.837) 
MENA*TYU      1.088 
(2.174) 
MENA*Government 
size*TYU 
     2.869 
(12.725) 
Constant 7.504*** 
(1.569) 
7.442*** 
(1.819) 
7.264 
(6.636) 
8.272*** 
(1.644) 
6.741*** 
(1.228) 
10.148*** 
(1.751) 
Adjusted R square 24% 25% 33% 23% 31% 33% 
Number of 
observation 
580 484 96 583 589 580 
Estimation method 2SLS 
Countries  Countries % of 
youth bulge 
<=30% 
Countries 
where % of 
youth bulge 
>30% 
   
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of 
instrument 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity 
test of one year lag 
of GDP growth as 
instrument of GDP 
growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. All 
models include all control variables included in models in Table 4-2 (results are not reported). For space restriction only the results of variables of 
interest are reported.  
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4.10.2 The Impact of the Joint Effect between Government Size and Corruption 
on the Level of Political Instability 
Models 13 to 18 in Table 4.4 examine the impact of the joint effect between 
government size and corruption on political instability.  
  Model 13 examines the impact of the joint effects of government size and 
corruption on the level of political instability in panel data. The independent effect of 
corruption has a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% level, suggesting that 
increasing the level of corruption enhances political instability. The independent effect 
of government size has a negative sign although it is insignificant. The joint effect 
between corruption and government size has a negative and significant coefficient at the 
1% level. It suggests that the interaction effect of government size is more important 
than the level of corruption to destabilize the political environment. In a country like 
Syria, the interaction effect of government size on instability at mean score of 
corruption 3.519 is -3.019311. Enlargement of government size by a standard deviation 
at mean score of corruption lowers instability by 0.713 units or 78% of a standard 
deviation of political instability312. The interaction effect turns the impact of corruption 
in the joint effect into a negative effect. The interaction effect of corruption at mean 
percentage of government size 2.665 is -1.217313. Decreasing the level of corruption at 
mean percentage of government size enhances instability by 1.094 units or 28% of one 
standard deviation of political instability314. 
 It might be that a government focuses more on quality of human resources than 
quantity. Hence, it hires qualified human resources to carry out checks and balances as 
well as accountability measures so that the level of corruption decreases (Kotera et al., 
2012). Alternatively, it might select to hire few employees and provide them with high 
wage levels so that they do not seek illegal payments (Montinola and Jackman, 2002). 
In general, control variables retain their sign and significance. 
 Model 14 examines the impact of the joint effect on political instability in 
countries where the percentage of youth bulge is equal to or less than 30%. The 
                                                 
311 The coefficient of government size (-0.553) + [(the coefficient of joint effect (-0.701)*(3.519) (mean 
score of corruption in Syria)]=-3.019. 
312 The coefficient of government size in jo int effect * (0.236)(its standard deviation in Syria)= 0.713 unit, 
or 78% = (-3.019*100)/(4.388)(St. dev of political instability in Syria). 
313  The coefficient of corruption (0.651) + [(the coefficient of joint effect (-0.701)*(2.665) (mean 
percentage a government size)]=-1.217. 
314 The coefficient of corruption in the joint effect *(0.899) (its St. dev in Syria) = 1.094 unit, or 8% = (-
1.217*100)/ (4.388) (St. dev of political instability in Syria).  
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independent effect of corruption and government size has a positive sign, suggest ing 
that enlargement of government size and increasing levels of corruption independently 
enhances political instability. The joint effect between the two variables has a negative 
coefficient although it is insignificant. It suggests that the interaction effect of 
government size is more important than the level of corruption to destabilize the 
political environment. The interaction effect of government size at mean score of 
corruption 2.433 on political instability is 0.428 (its independent effect is 0.796). 
Enlargement of government size at mean score of corruption by a standard deviation 
escalates instability by 0.146 units or 14% of one standard deviation of instability315. 
Similarly, the joint effect reduces the adverse impact of the independent effect of 
corruption on political instability. A standard deviation increase in the level of 
corruption at mean percentage of government size enhances political instability by 
0.165 units or 4% of one standard deviation of political instability316.  
The empirical results might be explained in light of the level of democracy in 
these countries. The average score of democracy in the Polity IV project over the 
sample period is 15 in countries where their percentage less than or equal to 30%. This 
places government under public scrutiny that makes it difficult to enlarge its size. Such 
enlargement might constitute an increase in taxes without corresponding improvement 
in quantity and quality of public goods and services. Similarly,  the incumbent might 
find it difficult to use some form of corruption to satisfy interest groups, which in turn 
enhances their risk on the political environment. Hence an enlargement of government 
size to satisfy specific segments of the population or corruption to please specific 
interest groups might come at the expense of the majority. Under such conditions, 
reducing corruption and downsizing government might be more rewarded because it 
increases government popularity among the majority of the population. Fjelde and 
Hegre (2014) point out that accommodating private interests is less rewarded in 
democratic countries because political support is gained from the majority.  
                                                 
315 The coefficient of government size in model 14 +[(the coefficient of the joint effect *(2.433)(mean 
score of corruption in  these group of countries)]=0.428. The coefficient of government size in  the jo int 
effect (0.428)*(0.342)(St. Dev. Of government size in these group countries)=0.146 unit or 14%= 
(0.428*100)/(3.077)(St. Dev. of political instability in these group of countries).  
 
316  The coefficient of corruption in model 14 + [(the coefficient of the joint effect *(2.789)(mean 
percentage of a government size in these group of countries)]=0.117. The coefficient of corruption in the 
joint effect (0.117)*(1.404)(St. Dev. Of corruption in these group countries)=0.165 unit or 4%= 
(0.117*100)/(3.077)(St. Dev. of political instability in these group of countries).  
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 Model 15 examines the impact of the joint effect on political instability in 
countries where youth bulge percentage is more than 30%. The independent effect of 
government size has a negative coefficient although is not significant. Enlargement of 
government size lowers the risk of political instability. The independent effect of 
corruption has a negative sign but is not significant. This suggests that a decrease in the 
level of corruption enhances political instability. Furthermore, the joint effect between 
the two variables has a negative and significant coefficient at the 5% level. It suggests 
that the interaction effect of government size is more important than the level of 
corruption to destabilize the political environment. The interaction effect of government 
size at mean score of corruption on instability is -7.352. Enlargement of the size of 
government by a standard deviation lowers instability by 3.315 units or 168% of one 
standard deviation of instability 317 . The interaction effect of corruption at mean 
percentage of government size 2.588% on political instability is -5.747. Corruption 
enhances instability by 5.737 units or 125% of one standard deviation of political 
instability when its level decreases by one standard deviation318. It might be that these 
countries have limited financial resources so that they can neither enlarge the 
government size to satisfy the public nor offer rent seeking opportunities for interest 
groups. De Mesquita and Smith (2009) point out that a high level of corruption reduces 
the political risk of interest groups whereas different forms of government expenditure 
like public employment negates the political risk initiated from mass anti-government 
movements. 
 Model 16 examines the impact of the joint effects between government size and 
corruption on political instability in oil countries. The independent effect of government 
size has a negative coefficient and is significant at the 5% level suggesting that the 
enlargement of government size lowers the level of political instability. Furthermore, its 
impact is more effective in lowering political instability in oil than non-oil countries as 
the interaction term between oil and government size has a negative sign although it is 
not significant. The independent effect of corruption enhances political instability; 
however, it exposes lower political risk in oil countries, as the interaction coefficient 
                                                 
317 The coefficient of government size in Model 15 + [(the coefficient of the joint effect *(3.754)(mean 
score of corruption in these group of countries)]=-7.532. The coefficient of government size in the jo int 
effect (-7.532)*(0.451)(St. Dev  of government size in these group countries)=3.315 unit o r 168%= 
(7.532*100)/(4.388)(St. Dev. of political instability in these group of countries).  
318 The coefficient of corruption in Model 15 + [(the coefficient of the joint effect *(2.588)(mean 
percentage of a government size in these group of countries)]=-5.474. The coefficient of corruption in  the 
joint effect (-5.474)*(1.048)(St. Dev. o f corruption in  these group countries)=5.747 unit or 125%= 
(5.474*100)/(4.388)(St. Dev. of political instability in these group of countries).  
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between oil and corruption is negative and significant at the 5% level. Corruption in oil 
countries satisfies the greed of some groups for oil rents so that their political risk 
reduces. The joint effect between corruption and government size has a negative sign 
and significant coefficient at the 1% level; however, it has a positive impact on oil 
countries as the interaction term between the joint effects and oil countries has a 
positive sign although it is insignificant. It suggests that the interaction effect of 
government size is more important than the level of corruption to destabilize the 
political environment in non-oil countries; while, it is vice versa in oil countries. The 
interaction effect of government size on political instability in oil countries at mean 
score of corruption 3.627 is 2.88 319 . Enlargement of government size by a standard 
deviation at mean score of corruption enhances political instability in oil countries by 
1.417 units or 71% of a standard deviation of political instability 320 ; in contrast, 
reducing its size by a standard deviation at mean score of corruption increases 
instability in non-oil countries by 0.927 units or 57% of one standard deviation of 
instability321. The interaction effect of corruption at mean percentage of government 
size 2.714 on instability in oil countries is 3.594322. One standard deviation increase in 
corruption at mean percentage of government size escalates instability by 3.820 units or 
88% of one standard deviation of political instability323 while one standard deviation 
decrease in corruption at mean percentage of a government size enhances instability by 
1.565 units or 29% of one standard deviation of political instability in non-oil 
countries324.  
In oil countries, large government size enhances the impact of corruption on 
political instability. These countries tend to stabilize the political environment through 
high levels of corruption to satisfy interest groups (Smith, 2004) and public employment 
                                                 
319 (The independent effect of government size + its coefficient in interaction with Oil dummy=-2.537)+ 
[(the coefficient of joint effect of government size and corruption + its coefficient in the interaction term 
with oil dummy=1.439*(3.627) (mean score of corruption in oil countries)]=2.088. 
320 The coefficient of government size in the joint effect (2.088)*(0.396)(St. dev of government size in oil 
countries)=1.417 unit or 71% = (2.088*100)/(4.072)(St.d ev of political instability in oil countries). 
321 (The independent effect of government size + [(the coefficient of jo int effect  between a government 
size and corruption=-0.697*(2.939) (mean score of corruption in non oil countries)=-2.271. The 
coefficient of government size in the joint  effect  (-2.271)*(0.413)(St. dev of a government size in non-oil 
countries)=0. 927 unit or 57% =(-2.271*100)/ (3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non-oil countries). 
322  (The independent effect of corruption + its coefficient in interaction with Oil dummy=-0.462)+ (the 
coefficient of jo int effect  between government size and corruption + its coefficient in  the interaction term 
with oil dummy=1.493*(2.714) (mean score of a government size in oil countries)=3.594. 
323  The coefficient of corruption in the joint effect (3.594)*(1.062)(St. dev of corruption in oil 
countries)=3.82 unit Or 88%= (3.594*100)/(4.072)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries). 
324 (The independent effect of corruption + [(the coefficient of jo int effect between government size and 
corruption=-0.696*(2.939) (mean score of corruption in non o il countries)=-1.155. The coefficient of 
corruption in the jo int effect  (-1.155)*(0.413)(St . dev of a government size in  non-oil countries)=1.565 
unit or 29% =(-1.155*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non-oil countries). 
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to satisfy the general public. However, over the long run they consume a substantial 
amount of public resources with adverse impacts on economic growth. The imbalance 
in growth rate between different forms of distribution and public income reduces the 
rate of return to investment (Lane and Tornell, 1996). Alternatively, the imbalance 
increases instability through a high level of competition on public resources across 
different segments of the population. In non-oil countries, reducing government size 
lowers the impact of corruption on political environment.  The level of democracy in 
non-oil countries is high in comparison to oil countries (their average score in the Polity 
IV project is 14 vs. 7 in oil countries). In these countries the incumbent evaluates the 
potential returns from lowering the prospective risks of the public and interest groups. It 
might find that reducing government size may bring the level of corruption down and 
thus enhance its chance to be reelected (rather than the opposite holding true).   
The impact of the joint effect between government size and corruption on 
political instability in democratic countries is examined in Model 17. Enlargement of 
government size is more effective in enhancing political stability in democratic than 
autocratic countries. The independent effect of corruption enhances political instability; 
however, it exposes higher political risk in democratic countries, as the interaction term 
between democracy and corruption is positive and significant at the 5% level. 
Corruption occurs in democratic countries; however, when it is caught it has a stronger 
impact on political environment than autocratic countries. The joint effect between 
corruption and government size has a negative sign; however, its impact is lower in 
democratic countries as the interaction term between democracy and the joint effect has 
a positive sign and significant coefficient at the 5% level. The results suggest that in 
both groups of countries the interaction effect of government size is more important 
than the level of corruption to destabilize the political environment; but, the effect is 
lower in democratic than autocratic countries. In democratic countries the interaction 
effect of government size at mean score of corruption 2.227 is -0.551325. Enlargement of 
government size by a standard deviation at mean score of corruption decreases the risk 
of political instability by 0.184 units or 19% of one standard deviation of political 
instability326. The interaction effect of corruption on political instability in democratic 
                                                 
325(The independent coefficient of government size + its interaction with the dummy of democracy=-
0.025) + [(the coefficient of corruption and government size + its interaction with democracy dummy=(-
0.236)*(2.227)(mean score of corruption in democratic countries)=-0.551. 
326 The coefficient of government size in the jo int effect (-0.551)*(0.334)(St. dev of government size in 
democratic countries)=0.184 unit or 19%=(-0.551*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of political instability in  
democratic countries). 
 256 
countries at mean percentage of government size 2.804 is -0.212 327 . Decreasing 
corruption by a standard deviation enhances instability by 0.290 units or 7% of one 
standard deviation of political instability328 . The joint effect suggests that a smaller 
government size reduces the impact of corruption on political instability in democratic 
countries. In these countries a reduction in government size and low level of corruption 
might constitute tax cuts that would satisfy the majority of the public. 
The impact of the joint effects between corruption and a government size on 
political instability in the MENA region is examined in Model 18. The independent 
effect of government size has a positive sign; however, its impact is stronger in the 
MENA region as the interaction between the MENA dummy and government size has a 
positive sign although it is not significant. This suggests that enlargement of 
government size enhances political instability. The independent effect of corruption 
enhances political instability; but it exposes lower risk on political environment in the 
MENA than non-MENA region. The joint effect between corruption and government 
size has a negative sign and the effect is higher in MENA region as the interaction term 
between MENA and the joint effect has a negative sign and is significant at the 10% 
level. The results point out that the interaction effect of government size is more 
important than corruption to destabilize the political environment and such importance 
is higher in MENA than non-MENA region. The interaction effect of government size 
on political instability in MENA at mean score of corruption 3.509 is -18.762329 . 
Reducing government size by a standard deviation enhances instability in the region by 
6.179 units or 430% of one standard deviation of political instability330 in comparison 
with 0.721 unit or 44% of one standard deviation in non-MENA region 331 . The 
interaction effect of corruption on instability in the MENA region at mean percentage of 
                                                 
327 (The independent coefficient of corruption + its interaction with the dummy of democracy=0.450) + 
[(the coefficient of corruption and a government size+ its interaction with democracy dummy=(-
0.236)*(2.804)(mean percentage of a government size in democratic countries)=-0.212. 
328 The coefficient of corruption in the joint effect (0.212)*(1.368)(St. dev of corruption in democratic 
countries)=0.290 unit or 7%=(-0.212*100)/(2.948)(St.dev of political instability in democratic countries). 
329 (The independent coefficient of government size + its interaction with the dummy of MENA=3.981) + 
[(the coefficient of corruption and government size + its interaction with MENA dummy=(-
6.481)*(3.509)(mean score of corruption in MENA)=-18.762. 
330The coefficient of government size in the jo int effect ( -18.762)*(0.329)(St. dev of government size in 
MENA)=6.179 unit or 430%=(18.762*100)/(4.366)(St . dev of political instability in MENA).  
331 (The independent coefficient of government size + [(the coefficient of corruption and government 
size(-0.716)*(2.949)(mean score of corruption in non-MENA countries)=-1.748. One standard deviation 
enlargement is calculated (-1.748)*(0.412)(St. dev of a government size  in  non-MENA countries)= 0.721 
unit or 44%= (1.748*100)/ (3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-MENA). 
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a government size 2.858% is -20.394332. One standard deviation decrease in corruption 
at mean percentage of government size increases instability in the MENA region by 16 
units or 467% of one standard deviation of instability 333  while each one standard 
deviation reduction in corruption in non-MENA enhances instability by 1.569 units or 
29% one standard deviation of instability334.  
Reducing government size reduces the impact of corruption on political 
instability in the MENA region and its impact is substantially high. This reduces the 
adverse impacts of corruption on the ability of labour market’s to create employment 
opportunities. By doing so, it eliminates political risk of mass anti-government 
movements (De Mesquita and Smith, 2009). The failure of government to reduce its 
size to mitigate the adverse impacts of a high level of corruption on public living 
standards leads to instability. Hollander and Byun (2012) point out that it leads to 
instability when an important segment of population like youth bulge believe the 
corrupted government fails to address their economic and political exclusiveness. In 
other words, the level of corruption in the MENA region is comparable to the level in 
non-MENA region; however, it might have a stronger impact on public living standards. 
Hence, a government downsizes it is size to mitigate its impact on public living 
standards. Control variables have the expected significant sign except urban growth rate 
and trade openness.  
                                                 
332 (The independent coefficient of corruption + its interaction with the dummy of MENA=-1.867) + [(the 
coefficient of corruption and government size+ its interaction with MENA dummy=(-
6.481)*(2.858)(mean percentage of a government size in MENA)=-20.392. 
333The coefficient of corruption in the joint effect (-20.392)*(0.782)(St. dev of corruption in MENA)=16 
unit or 467%=(-20.392*100)/(4.366)(St.dev of political instability in MENA).  
334 (The independent coefficient of corruption + [(the coefficient of corruption and government size (-
.716)*(2.666)(mean percentage of government size in non-MENA countries)=-1.136. One standard 
deviation decrease is calculated (-1.136)*(1.405)(St. dev of corruption in non-MENA countries)= 1.596 
unit or 29%= (1.136*100)/ (3.977)(St .dev of political instability in non-MENA). 
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Table 4.4 The Joint Effect between Government Size and Corruption on the Level 
of Political Instability over the Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables 
 
Dependent variable: Political instability  
 
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Government Size -0.553 
(0.653) 
0.796 
(0.831) 
-0.558 
(1.263) 
-0.221 
(0.686) 
0.224 
(1.194) 
0.364 
(0.804) 
Corruption 0.651*** 
(0.125) 
0.539*** 
(0.123) 
-0.555 
(0.542) 
0.713*** 
(0.126) 
-0.533 
(0.408) 
0.774*** 
(0.136) 
Corr*Government size -0.701*** 
(0.248) 
-0.151 
(0.224) 
-1.901** 
(0.767) 
-0.697*** 
(0.258) 
-2.103*** 
(0.735) 
-0.716*** 
(0.265) 
Oil    -0.575 
(0.484) 
  
Oil*Government size    -2.315 
(2.193) 
  
Oil*Corr    -1.175** 
(0.514) 
  
Oil*Corr*Government 
size 
   2.190 
(1.680) 
  
DD     -1.694*** 
(0.435) 
 
DD*Government size     -0.250 
(1.485) 
 
DD*Corr     0.984** 
(0.420) 
 
DD*Government 
size*Corr 
    1.867** 
(0.796) 
 
MENA      -2.044 
(1.525) 
MENA*Government size      3.616 
(3.714) 
MENA*Corr      -2.641** 
(1.192) 
MENA*Corr*Government 
size 
     -5.764* 
(3.347) 
Constant 4.383*** 
(1.228) 
2.538** 
(1.177) 
10.166** 
(4.264) 
4.195*** 
(1.271) 
5.526*** 
(1.279) 
3.252*** 
(1.177) 
Adjusted R square 25% 26% 33% 26% 30% 33% 
Number of observation 589 493 96 592 589 589 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test 
of one year lag of GDP 
growth as instrument of 
GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. All 
models include all control variables, included in models in Table 4-2  (results are not reported). For space restriction only the results of variables of 
interest are reported.  
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4.10.3 The Impact of the Joint Effect between Government Size and Gross 
Tertiary Enrolment on the Level of Political Instability 
Models 19 to 24 in Table 4.5 examine the impact of the joint effect between 
government size and gross tertiary enrolment on political instability.  
 In Model 19 the impact of the joint effect on political instability is tested in 
panel data set. The independent effect of government size has a negative sign and is 
significant at the 1% level. The independent effect of gross tertiary enrolment has a 
negative and significant coefficient at the 1% level. This suggests that decreasing the 
level of gross tertiary enrolment enhances political instability. The joint effect has a 
positive sign and is significant at the 1% level. It suggests that the interaction effect of 
gross tertiary enrolment is more important than the government size to destabilize the 
political environment. The interaction effect of government size on the level of political 
instability in Angola at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment 1.825% is -2.385335. 
Reducing government size at mean percentage of gross tertiary enro lment enhances 
instability in Angola by 0.925 units or 52% of a standard deviation of political 
instability336. The interaction effect of gross tertiary enrolment on the level of political 
instability at mean percentage of government size 3.243% is 0.218337. One standard 
deviation increase in gross tertiary enrolment at mean percentage of government size 
increases the risk of political instability by 0.437 units or 5% of one standard deviation 
of political instability 338 . Increasing the number of educated youth that exceeds 
economic size or growth rate forces government to create public employment. As 
government size and educated youth continue to grow, it experiences pressure from 
wage bills while the number of educated youth who experience unemployment 
accumulates. In other words, a combination of the negative consequences of a bloated 
government sector and a large number of educated youth enhances political instability. 
 Models 20 and 21 examine the impact of the joint effect on political instability 
in countries where the percentage of youth bulge is equal to or less than 30% and in 
countries where their percentage is more than 30% respectively. In both groups, the 
                                                 
335 The independent effect of government size + [(coefficient of the joint effect*(1.825)(mean percentage 
of gross tertiary enrollment in Angola)]=-2.385. 
336 The coefficient of government size in the joint effect (2.385)*(0.388)(St. dev of a government size in 
Angola)=0.925 unit or 52% =(2.385*100)/(4.632)(St . dev of political instability in Angola). 
337 The independent effect of gross tertiary enro llment +[(coefficient of the joint effect*(3.243)(mean 
percentage of a government size)]=0.218. 
338 The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment in the joint effect (0.218)*(2 )(St. dev of gross tertiary 
enrollment in Angola)=0.437 unit or 5% =(0.218*100)/(4.632)(St. dev of political instability in Angola). 
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independent effect of government size and gross tertiary enrolment has a negative sign. 
However, the joint effect produces different impacts on political instability across the 
two groups. It has a positive sign and significant coefficient at the 5% level in countries 
where their percentage is less than or equal to 30%, indicating that the interaction effect 
of gross tertiary enrolment is more important than the government size to destabilize the 
political environment. On the other hand, it has a negative sign although it is 
insignificant in countries where their percentage is more than 30 suggesting that the 
interaction effect of the government size is more important than gross tertiary enrolment 
to destabilize the political environment. In countries where the percentage of youth 
bulges is less than or equal to 30%, enlargement of government size by a standard 
deviation at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment enhances instability by 0.289 
units or 28% of one standard deviation of political instability 339 . In contrast, the 
interaction effect of government size has a negative relationship with political instability 
in countries where their percentage is more than 30%. Enlargement of government size 
at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment lowers instability by 1.274 units or 64% 
of one standard deviation of instability340. Similarly, the interaction effect of education 
has the opposite impact on instability at mean percentage of government size across the 
two groups. Each one standard deviation improvement in the level of educational 
attainment enhances instability by 2.226 units or 3% of one standard deviation of 
instability in countries where their percentage is less than or equal to 30%341 while in 
countries where their percentage is more than 30% each one standard deviation decrease 
in gross tertiary enrolment enhances instability by 0.501 units or 1% of one standard 
deviation of instability342.  
                                                 
339 The independent effect of government size in  model 20 + [(the coefficient of jo int effect between 
gross tertiary enrolment and a government size*(38.655)(mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment in  
countries where the percentage of youth bulge less than 30%)=0.846. The coefficient of government size 
in the joint effect (0.846)*(0.346)(St. dev of government size in these countries)=0.289 unit or 
28%=(0.846*100)/(3.077)(St. dev of political instability these countries). 
340 The independent effect of government size in  model 21 + [(the coefficient of jo int effect between 
gross tertiary enro lment and a government size*(9.974)(mean  percentage of gross tertiary  enrolment  in  
countries where the percentage of youth bulge more than 30%)=-2.824. The coefficient of government 
size in the joint effect (2.824)*(0.451)(St. dev of government size in these countries)=1.274 unit or 
64%=(2.824*100)/(4.388)(St. dev of political instability these countries). 
341  The independent effect of gross tertiary enrolment in model 20 + [(the coefficient of jo int effect 
between gross tertiary enrolment and government size*(2.789)(mean percentage of a government size in  
countries where the percentage of youth bulge less than 30%)=0.103. The coefficient of a gross tertiary 
enrolment in the joint effect (0.103)*(21.659)(St. dev of gross tertiary enrolment in these 
countries)=2.226 unit or 3%=(0.103*100)/(3.077)(St. dev of political instability these countries). 
342  The independent effect of gross tertiary enrolment in model 21 + [(the coefficient of jo int effect 
between gross tertiary enrolment and a government size*(2.588)(mean percentage of government size in  
countries where the percentage of youth bulge more than 30%)= -0.048. The coefficient of gross tertiary 
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The positive joint effect in countries where their percentage is less than or equal 
to 30% might be due to the fact that these countries achieve a high level of gross tertiary 
enrolment (the average enrolment over the sample period is 39%). This percentage is 
higher than the actual needs of the economy size so that government enlarges its size to 
deal with the risk of educated youth on the political environment; otherwise, instability 
is enhanced. Alternatively, it might be that there is a significant change in economic 
structure so that the skills attained from the educational system are no longer required 
by the productive sector. Under both scenarios government size reaches alarming levels 
while the number of educated youth continues to accumulate. The negative joint effect 
in countries where their percentage is more than 30% is attributed to the fact that 
enlargement in government size can lower the adverse impact of low gross tertiary 
enrolment, especially because its average percentage over the sample period is low 
(around 9% in this group of countries).  
Model 22 examines the impact of the joint effect between government size and 
gross tertiary enrolment on political instability in oil countries. Enlargement of 
government size lowers political instability and its stabilization effect is higher in oil 
than non-oil countries. The independent effect of gross tertiary enrolment has a negative 
sign and is significant at the 1% level; however, it has a positive impact on political 
instability in oil countries as the interaction term between oil and gross tertiary 
enrolment has a positive sign although it is not significant. The joint effect between 
gross tertiary enrolment and government size has a positive sign and is significant at the 
1% level; however, it has a negative impact in oil countries as the interaction term 
between oil and the joint effect has a negative sign but is insignificant. In other words, 
in non-oil countries the interaction effect of gross tertiary enrolment is more important 
than government size to destabilize the political environment; while, it is vice versa in 
oil countries. The interaction effect of government size on the level of political 
instability in oil countries at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment 22.215% is -
3.516343. Enlargement of government size by a standard deviation at mean percentage of 
gross tertiary enrolment lowers the risk of political instability in oil countries by 1.393 
units or 86% of a standard deviation of political instability344; in contrast, enlargement 
                                                                                                                                               
enrolment in the joint effect (-0.048)*(10.424)(St. dev of a gross tertiary enrolment in these 
countries)=0.502 unit or 1%=(0.048*100)/(4.388)(St. dev of political instability these countries). 
343(The independent effect of government size + its interaction with oil dummy=-2.583)+ (coefficient of 
joint effect between government size and gross tertiary enrolment + its coefficient in interaction term with 
oil dummy= (-0.041)*(22.515)(mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment in oil countries)= -3.516.  
344 The coefficient of government size in  the joint effect (-3.516)*(0.396)(St. dev of a government size in 
oil countries)=1.393 or 86%= (3.516*100)/(4.071)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries). 
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of government size by one standard deviation at mean percentage of gross tertiary 
enrolment enhances instability in non-oil countries by 0.073 units or 5% of one standard 
deviation in political instability345. The interaction effect of gross tertiary enrolment at 
mean percentage of government size 2.714% on the level of political instability in oil 
countries is -0.060346. One standard deviation decrease in gross tertiary enrolment at 
mean percentage of government size increases the risk of political instability in oil 
countries by 1.137 units or 1.5% of one standard deviation of political instability347. The 
interaction effect of gross tertiary enrolment on instability in non-oil countries at mean 
percentage of government size 2.681% is 0.174348. One standard deviation increase in 
gross tertiary enrolment at mean percentage of government size increases instability by 
4.384 units or 5% of one standard deviation of political instability349. 
 Rentier state theory suggests that oil countries stabilize their political 
environment through different forms of distribution of expenditure, including 
expenditure on education (Sandbakken, 2006). This produces a high number of 
educated youth that exceeds the requirements of the economy. This condition worsens 
with a lack of diversification in economic activities because of heavy reliance on oil 
sectors as a result of the Dutch Disease effect. Governments respond by enlarging their 
size to lower the political risk of educated youth. Absorbing educated youth in the 
public sector abolishes the opportunities available to some interest groups to organize 
them to act against a government. Smith (2004) points out that the risk of political 
instability resulting from greed for oil rents is reduced by creating public employment.  
The joint effect has a positive sign in non-oil countries. A positive response of 
government to absorb educated youth within the public sector leads to political 
instability through different channels. It increases the level of current expenditure at the 
                                                 
345 The independent effect of government size + [(coefficient of joint effect between a government size 
and gross tertiary enro lment*(27.798)(mean  percentage of gross tertiary enro lment in non oil 
countries)=0. 180. The coefficient of government size in  the jo int effect (0.180)*(0.408 )(St. dev of a  
government size in non-oil countries)=0.073 unit  or 5%=(0.180*100)/(3.985)(St . dev of political 
instability in non-oil countries). 
346 (The independent effect of gross tertiary enro lment + its interaction with o il dummy=0.051)+ 
(coefficient of jo int effect between government size and gross tertiary enrolment + its coefficient in  
interaction term with oil dummy= -0.041)*(2.714)(mean percentage of a government size in oil 
countries)= -0.060.  
347 The coefficient of gross tertiary in the joint effect *(18.757)(St. dev of gross tertiary enrolment in oil 
countries)=1.137 unit or 1.5%=(0.060*100)/(4.072)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries).  
348The independent effect of gross tertiary enrolment + [(coefficient of interaction between government 
size and gross tertiary enrolment*(2.680)(mean percentage of government size in non o il countries)= 
0.179.  
349  The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment in the joint effect*(24.261)(St. dev of gross tertiary 
enrolment in  non oil countries)=4.384 un it or 5%=(0.174*100)/ (4.072)(St. dev of political instability in  
non oil countries).   
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expense of capital expenditure required to stimulate productivity in the private sector 
(Algan et al., 2002). This hurts the private sector’s ability to create employment 
opportunities and pay taxes and consequently government ability to continue enlarging 
its size. It also has an adverse impact on the available pool of skills in a country. 
Educational attitudes are oriented towards field of study that are required by 
government sectors, not private sectors (Alesina et al., 2000). This creates pressure on 
educational institutions because the public believes that public employment is 
guaranteed; consequently, pressure intensifies for government to create more public 
employment opportunities (Stevenson, 1992). These factors raise significant difficulties 
for a government over the long run to continue acting as employer of last resort and 
damage the productive sector’s ability to create employment opportunities. Control 
variables have a significant expected sign. 
The impact of the joint effect between government size and gross tertiary 
enrolment on political instability in democratic countries is examined in Model 23. The 
independent effect of government size has a negative sign although it is not significant. 
The independent effect of gross tertiary enrolment has a negative sign and significant 
coefficient at the 1% level; however, it has a lower impact on political instability in 
democratic countries as the interaction term between democracy and gross tertiary 
enrolment has a positive sign and significant coefficient at the 10% level. Democratic 
practices in democratic countries lower the adverse impact of a low level of gross 
tertiary enrolment on political environment. These practices offer political channels to 
educated and uneducated youth to evaluate government performance and discipline 
politician wrongdoing or underperformance. The joint effect between gross tertiary 
education and government size has a positive sign; however, it exposes a higher risk on 
political environment in democratic than autocratic countries. Put it differently, the 
interaction effect of gross tertiary enrolment is more important than the government size 
to destabilize the political environment and the effect is higher in democratic than 
autocratic countries. The interaction effect of government size at mean percentage of 
gross tertiary enrolment has a different impact on instability between democratic and 
autocratic countries. In democratic countries, expansion of government size by a 
standard deviation at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment enhances instability 
by 0.206 units or 21% of one standard deviation of political instability 350  whereas 
                                                 
350 (The independent effect of government size + its interaction with democracy dummy=-2.618)+ (the 
coefficient of the joint effect between government size and gross tertiary enrolment+ its coefficient in  
interaction term with democracy dummy= (0.080)*(40.0149)(mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment 
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reducing government size in autocratic countries by one standard deviation enhances 
instability by 0.086 units or 5% of one standard deviation of instability351. Educational 
attainment enhances instability at mean percentage of government size in democratic 
and autocratic countries. Increasing the percentage of gross tertiary enrolment by a 
standard deviation at mean percentage of government size enhances instability by 4.442 
units or 6% of one standard deviation of political instability in democratic countr ies352 
and by 1.443 units or 2% in autocratic countries353.  
The interaction effect of gross tertiary enrolment is more important to political 
stability than a government size in democratic and autocratic countries. The difference 
in the percentage of youth bulge between the two groups produces different scenarios354. 
In democratic countries, it might be that their percentage is insufficient to satisfy human 
resource needs of the public and private sectors. This increases competition between the 
two sectors on human resources; consequently, it drives their wage level up. The profit 
consideration that drives the private sector leads them to consider youth bulge 
recruitment infeasible. This damages the ability of the private sector to generate profits 
and pay taxes, which in turn decreases the level of public revenue. For example, a 
shortage in labour supply had an adverse impact on 2015 economic growth in Germany. 
The shortage hampered economic growth, increased the wage level, and prevented 
establishment of new business (Gordon, 2014). Such shortages might force some 
domestic businesses to move their operations to countries where there are abundant 
human resources with low wage levels. In autocratic countries, it might be that 
government size is incapable of keeping pace with the growing number of educated 
                                                                                                                                               
in democratic countries)= 0.617. The coefficient of government size in the joint effect (0.617)*(0.334)(St. 
dev of a government size in democratic countries)= 0.206 unit or 21%=(0.617*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of 
political instability in democratic countries). 
351 The independent coefficient of government size +[(The coefficient of joint effect between government 
size and gross tertiary enrolment*(15.876)(mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment in  autocratic 
countries)=-0.197. The coefficient of a government size in the joint effect (0.197)*(0.437)(St. dev of a 
government size in autocratic countries)=0.086 unit or 5% =(0.197*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of political 
instability in autocratic countries). 
352 (The independent coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment + its interaction with democracy dummy)=-
0.040)+ (the coefficient of joint effect between government size and gross tertiary enrolment+ its 
coefficient in  interaction term with democracy dummy= (0.080)*(2.804)(mean percentage of government 
size in democratic countries)= 0.186. The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment in the jo int effect  
(0.186)*(23.825)(St. dev of g ross tertiary enrolment in democrat ic countries )=4.443 unit or 6% 
=(0.186*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of political instability in democratic countries). 
353 The coefficient of the independent effect of gross tertiary  enrolment + the coefficient o f joint  effect 
between government size and gross tertiary enrolment*(2.615)(mean percentage of government size in  
autocratic countries)=0.088. The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment in the joint effect*  
(0.080)*(16.313)(St. dev of gross tertiary enrolment in autocratic countries)=1.443 unit or 
2%=(0.080*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of political instability in autocratic countries). 
354 The average percentage of youth bulge over the sample period in democrat ic countries is 23% vs. 32% 
in autocratic countries. 
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youth, which enhances instability. Control variables have a significant sign except urban 
growth rate.    
 Model 24 examines the impact of the joint effect between government size and 
gross tertiary enrolment on political instability in the MENA region. The independent 
effect of government size has a positive impact on political instability in the MENA 
region, as its interaction term has a positive sign although it is insignificant. The 
independent effect of gross tertiary enrolment has a negative sign and significant 
coefficient at the 1% level; however, it turns into a positive impact in the MENA region 
as the interaction term between MENA and gross tertiary enrolment has a positive sign 
although it is not significant. Put differently, the MENA region faces higher a political 
risk from an increasing number of educated youth than non-MENA region. The joint 
effect between gross tertiary enrolment and government size has a positive sign and 
significant coefficient at the 1% level; however, it turns into a negative impact in the 
MENA region as the interaction term between MENA and the joint effect has  a negative 
sign but is not significant. In other word, in MENA region the interaction effect of the 
government size is more important than gross tertiary enrolment to destabilize the 
political environment; while it is vice versa in non-MENA region. The interaction effect 
of government size on instability at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment in the 
MENA region is -0.840. Enlarging government size by a standard deviation at mean 
percentage of gross tertiary enrolment lowers instability in the region by 0.276 units or 
19% of one standard deviation of instability 355; in contrast, enlargement of government 
size by one standard deviation at mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolme nt enhances 
instability in non-MENA region by 0.239 units or 15% of one standard deviation of 
instability356. The interaction effect of education on instability at mean percentage of 
government size is different in the MENA than non-MENA region. Reduction in gross 
tertiary enrolment by one standard deviation at mean percentage of government size 
enhances instability in the MENA region by 1.636 units or 3% of one standard deviation 
                                                 
355  (The independent effect of government size + its interaction with  MENA dummy=0.103)+ (the 
coefficient of the joint effect between government size and gross tertiary enrolment+ its coefficient in  
interaction term with MENA dummy=-0.049)*(19.204)(mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment in  
MENA countries)=-0.840. The coefficient of government size in the jo int effect (0.840)*(0.329)(St. dev 
of a government size in MENA countries)= 0.276 unit or 19%=(0.840*100)/ (4.366)(St. dev of political 
instability in MENA countries). 
356 The independent effect of a government size + [(coefficient of jo int effect between a government size 
and gross tertiary enrolment*(27.743)(mean percentage of gross tertiary enrolment in non MENA 
countries)=0.580. The coefficient of government size in the joint effect (0.580)*(0.413 )(St. dev of a 
government size in non-MENA countries)=0.239 unit or 15%=(0.580*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political 
instability in non-MENA countries). 
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of instability357; while an increase in its level by one standard deviation in non-MENA 
enhances instability by 3.808 units or 4% of one standard deviation of instability358.  
Governments in the MENA region lower the political risk of an increasing 
number of educated youth by enlarging the government size. Governments are forced to 
do so because of mismatch between skills gained from the educational system and those 
required by labour markets. Huntington (1968) points out that mismatch between skills 
gained from education and those required by labour markets enhances instability. Some 
countries in the region, like Egypt, tends to absorb educated youth in the public sector 
(Gelb et al., 1991 and Urdal, 2006). However, this creates an educational attitude 
among the public towards areas of study that guarantee public employment. This creates 
extra pressure on government to create more public employment opportunities. 
Pissarides and Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2006) point out that the attitude in these 
countries increases pressure on educational instituations in the MENA region, which in 
turn increases the number of youth who are queuing for employment in public sectors in 
the region. While such public policy pays off over the medium-term, it increases the 
risk of political instability over the long-term both directly and indirectly as the 
independent effect of government size and education has a positive sign. Directly, the 
failure of growth rate in government size to match the growth rate of educated youth 
enhances political instability. It has an adverse impact on political environment through 
increasing the level of corruption. This is because public employment in such conditions 
is driven by political, nepotism and patronage considerations rather than merit-based 
criteria. Poor bureacratic quality and lack of skills required by the private sector 
increases demand on some public posts because they offer abundant rent seeking 
opportunities (Tanzi, 1998).  
  
                                                 
357 (The independent effect of gross tertiary enrolment + its interaction with MENA dummy=0.003)+ (the 
coefficient of the joint effect between government size and gross tertiary enrolment+ its coefficient in  
interaction term with MENA dummy=(-0.049)*(2.858)(mean percentage of government size in MENA 
countries)=-0.138. The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment in the joint effect (0.138)*(12.199 )(St. dev 
of a g ross tertiary enrolment in MENA countries)= 1.683 unit or 3%=(0.138*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of 
political instability in MENA countries). 
358The coefficient of the independent effect of gross tertiary enrolment+ the coefficient of jo int effect 
between government size and gross tertiary enrolment*(2.666)(mean percentage of government size in  
non-MENA countries)=0.157. The coefficient of gross tertiary enrolment in the joint effect*  
(0.157)*(24.617)(St. dev of gross tertiary enrolment in non-MENA countries)=3.808 unit or 
4%=(0.157*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-MENA countries). 
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Table 4.5 The Joint Effect between Government Size and Gross Tertiary 
Enrolment on the Level of Political Instability over the Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Political instability  
Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 
Government Size -2.541*** 
(0.562) 
-1.202* 
(0.693) 
-2.817** 
(1.382) 
-2.312*** 
(0.588) 
-1.291 
(0.869) 
-1.625*** 
(0.602) 
GTE -0.057*** 
(0.008) 
-0.045*** 
(0.008) 
-0.046 
(0.042) 
-0.061*** 
(0.008) 
-0.091*** 
(0.025) 
-0.054*** 
(0.007) 
GTE*Government size 0.085*** 
(0.022) 
0.053** 
(0.023) 
-0.0008 
(0.075) 
0.089*** 
(0.024) 
0.068 
(0.063) 
0.079*** 
(0.021) 
Oil    -1.843** 
(0.889) 
  
Oil*Government size    -0.270 
(2.965) 
  
Oil*GTE    0.113 
(0.072) 
  
Oil*GTE*Government 
size 
   -0.131 
(0.298) 
  
DD     -2.110*** 
(0.428) 
 
DD*Government size     -1.326 
(1.046) 
 
DD*GTE     0.051* 
(0.026) 
 
DD*GTE*Government 
size 
    0.011 
(0.066) 
 
MENA      -5.038*** 
(1.249) 
MENA*Government size      1.729 
(3.024) 
MENA*GTE      0.056 
(0.070) 
MENA*GTE*Government 
size 
     -0.128 
(0.265) 
Constant 3.994** 
(1.721) 
3.547* 
(1.897) 
10.041 
(6.808) 
4.337*** 
(1.710) 
4.241*** 
(1.303) 
5.789*** 
(1.769) 
Adjusted R square 27% 26% 30% 30% 30% 35% 
Number of observation 580 484 96 583 589 580 
Estimation method 2SLS 
Countries  YB<=30% YB> 30%    
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of 
one year lag of GDP 
growth as instrument of 
GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. All 
models include all control variables  included in models in Table 4-2 (results are not reported). For space restriction only the results of variables of 
interest are reported. 
4.10.4 The Impact of the Joint Effect between Government Size and Trade 
Openness on the Level of Political Instability 
Models 25 to 30 in Table 4.6 examine the impact of the joint effect between 
government size and trade openness on political instability under different 
circumstances.   
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Model 25 examines the impact of the joint effect between trade openness and 
government size on political instability in panel data. The independent effect of 
government size has the expected negative sign and is significant at the 1% level. The 
independent effect of trade openness has a negative coefficient although it is 
insignificant. This suggests that a low level of trade openness enhances political 
instability. The joint effect between trade openness and government size has a negative 
sign but is not significant. In other words, a government fails to enlarge its size to lower 
the adverse impact of a low level of trade openness on political environment. The 
interaction effect of government size on the level of political instability at mean 
percentage of trade openness 73.125% is -1.899359 . The risk of political instability 
reduces by 0.777 units or 45% of one standard deviation of political instability when a 
government enlarges its size by a standard deviation at mean percentage of trade 
openness360. The interaction effect of trade openness on the level of political instability 
at mean percentage of government size 2.687% is -0.014361. Increasing the level of trade 
openness at mean percentage of government size lowers the risk of political instability 
by 0.666 units or 0.35% of one standard deviation of political instability362.  
A low level of trade openness increases unemployment and reduces economic 
opportunities in a country. Government size can be used to reduce unemployment, 
which in turn maintains the level of consumption in the economy (Cameron, 1978). This 
helps to compensate the public for lost economic benefits resulting from a low level of 
trade openness. Bricker and Foley (2013) point out that economic benefits brought by 
trade openness create common interests among the public to maintain stability. In other 
words, enlargement of government size offers employment opportunities that help to 
maintain the consumption level in a country required to maintain economic benefits. 
Control variables retain their sign and significance.  
Models 26 and 27 examine the impact of the joint effect on political instability 
in countries where the percentage of youth bulge is less than or equal to 30% and in 
countries where their percentage is more than 30% respectively. The independent effect 
of government size and trade openness has a negative sign in both groups of countries. 
                                                 
359 The independent coefficient of government size + [(the coefficient of the joint effect *(73.125)(mean 
percentage of trade openness)]=-1.899. 
360 The coefficient of government size in the joint effect (1.899)*(0.409)(St. dev of a government size)=0. 
777 unit or 45%= (1.899*100)/(4.030)(St. dev of political instability). 
361  The independent coefficient of trade openness +[(coefficient of the joint effect*(2.687)(mean 
percentage of a government size)]=-0.014. 
362The coefficient of trade openness in the joint effect (-.014)*(46.917)(St. dev of trade openness)=0.666 
unit or 0.35%= (0.014*100)/ (4.030)(St. dev of political instability). 
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However, there is variation in the impact of the joint effect across the two groups. In 
countries where their percentage is less than or equal to 30% the joint effect has a 
positive and significant coefficient at the 1% level. This suggests that enlargement of 
government size reduces the adverse impact of a low level of trade openness on political 
environment. On the other hand, the joint effect has a negative sign and is significant at 
the 5% level in countries where their percentage is more than 30%. This indicates that 
small government size enhances the adverse impact of a low level of trade openness on 
political environment. The interaction effect of government size at mean percentage of 
trade openness on instability in countries where their percentage is less than or equal to 
30% is 0.482. Each one standard deviation expansion in government size at mean 
percentage of trade openness enhances instability by 0.165 units or 16% of one standard 
deviation of instability363. This is in contrast to its effect on instability in countries where 
their percentage is more than 30%, where enlargement of government size at mean 
percentage of trade openness by a standard deviation lowers political instability by 
1.983 units or 100% of one standard deviation of instability 364. The interaction effect of 
trade openness at mean percentage of government size on instability in countries where 
the percentage of youth bulge is less than or equal to 30% is 0.034. Increasing the level 
of trade openness by one standard deviation escalates instability by 1.724 units or 1% of 
one standard deviation of instability 365 while in countries where the percentage of youth 
bulge is more than 30% each one standard deviation decrease in trade openness 
enhances instability by 5.682 units or 3% of one standard deviation of instability366.  
Governments in countries where the percentage of youth bulge constitutes less 
than or equal to 30% successfully enlarge its size to lower the impact of trade openness 
on political instability while governments in countries where their percentage is more 
                                                 
363 The independent coefficient of government size in Model 26 + [(the coefficient of the jo int effect 
*(74.439)(mean percentage of trade openness in countries where the percentage of youth bulge less than 
30%)]=0.482. The coefficient of government size in  the jo int effect (0.482 )*(0.342)(St. dev of 
government size in these countries)=0.165 un it or 16%= (0.482*100)/(3.077 )(St. dev of political 
instability). 
364The independent coefficient of government size in Model 27 + [(the coefficient of the joint effect 
*(72.854)(mean percentage of trade openness in countries where the percentage of youth bulge more than 
30%)]=-4.392.The coefficient of government size in the joint effect (-4.392)*(0.451)(St. dev of 
government size in these countries)=1.982 unit  or 100%= (4.392*100)/(4.388 )(St. dev of political 
instability). 
365  The independent coefficient of trade openness in Model 26 + [(the coefficient of the joint effect 
*(2.789)(mean percentage of government size in countries where the percentage of youth bulge less than 
30%)]=0.034. The coefficient of trade openness in the joint effect (0.034)*(50)(St. dev of trade openness 
in these countries)=1.724 unit or 1%= (0.034*100)/ (3.077)(St. dev of political instability). 
366 The independent coefficient of t rade openness in Model 27 +[(the coefficient of the joint effect 
*(2.588)(mean percentage of government size in countries where the percentage of youth bulge more than 
30%)]=-0.135. The coefficient of trade openness in the joint effect ( -0.135)*(43)(St. dev of trade 
openness in these countries)=5.862 unit or 3%= (0.135*100)/(4.388)(St. dev of political instability).  
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than 30% fail to do so. In both groups of countries the level of trade openness and 
government size are similar367; however, there is a significant difference in the average 
percentage of youth bulge (the average percentage over the sample period is 21.5% in 
countries where their percentage is less than 30% vs. 34% in countries where their 
percentage is more than 30%). Therefore, countries with a percentage of youth bulge 
less than or equal to 30% can more easily absorb unemployment resulting from poor 
trade openness in the public sector than the other group of countries. This can be noted 
from the interaction effect of government size (trade openness) at mean percentage of 
trade openness (government size) required to stabilize the political environment in 
countries where the percentage of youth bulge is more than 30%, which is higher than 
the other group. 
Model 28 examines the impact of the joint effect between government size and 
trade openness on the level of political instability in oil countries. The independent 
effect of government size has a negative sign; however, it is more effective in 
stabilizing the political environment in oil than non-oil countries. Similarly, the 
independent effect of trade openness has a negative sign; but its impact is more 
important for stability in oil countries than non-oil countries as the interaction effect 
between oil and trade openness has a negative sign although it is not significant. The 
joint effect of trade openness and government size has a negative sign; however, it turns 
into a positive impact in oil countries as the interaction term between oil and the joint 
effect has a positive sign although it is not significant. In other words, oil countries 
succeed in enlarging government size to lower the adverse impact of low trade openness 
on political environment.  Enlargement of government size by a standard deviation at 
mean percentage of trade openness lowers instability in oil countries by 0.644 units or 
40% of one standard deviation of political instability368 and by 0.690 units or 42% in 
non-oil countries369. The interaction effect of trade openness on the level of political 
                                                 
367 The average level of trade openness over the sample period is 73% in countries where the percentage 
of youth bulge is more than 30% vs. 74.4% in countries where their percentage is less th an 30%. 
Similarly, government size in the former group is 2.588% vs. 2.78% in the latter group. 
368The independent effect of government size + its interaction with oil dummy=-1.949) + (the coefficient 
of joint effect between  a government size and t rade openness + its coefficient in interaction term with oil 
dummy = (0.003)*(80.244)(mean percentage of trade openness in oil countries)= -1.626. The coefficient 
of government size in the joint effect (1.626)*(0.396)(St. dev of government size in oil countries)=0.664 
unit or 40%=(1.626*100)/(4.071)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries). 
369 The independent effect of government size + the coefficient of jo int effect of government size and 
trade openness (-0.003)*(75)(mean percentage of trade openness in non-oil countries)=-1.691. The 
coefficient of government size in the jo int effect  (1.691)*(0.408)(St. dev of government size in non-oil 
countries)=0.690 unit or 42%=(1.691*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non-oil countries). 
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instability in oil countries at mean percentage of government size 2.714% is -0.008370. 
One standard deviation increase in trade openness at mean percentage of government 
size reduces the risk of political instability by 0.371 units or 0.21% of one standard 
deviation of political instability in oil countries371 and by 0.718 units or 0.37% of one 
standard deviation of political instability in non-oil countries372.  
Enlarging government size in oil countries reduces the adverse impact of trade 
openness on political environment (the coefficient of independent effect of trade 
openness is -0.019 while the interaction effect is -0.008). Reserves accumulated from oil 
rents enable these countries to enlarge government size in response to a low level of 
trade openness or fluctuation in oil prices (their main export commodity). On the other 
hand, the joint effect enhances the impact of small government size and low level of 
trade openness on political environment (the coefficient of the independent effect of 
trade openness is -0.003 while the interaction effect is -0.014). It might be that these 
countries find it difficult to enlarge government size amidst a low level of trade 
openness, which in turn reduces public revenue. In such conditions, enlargement of 
government size might constitute extra taxes on the productive sector that is already 
suffering from low trade openness.      
Model 29 examines the impact of the joint effect between government size and 
trade openness on the level of political instability in democratic countries. The 
independent effect of government size has a negative sign; however, it is more 
important in stabilizing the political environment in democratic than autocratic 
countries. The independent effect of trade openness has a negative sign; however, it 
exposes lower risk in democratic than autocratic countries. The joint effect of trade 
openness and government size has a negative and significant coefficient at the 1% level 
suggesting that small government size enhances the adverse impact of trade openness 
on political environment. However, the interaction effect between democracy and the 
joint effect is positive and significant at the 1% level. In other words, democratic 
countries reduce the adverse impact of a low level of trade openness on political 
                                                 
370The independent effect of t rade openness + its interaction with o il dummy=-0.019)+ (the coefficient of 
joint effect between government size and trade openness + its coefficient in interaction term with oil 
dummy = 0.004)*(2.714)(mean percentage of a government size in oil countries)= -0.008.  
371The coefficient of trade openness in the joint effect  (-0.008)*(45)(St. dev of trade openness in oil 
countries)=0.371 unit or 0.27%=(0.008*100)/(4.071)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries). 
372The independent coefficient of trade openness+ the coefficient of the joint effect between government 
size and trade openness*(2.684)(mean percentage of government size in non-oil countries)= -0.014. The 
coefficient of trade openness in the joint effect (-0.014)*(49.311)(St. dev of trade openness in non-oil 
countries)=0.718 unit Or 0.37% =(0.014*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability  in  non- oil 
countries). 
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environment through enlarging government size. The interaction effect of government 
size on the level of political instability in democratic countries at mean percentage of 
trade openness 77.364% is 0.059373. One standard deviation increase in government size 
at mean percentage of trade openness increases the risk of political instability in 
democratic countries by 0.019 units or 2% of one standard deviation of political 
instability374 . In contrast, one standard deviation enlargement of government size in 
autocratic countries lowers instability by 2.402 units or 126% of one standard deviation 
of political instability375. The interaction effect of trade openness on the level of political 
instability in democratic countries at mean percentage of government size 2.804% is 
0.035376 . One standard deviation increase in trade openness at mean percentage of 
government size increases the risk of political instability in democratic countries by 
1.951 units or 1% of one standard deviation of political instability377. The interaction 
effect of trade openness on the level of political instability in autocratic countries at 
mean percentage of government size 2.615% is -0.208 378 . One standard deviation 
increase in trade openness at mean percentage of government size lowers the risk of 
political instability in autocratic countries by 8 units or 5% of one standard deviation of 
political instability379.  
The results of the joint effect indicate that enlargement of government size and a 
high level of trade openness has a negative effect on political environment in 
democratic countries although the effect is negligent. It might be that this negligent 
                                                 
373 The independent effect of government size + its interaction with democracy dummy=-1.057) + (the 
coefficient of joint effect between government size and trade openness + its coefficient in interaction term 
with democracy dummy = (0.014)*(77)(mean percentage of trade openness in democrat ic countries)= 
0.059.  
374 The coefficient of government size in the joint effect (0.059)(0.334)(St. dev of government size in 
democratic countries)=0.019 unit  or 2%=(0.059*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of polit ical instability in  democratic 
countries). 
375The independent effect of government size + [(the coeffic ient of the jo int effect between government 
size and trade openness*(70.398)(mean percentage of trade openness in autocratic countries)]=-5.496. 
The coefficient of government size in  the jo int effect  ( -5.496)*(0.437)(St. dev of government size in  
autocratic countries)=2.402 unit or 126%=(-5.496*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of political instability in  
autocratic countries). 
376 The independent effect of trade openness + its interaction with democracy dummy=-0.005)+ (the 
coefficient of joint effect between government size and trade openness + its coefficient in interaction term 
with democracy dummy = 0.014)*(2.804)(mean percentage of government size in democrat ic countries)= 
0.035.  
377 The coefficient of trade openness in the jo int effect (0.035)*(55.582)(St. dev of trade openness in 
democratic countries)=1.951 units or 1%=(0.035*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of polit ical instability in  
democratic countries). 
378  The independent coefficient of trade openness  + [(the coefficient of joint effect between trade 
openness and government size*(2.615)(mean percentage of government size in  autocratic countries)]= -
0.208. 
379  The coefficient of trade openness in the joint effect (0.208)*(38.34)(St. dev of trade openness in 
autocratic countries)=8 unit  or 5% =(0.208*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of political instability in autocratic  
countries). 
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effect contributes to the difference in adherence to democratic practices across these 
countries in addition to external risk brought by a high level of integration with 
international markets. This research uses dummy variables to group countries into 
democratic and autocratic countries based on the Freedom House data set; however, 
there is variation in the level of democracy across democratic countries according to 
their score in the Polity IV project. For example, several countries classified as 
democratic by the Freedom House data set have an average score in the Polity IV 
project over the sample period that falls far below the average in democratic 
countries 380 . Hence, adherence to democratic practices influences the relationship 
between the joint effect and political instability. In an immature democracy it is 
expected that trade openness breeds corruption; consequently, its economic benefits are 
not equally distributed across the population. Tavares (2005) and Amundsen (1999) find 
that economic reform leads to a high level of corruption when economic opportunities 
increase but accountability measures continue to be underdeveloped. Alternatively, a 
high level of trade openness brings both disadvantages and advantages. It might be that 
a high level of integration with international markets raises difficulties for governments 
to control macroeconomic environment such as aggregate demand and inflation rate as 
indicated by Cameron (1978). In such conditions, a government enlarges its size by 
creating employment opportunities; however, it may be that it cannot increase the wage 
level to match the level of the inflation rate. This deteriorates public employees’ living 
standards and may spark anger against the government. 
Model 30 examines the impact of the joint effect between government size and 
trade openness on the level of instability in the MENA region. The independent effect 
of government size has a negative sign and it is more important in stabilizing political 
environment in the MENA than non-MENA region. The independent effect of trade 
openness enhances political instability; however, it exposes lower political risk in the 
MENA region as the interaction coefficient between the MENA region and trade 
openness has a positive sign although it is not significant. The joint effect of trade 
openness and government size has a negative coefficient but is not significant, 
suggesting that small government size enhances the adverse impact of trade openness 
on political environment. However, it turns into a positive impact in the MENA region 
as the interaction effect between the MENA region and the joint effect has a positive 
sign and is significant at the 5% level. In other words, MENA countries reduce the 
                                                 
380 The average score of democracy in these countries in Polity IV project is 18; while some countries that 
are classified as democratic in the Freedom House data set receive a score less than 18.  
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adverse impact of low levels of trade openness on political environment through 
enlarging government size. The interaction effect of government size on instability in  
the MENA region at mean percentage of trade openness 82% is 5.147 381. Expansion of 
government size by one standard deviation at mean percentage of trade openness 
enhances instability by 1.695 units or 118% of one standard deviation of political 
instability382. In the non-MENA region, reducing government size at mean percentage of 
trade openness enhances instability by 0.385 units or 24% of one standard deviation of 
instability383. The interaction effect of trade openness on instability in the MENA region 
at mean percentage of government size 2.858% is 0.255. Each one standard deviation 
increase in trade openness at mean percentage of government size enhances instability 
by 9.115 units or 6% of one standard deviation of instability in the region384, whereas 
one standard deviation decrease in trade openness enhances instability in non-MENA by 
0.714 units or 0.39% of one standard deviation of instability385.  
The interaction effect of government size and trade openness in MENA suggests 
that enlargement of government size in response to a low level of trade openness has 
some negative effects. It might be that its size enlarges in terms of employment; 
however, the wage level does not similarly grow. Similarly, it might be that the level of 
trade openness is high; however, it is dominated by import rather than export in the 
region, which exposes the public to inflation rates in international markets. Its high rate 
amidst a fixed wage level deteriorates the living standards of public employee. For 
example, some countries in the region such as Egypt, Yemen, Morocco and Tunisia in 
2008 experienced some forms of riots caused by a high inflation rate that had a negative 
effect on some people’s ability to satisfy their basic living requirements. Its rate 
                                                 
381 The independent effect of government size + its interaction with MENA dummy=-1.960)+ (the 
coefficient of jo int effect  between government size and t rade openness+ its coefficient in  interaction term 
with MENA dummy =(0.086)*(82)(mean percentage of trade openness in MENA countries)= 5.147.   
382 The coefficient of government size in  the joint effect  (5.147)*(0.329)(St. dev  of government size in 
MENA)=1.691 unit or 118%= (5.147*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political instability in MENA). 
383 The independent effect of government size + [(the coefficient of the joint effect between government 
size and trade openness*(72)(mean percentage of trade openness in non-MENA countries)]=-0.932. The 
coefficient of government size in the jo int effect (-0.932)*(0.412)(St. dev of government size in non-
MENA countries)=0.385 unit or 24%=(-0.932*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non MENA  
countries). 
384The independent effect of trade openness + its interaction with MENA dummy=0.007) + (coefficient of 
joint effect between government size and trade openness+ its coefficient in interaction term with MENA  
dummy =(0.086)*(2.858)(mean percentage of government size in MENA countries)=0.255 .The 
coefficient of trade openness in the joint effect (0.255)*(35)(St. dev of trade openness in MENA)=9 unit  
or 6%= (0.255*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political instability in MENA). 
385The independent effect of trade openness + (coefficient of joint effect between government size and 
trade openness (-0.0039)*(2.666)(mean percentage of government size  in non-MENA countries)=-0.015 
.The coefficient of trade openness in the joint effect  (-0.015)*(46.5)(St. dev of trade openness in non-
MENA)=0.714 unit or .37%= (0.015*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-MENA). 
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contributes to political instability especially in low and middle- income economies 
where a sizeable portion of household incomes goes to food expenditure (Ansani and 
Daniele, 2012). Control variables retain their sign and significance except rents from 
natural resources that turns into an insignificant positive sign. 
Table 4.6 The Joint Effect between Government Size and Trade Openness on the 
Level of Political Instability over the Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables 
 
Dependent variable: Political instability  
Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 
Government Size -1.715*** 
(0.522) 
-0.544 
(0.594) 
-1.009 
(1.748) 
-1.479*** 
(0.525) 
-0.094 
(0.931) 
-0.650 
(0.556) 
TO -0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
-0.015 
(0.015) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
TO*Government size -0.002 
(0.008) 
0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.046* 
(0.025) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.076*** 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
Oil    -1.750*** 
(0.629) 
  
Oil*Government size    -0.469 
(1.924) 
  
Oil*TO    -0.012 
(0.020) 
  
Oil*TO*Government 
size 
   0.006 
(0.065) 
  
DD     -1.802*** 
(0.320) 
 
DD*Government size     -0.963 
(1.003) 
 
DD*TO     0.002 
(0.009) 
 
DD*TO*Government 
size 
    0.091*** 
(0.013) 
 
MENA      -6.139***   
(1.172) 
MENA*Government 
size 
     -1.310 
(2.225) 
MENA*TO      0.012 
(0.016) 
MENA*TO*Governme
nt size 
     0.090** 
(0.043) 
Constant 5.406***    
(1.715) 
4.431** 
(1.876) 
8.597 
(6.359) 
5.898*** 
(1.753) 
4.266*** 
(1.215) 
7.492*** 
(1.868) 
Adjusted R square 22% 25% 35% 21% 32% 32% 
Number of observation 580 484 96 583 589 580 
Estimation method 2SLS 
Countries  YB<= 30% YB>30%    
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity 
test of one year lag of 
GDP growth as 
instrument of GDP 
growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. All 
models include all control variables  included in models in Table 4-2 (results are not reported). For space restriction only the results of variables of 
interest are reported.  
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4.10.5 The Impact of the Joint Effect between Government Size and Urban 
Growth Rate on the Level of Political Instability 
 Models 31 to 36 in Table 4.7 examine the impact of the joint effect between 
government size and urban growth rate on political instability under different 
conditions. 
 Model 31 examines the impact of the joint effect on instability in panel data. The 
independent effect of government size has the expected negative sign. The independent 
effect of urban growth rate has a positive sign and is significant at the 10% level. This 
suggests that a rapid urban growth rate enhances political instability. The joint effect 
between the two variables has a positive sign and significant coefficient at the 1% level; 
suggesting that the interaction effect of urban growth rate is more important than 
government size to destabilize the political environment. The interaction effect of 
government size on instability at mean urban growth rate 3.218% is -0.458. Reducing 
government size by one standard deviation at mean urban growth rate enhances 
instability by 0.187 units or 12% of one standard deviation of instability 386 . The 
interaction effect of urban growth rate on instability at mean percentage of government 
size 2.687% is 1.098. Each one standard deviation increase in urban growth rate at mean 
percentage of government size enhances instability by 3 units or 27% of one standard 
deviation of instability387. Control variables retain their sign and significance. 
 Models 32 and 33 examine the impact of the joint effect on instability in 
countries where the percentage of youth bulge is less than or equal to 30% and in 
countries where their percentage is more than 30% respectively. The joint effect in both 
groups has a positive sign; however, it exposes higher political risk in countries where 
their percentage is less than or equal to 30%. In other word, the interaction effect of 
urban growth rate is more important than government size to destab ilize the political 
environment and the effect is higher in latter group of countries. In countries where 
youth bulge makes up less than or equal to 30% of population, expansion of government 
size by a standard deviation at mean urban growth rate 3% enhances instability by 0.349 
                                                 
386The independent effect of government size + [(the coefficient of the jo int effect between government 
size and urban growth rate*(3.218)(mean percentage of urban growth rate)]=-0.458. The coefficient of 
government size in the jo int effect (-0.458)*(0.409)(St. dev of a government size)=0.187 unit or 12%=(-
0.458*100)/(4.030)(St. dev of political instability).  
387 The independent effect of urban growth rate + [(the coefficient of the joint effect between government 
size and urban growth rate*(2.678)(mean percentage of government size)]=1.098. The coefficient of 
urban growth in the joint effect (1.098)*(2.707)(St. dev of a urban growth rate)=2.971 unit or 
27%=(1.098*100)/(4.030)(St. dev of political instability). 
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units or 33% of one standard deviation of instability 388, while in countries where their 
percentage is more than 30%, one standard deviation enlargement of government size 
lowers instability by 1.138 units or 57% of one standard deviation of instability389. The 
interaction effect of urban growth rate on instability at mean percentage of government 
size in countries where their percentage is less than or equal to 30% is 1.256. Each one 
standard deviation increase in urban growth rate at mean percentage of government size 
2.789% enhances instability by 3.325 units or 41% of one standard deviation of 
instability 390 in comparison with 0.756 units or 6% in countries where their percentage 
is more than 30% 391 . Rapid urban growth rate produces different needs and 
requirements. It might be that governments in countries where their percentage is less 
than or equal 30% satisfy some of these needs but leave many unsatisfied. Hence, a 
slow or limited ability to meet these needs and requirements because of financial 
pressures and intense public pressure leads to instability. For example, a failure of 
government to meet basic needs like housing drives prices up. This comes at the 
expense of other basic needs of households.   
 Model 34 examines the impact of the joint effect on instability in oil countries. 
Large governments enhance political stability; however, it has a higher stabilization 
effect in oil than non-oil countries. The independent effect of urban growth rate 
enhances political instability; however, it exposes lower political risk in oil countries, as 
the interaction coefficient between oil and urban growth rate is negative and significant 
at the 5% level. The joint effect between urban growth rate and government size has a 
positive sign and significant coefficient at the 1% level; however, it turns into a negative 
impact in oil countries as the interaction term between the joint effect and oil dummy 
has a negative sign and significant coefficient at the 5% level. In other words, in non-oil 
countries the interaction effect of urban growth rate is more important than government 
                                                 
388 The independent coefficient of government size in Model 32 + [(the coefficient of the jo int effect 
*(3)(mean of urban growth rate in countries where the percentage of youth bulge less than 30%)]=1.020. 
The coefficient of government size in the joint effect (1.020)*(0.342)(St. dev of government size in these 
countries)=0.349 unit or 33%= (1.060*100)/(3.077)(St. dev of political instability). 
389 The independent coefficient of government size in Model 33 + [(the coefficient of the jo int effect 
*(3.343)(mean  of u rban growth rate in countries where the percentage of youth bulge more than 30%)]= -
2.514. The coefficient of government size in the joint effect (-2.514)*(0.451)(St .dev of government size 
in these countries)=1.134 unit or 57%= (2.514*100)/(4.388)(St. dev of political instability). 
390 The independent coefficient of urban growth rate in Model 32 + [(the coefficient of the joint effect 
*(2.789)(mean percentage of government size in countries where the percentage of youth bulge less than 
30%)]=1.256. The coefficient of urban growth rate in the joint effect (1.256)*(2.647)(St. dev of a urban 
growth rate in these countries)=3.325 unit or 41%= (1.256*100)/(3.077)(St. dev of political instability). 
391 The independent coefficient of urban growth rate in Model 33 + [(the coefficient of the joint effect 
*(2.588)(mean percentage of government size in countries  where the percentage of youth bulge more than 
30%)]=0.268. The coefficient of urban growth rate in the joint effect (0.268)*(2.821)(St. dev of urban 
growth rate in these countries)=0.756 unit or 6%= (0.268*100)/(4.388)(St. dev of political instability). 
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size to destabilize the political environment; while, in oil countries it is vice versa. The 
impact of enlargement of government size at mean urban growth rate enhances political 
stability more substantially in oil than non-oil countries. In oil countries the interaction 
effect of government size on instability at mean urban growth rate 3.5% is -15. 
Enlargement of government size by one standard deviation at mean urban growth rate 
lowers instability by 6 units or 369% of one standard deviation of instability 392  in 
comparison with 0.060 units or 4% of one standard deviation of political instability in 
non-oil countries393. Enlargement of government size in oil countries turns the impact of 
urban growth rate on political instability into a negative. The interaction effect of urban 
growth rate on instability in oil countries at mean percentage of government size 
2.715% is -9.75. Reduction in urban growth rate by one standard deviation at mean 
percentage of government size enhances instability by 22 units or 238% of one standard 
deviation of instability394; in contrast, one standard deviation increase in urban growth 
rate at mean percentage of government size enhances instability in non-oil countries by 
3.193 units or 29% of one standard deviation of instability395.  
 Enlargement of government size to meet rapid urban growth rate is more 
rewarded with stability in oil than non-oil countries. In oil countries enlargement of 
government size eliminates one prospective risk in their territories initiated from a low 
urban growth rate. Its low rate might be associated with high political instability 
because oil fields and expensive equipment are located in remote areas so that they 
become targets of rebellion and law breakers according to rent seeking theory (Smith, 
2004). Enlargement of government size reduces the risk of low urban growth by 
                                                 
392 The independent effect of government size + its interaction with oil dummy=-3.451) + (the coefficient 
of jo int effect between government size and urban growth rate + its coefficient in interaction term with oil 
dummy = (-3.316)*(3.5)(mean urban growth rate in o il countries)=-15. The coefficient of a government 
size in the joint effect (-15)*(0.396)(St. dev of a government size in  oil countries)=6 unit  or 
369%=(15*100)/(4.071)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries). 
393 The independent effect of government size + the coefficient of jo int effect of government size and 
urban growth rate (0.407)*(3.082)(mean urban growth rate in non-oil countries)=-0.147. The coefficient 
of government size in the jo int effect (0.147)*(0.408)(St . dev of government size  in non-oil 
countries)=0.060 unit or 4%=(0.147*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in non -oil countries). 
394The independent effect of urban growth rate + its interaction with oil dummy=-0.712) + (the coefficient 
of jo int effect between government size and urban growth rate + its coefficient in interaction term with oil 
dummy = (-3.316)*(2.714)(mean  percentage of a government size in oil countries)= -9.717. The 
coefficient of urban growth rate in the joint effect (-9.717)*(2.169)(St. dev of urban growth rate in oil 
countries)=22 unit or 238%=(9.717*100)/(4.071)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries). 
395  The independent coefficient of urban growth rate + the coefficient of the joint effect between 
government size and urban growth rate*(2.684)(mean percentage of a government s ize in non-oil 
countries)=1.15. The coefficient of urban growth rate in the joint effect (1.15)*(2.774)(St. dev of urban 
growth in non-oil countries)=3.139 unit or 29% =(1.15*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability in  
non- oil countries). 
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motivating people who live in these areas to move to urban areas to seek better 
livelihoods, which in turn reduces the risk of instability. In non-oil countries a small 
government enhances the adverse impact of urban growth rate on political environment. 
Governments in these countries might satisfy the need for services associated with 
urban growth rate by hiring human resources; however, they do not have sufficient 
financial resources to satisfy infrastructure needs. Under such conditions, people living 
in a small geographic area without access to many public goods and services might 
organize collective action against a government. Huntington (1968) argues that the 
imbalance in growth rate of socioeconomic and political environment leads to 
instability.  
 Model 35 examines the impact of the joint effect on instability in democratic 
countries. The independent effect of enlargement of government size enhances stability; 
however, it is more rewarded in autocratic than democratic countries. The independent 
effect of urban growth rate has a negative sign and is significant at the 5% level; 
however, it turns into a positive impact in democratic countries as the interaction term 
between democracy and urban growth rate has a positive sign and significant coefficient 
at the 1% level. The joint effect has a positive sign but is not significant. Additionally, it 
constitutes higher risk in democratic than autocratic countries as the interaction term 
between democracy and the joint effect has a positive sign but not significant. The 
results suggest that the interaction effect of urban growth rate is more important than 
government size to destabilize the political environment and the effect is higher in 
democratic than autocratic countries. The interaction effect of government size on 
instability in democratic countries at mean urban growth rate 2.971% is 0.322. 
Expansion of government size by one standard deviation at mean urban growth rate 
enhances instability by 0.107 units or 11% of one standard deviation of instability396; 
whilst in autocratic countries, enlargement of government size by one standard 
deviation at mean urban growth rate lowers instability by 0.741 units or 39% of one 
standard deviation of instability 397 . The interaction effect of urban growth rate on 
                                                 
396 The independent effect of government size + its interaction with democracy dummy=-0.854) + (the 
coefficient of jo int effect between government size and urban growth rate + its coefficient in interaction 
term with democracy dummy = (0.396)*(2.971)(mean of urban growth rate in democratic 
countries)=0.322. The coefficient of government size in the jo int effect (0.322 )(0.334)(St. dev of 
government size in democratic countries)=0.107 unit  or 11%=(0.322*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of political 
instability in democratic countries). 
397  The independent effect of government size (-1.870) + (the coefficient of jo int effect  between a 
government size and urban growth rate (0.056)*(3.2)(mean of urban growth rate in autocratic countries) 
countries)=-1.690. The coefficient of government size in the joint  effect  ( -1.690)(0.437)(St. dev of 
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instability in democratic countries at mean size of government 2.804 is 1.197. Each one 
standard deviation increase in urban growth rate at mean government size enhances 
instability by 2.920 units or 41% of one standard deviation of instability 398  in 
comparison with 0.009 units or 0.08% of one standard deviation of instability in 
autocratic countries399.  
 Small government size enhances the adverse impact of urban growth rate on 
political environment in democratic and autocratic countries; however, the interaction 
effect of urban growth rate is higher in democratic than autocratic countries. In 
democratic countries enlargement of government size (in some instances) aims to 
address income inequality and ethnic fractionalization, as mentioned earlier. Therefore, 
when paid taxes are allocated to serve other non-productive areas at the expense of 
quantity and quality of public goods and services, it may spark public anger against a 
government. In autocratic countries, while one cannot rule out that enlargement of 
government aims to respond to urban growth needs, it might also be used to hire 
security forces 400 . Therefore, public dissatisfaction is addressed by force so that the 
interaction effect of urban growth rate is negligent. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that 
a high level of urbanization reduces the risk of political instability. Low population 
density and urbanization inhibits government ability to deal with political instability,  
especially in countries with a low level of economic development.  
 Model 36 examines the impact of the joint effect on instability in the MENA 
region. The independent effect of government size enhances instability; however, it 
exposes lower risk in MENA than non-MENA countries. The independent effect of 
urban growth rate enhances political instability, yet it exposes higher risk in the MENA 
than non-MENA region. The joint effect has a positive and significant coefficient  
suggesting that urban growth rate dominated the interaction effect; while, it is vice versa 
                                                                                                                                               
government size in autocratic countries)=0.741 unit or 39%=(-1.690*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of political 
instability in autocratic countries). 
 
398 The independent effect of urban growth + its interaction with democracy dummy=0.086)+ (the 
coefficient of jo int effect between government size and urban growth rate + its coefficient in interaction 
term with democracy dummy =(0.396)*(2.804)(mean percentage of government size in democratic 
countries)=1.197. The coefficient of urban growth rate in the joint effect (1.197)*(2.438 )(St. dev of urban 
growth rate in democrat ic countries)=2.920 unit or 41%=(1.197*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of political 
instability in democratic countries). 
399The independent coefficient of urban growth rate + [(the coefficient of jo int effect between urban 
growth and government size*(2.615)(mean percentage of government size in autocratic 
countries)]=0.003. The coefficient of urban growth rate in the joint effect (0.003)*(2.749)(St. dev of 
urban growth rate in autocratic countries)=0.009 unit or 0.08% =(0.003*100)/(4.349)(St. dev of political 
instability in autocratic countries). 
400 Proxy used to measure government size includes salaries of military forces. 
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in MENA region as the interaction effect between MENA and joint effect is negative 
although not significant. The interaction effect of government size on instability in the 
MENA region at mean urban growth rate 3.846% is -0.644. Enlargement of government 
size by one standard deviation lowers instability by 0.212 units or 15% of one standard 
deviation of instability401; while in the non-MENA region, expansion of government 
size at mean urban growth rate enhances instability by 0.256 units or 16% of one 
standard deviation of instability 402 . The interaction effect of urban growth rate on 
instability in the MENA region at mean size of government 2.858 is -0.480. Each one 
standard deviation decrease in urban growth rate at mean size of government enhances 
instability in the region by 1.117 units or 11% of one standard deviation of instability403; 
while in non-MENA region, one standard deviation increase in urban growth rate 
enhances instability by 4 units or 32% of one standard deviation of instability404. 
 Government in the MENA region dominates the economic environment and 
labour market as mentioned earlier. Under such conditions, concentration of a high 
percentage of the population in a small geographic area is more feasible from both 
economic and security perspectives in order to stabilize the political environment. 
Economically, governments become more efficient in providing public goods and 
services to people residing in a small geographic area than a population spread over a 
large area. From a security perspective, governments can also easily enforce stability on 
public live in small geographic area.  
  
                                                 
401  The independent effect of government size + its interaction with MENA dummy=0.211)+ (the 
coefficient of jo int effect between government size and urban growth rate + its coefficient in interaction 
term with  MENA  dummy =(-0.222)*(3.846)(mean urban growth rate  in  MENA countries)=-0.644. The 
coefficient of government size in the joint effect  (0.644)*(0.329)(St. dev of government size in  
MENA)=0.212 unit or 15%= (0.644*100)/(4.366)(St . dev of political instability in MENA). 
402The independent effect of government size + [(the coefficient of the jo int effect between government 
size and urban growth rate*(3.100)(mean urban growth rate in non-MENA countries)]=0.621. The 
coefficient of government size in the jo int effect  (0.621)*(0.412)(St. dev of government size in non-
MENA countries)=0.256 un it Or 16%=(0.621*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of polit ical instability in non MENA  
countries). 
403  The independent effect of urban growth rate + its interaction with MENA dummy=0.153) + 
(coefficient of joint effect between government size and urban growth rate + its coefficient in interaction 
term with  MENA  dummy =(-0.222)*(2.858)(mean percentage of government size  in  MENA countries)=-
0.482 .The coefficient of urban growth rate in the joint effect  (-0.482)*(2.313)(St. dev of urban growth 
rate in MENA)=1.117 unit or 11%= (0.482*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political instability in MENA). 
404 The independent effect of urban growth + (coefficient of joint effect between government size and 
urban growth rate *(2.666)(mean percentage of government size in non-MENA countries)=1.279. The 
coefficient of urban growth rate in the jo int effect (1.279)*(3.100)(St. dev of urban growth rate  in non-
MENA)=4 unit or 32%= (1.279*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-MENA). 
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Table 4.7 The Joint Effect between Government Size and Urban Growth Rate on 
the Level of Political Instability over the Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables 
 
Dependent variable: Political instability  
 
Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 
Government Size -1.689*** 
(0.496) 
-0.310 
(0.511) 
-2.782**   
(1.406) 
-1.404*** 
(0.501) 
-1.870** 
(0.896) 
-0.797 
(0.556) 
UGR 0.070* 
(0.040) 
0.022 
(0.038) 
0.061 
(0.149) 
0.057 
(0.041) 
-0.139** 
(0.070) 
0.059 
(0.039) 
UGR*Government size 0.382*** 
(0.123) 
0.442*** 
(0.108) 
0.079 
(0.393) 
0.407*** 
(0.125) 
0.054 
(0.247) 
0.457*** 
(0.113) 
Oil    -2.029***   
(0.684) 
  
Oil*Government size    -2.047 
(1.389) 
  
Oil*UGR    -0.769** 
(0.336) 
  
Oil*URG*Government 
size 
   -3.724** 
(1.463) 
  
DD     -1.913***   
(0.336) 
 
DD*Government size     1.016 
(0.981) 
 
DD*UGR     0.225*** 
(0.082) 
 
DD*UGR*Government 
size 
    0.341 
(0.278) 
 
MENA      -5.046***   
(1.268) 
MENA*Government size      1.008 
(2.570) 
MENA*UGR      0.093 
(0.246) 
MENA*UGR*Government 
size 
     -0.680 
(1.487) 
Constant 6.193*** 
(1.700) 
4.516** 
(1.788) 
11.283* 
(6.536) 
6.588***   
(1.629) 
5.278***   
(1.247) 
8.043***   
(1.719) 
Adjusted R square 24% 29% 30% 26% 31% 33% 
Number of observation 580 484 96 583 589 580 
Estimation method 2SLS 
Countries  YB<=30% YB>30    
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of 
one year lag of GDP 
growth as instrument of 
GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. All 
models include all control variables  included in models in Table 4-2 (results are not reported). For space restriction only the results of variables of 
interest are reported. 
4.11 Empirical Results: The Joint Effect between Government Role and 
Unemployment Rate on Political Instability 
Models 37 to 40 in Table 4.8 examine the impact of the joint effect between 
government role and youth unemployment on political instability.  
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 Mode 37 examines the impact of the joint effect between government role and 
youth unemployment on instability in panel data. The independent effect of the role of 
government has a negative sign and significant coefficient at the 5% level; suggest ing 
that expansion in government role by increasing expenditure on education has a 
stabilization effect on political environment. The independent effect of youth 
unemployment has a positive and significant sign at the 1% level; i.e. the higher youth 
unemployment the greater the risk of political instability. The joint effect between the 
two variables has a positive sign but is insignificant; suggesting that the interaction 
effect of youth unemployment is more important than government role to destabilize the 
political environment. The interaction effect of government role on political instability 
at mean rate of unemployment 2.727 is -2.616. Decreasing the role of government by 
one standard deviation at mean rate of unemployment enhances instability by 0.318 
units or 65% of one standard deviation of instability 405 . The interaction effect of 
unemployment at mean percentage of government role 0.005% is 0.851. Each one 
standard deviation increase in unemployment rate at mean percentage of government 
role enhances instability by 0.547 units or 21% of one standard deviation of 
instability406.  
The interaction effect of unemployment dominates the impact of the joint effect 
on political instability. Some governments expand educational opportunities when they 
fail to create employment opportunities. This policy option succeeds in reducing the 
political risk of some segments of the population like youth bulge; however, it increases 
their political risk over the long run. This is because these opportunities will produce 
educated people who cannot be absorbed by the size of economy or its growth rate as 
per Huntington (1968). These will add to an already high unemployment rate that leads 
to instability. Control variables have a significant sign. The model is not re-estimated 
for countries where the percentage of youth bulge is less than or equal to 30% and for 
countries where their percentage is more than 30% because there is an insufficient 
number of observations in education expenditure for the former group of countries.  
                                                 
405The independent effect of the ro le of government + [(the coefficient of the joint effect between the role 
of government and youth unemployment*(2.727)(mean rate of unemployment)]=-2.606. The coefficient 
of the role of government in the joint effect (2.616)*(0.122)(St. dev of the role of government)=0.318 unit  
or 65%=(2.606*100)/(4.030)(St . dev of political instability). 
406The independent effect of youth unemployment + [(the coefficient of the joint effect between the role 
of government and youth unemployment*(0.005)(mean  percentage of government ro le)]=0.851. The 
coefficient of unemployment in  the jo int effect (0.851)*(0.642)(St. dev unemployment)=0.547 un it or 
21%=(0.851*100)/(4.030)(St. dev of political instability). 
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Model 38 examines the impact of the joint effect between education expenditure 
and total youth unemployment on political instability in oil countries. The independent 
effect of public education expenditure has a negative and significant coefficient, 
suggesting that the role of government in enhancing education lowers the level of 
political instability. However, the interaction term between oil and education 
expenditure is positive although not significant. In other words, the negative effect from 
education expenditure on political instability becomes positive in oil producing 
countries compared to non-oil countries. Furthermore, the effect of education is more 
effective in lowering political instability in non-oil countries than oil countries. On the 
other hand, the independent effect of youth unemployment enhances political 
instability; however, it exposes lower political risk in oil countries, as the interaction 
coefficient between oil and total youth unemployment is negative and significant at the 
1% level. Moreover, the joint effect between total youth unemployment and education 
expenditure has a significant negative impact in oil countries. In other words, the 
positive role of government with youth unemployment lowers the risk of political 
instability in oil countries. The results reveal that the interaction effect of government 
role is more important than unemployment to destabilize the political environment. The 
interaction effect of the role of government on instability in oil countries at mean rate of 
unemployment 2.729% is -64.64. Oil countries face a lower risk of political instability 
than non-oil countries by 9 units or 1588% of one standard deviation of political 
instability when a government role expands by one standard deviation at mean rate of 
unemployment407. Similarly, the interaction effect of unemployment at mean percentage 
of government role is less risky in oil than non-oil countries. Its political risk is lower in 
oil than non-oil countries by 1.129 units or 47% of one standard deviation of instability 
when its rate increases by one standard deviation408.  
                                                 
407 The independent effect of the role of government + its interaction with oil dummy=1.585)+ (the 
coefficient of jo int effect between the role of government and unemployment + its coefficient in  
interaction term with  oil dummy = (-24.528)*(2.729)(mean rate of unemployment  in  oil countries)=-
64.64. The coefficient  of the role of government in  the joint effect (-64.64)*(0.132)(St. dev of the role of 
government in oil countries)= 9 unit or 1588%=(64.64*100)/(4.071)(St. dev of polit ical instability in oil 
countries). 
408 The independent effect of youth unemployment + its interaction with oil dummy=-1.859)+ (the 
coefficient of jo int effect between the role of government and unemployment + its coefficient in  
interaction term with oil dummy = (-24.528)*(0.0025)(mean percentage of the government role in oil 
countries)=-1.926. The coefficient of unemployment rate in the jo int effect (-1.926)*(0.586)(St. dev 
unemployment in  oil countries)= 1.125 unit o r 47%=(1.926*100)/(4.071)(St. dev of political instability in  
oil countries). 
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The variation in the impact of the joint effect on political instability between oil 
and non-oil countries suggests that oil countries successfully expand educational 
opportunities as an alternative option of employment to reduce the adverse impact of 
unemployment on political environment in line with rentier state theory. In non-oil 
countries, more investment on education amidst a high rate of youth unemployment 
enhances political instability. This positive relationship can be explained in that 
expanding education expenditure amidst unemployment constitutes an increase in taxes 
on the productive sector, which in turn reduces its ability to create employment. Hence, 
in these countries the policy option to reduce the political risk of unemployment 
requires using public resources to create favorable economic environments to absorb 
unemployment. 
Model 39 examines the impact of the joint effect on instability in democratic 
countries. The independent effect of government role has a negative sign, suggesting 
that investing in education breeds stability; however, its stabilization effect is more 
important in autocratic countries than democratic countries. The independent effect of 
youth unemployment exposes higher risk on political environments in democratic than 
autocratic countries. The joint effect of government role and youth unemployment has a 
negative sign although it is insignificant; however, it has a positive impact on 
democratic countries as the interaction term between democracy and the joint effect has 
a positive sign but is not significant. The results reveal that in democratic countries the 
interaction effect of youth unemployment is more important than government role to 
destabilize the political environment; while, it is vice versa in autocratic countries. In 
other words, democratic countries fail to expand government roles to lower the risk of 
unemployment on political environment, while the positive response from autocratic 
countries lowers such risk. The interaction effect of the role of government on 
instability in democratic countries at mean rate of unemployment 2.732% is 0.264. 
Democratic countries face higher risk of instability than autocratic countries by 0.027 
units or 9% of one standard deviation of instability 409 when the government role expands 
by a standard deviation at mean rate of unemployment. The interaction effect of 
unemployment at mean role of government is more risky in democratic than autocratic 
                                                 
409 The independent effect of the role of government + its interaction with democracy dummy= -3.103) + 
(the coefficient of joint effect between the ro le of government and unemployment + its coefficient in  
interaction term with democracy dummy = (1.232)*(2.732)(mean rate of unemployment in democratic 
countries)=0.264. The coefficient of the role of government in the joint effect (0.264)*(0.102)(St. dev of 
the role of government in  democratic countries)= 0.027 unit or 9%=(0.264*100)/(2.981)(St. dev of 
political instability in democratic countries). 
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countries. It is higher by 0.718 units or 42% of one standard deviation of instability 
when unemployment increases by a standard deviation at mean role of government410.  
In autocratic countries, investment in education reduces the risk of unemployed 
youth on political environment. Investing in education in autocratic countries stabilizes 
the political environment through stimulating economic development, which lays the 
foundation to move towards democracy in the future. Brown and Hunter (2004) point 
out that economic growth brought by education enhances government legitimacy in 
autocratic countries. Additionally, it assists a government’s effort to increase an 
individual’s opportunity cost. Increasing public resources additionally helps a 
government to outspend anti-government movements (Thyne, 2006). Economic wealth 
and civic skills resulting from education further lay the foundation to move towards 
democracy. This is because education clarifies rights, obligations and punishments 
associated with citizenship. It enhances co-operation between different segments of a 
society. It provides citizens with equal opportunities and it combines the different 
interests and objectives of different groups under common citizenship (Heyneman, 
2003). On the other hand, in democratic countries there is no shortage of qualified youth 
as the percentage of gross tertiary enrolment is high (around 40%) so that a government 
might consider re-allocation of expenditure on education to improve conditions in the 
labor market such as encouraging entrepreneurship by offering soft loans, business 
support or tax exemption. Control variables retain their sign and significance except 
economic growth and trade openness that turn into insignificant negative and 
insignificant positive sign, respectively. 
The importance of the joint effect on instability in the MENA region is 
investigated in Model 40. The independent effect of the role of government has a 
negative sign; however, its stabilization effect is substantially higher in the MENA 
region. This suggests that expenditure on education brings a high level of stability. The 
independent effect of youth unemployment enhances political instability; however, it 
exposes lower political risk in MENA countries, as the interaction coefficient between 
MENA and total youth unemployment is negative but insignificant. Moreover, the joint 
                                                 
410 The independent effect of unemployment + its interaction with democracy dummy=1.232) + (the 
coefficient of jo int effect between the role of government and unemployment + its coefficient in  
interaction term with democracy dummy=(1.232)*(0.006)(mean percentage of the role of government in  
democratic countries)=1.241. The coefficient of unemployment in the jo int effect  (1.241)*(0.578)(St. dev 
unemployment in democratic countries)=0.718 unit or 42%=(1.241*100)/(2.981)(St. dev of polit ical 
instability in democratic countries). 
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effect between the two variables has a negative impact on political instability in MENA 
countries. This suggests that the interaction effect of government role is more important 
than youth unemployment to destabilize the political environment. MENA countries 
face a lower risk of instability than non-MENA region by 1.098 units or 187% of a 
standard deviation of instability when the government role expands by a standard 
deviation at mean rate of youth unemployment411. Similarly, the interaction effect of 
unemployment constitutes a lower risk on political environment in the MENA region 
than non-MENA. Each one standard deviation increase in unemployment rate at mean 
percentage of the role of government enhances instability in the region by 0.470 units or 
20% of one standard deviation of instability412; in comparison with 0.582 units or 23% 
of one standard deviation of instability in non-MENA region413.  
In the MENA region countries can waive the risk of youth unemployment over 
the short run by expanding its role. This gives governments in the region a period of 
time in which to work on factors leading to a high unemployment rate such as 
corruption, a large public sector, and weak entrepreneurship as discussed earlier in this 
thesis. Failing to do so will increase the number of educated youth with an adverse 
impact on political environment. In general, control variables retain their sign and 
significance. 
  
                                                 
411The independent effect of the role of government + its interaction with MENA dummy=-7.072) + (the 
coefficient of jo int effect between the role of government and unemployment + its coefficient in  
interaction term with MENA dummy = (-0.348)*(3.073)(mean rate of unemployment in MENA 
countries)=-8.142. The coefficient of the ro le of government in  the joint effect ( -8.142)*(0.135)(St. dev of 
the role of government in MENA countries)= 1.098 unit or 187%=(-8.142*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of 
political instability in MENA countries). 
412 The independent effect of unemployment + its interaction  with MENA dummy=0.869) + (the 
coefficient of jo int effect between the role of government and unemployment + its coefficient in  
interaction term with MENA dummy=(-0.348)*(-0.005)(mean percentage of the role of government in  
MENA countries)=0.871. The coefficient of unemployment in the joint effect (0.871)*(0.539)(St. dev 
unemployment in MENA countries)=0.471 unit or 20%=(0.871*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political 
instability in MENA countries). 
413 The independent effect unemployment + the coefficient of jo int effect of the role of government and 
unemployment rate (1.273)*(0.006)(mean percentage of the role of government in non-MENA 
countries)=0.909. The coefficient of unemployment in the joint effect (0.909)*(0.64)(St. dev of 
unemployment in non-MENA countries)=0.582 unit or 23%=(0.909*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political 
instability in non-MENA countries). 
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Table 4.8 The Joint Effect between Government Role and Youth Unemployment 
on the Level of Political Instability over the Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Political instability  
Model 37 Model 38 Model 39 Model 40 
Education Expenditure -3.962** 
(1.825) 
-2.884** 
(1.449) 
-6.230* 
(3.478) 
-3.370** 
(1.729) 
TYU 0.849*** 
(0.191) 
0.899*** 
(0.188) 
-0.336 
(0.501) 
0.902*** 
(0.180) 
Education Expenditure*TYU 0.497 
(2.009) 
1.460 
(1.854) 
-3.609 
(4.364) 
1.273 
(1.870) 
Oil  -4.097*** 
(0.951) 
  
Oil*Education Expenditure  4.469 
(6.229) 
  
Oil*TYU  -2.759*** 
(0.874) 
  
Oil*TYU*Education 
Expenditure 
 -25.719*** 
(8.659) 
  
DD   -1.869*** 
(0.345) 
 
DD*Education Expenditure   3.126 
(3.661) 
 
DD*TYU   1.569*** 
(0.550) 
 
DD*TYU*Education 
Expenditure 
  4.842 
(4.780) 
 
MENA    -8.628*** 
(1.552) 
MENA*Education Expenditure    -3.701 
(4.388) 
MENA*TYU    -0.033 
(0.872) 
MENA*TYU*Education 
Expenditure 
   -1.621 
(9.691) 
Constant 4.246*** 
(1.603) 
7.466*** 
(1.934) 
3.885*** 
(0.958) 
8.043*** 
(2.057) 
Adjusted R square 26% 30% 34% 34% 
Number of observation 378 376 387 378 
Estimation method 2SLS 
P-value 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one 
year lag of GDP growth as 
instrument of GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. All 
models include all control variables included in  models in Table 4-2 (results are not reported). For space restriction only the results of variables of 
interest are reported. 
4.12 Empirical Results: The Joint Effect between Government Role and Urban 
Growth Rate on Political Instability 
Models 41 to 44 in Table 4.9 examine the impact of the joint effect between 
urban growth rate and the role of government on political instability under different 
circumstances.  
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Model 41 examines the impact of the joint effect between urban growth rate and 
government role on instability in panel data. The empirical results find the risk of 
political instability decreases by increasing the level of expenditure on education, as the 
independent effect of government role has a negative and significant coefficient. The 
independent effect of urban growth rate has a positive and significant coefficient, 
suggesting its rapid change enhances political instability. The joint effect between the 
two variables has a negative sign and significant coefficient at the 10% level. The 
results point out that the interaction effect of government role is more important than 
urban growth rate to destabilize the political environment. Put it differently, a 
government that successfully expands its role reduces the risk of political instability 
from the prospective channel of rapid urban growth rate that places pressure on 
educational institutions. The interaction effect of government role on instability at mean 
urban growth rate 3.218% is -7.142. The failure of government to carry out its role by a 
standard deviation at mean urban growth rate enhances instability by 0.873 units or 
177% of one standard deviation of political instability414. The interaction effect of urban 
growth rate on instability at mean percentage of government role 0.005% is 0.137. The 
upward change by a standard deviation in urban growth rate at mean percentage of the 
government role enhances instability by 0.371 units or 4% of one standard deviation of 
political instability415. 
 Expenditure in education has a direct and indirect stabilization effect on 
political environment. Directly, it reduces pressure on educational institutions resulting 
from rapid urban growth rate as suggested by modernization theory. It increases an 
individual’s opportunity cost to commit political instability incidences as stated by 
opportunity perspective (Taydas et al., 2010). Indirectly, it produces qualified human 
resources to meet new needs and requirements resulting from the level of economic 
development, such as health care, as stated by Wagner law (Lee, 1993). By doing so, a 
government shows the public, with their different needs and requirements, that it cares 
about their living standards and actively devotes financial resources to improve it 
                                                 
414  The independent effect of the role of government + the coefficient of jo int effect of the role of 
government and urban growth rate (-0.966)*(3.218)(mean urban growth rate)=-7.142. The coefficient of 
the role of government in the joint effect (-7.142)*(0.122)(St. dev of the role of government)=0.873 unit  
or 177%=(-7.142*100)/(4.030)(St. dev of political instability). 
415 The independent effect of urban growth rate + the coefficient of joint  effect  of the ro le of government 
and urban growth rate (-0.966)*(0.005)(mean percentage of the government role)=0.137. The coefficient 
of the urban growth rate in  the jo int effect (0.137)*(2.707)(St. dev of urban growth rate)=0.371 unit  or 
4%=(0.137*100)/(4.030)(St. dev of political instability). 
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(Taydas and Peksen, 2012). Control variables retain their sign and significance except 
economic growth and trade openness that turn into an insignificant negative and 
positive sign respectively.  
 Model 42 examines the impact of the joint effects on instability in oil countries. 
The independent effect of government role has a negative and significant coefficient 
suggesting that the role of government in enhancing education lowers the level of 
political instability; however, its impact is higher in oil countries. The independent 
effect of urban growth rate enhances political instability; however, its political risk is 
lower in oil countries as its interaction with oil dummy has a negative coefficient 
although it is insignificant. The joint effect between the two variables has a negative 
impact on political instability; however, its impact is substantially higher in oil 
countries. This suggests that the interaction effect of government role is more important 
than urban growth rate to destabilize the political environment and such effect is higher 
in oil than non-oil countries. The interaction effect of the role of government on 
political instability at mean rate of urban growth is higher in oil than non-oil countries. 
One standard deviation expansion in the role of government at mean urban growth rate 
enhances stability in oil countries by 5.678 units or 1047% of one standard deviation of 
political instability416 in comparison with 0.685 units or 147% of one standard deviation 
of instability in non-oil countries 417 . The interaction effect of urban growth rate on 
instability in oil countries at mean percentage of the role of government 0.003 is -1.102. 
Each one standard deviation decrease in urban growth rate at mean percentage of 
government role feeds instability in oil countries by 2.395 units or 27% of one standard 
deviation of instability418, while one standard deviation increase in urban growth rate at 
                                                 
416The independent effect of the role of government + its interaction with o il dummy=-9.017) + (the 
coefficient of jo int effect between the role of government and urban growth rate + its coefficient  in  
interaction term with o il dummy = (-9.637)*(3.491)(mean  of u rban growth rate in  oil countries)=-42.567. 
The coefficient of the role of government in the joint effect (-42.567)*(0.133)(St. dev of the role of 
government in o il countries)=5.678 unit  or 1047%=(42.567*100)/(4.071)(St. dev of political instability in  
oil countries).  
417 The independent effect of the role o f government + the coefficient of joint effect of the ro le of 
government and urban growth rate (-0.975)*(3.082)(mean urban growth rate in non-oil countries)=-5.855. 
The coefficient of the role of government in the jo int effect (-5.855)*(0.117)(St. dev of the role of 
government in  non-oil countries)=0.685 unit o r 147%=(5.855*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of political instability 
in non-oil countries). 
418 The independent effect of urban growth rate + its interaction with oil dummy=-1.077)+ (the coefficient 
of joint effect between the role of government and urban growth rate+ its coefficient in interaction term 
with o il dummy = (-9.737)*(0.003)(mean percentage of the government role in o il countries)=-1.104. The 
coefficient of urban growth rate in the joint effect ( -1.104)*(2.169)(St. dev of urban growth in oil 
countries)=2.395 unit or 27%=(1.104*100)/(4.071)(St. dev of political instability in oil countries).  
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mean percentage of the government role enhances instability in non-oil countries by 
0.445 units or 4% of one standard deviation of instability419.  
Oil countries can deescalate instability by making it attractive to the public who 
reside in remote areas to move to urbanized areas through increasing their expenditure 
on education. This eliminates the risk of political instability from lawbreakers and 
people seeking oil rents and expensive equipment located in remote areas, as suggested 
by rent seeking theory (Smith, 2004). Control variables retain their sign and 
significance.   
 Model 43 investigates the impact of the joint effect on instability in democratic 
countries. The independent effect of government role has a negative and significant 
coefficient at the 10% level, suggesting that the role of government in terms of investing 
in education decreases the level of political instability. However, it has a lower 
stabilization effect in democratic countries, as the interaction term between democracy 
and government role is positive although not significant. In other words, investing in 
education is more rewarded in autocratic than democratic countries. The independent 
effect of urban growth rate enhances political instability; however, it exposes higher 
political risk in democratic countries, as the interaction coefficient between democracy 
and urban growth is positive and significant at the 5% level. Moreover, the joint effect 
between urban growth rate and education expenditure has a negative impact on political 
instability and it is more important in democratic than autocratic countries as the 
interaction term between democracy and the joint effect has a positive sign but is not 
significant. The results reveal that that the interaction effect of education expenditure is 
more important than urban growth rate to destabilize the political environment and such 
effect is higher in democratic than autocratic countries. Increasing public expenditure 
on education in response to educational needs arising from urban growth rate lowers the 
risk of political instability. Increasing public expenditure on education by a standard 
deviation at mean urban growth rate decreases instability in democratic countries by 
0.666 units or 220% of one standard deviation of instability420 comparing to 1.203 units 
                                                 
419The independent effect of urban growth rate + the coefficient of joint effect of the role of government 
and urban growth rate  (-0.975)*(0.005)(mean  percentage of the government role in non-oil 
countries)=0.160. The coefficient of urban growth rate in the joint effect (0.160)*(2.774)(St. dev of urban 
growth rate in  non-oil countries)=0.445 unit or 4%=(0.16*100)/(3.985)(St. dev of polit ical instability in  
non-oil countries). 
420The independent effect of the role of government + its interaction with democracy dummy=-3.314) + 
(the coefficient of joint effect between the ro le of government and urban growth rate+ its coefficient in  
interaction term with democracy dummy = (-1.071)*(2.971)(mean of urban growth rate in democratic 
countries)=-6.497. The coefficient of the ro le of government in  the joint effect (-6.497)*(0.102)(St. dev of 
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or 201% in autocratic countries 421 . The interaction effect of urban growth rate on 
instability in democratic countries at mean percentage of the role of government 0.006% 
is 0.151. Instability enhances by 0.368 units or 5% of one standard deviation of political 
instability for each one standard deviation increase in urban growth rate 422; while each 
one standard deviation decrease in urban growth rate enhances instability by 0.178 units 
or 1.28% of one standard deviation of political instability in autocratic countries423.  
In autocratic countries enlargement of government role fails to mitigate the 
adverse impact of low urban growth rate on political environment. When countries do 
not have sufficient financial resources to enforce stability over their entire territory, 
investing in education concentrates the public in a small geographic area. This 
constitutes less financial resources being allocated to security forces so that more 
financial resources can be allocated to sectors to build stability. Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) point out that a more urbanized population in countries at a low level of 
development enhances stability. Descriptive analysis confirms the result in the case of 
Sri Lanka which experiences a higher risk of political instability (its average score over 
the sample period is 13 vs. 9 in autocratic countries), has a low level of expenditure in 
education (its average is 0.9% vs. 1.3% in autocratic countries) and a low urban growth 
rate (0.433% vs. 3.4% in autocratic countries). In democratic countries, while increasing 
education expenditure reduces the adverse impact of high urban growth rate on political 
environment, its impact still exists. It might be that in these countries a government 
successfully responds to one need arising from urban growth rate (which is education), 
however, it experiences difficulty in responding to other needs. This is because the 
needs and requirements produced by level of economic development (as stated by 
                                                                                                                                               
the role of government in democrat ic countries)=0.665 unit or 220%=(6.497*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of 
political instability in democratic countries).   
421 The independent effect of the role o f government + the coefficient of joint effect of the ro le of 
government and urban growth rate (-0.702)*(3.201)(mean urban growth rate in autocratic countries)=-
8.762. The coefficient  of the role of government in  the joint effect (-8.762)*(0.137)(St. dev of the role of 
government in autocratic countries)=1.203 unit o r 201%=(8.762*100)/ (4.349)(St. dev of political 
instability in autocratic countries). 
422The independent effect of urban growth rate + its interaction with democracy dummy=0.158) + (the 
coefficient of jo int effect between the role of government and urban growth rate+ its coefficient in  
interaction term with democracy dummy = (-1.071)*(0.006)(mean percentage of government role in  
democratic countries)=0.151. The coefficient of urban growth rate in the joint effect (0.151)*(2.438)(St. 
dev of urban growth rate in  democratic countries)= 0.368 unit or 5%=(0 .151*100)/(2.948)(St. dev of 
political instability in democratic countries).   
423 The independent effect of urban growth rate + the coefficient of joint  effect  of the ro le of government 
and urban growth rate (-0.702)*(0.004)(mean percentage of government role in autocratic countries)=-
.055. The coefficient of u rban growth rate in the jo int effect (-0.055)*(3.201)(St. dev of urban growth rate  
in autocratic countries)=0.178 unit or 1.28%=(0.055*100)/ (4.349)(St. dev of polit ical instability in  
autocratic countries). 
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Wagner law) represents needs of different segments of society (Lee, 1993). The failure 
of government to satisfy needs of the majority in democratic countries leads to 
instability (Fjelde and Hegre, 2014). Control variables retain their sign and significance.   
Model 44 examines the impact of the joint effect on instability in the MENA 
region. The independent effect of government role has a negative and significant 
coefficient at the 10% level, suggesting that the role of government in enhancing 
education lowers the level of political instability. It is more important in stabilizing the 
political environment in the MENA region than non-MENA region. Similarly, urban 
growth rate is positively associated with instability and its impact is substantially higher 
in the MENA than non-MENA region. The joint effect between urban growth rate and 
education expenditure has a negative sign and significant coefficient at the 10% level; 
however, it has a positive impact in MENA as the interaction term between MENA and 
the joint effect has a positive sign and significant coefficient at the 5% level. In other 
words, in MENA region the interaction effect of urban growth rate is more important 
than government role to destabilize the political environment; while, it is vice versa in 
non-MENA region. The interaction effect of government role at mean urban growth rate 
exposes a higher risk on political environment in the MENA than non-MENA region. 
Expansion of government role at mean urban growth rate enhances instability in the 
MENA region by 3.313 units or 563% of one standard deviation of political 
instability424, while in non-MENA, instability increases by 0.755 units or 159% of one 
standard deviation of instability for each one standard deviation reduction in the role of 
government425. Similarly, the interaction effect of urban growth rate constitutes a higher 
risk on political environment in the MENA than non-MENA region. Urban growth rate 
increase by a standard deviation at mean percentage of government role enhances 
                                                 
424The independent effect of the role of government + its interaction with MENA dummy=-8.374) + (the 
coefficient of jo int effect between the role of government and urban growth rate+ its coefficient in  
interaction term with MENA dummy = (8.564)*(3.846)(mean of urban growth rate in MENA 
countries)=24.567. The coefficient of the role of government in the joint effect (24.567)*(0.135)(St. dev 
of the ro le of government in  MENA countries)=3.313 unit  or 563%=(24.567*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of 
political instability in MENA countries).    
425 The independent effect of the role o f government + the coefficient of joint effect of the ro le of 
government and urban growth rate (-0.975)*(3.1)(mean urban growth rate in non-MENA countries)=-
6.341. The coefficient  of the role  of government in  the joint effect (-6.341)*(0.119)(St. dev of the role of 
government in non-MENA countries)= 0.755 unit or 159%=(6.341*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political 
instability in non-MENA countries). 
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instability in the region by 2.333 units or 23% of a standard deviation of instability426 in 
comparison with 0.442 units or 4% in non-MENA region427.  
The positive joint effect in the MENA region might be because the growth rate 
in education expenditure falls behind urban growth rate. Descriptive statistics in MENA 
show that the average urban growth rate over the sample period is 4% while expenditure 
on education grows by 1.5%. Shambayati (1994) presents the impact of oil rents on 
socioeconomic and political environment in Iran prior to the 1979 revolution. Oil rents 
speed up the level of rural-urban migration with the hope that urban life would improve 
the migrants’ living standards; however, migrants are disappointed when their 
expectations are not met. This creates feelings of actual and relative deprivation among 
a wide segment of a society that set the stage for the Iranian revolution in 1979. Control 
variables retain their sign and significance.    
                                                 
426  The independent effect of urban growth rate + its interaction with MENA dummy=1.053) + (the 
coefficient of jo int effect between the role of government and urban growth rate + its coefficient  in  
interaction term with MENA dummy = (8.564)*(0.005)(mean percentage of the role of government in 
MENA countries)=1.007. The coefficient of urban growth rate in the joint effect (1.007)*(2.313)(St. dev 
of urban growth rate in MENA countries)=2.333 unit or 23%=(1.007*100)/(4.366)(St. dev of political 
instability in MENA countries).    
427 The independent effect of urban growth rate + the coefficient of joint  effect  of the ro le of government 
and urban growth rate (-0.975)*(0.005)(mean percentage of government role in non-MENA 
countries)=0.158. The coefficient of urban growth rate (0.158)*(2.794)(St. dev of urban growth rate in 
non-MENA countries)= 0.442 unit or 4%=(0.158*100)/(3.977)(St. dev of political instability in non-
MENA countries). 
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Table 4.9 The Joint Effect between Government Role and Urban Growth Rate on 
the Level of Political Instability over the Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Political instability  
Model 41 Model 42 Model 43 Model 44 
Education Expenditure -4.032** 
(1.783) 
-2.848** 
(1.399) 
-6.513* 
(3.782) 
-3.317* 
(1.727) 
UGR 0.142*** 
(0.043) 
0.165*** 
(0.044) 
-0.052 
(0.068) 
0.164*** 
(0.045) 
Education Expenditure*UGR -0.966* 
(0.508) 
-0.975** 
(0.490) 
-0.702 
(0.475) 
-0.975* 
(0.541) 
Oil  -3.683*** 
(0.880) 
  
Oil*Education Expenditure  -6.168 
(7.134) 
  
Oil*UGR  -1.243 
(0.832) 
  
Oil*UGR*Education 
Expenditure 
 -8.661 
(8.189) 
  
DD   -2.256*** 
(0.384) 
 
DD*Education Expenditure   3.198 
(3.879) 
 
DD*UGR   0.210** 
(0.088) 
 
DD*UGR*Education 
Expenditure 
  -0.368 
(0.688) 
 
MENA    -8.477*** 
(1.628) 
MENA*Education Expenditure    -5.057 
(3.440) 
MENA*UGR    0.888** 
(0.445) 
MENA*UGR*Education 
Expenditure 
   9.539** 
( 4.189) 
Constant 2.472 
(1.724) 
5.028*** 
(1.915) 
2.298** 
(1.101) 
6.148*** 
(2.082) 
Adjusted R square 26% 31% 34% 35% 
Number of observation 378 376 387 378 
Estimation method 2SLS 
P-value 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one 
year lag of GDP growth as 
instrument of GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. All 
models include all control variables included in models in Table 4-2 (results are not reported). For space restriction only the results of variables of 
interest are reported. 
4.13 Sensitivity Analysis 
 Sensitivity analysis is carried out using an alternative proxy of political 
instability adopted from Saha and Yap (2013), an alternative proxy of government size 
from the Heritage Foundation and an alternative estimation technique (fixed effect 
period effect)428. It will be estimated for Model 2 that examines the independent effect 
of government size on political instability; Model 7 that examines the joints effect of 
                                                 
428 Results are attached in the appendix;  models 37 and 41 are not estimated using alternative proxy  of 
education expenditure. 
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government size and youth unemployment on political instability; Model 13 that 
investigates the impact of joint effect of corruption and government size on political 
instability; Model 19 that examines the impact of gross tertiary enrolment on political 
instability moderated by the government size; Model 25 that examines the impact of 
trade openness on political instability moderated by government size; Model 31 that 
tests the impact of urban growth rate moderated by government size on political 
instability; and  Models 37 and 41 that examine, respectively, the impact of 
unemployment and urban growth rate on political instability moderated by educational 
expenditure.   
 In general, the independent effect of government size and the role of government 
on political instability maintain their sign and significance under an alternative proxy of 
political instability, government size and estimation technique. A government can 
stabilize the political environment through enlarging its size or expanding the 
government role. 
The effect of government size moderated by youth unemployment on political 
instability examined in Model 7 maintains its sign and significance when it is estimated 
using an alternative proxy of instability, alternative proxy of the government size and 
fixed effect (year).  
 The impact of the joint effect of corruption and government size on political 
instability tested in Model 13 shows variation in the results under alternative proxies of 
government size and political instability as well as the alternative estimation technique. 
The joint effect maintains its sign under an alternative proxy of the government size and 
political instability; however, it yields a significant expected positive sign under fixed 
effect technique (period effect). 
 The impact of government size on political instability moderated by gross 
tertiary enrolment investigated in Model 19 retain its sign under an alternative proxy of 
political instability and government size, but it turns into a significant negative sign 
when the model is estimated using fixed effect (period effect).    
 Across all models the impact of the joint effect of trade openness and 
government size and the joint effect of government size and urban growth rate on 
political instability maintains its sign and significance.   
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 The impact of the role of government on political instability moderated by youth 
unemployment and urban growth rate is estimated using an alternative proxy of 
instability and fixed effect (period effect). The role of government maintains its sign 
when the model is estimated using an alternative proxy of instability, however under 
fixed effect it turns into a significant negative sign. The impact of the interaction 
between the role of government and urban growth rate does not maintain either its sign 
or its significance under an alternative proxy of instability or fixed effect. 
4.14 Conclusion and Discussion   
This study assumes that a government can reduce the risk of political instability in 
a country through enlarging its size or expanding its role in response to a poor 
socioeconomic environment. Therefore, the study examines the independent effect of 
government size on political instability. Furthermore, it examines the impact of youth 
unemployment, corruption, gross tertiary enrolment, trade openness, and urban growth 
rate moderated by government size on political instability. Additionally, it investigates 
the independent effect of the role of government and its moderated effect in the form of 
youth unemployment and urban growth rate on political instability. The hypotheses set 
are investigated using 2SLS in a panel data analysis, countries where the percentage of 
youth bulge is less than or equal to 30%, countries where youth bulge makes up more 
than 30% of the population, oil countries, democratic countries and the MENA region.    
4.14.1 The Independent Effect of Government Size on Political Instability 
 The first hypothesis assumes that enlargement of government size lowers the 
risk of political instability. The empirical results confirm the hypothesis across all sub-
samples used in the empirical analysis; however, its marginal effect varies based on 
each sub-sample’s unique circumstances. 
 The negative relationship between the independent effect of government size 
and political instability confirms the statement of state capacity theory that emphasises 
the strength of different aspects of state capacity, one of which is the financial capacity 
to prevent, eliminate and terminate political instability (Fjelde and De Soysa, 2009). 
Non-profit considerations that drive a government operation are more important in 
stabilizing the political environment. The empirical results represent a departure from 
Taydas and Peksen (2012) who find no relationship between the two variables when 
political instability is measured by the onset of armed conflict. 
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 The independent effect of government size is more important for stabilizing the 
political environment in oil than non-oil countries. In oil countries, a low level of 
democracy does not offer political channels for competition for public office or to 
satisfy yearning by interested parties for oil rents. Therefore, its size is more important 
in stabilizing the political environment than non-oil countries, in line with rentier state 
theory. Furthermore, its size is important to address the negative consequences of the 
Dutch Disease model on the labor market. Empirically, the results in oil countries are in 
conflict with empirical research that finds no relationship when political instability is 
measured in the form of armed conflict like Higashijima et al. (2014). Governments in 
non-oil countries can respond to public needs through several measurements, including 
tax cuts. Hence, in these countries enlargement of government size is not the only 
public option to response to such needs. 
 Government size is more effective in stabilizing the political environment in 
autocratic than democratic countries. In democratic countries its size serves both 
political and economic objectives as stated by the political and economic hypothesis. 
Economically, it aims to address issues such as income inequality and ethnic 
fractionalization (see, for example, Alesina et al. 1999, 2000). Politically, it aims to 
please some segments of the public so as to enhance re-election prospects. However, it 
is expected that political inclusion in these countries place restrictions on governments 
to enlarge their size for non-productive considerations.   
 Government size has a lower stabilization effect in the MENA than non-MENA 
region. It might be that its size in the MENA region increases but does not bring 
corresponding improvement in quantity and quality of public goods and services. 
Alternatively, its bloated size may have an adverse impact on economic growth and 
institutional quality. Therefore, the marginal stabilization impact of its independent 
effect is deleterious by its adverse impact on other aspects. 
4.14.1.1 Contribution  
 The independent effect of government size on political instability examined in 
this study is distinct to past empirical research in several aspects. There is a lack of 
studies in the empirical research that measure the effect of government size in reducing 
political risk using financial measurements. The author of this study came across only 
two empirical research studies, namely Taydas and Peksen (2012) and Higashijima et 
al. (2014), who investigate the relationship between different types of government 
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expenditure and political instability. Both studies can be criticized for measuring 
political instability in the form of severe incidences like armed conflict, which as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, is an inappropriate proxy. Taydas and Peksen (2012) 
investigate the impact of government expenditure on political instablity in a panel data 
set without distinguishing between countries; while Higashijima et al. (2014) focus on 
oil countries. The present study, by using a broad proxy of political instability and 
several sub-samples, shows that government size is important in stabilizing political 
environment under different sub-samples. The present study finds that the independent 
effect of government size has a negative and a significant relationship with polit ical 
instability in countries where the percentage of youth bulge more than 30%, non-oil 
countries and autocratic countries. The fact that this importance is higher in autocratic 
than democratic countries might be due to the fact that better living standards can 
reduce public demand to move to democracy.  
4.14.2 The Joint Effect of Government Size and Youth Unemployment on Political 
Instability 
The second hypothesis assumes that the impact of unemployment on political 
instability is lower in countries with a larger government size. The empirical results 
confirm the hypothesis in the case of countries with less than or equal to 30% of youth 
bulge among its population and democratic countries; whereas the interaction effect of 
unemployment dominates the impact of the joint effect on political instability in panel 
data analysis, countries with more than 30% youth bulge, oil and non-oil countries, 
autocratic countries and the MENA region. 
The negative relationship between the joint effects and political instability in 
democratic countries and countries where the percentage of youth bulge is less than or 
equal to 30% among the population suggests that a larger size of government lowers the 
risk of unemployment on political environment. In these countries, it could be that the 
enlargement of government size achieves dual objectives. It reduces the unemployment 
rate among youth and it constitutes improvement of public goods and services. Under 
such conditions, government size satisfies the majority of the public. The empirical 
results in democratic countries confirm the assumption of the political and economic 
hypothesis that government size is used in democratic countries to create public 
employment (among other objectives) in order to gain votes and satisfy supporting 
constituencies (Carmignani, 2009).  
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The positive relationship between the joint effect and political instability in 
panel data analysis, countries with more than 30%, oil and non-oil countries, autocratic 
countries, and the MENA region suggests that government size fails to lower the risk of 
unemployment on political environment. The results suggest that using government size 
to absorb unemployment is viable when used to deal with unforeseeable circumstances 
like a sudden economic crisis; however, it is not a healthy option over the long run. This 
is because it constitutes a substantial cost on economic growth (Algan et al., 2002), 
institutional quality (Stevenson, 1992) and public educational attitudes (Alesina et al, 
2000). As a result, public pressure on governments is intensified to act as employer of 
last resort. However, wage bill pressures and new needs and requirements produced by 
each level of economic development place restrictions on public finance and make it 
difficult for a government to enlarge its size to absorb unemployment.  
4.14.2.1 Contribution  
 This study is the first to examine the impact of the joint effect between 
government size and unemployment on political instability using different sub-samples 
that cover a long period of time. The empirical results show that government size can 
lower the adverse impact of unemployment on political environment. The results find a 
negative and a significant relationship between the joint effect and political instability in 
democratic countries. Furthermore, the results find positive sign and significant 
coefficient of the joint effect in non-oil countries, autocratic countries and non-MENA 
regions, suggests that it might turn into a destabilization effect on political environment. 
This is because a government responds by addressing the outcome not the factors 
driving the unemployment rate up. Therefore, its size reaches an alarming level that has 
a negative impact on other aspects while unemployment continues to expose risk on the 
political environment.   
4.14.3 The Joint Effect of Government Size and Corruption on Political Instability 
The third hypothesis assumes that the impact of corruption on political instability 
is stronger in a country with a larger government size. The empirical results find support 
for the hypothesis in the case of oil countries. The joint effect is negative in non-oil 
countries, democratic countries, autocratic countries, countries where the percentage of 
youth bulge is both less than or equal to 30%, countries where their percentage more 
than 30%, the MENA region and panel data analysis. It suggests small government size 
lowers the impact of corruption on political instability. 
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The positive relationship between the joint effects  and political instability in oil 
countries suggests that a large government enhances the impact of corruption on 
political instability. Government size and corruption are used in these countries to 
satisfy the public and interest groups, respectively; however, this speeds up the 
consumption of oil rents. Consumption of oil rents by current expenditure allocated to 
enlargement of government size and rent-seeking activities exaggerate their adverse 
impact on political environment in the event of a sharp and sudden fall in oil prices. 
Currently, oil producers are experiencing financial pressure at different levels due to a 
fall in oil prices in late 2013. The low prices have an instant adverse impact on political 
environment in countries with a large public sector and high level of corruption, such as 
Iraq and Venezuela. Other producers are forced to cut their capital expenditure in order 
to meet wage bills of the public sector, which further deteriorates poor economic 
growth. The results suggest that a projection of rent seeking theory of a stabilization 
effect of government size and corruption varies according to the level of oil prices and 
the level of economic development at each period of time. The positive association 
between corruption and government size is in line with the empirical findings of 
Jaimovich and Rud (2014) that massive unproductive employment in the public sector 
in Argentina increases the level of corruption and rent seeking because employees lack 
the required skills or a skills mismatch exists.   
 The negative relationship between the joint effect and political instability in non-
oil countries, democratic countries, autocratic countries, countries where the percentage 
of youth bulge is both less than or equal to 30%, countries where their percentage more 
than 30%, the MENA region and panel data analysis suggests that small government 
size lowers the impact of corruption on political environment. Different factors might 
drive the negative joint effect across these sub-samples. In non-oil countries, it might be 
that small government size and a low level of corruption boosts economic growth, 
which in turns increases public revenue that can be used to stabilize a country further. In 
democratic countries, small government size and low level of corruption improves 
efficiency in delivering public goods and services, which increase public popularity. 
The empirical results in democratic countries confirm findings of Fjelde and Hegre 
(2014) and the argument made by Clapham (1982) cited by Arriola  (2009), but are 
departure from  other empirical research, like Manzetti and Wilson (2007) and the 
argument made by Leys (1965). In light of the adverse impact of the public sector and 
corruption on different aspects of society in the MENA region, reducing government 
size and a reduction in the level of corruption might create a more favourable economic 
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environment. Altough the joint effect is negative in countries based on the percentage of 
youth bulge among population, their political outcome is different. In countries where 
their percentage is less than or equal to 30% the joint effect reduces the positive 
relationship between the independent effect of government s ize and the independent 
effect of corruption with political instability. In countries where their percentage is more 
than 30% the joint effect enhances the negative relationship between the independent 
effect of government size and the independent effect o f corruption with political 
instability.  
4.14.3.1 Contribution   
The study examines the impact of corruption moderated by the government size on 
political instability using different sub-samples over a long period of time. The results 
show that the independent stabilization effect of government size and corruption on 
political environment in oil countries, as suggested by rent seeking theory, can turn into 
a destabilization effect when their combined effect is considered. The results find a 
negative and significant relationship between the joint effect and political instability in 
countries where the percentage of youth bulge more than 30%,  non-oil countries, 
autocratic countries, democratic countries, the MENA region and non-MENA region. In 
these sub-samples small government size lower the impact of corruption on political 
environment.     
4.14.4 The Joint Effect of Government Size and Gross Tertiary Enrolment on 
Political Instability 
 The fourth hypothesis investigates the impact of the joint effect between gross 
tertiary enrolment and government size on instability, assuming that the larger the size 
of government in a country, the lower the impact of high gross tertiary enrolment on  
political instabiliy. The empirical results confirm the hypothesis in countries where the 
percentage of youth bulge is more than 30%, oil countries and the MENA region. In 
these sub-samples enlargement of government size reduces the positive relationship 
between gross tertiary enrolment and political instability.   
 The empirical results find a positive relationship between the joint effect and 
political instability in countries where the percentage of youth bulge is less than or 
equal to 30%, panel data analysis, non-oil countries, democratic and autocratic 
countries. In these sub-samples enlargement of government size and increases in gross 
tertiary enrolment enhances political instability. The link between the joint effect and 
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political instability results from imbalance in the growth rate of educated youth and 
demand for labor forces. A government enlarges its size to absorb educated youth in 
public employment; however, its growth rate falls behind the growth of educated youth. 
Under such conditions, a government cannot enlarge its size and the issues related to 
educated youth exposes risk on the political environment.  
4.14.4.1 Contribution 
 This study tests the impact of gross tertiary enrolment on political instability 
moderated by government size, which has not been tested in past empirical research. It 
shows that a government can enlarge its size to reduce the positive relationship between 
gross tertiary enrolment and political instability. It finds a positive and significant 
relationship between the joint effect and political instability in panel data analysis, 
countries where the percentage of youth bulges less than or equal to 30%, non-oil 
countries and non-MENA region. In these sub-samples this option enhances political 
instability over the long run. This is because government size reaches an alarming level 
while the number of educated continues to accumulate. 
4.14.5 The Joint Effect of Government Size and Trade Openness on Political 
Instability 
 The fifth hypothesis assumes that the impact of trade openness on instability is 
lower in countries where government size is large. The empirical results confirm the 
hypothesis in countries where the percentage of youth bulge is less than or equal to 
30%, oil countries, democratic countries and the MENA region. This suggests that 
enlargement of government size lowers the adverse impact of a low level of trade 
openness on political environment. The positive joint effect is in line with the social 
insurance and economic hypothesis that states government size is used in some 
countries to reduce the impact of trade openness on political instability.   
 The joint effect has a negative relationship with instability in panel data analysis, 
countries where the percentage of youth bulge is more than 30%, non-oil countries, and 
autocratic countries. It indicates that small government size enhances the impact of low 
trade openness on political instability.  
4.14.5.1 Contribution  
 The importance of government size in lowering the adverse impact of low trade 
openness on political environment tested in this study has not been investigated before 
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in the empirical literature. The results find that enlargement of government size has a 
significant impact to lower the effect of trade openness on political instability in 
countries where the percentage of youth bulge less than or equal to 30%, democratic 
countries and the MENA region. The results show that small government size has a 
significant impact to enhance the effect of trade openness on political instability in 
countries where the percentage of youth bulge more than 30% and autocratic countries. 
4.14.6 The Joint Effect of Government Size and Urban Growth Rate on Political 
Instability  
 The sixth hypothesis assumes that the impact of urban growth rate on political 
instability is lower in a country where government size is large. The empirical results 
confirm the hypothesis in oil countries and the MENA region. In these countries large 
government size lower the impact of urban growth rate on political instability. In the 
MENA region, the empirical results do not confirm the argument made by Ross et al. 
(2011) that MENA experiences a rapid change in urban growth rate that creates pressure 
on the labor market. The results are in line with empirical research that finds a negative 
association between urban growth rate and political instability such as Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002, 2004). 
 The joint effect has a positive relationship with political instability in panel data 
analysis, countries where the percentage of youth bulge is more than 30%, countries 
where their percentage is less than or equal to 30%, democratic and autocratic countries 
and non-oil countries. This suggests the failure of government to enlarge its size 
enhances the adverse impact of high urban growth rate on political environment. Urban 
growth rate can stabilize the political environment by concentrating a significant 
percentage of the population in a small geographic area. This enhances government 
efficiency in delivering public goods and services and monitoring of the public. 
However, its rapid growth rate and the many goods and services associated with it 
enhance instability when government size lags behind the urban growth rate. Azam 
(2001) and Fjeldeand and De Soysa (2009) point out that the failure of government to 
enlarge its size to respond to public needs leads to instability. Empirically, this is in line 
with the findings of Kraay and Van Rijckeghem (1995) that a high level of rural-urban 
migration increases demand on infrastructure, education and employment opportunities. 
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4.14.6.1 Contribution 
This study examines the impact of urban growth rate on political instability 
moderated by government size, which has not yet been tested by past empirical 
research. The empirical results find a positive and significant relationship between the 
joint effect and political instability in panel data analys is, countries where the 
percentage of youth bulge less than or equal to 30%, non-oil countries and the non-
MENA region. The results find a negative and significant relationship between the joint 
effect and political instability in oil countries. 
4.14.7 The Joint Effect of Government Role and Youth Unemployment on 
Political Instability 
The seventh hypothesis assumes that the impact of unemployment on instability 
is lower in a country where the role of government is large. The empirical results 
confirm the hypothesis in oil countries, autocratic countries, and the MENA region. 
This indicates that expansion in the role of government lowers the political risk of 
unemployment. Further education at secondary and post secondary levels enhances the 
opportunities for the unemployed to find employment (Riddell and Song, 2012). 
Education can be used as an alternative to employment to lower the risk of 
unemployment on political environment. This gives a government time to improve the 
prevailing economic environment so that it becomes more responsive to employment 
requirements. In some countries a government reach an agreement with the private 
sector to hire youth enrolled in vocational training financed by government.  
The joint effect has a positive relationship with political instability in panel data 
analysis, non-oil countries, and democratic countries. It suggests that government 
expenditure on education fails to lower the impact of unemployment on political 
instability. The results suggest this might be because unemployment results from the 
economic conditions in a country rather than skills mismatch between skills attained 
from education and those required in labor markets. Hence, further expenditure on 
education constitutes waste of public resources while youth unemployment continue to 
exposes risk on political environment. Alternatively, it might be  that unemployment is 
caused by skills mismatch; however, the level of expenditure is insufficient to cover all 
unemployed or when the level of skills mismatch is significant and requires significant 
investment in re-training.   
 306 
 Expenditure on education might or might not waive the political risk of 
unemployment as the empirical results show. However, it gives a government time to 
investigate the determinants of unemployment and work to settle those that contribute 
most significantly. Furthermore, it is more feasible than enlarging government size to 
absorb unemployment that establishes a long-term financial commitment by 
governments and has negative consequences. 
4.14.7.1 Contribution 
This study investigates the impact of unemployment moderated by government 
expenditure on education as an alternative to the effect of government size on political 
instability. The joint effect has not previously been tested in the empirical literature. The 
present study finds a negative and significant relationship between the joint effect and 
political instability in oil countries. 
4.14.8 The Joint Effect of Government Role and Urban Growth Rate on Political 
Instability 
 The eighth hypothesis assumes that the impact of urban growth rate on 
instability is lower in a country where the government role is large. The empirical 
results confirm the hypothesis in panel data analysis, oil and non-oil countries, 
democratic and autocratic countries. This suggests that more expenditure on education 
lowers the adverse impact of urban growth rate on political instability.  Government 
expenditure on education eliminates the political risk from one channel of rapid urban 
growth rate (see, for example, Kraay and Van Rijckeghem, 1995, Urdal, 2006 and 
Turchin, 2013). 
 The joint effect has positive relationship with political instability in the MENA 
region. It suggests that urban growth rate enhances its impact on political instability 
when expenditure on education is small. It might be that while a government meets the 
demand for educational opportunities it fails to meet other requirements like 
infrastructure.  
 A rapid urban growth rate produces different needs and requirements, one of 
which is education. Increasing expenditure on education alongside meeting other needs 
and requirements enhances political stability. However, expenditure on education 
without considering other needs has an adverse impact on political environment. This is 
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because it might drive rural-urban migration up and create pressures on other 
infrastructure.  
4.14.8.1 Contribution 
The mitigation effect of expenditure of education on political risk of urban growth 
rate is not examined by past empirical literature. The present study finds a negative and 
significant relationship between the joint effect and political instability in panel data 
analysis, non-oil countries and non-MENA region. It finds a positive and significant 
relationship between the joint effect and political instability in MENA region. This 
suggests failure of governments in the region to response to one need associated with 
rapid urban growth rate. 
4.15 Future Research 
The first and most prominent suggestion is to investigate the impact of government 
size on political instability using an alternative proxy of government size. This study 
measures it as the percentage of government consumption to GDP; however, this has 
limitations. The size might inflate or deflate by the size of GDP. In some countries the 
percentage could be high because of small GDP and vice versa. An alternative proxy is 
considered here; however, poor data quality and insufficient number of observation for 
developing countries restricts further investigation429.   
 One prospective future research area is to identify the channel(s) that link an 
oversized public sector to political instability. Empirical results show that the 
government sector either has a stabilization or destabilization effect on political 
environment. The literature points out that the effect goes through several channels, 
such as institutional quality, economic growth, and pressure on public finance, which all 
need to be verified empirically. The choice of channel helps a government to enlarge its 
size to eliminate its adverse impact on other aspects.   
Future research might investigate the impact of government size on political 
instability in countries with a high level of capital expenditure and low level of current 
expenditure versus countries that have a high level of current expenditure and low level 
of capital expenditure. Enlargement of government size by creating public employment 
might come at the expense of expenditure on other sectors like infrastructure. In some 
                                                 
429  Alternative proxies considered in this research are the percentage of public employees to total 
employment, the rat io of public employees to total population, the percentage of wage bill to total 
government consumption and the percentage of wage bill to total revenue. 
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countries government enlarges its size to address several determinants of political 
instability; however, it exaggerates risks associated with shortages in water and 
electricity supply (for example).   
 In expenditure on education and political instability, future research might use 
an alternative proxy like expenditure on education per capita. The proxy used in this 
research, which is expenditure on education to GDP, has a limitation in that it does not 
consider the number of students. It might be that the growth rate in expenditure falls 
behind the growth rate of the number of students. This leads to a low level of education 
expenditure per capita. The second direction is to investigate the impact of expenditure 
per capita at each educational level on instability in countries based on their level of 
economic development. For example, it is expected that expenditure on education at 
each educational level respond to the level of economic development. Similarly, 
countries where the dependency ratio is high spend more on educational levels 
equivalent to this group of population.   
4.16 Policy Implications      
This study investigates the relationship between government size and government 
role on the one hand and political instability on the other hand. It assumes that a 
government can lower the adverse impact of some factors on the political environment. 
The empirical results confirm the assumption in some sub-samples; however, in other 
sub-samples a government size enhances the impact of these factors on political 
instability. This suggests that government size is an unsustainable option and aggressive 
reliance on it to enhance stability might lead to instability. Hence, policy makers need to 
improve factors that initiate instability in the first instance. By doing so, a government 
can successfully create common interests with the public to enhance stability.     
Policy makers need to improve factors that reduce public pressure on a government 
to act as employer of last resort. They need to create favorable economic environments 
that generate employment opportunities. Financial pressure and other factors restrict a 
government’s ability to continue to act as employer of last resort. From general reading 
of the author of this study, Tunisia and Egypt used government size to absorb 
unemployment among youth; however, over the long run it created financial pressure to 
meet wage bills and unemployment continued to entail significant risk on political 
environment. Financial pressure can be observed even in wealthy countries like Kuwait, 
where the government faces challenges to meet the wage bill that is expected to reach 
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70% of the public budget and at the same time needs to continue to act as employer of 
last resort for new entrants into the labor market.  
Creating favorable economic environment enhances the role of the private sector 
on economic growth; consequently in creation of employment opportunities. This helps 
a government to allocate financial resources from inefficient distribution channel like 
public employment as indicated by the literature to other area that is much needed to 
enhance and sustain economic growth like building and maintaining the infrastructure.  
Policy makers need to turn education from a prospective source of instability into a 
source of prosperity. It leads to instability due to small economic s ize, low growth rate, 
skills mismatch and the failure of government to absorb educated youth in the public 
sector. Policy makers can turn education into a source of prosperity through aligning 
skills attained from educational system with the skills required by the international labor 
market. This releases pressure on the domestic labor market and turns educated youth 
into an instrument to generate foreign currency and a channel with which to transfer 
knowledge from the international to domestic arena. From general reading of the author 
of this study, domestic labor working in international markets constitutes a major source 
of foreign currency in countries such as Jordan and the Philippines. 
This study sheds light on the importance of government size and its role to relax 
pressure on employment and educational opportunities associated with rapid change in 
urban growth rate; however, other emergent needs and requirements are equally 
important to stabilize political environment. The failure of government to provide 
infrastructure or encourage the private sector to do so has adverse effects on its success 
in addressing the shortage in employment and educational opportunities. For example, 
the living standards of the public are negatively affected when demand for housing 
exceeds supply and a significant amount of household income is directed to 
accommodation expenses. Similarly, stability enhances when the supply of electricity, 
water, entertainment facilities, and so on match a rapid urban growth rate. In summary, 
in order for government to eliminate the adverse effect of rapid urban growth rate it 
should set a plan to address its multidimensional needs and requirements.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Further Research 
5.1 Introduction  
  This thesis investigates factors that enhance or reduce the risk of political 
instability. It is a departure from past empirical work in several aspects. It investigates 
the role of youth bulge 430 , corruption and government size on political instability 
moderated by other determinants of political instability that have received less attention 
in past empirical research. It uses a broad measure of political instability that includes 
minor and major incidences, unlike past empirical literature that tends to measure 
political instability by outbreaks of civil war, which is a relatively rare incidence. It 
examines the impact of joint effects on political instability in panel data analysis 
covering a period from 1984 to 2013. The four sub-samples considered are: OECD 
countries, democratic countries, oil countries, and the MENA region. The results are 
estimated using 2SLS to deal with endogeneity issues unlike past empirical research 
that tends to measure the dependent variable using a dummy variable. The hypotheses 
tested and main results are presented in the following sections. These hypotheses are, of 
course, discussed in greater detail in the respective substantial chapters. 
5.2 Chapter 2: The Role of Youth Bulge in Enhancing Political Instability 
 The second chapter examines the role of youth bulge on political instability 
moderated by unemployment, economic growth, level of democracy, educational 
attainment, and rents from natural resources.  
 The empirical results confirm the first hypothesis that youth bulge enhances 
political instability in all sub-samples except MENA and oil countries. The institutional 
structure in OECD countries lowers the impact of youth bulge on political instability. In 
OECD countries there are better opportunities including more educational opportunities 
at university level, whereas in non-OECD countries young people’s concerns are driven 
by a demand to improve basic living standards and/or more income equality. 
Democratic countries face a higher youth bulge risk than autocratic countries. The 
                                                 
430 The term ‘youth bulge’ is widely used to refer to a high proportion of the population being in  a 
youthful age group. In this thesis no arbitrary line is drawn to say whether, or not, there is a ‘youth bulge’ 
in a g iven country. Rather, the term youth bulge is used here to denote a variable that measures the 
proportional size o f a youthful age group. Earlier in this thesis the details of this variable are specified and 
discussed. 
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higher risk in democratic countries might be as a result of immature democracy431, high 
level of media coverage of youth dissatisfaction or the failure of government to meet 
youth expectation. 
 The empirical results find support for the second hypothesis that higher the 
economic growth the lower the role of youth bulge as a cause of political instability. 
The influence of economic growth is equally important in countries where the 
percentage of youth bulge is 23% as is the case in OECD countries or where youth 
bulge percentage is more than 30% as is the case in non-OECD countries. Furthermore, 
it is equally important in democratic and autocratic countries, oil and non-oil countries 
and in the MENA region. In panel data analysis, positive income growth enhances 
political stability through increasing the individual’s opportunity cost of committing 
politically destabilizing acts. In oil countries economic growth is more important than in 
non-oil countries because it is driven by government expenditure that depends on oil 
prices. The recent fall in oil prices has caused reductions in government expenditure, 
which has an adverse impact on all related economic activities. This has decreased the 
level of employment opportunities, either created by the public or private sectors, which 
has exacerbated political instability. Also, inflation rates have increased as a result of 
increases in government fees to offset the adverse impact of low oil prices.  
 The results suggest that high economic growth decrease the chances of youth-
driven political instability. A country can lower the political risk of youth bulge through 
creating a favorable economic environment. Such an environment offers youth a 
channel to reap economic benefits rather than allocating their time and effort to engage 
in political direct action. The middle- income segments of the population produced by 
economic growth enhance political stability. Furthermore, a government increases its 
revenue as a result of stimulating economic growth. This revenue can be used to 
enhance stability further by increasing expenditure on public welfare such as education, 
health services, and other social services. 
 The third hypothesis, that the impact of youth bulge on political instability is 
stronger when young people experience unemployment, finds empirical support in 
MENA and OECD countries. However, the dissatisfaction is expected to go through 
political channels in OECD countries; while in the absence of such channels in the 
                                                 
431 While illiberal immature democracies have more-or-less free and fair elections, they do not have the 
institutions associated with liberal democracy (such as a free press) and governments frequently engage in 
cronyism and corruption.  
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MENA region there is the likelihood of violence. In OECD countries, a government 
failure to reduce unemployment rate sparks youth anger and the public who might be 
affected by an increase in crime rates, resulting from unemployment. In democratic 
countries (particularly those that are chaotic and immature) some interested parties 
might provoke encourage unemployed youth to act against a government. In the MENA 
region, unemployed youth cannot gain access to some services and the absence of 
financial support for the unemployed prevent unemployed youth from achieving 
financial independence. In addition, in an environment where patronage and cronyism 
are rife, an unemployed person might feel held back by their position in society and 
hence feel very pessimistic and resentful.    
 The empirical results do not find support of the relationship between the joint 
effect of youth bulge and unemployment on political instability in panel data analysis, 
oil and non-oil countries and autocratic countries. In panel data  analysis, it might be that 
some governments absorb unemployment by creating massive public employment. This 
increases wage expenditure with adverse impacts on a government’s ability to meet 
public requirements of public goods and services such as education and health care. 
This shifts the political risk from unemployed youth to the insufficient quantity and 
quality of public goods and services. In oil countries, oil rents are used to create public 
employment and attract investors to establish projects so that the risk of unemployment 
is abolished.   
 The fourth hypothesis is that the higher the level of democracy the lower the 
impact of youth bulge on political instability. Contrary to initial expectations, moving 
towards democracy enhances the impact of youth bulge on political instability across all 
sub-samples. In panel data analysis, an improvement in democracy is likely to enhance 
the role of youth bulge in a country where there are unfavorable socioeconomic 
conditions, such as a low level of educational attainment, a poor economic environment 
and a high level of ethnic segmentation. In OECD countries the cause and outcome of 
political instability are different to that in non-OECD countries. In OECD countries, the 
failure of government to protect living standards and employment opportunities can lead 
to instability in the forms of disruptive new political movements, riots and 
demonstrations that typically lead to political change. In non-OECD countries the 
transition from autocracy to democracy enhances frequently violent political instability. 
Moving towards democracy in oil countries and the MENA region places the incumbent 
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governments under public scrutiny, which restricts their ability to use different 
strategies, like patron-client networks, to stabilize aspects of the political environment.  
 The fifth hypothesis is that a high level of gross tertiary enrolment enhances the 
impact of youth bulge on political instability. The empirical results confirm the 
hypothesis in MENA and oil countries. In the MENA region, a high level of 
government involvement in labor markets and a low level of democracy prevent young 
people from achieving their education- induced expectations in terms of employment 
and political opportunities. In oil countries, expenditure on education is used as a 
distribution channel rather than to meet economic needs. This produces a large number 
of educated youth who face difficulty especially because there is a lack of 
diversification in economic activities as a result of the Dutch disease.  
 The sixth hypothesis assumes that the higher the rents from natural resources the 
lower impact of youth bulge on political instability. The empirical results confirm the 
hypothesis in panel data analysis; whereas, in the MENA region it is positive. In the 
MENA region corruption and rent-seeking activities consume a substantial amount of 
oil rents and leave little or no room to satisfy youth bulge needs and requirements.  
 The second chapter provides a general framework about the role of youth bulge 
on political instability moderated by other factors; however, the importance of each 
joint effect depends on each country’s circumstances. For example, the empirical results 
in the MENA region show that the role of youth bulge on political instability hinges on 
other factors such as economic growth, labor market, and educational attainment.  
5.2.1 Chapter 2: The Role of Youth Bulge in Enhancing Political Instability - 
Contribution to Knowledge  
 This chapter contributes to the literature in several aspects. It provides support 
that the role of youth bulge on political instability not being limited to large-scale 
incidences of instability like civil war, as measured by past empirical literature. It 
examines the role of youth bulge on political instability moderated by economic growth, 
unemployment, level of democracy, education and rents from natural resources. The 
joint effect between economic growth, level of democracy and education are examined 
by Urdal (2006); however, the author measures political instability in the form of civil 
war in panel data analysis without considering the variation in the percentage of youth 
bulge or the socioeconomic and political environment. The chapter fills the gap by 
examining the role of youth bulge and their impact moderated by other factors on 
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political instability in panel data analysis, OECD countries, oil countries, democratic 
countries and the MENA region. These sub-samples show significant variation in the 
percentage of youth bulge and other determinants of political instability. Furthermore, it 
uses an alternative measure of political instability that considers small and large 
incidences of political instability. 
5.2.2  Chapter 2: The Role of Youth Bulge in Enhancing Political Instability - 
Future Research 
 Future research can investigate the effect of the private sector, educational level, 
democracy, and educational system in the role of youth bulge on political instability. It 
can potentially investigate the variation in the level of political instability between 
countries that have the same percentage of youth bulge; however, they are differing in 
socio-economic and political environment. In the private sector, it can investigate the 
role of youth bulge on political instability in countries that have successful 
entrepreneurship versus countries that have capital- intensive projects. With educational 
level, it can examine the variation on political instability based on the educational le vel 
of unemployed youth. With democracy, it can examine the variation in the impact of 
youth bulge moderated by the level of democracy on political instability in countries 
that have a similar percentage of youth bulge but at different levels of economic 
development. Concerning the educational system, it can investigate the role of youth 
bulge on political instability in countries with high quality educational systems versus 
poor quality. Alternatively, it can investigate their impact on instability in countries that 
include developing civic skills in the educational curriculum versus countries that do 
not.  
 Future research can investigate the impact of youth bulge on other aspects of 
society rather than political instability. It can investigate the impact of youth bulge in 
moving from autocracy to democracy as examined by Wilson and Dyson (2017). 
Likewise, other research points to a possible relationship between demographic 
transition and international relationships that goes through economic growth and 
political instability as indicated by Kugler (2017). Similarly, recent research 
investigates the determinants of immigration among other factors in demographic 
transition as examined by Tuccio (2017). Other research investigates the impact of 
unemployed youth on crime rate as examined by Namuggala (2017). 
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5.2.3 Chapter 2: The Role of Youth Bulge in Enhancing Political Instability - 
Policy Implication 
 Generally, the empirical results show that socioeconomic and political factors 
can moderate the role of youth bulge as a causal factor for political instability. Hence, 
public policy needs to create a favorable economic environment and educational system 
in order to turn youth bulge from a demographic curse into a demographic dividend. 
Furthermore, improvement in these areas should proceed moving to democracy. 
5.3 Chapter 3: Does Corruption Enhance Political Instability? 
 The third chapter examines the impact of youth bulge, youth unemployment, and 
educational attainment on political instability moderated by corruption. The measure of 
corruption used in the chapter considers bureaucratic and political corruption; however, 
more attention is given to the latter.  
          The first hypothesis is that the independent effect of corruption enhances political 
instability. The empirical results support the hypothesis; however, it has less of an effect 
in OECD than in non-OECD countries, democratic than in autocratic countries, oil than 
in non-oil countries and in the MENA than in non-MENA region. In OECD and 
democratic countries, it is used to stabilize the political environment through meeting 
the requirements of interest groups; however, it turns into a destabilizing factor when 
discovered by the public. In autocratic countries, it has adverse impacts on public living 
standards and with the absence of democratic and legal channels to fight it; it 
contributes to latent or actual political instability. In oil countries, oil rents offer a 
government an instrument to lower its adverse impact on the public; while the public in 
non-oil countries pays much of the cost of corruption through taxes and its adverse 
impact on their living standards. In the MENA region, it creates common benefits 
between the public and government that lowers its impact on political instability. 
        The empirical results confirm the second hypothesis that corruption enhances the 
adverse impact of youth bulge on political environment. However, the joint effect 
exposes lower risk in non-OECD than in OECD countries, democratic than in autocratic 
countries, non-MENA than in MENA region and in oil than in non-oil countries. In 
panel data analysis, interest groups who are unhappy with their gains from corruption 
activities or who have accumulated financial resources organize desperate youths to act 
against a government. In OECD countries political channels and public sensitivity to 
corruption enhances mostly non-violent instability in these countries when corrupt 
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transactions are observed. Furthermore, it enhances instability when incumbents satisfy 
private interest groups at the expense of the public. In democratic countries, dissatisfied 
interest groups from the distribution patterns of corruption benefits organized youth 
suffered from its adverse impact on their lives act against a corrupt government. In 
autocratic countries, the young commit acts of violence because of their failure to be 
able to make their way in a corrupt society that is controlled by relatively few interest 
groups. In the MENA region, with a high percentage of youth bulge, a high level of 
corruption and a low level of democracy, there is a favorable breeding environment for 
anti-government groups to organize youth against the government. In oil countries, oil 
rents offer government financial resources with which to satisfy interest groups 
including young people, which enhance political stability (even though beneath the 
surface there may be unobservable latent instability).   
             The third hypothesis is that corruption enhances the adverse impact of 
unemployment on political environment. The empirical results find that the joint effect 
exposes higher political risk in OECD than in non-OECD countries, in democratic than 
in autocratic countries and in the MENA than in non-MENA region. In OECD countries 
incumbent governments come under public pressure to reduce unemployment and 
corruption, and its failure to respond to such demands enhances instability. In the 
MENA region, high levels of corruption and absence of checks and balances in the 
region lead to the best employment opportunities going to those with the right 
connections. The empirical results do not find support for the impact of the joint effect 
on political instability in oil and non-oil countries.  
           The fourth hypothesis is that corruption enhances the adverse impact of a high 
level of gross tertiary enrolment on political environment. The empirical results confirm 
the hypothesis in autocratic countries, the MENA region and oil countries. In autocratic 
countries a government comes under full control of a narrow ruling clique. This has 
adverse impacts on economic growth and employment opportunities to absorb educated 
youth. In MENA corruption leads to poor labor market conditions, and as a result 
growth in employment opportunities do not keep pace with increasing numbers of 
educated youth. Furthermore, low levels of democracy fail to accommodate civic skills 
produced by high levels of educational attainment. In oil countries, an increase in 
educational attainment creates pressure on poor labor market condition as a result of the 
Dutch disease. It creates pressure on political systems that lack the appropriate channels 
to accommodate civic skills of educated youth. 
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       The joint effect of gross tertiary enrolment and corruption has a negative impact on 
political instability in panel data analysis, OECD countries, non-OECD countries, 
democratic countries, and non-oil countries. In these countries a low level of gross 
tertiary enrolment lowers the adverse impact of corruption on political environment. In 
panel data analysis, low levels of educational attainment constitute a lack of knowledge 
and civic skills among youth to observe corrupted transactions. In OECD countries, 
education restricts a government’s ability to stabilize the political environment through 
political corruption. In democratic countries, a low level of gross tertiary enrolment has 
adverse impacts on different aspects of government performance, which in turn reduces 
public support. However, lack of knowledge and skills as a result of low gross tertiary 
enrolment lowers the adverse impact of corruption on the political environment. In non-
oil countries low educational attainment constitutes reductions in public revenue and 
restrictions on improving public finance. This reduces a government’s ability to satisfy 
public needs, which enhances instability. 
5.3.1 Chapter 3: Does Corruption Enhance Political Instability? Contribution to 
Knowledge 
          The chapter examines the independent effect of corruption on political instability. 
Furthermore, it examines the impact of youth bulge, unemployment, and gross tertiary 
education moderated by corruption on political instability. The joint effect between 
corruption and other factors has received less attention in the empirical research. There 
is only one empirical study that examines the impact of the joint effect between youth 
bulge and corruption on political instability, namely Farzanegan at el. (2014); however, 
the authors examine the impact of the joint effect in a panel data analysis set covering a 
period from 2002 to 2012. The chapter differs to that study by using an alternative 
proxy of political instability and examining the impact of the joint effect on political 
instability in several sub-samples. The joint effect between corruption and 
unemployment and corruption and education has not been tested in past empirical 
research. Furthermore, the chapter is distinct from other research in the nexus of 
corruption and political instability. It uses a proxy of corruption that measures its 
political risk and it uses a broad measure of political instability. It examines its impact 
on the political environment unlike past empirical literature that measures its impact on 
economic growth, government performance, and public welfare. It examines its impact 
on the political environment in panel data analysis, OECD countries, oil countries, 
democratic countries, and the MENA region over period from 1984-2013. These sub-
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samples show variation in the level of corruption, the percentage of youth bulge and 
socioeconomic and political environment. 
5.3.2 Chapter 3: Does Corruption Enhance Political Instability? Future Research  
The empirical results suggest several directions for future research. The lower 
effect of the independent effect of corruption in oil countries and the MENA region 
need further investigation. Similarly, the lower effect of youth bulge and youth 
unemployment moderated by corruption on political instability in oil countries needs 
further investigation. Furthermore, future study might investigate the impact of the joint 
effect of youth bulge and corruption on political instability in oil countries based on oil 
production per capita or oil reserves per capita. Alternatively, it might investigate the 
impact of the joint effect between corruption and repression on political environment in 
oil countries. It can investigate the relationship between corruption and political 
instability in the MENA region and oil countries using variables measuring the 
satisfaction of interest groups. 
Other future research into the unemployment-corruption nexus can examine the 
impact of the joint effect on political instability between countries that have high levels 
of corruption and unemployment, and countries with low levels of corruption and high 
unemployment. It can investigate its impact using an alternative measure of 
unemployment like unemployment to total labor force. 
With regard to the education-corruption nexus, future research can investigate 
the impact of each educational level on political instability moderated by the level of 
corruption. Alternatively, it can investigate the joint effect between education quality, 
such as a country’s performance in maths and science worldwide. 
It can investigate the independent impact of corruption and its joint effect on 
political instability in countries where corruption is a common norm versus countries 
where it is non-common. Alternatively, it is possible to investigate the variation in the 
level of political instability based on the type of corruption, like petty corruption versus 
grand corruption. 
 Further research can investigate the impact of corruption on political instability 
that goes through different channels. It can investigate its impact on political instability 
through increasing outward immigration in a country as examined by Poprawe (2015). 
Corruption can enhance political instability through its adverse impact on efficiency of 
 319 
government expenditure (Castro, Guccio, and Rizzo, 2014). Other areas that might link 
corruption to political instability might go through human capital, political legitimacy 
and political rights (Dimant and Tosato, 2017). 
5.3.3 Chapter 3: Does Corruption Enhance Political Instability? Policy 
Implication.  
Strategies to fight corruption either at the political or bureaucratic levels requires 
strong political will; otherwise they fail to reduce corruption. Improving living 
standards, increasing predictability, and clarity of bureaucratic procedures and 
automation of government can reduce bureaucratic corruption. Political reforms that 
install democracy and work in parallel with economic reform lower the level of political 
corruption. Policy makers can enhance an individual and community role in fighting 
both type of corruption. An individual role enhances when the education system helps 
her/ him to distinguish between public and private rights; while, the community role 
enhances by increasing the level of transparency in allocation of public expenditure.    
5.4 Chapter 4: Does Large Government Size Play a Crucial Role in Subsiding 
Political Instability? 
              In the fourth chapter, it is hypothesized that a government can play an 
important role to mitigate or diminish the role of youth bulge on political instability 
through enlarging its size or expanding its role. Hypotheses examine the impact of 
youth unemployment, corruption, educational attainment, trade openness, and urban 
growth on political instability moderated by government size. Also, they investigate the 
impact of youth unemployment and urban growth rate on political instability moderated 
by the government role. The OECD countries sub-sample is replaced by a sub-sample 
of countries where the percentage of youth bulge is less than or equal 30% and hence 
there is also a sub-sample made up of countries where their percentage is more than 
30%. The independent effect of government size and role has a negative relationship 
with political instability. Increasing government size or expanding its role has a 
stabilization effect on political environment across all sub-samples.  
The second hypothesis is that the larger the size of government in a country the 
lower the impact of unemployed youth on the political instability.  The results confirm 
the hypothesis in countries where the percentage of youth bulge is less than or equal to 
30% and democratic countries. In these countries enlargement of government size 
address youth unemployment and satisfy general public needs and requirements which 
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breed stability. Enlargement of government size enhances the impact of unemployment 
on political instability in panel data analysis; countries with a youth bulge percentage 
more than 30%, oil countries and the MENA region. The positive joint effect might be 
attributed to the fact that absorbing unemployment through public employment creates 
pressure on governments to create further public employment; otherwise, it leads to 
instability.  
The third hypothesis is that a large government size enhances the impact of 
corruption on political instability. The empirical results confirm the hypothesis in oil 
countries. In oil countries a large government size and high level of corruption speed up 
the consumption of public resources, which in turn enhances political instability over 
the long run.   
The joint effect of corruption and government size has a negative relationship 
with political instability in panel data analysis, countries where the percentage of youth 
bulge is less than or equal to 30%, countries where their percentage is more than 30%, 
democratic countries, autocratic countries, non-oil countries and the MENA region. The 
results suggest that minimizing government size lowers the impact of corruption on 
political instability. In panel data analysis, countries choose to hire qualified human 
resources at high wage levels to lower the level of corruption. In countries where the 
percentage of youth bulge is less than or equal to 30% a government reduces its size and 
decreases the level of corruption to enhance its popularity among the public. In 
countries where the percentage of youth bulge is more than 30% the joint effect 
enhances the adverse impact of the independent effect of small government size and low 
level of corruption on the political environment. It might be that these countries have 
limited financial resources so that they can neither enlarge the government size to 
satisfy the public nor offer rent seeking opportunities for interest groups. In non-oil 
countries, government reduces its size and brings corruption down because it wants to 
please the majority of the public. In the MENA region downsizing a government size 
lowers the adverse impact of corruption on public living standards, which enhances 
political stability.    
The fourth hypothesis is that the larger the size of a government in a country the 
lower the impact of gross tertiary education on political instability. The empirical results 
confirm the hypothesis in countries where the percentage of youth bulge is more than 
30%, oil countries and the MENA region. The results suggest that government size 
lowers the political risk of a high level of gross tertiary enrolment on the political 
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environment. In oil countries oil rents enable a government to absorb educated youth in 
the government sector in response to increasing numbers of educated youth and poor 
labor market conditions in order to lower the risk of political instability. In the MENA 
region the size of government is enlarged to absorb educated youth with skill 
mismatches between labor market requirements and skills attained from the educational 
system. 
The joint effect of gross tertiary enrolment and government has a positive 
relationship with political instability in panel data analysis, countries where the 
percentage of youth bulge is less than or equal to 30%, non-oil countries, autocratic and 
democratic countries and non-MENA region. The results suggests enlargement of 
government size and increasing the level of gross tertiary enrolment enhances political 
instability. In panel data analysis, wage bills create pressure on government size while 
the number of educated youth continues to grow, which enhances political instability. In 
countries where the percentage of youth bulge is less than or equal to 30%, they achieve 
a high level of gross tertiary enrolment that exceeds labor market requirements and 
government size cannot enlarge further, which enhances political instability. In non-oil 
countries enlargement of government size comes at the expense of capital expenditure. 
As a result it reduces employment in the private sector and creates an educational 
preference that prefers public over private sector employment. This creates pressure on 
government to continue to act as employer of last resort; otherwise instability would be 
increased. In democratic countries the small demographic proportion of young people 
increases competition over human resources between the private and public sector, 
which drives their wages up. This hurts the private sector’s ability to hire educated 
youth and pay taxes, which in turn reduces public revenue. Furthermore, shortages in 
human resources lead to poor economic growth, increase the wage level, and prevent 
establishment of new business. 
The fifth hypothesis is that the larger the size of a government in a country the 
lower the impact of trade openness on political instabiliy. The empirical results confirm 
the hypothesis in countries where the percentage of youth bulge is less than or equal to 
30%, democratic countries, oil countries and the MENA region. In countries where the 
percentage of youth bulge is less than or equal to 30% it might be that a government 
succeeds in absorbing unemployment resulting from poor economic growth, because 
youth constitute on average around 21.5%. In oil countries, high levels of exposure to 
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international oil prices forces a government to have a large government sector to lower 
the adverse impact of trade openness on political environment.  
The joint effect between trade openness and government size has negative 
relationship with political instability in countries where the percentage of youth bulge is 
more than 30%, non-oil countries, autocratic countries and non-MENA region. The 
results suggest that a government size fails to lower the impact of trade openness on 
political instability. In panel data analysis the failure of government to enlarge its size in 
response to a low level of trade openness lowers employment opportunties. This reduces 
the level of consumption which hurts the profitability of the private sector. In non-oil 
countries, a government faces difficulty to enlarge it is size amidst low levels of trade 
openness because it might increase taxes on the private sector. This increases the cost 
on the sector and causes inherent difficulty in coping with low levels of trade openness. 
The sixth hypothesis is that a larger government size lower the impact of urban 
growth rate on political instability. The empirical results confirm the hypothesis in oil 
countries and the MENA region. In oil countries enlargement of government size meets 
the needs and requirements of rapid urban growth and lowers the potential political risk 
from low urban growth rate. In the MENA region, governments play an important role 
as provider of public goods and services so that enlargement of government size in 
response to urban growth rate is more feasible from an efficiency point of view and a 
security perspective. 
The joint effect between urban growth rate and government size has a positive 
relationship with political instability in panel data analysis, countries where the 
percentage of youth bulge is less than or equal to 30%, countries where their percentage 
is more than 30%, non-oil countries, democratic and autocratic countries and non-
MENA region. This suggests that a government size fail to lower the impact of urban 
growth rate on political instability. The impact of rapid urban growth on the political 
environment is higher in countries where the percentage of youth bulge is less than or 
equal to 30% compared to countries where their percentage is more than 30%. It might 
be that governments in the former countries meet some requirements of urbanization; 
however, many are not met. In non-oil countries a government might satisfy people’s 
needs associated with urbanization, but be unable to provide much needed infrastracure 
which can spark public anger against it. In democratic countries, a government might 
enlarge its size to respond to income inequality without improving the quantity and 
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quality of public goods and services. This sparks public anger against government 
because they do not receive services and goods equivalent to what they paid in taxes.  
The eight hypothesis is that larger the government role the lower the impact of 
urban growth rate on political instability. The results confirm the hypothesis in oil 
countries, autocratic countries, and the MENA region. It suggests that a government 
role lowers the impact of unemployment on political instability. In autocratic countries 
investment in education reduces the risk of unemployed youth with regards to the 
political environment. Investing in education in these countries stabilizes the political 
environment through stimulating economic development, which lays a foundation to 
move towards democracy in the future. In the MENA region countries can waive the 
risk of youth unemployment over the short run by expanding a government’s role. This 
gives governments in the region a period of time in which to work on mitigating 
underlying factors that lead to high unemployment. 
The joint effect between expenditure on education and unemployment has a 
positive relationship with political instability in panel data analysis, non-oil countries, 
democratic countries, and non-MENA region. The results suggest that expenditure on 
education fail to lower the impact of unemployment on political instability. In panel 
data analysis, expanding educational opportunities to deal with unemployment has a 
stabilization effect over the medium term; however, it has a destabilization effect over 
the long run as economic size fails to absorb increasing numbers of educated youth. In 
non-oil countries using educational opportunities to absorb unemployment inhibits the 
private sector’s ability to create employment over the long run; hence political 
instability is exacerbated by educated youth who experience difficulty finding 
employment opportunities. In democratic countries there is no shortage of qualified 
youth as the percentage of gross tertiary enrolment is high at around 40% so that 
government might consider re-allocation of expenditure on education to improve 
conditions in the labor market  
The ninth hypothesis is that the larger the role of a government in a country the 
lower the impact of urban growth rate on political instabiliy. The results confirm the 
hypothesis in all sub-samples except the MENA region. In panel data analysis 
expanding educational opportunities reduces pressure on educational institutions and 
provides society with the human resources required to meet the needs and requirments 
of the public, as suggested by Wagner law. Oil countries can increase the expenditure 
on education to lower prospective political risk from low urban growth rate.  Rent 
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seeking theory states that its low rate increases the political risk because of oil rents and 
expensive equipment located in remote areas. Hence, attracting a rural population to 
move to urban areas offer opportunities for a government to control the public. The joint 
effect has a positive sign in the MENA region; it suggests that enlargement of 
government size enhances the impact of urban growth rate on political instability. In the 
region it might be that oil rents speed up the level of rural-urban migration with the 
hope that urban life would improve the migrants’ living standards; however, migrants 
are disappointed when their expectations are not met. 
5.4.1 Chapter 4: Does Large Government Size Play a Crucial Role in Subsiding 
Political Instability? Contribution to Knowledge 
        The chapter examines the impact of youth unemployment, corruption, gross 
tertiary enrolment, trade openness, and urban growth rate moderated by government 
size on political instability. Additionally, it investigates the independent effect of the 
role of government and its moderated effect via youth unemployment and urban growth 
rate on political instability. The hypotheses are investigated using 2SLS in panel data 
analysis, countries where the percentage of youth bulge is less than or equal to 30%, 
countries where youth bulge make up more than 30% of the population, oil countries, 
democratic countries and the MENA region. The chapter is different from past 
empirical research in several aspects. There is a dearth of empirical research that 
considers the financial role of government in reducing political risk. Only two empirical 
pieces of research, namely Taydas and Peksen (2012) and Higashijima et al. (2014), 
investigate the relationship between the independent effect of different type s of 
government expenditure and political instability. Both studies can be criticized for 
measuring instability only in the form of severe incidences like armed conflict, which, 
as is discussed in the second chapter, is an inappropriate proxy. Taydas and Peksen 
(2012) investigate the impact of government expenditure on political instability in panel 
data analysis without distinguishing between countries, while Higashijima et al. (2014) 
focus on oil countries. Furthermore, these studies do not examine the moderated effect 
of government size or its role with other factors on political instability. 
5.4.2 Chapter 4: Does Large Government Size Play a Crucial Role in Subsiding 
Political Instability? Future Research 
Future research can investigate the impact of government size on political 
instability using alternative measures for government size. This research hypothesizes 
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that government size has a stabilization effect on the political environment; however, it 
might have a destabilization effect. Hence, future research could investigate the 
conditions in which government size enhances political instability and from which 
channel(s). Furthermore, enlarging government size increases current expenditure at the 
expense of capital expenditure. It might investigate the impact of government size on 
political instability in countries that have high levels of capital expenditure and low 
levels of current expenditure versus countries that have a high level of current 
expenditure and low levels of capital expenditure. 
Future research can investigate the impact of expenditure on education on 
political instability using an alternative proxy like expenditure on education per capita. 
Furthermore, it can investigate the impact of expenditure per capita at each educational 
level on instability in countries based on their level of economic development. 
5.4.3 Chapter 4: Does Large Government Size Play a Crucial Role in Subsiding 
Political Instability? Policy Implications 
 The research hypothesizes that government size or role can lower the 
contribution of some factors on political instability. However, the results in some sub-
samples show that enlargement of government size enhances political instability. 
Therefore, policy makers need to improve factors that induce a government to enlarge 
its size to mitigate the risk of political instability. These factors are mainly concentrated 
in labor markets and the education sector. In labor markets, policy makers need to 
create a favorable economic environment that generates employment opportunities and 
reduces pressure on governments to act as employer of last resort. They need to turn 
education into a source of prosperity through aligning skills attained from the 
educational system with the skills required by domestic and international labor markets. 
This research sheds light on the importance of government size and its role in 
relaxing pressure on employment and educational opportunities associated with rapid 
change in urban growth rate; however, other emergent needs and requirements are 
equally important to stabilize the political environment and require further study.   
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 Article Definition of Political Instability 
1 Urdal, H. (2006). A clash of 
generations? Youth bulges and 
political violence. International 
Studies Quarterly, 50(3), 607-629 
1. First definition: An armed conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility 
concerning government and/or territory, between at least two parties, of which 
one is the government of a state, using armed force. Data is collected from 
Uppsala/PRIO data set.  
2. Second definition: political instability is measured in terms of terrorism and 
riots and violent demonstration event count data collected as part of the U.S 
State Failure Task Force (SFTF) project, and originate from the Protocol for the 
Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA) at Harvard University.  
2 Goldstone, J. A., Bates, R. H., 
Epstein, D. L., Gurr, T. R., Lustik, 
M. B., Marshall, M. G., ... & 
Woodward, M. (2010). A global 
model for forecasting political 
instability. American Journal of 
Political Science, 54(1), 190-208. 
  
1. First definition: civil wars (including both ethnic and revolutionary wars). These 
are events that resulted in at least 1,000 total deaths from conflicts involving 
state forces, sustained at a rate of at least 100 deaths per year.  
2. Second definition measure political instability as the following: 
▪ Adverse Regime Changes are major, adverse shifts in political institutions that 
involve the sudden loss of authority of central state institutions and/or their 
replacement by a more radical or nondemocratic  regime. 
▪ Genocides and politicides are sustained and purposive efforts by states or their 
agents to visit extreme violence and/or death upon a particular communal or 
political group 
3 Fearon, J. D., and Laitin, D. D. 
(2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and 
civil war. American Political Science 
Review, 97(01), 75-90. 
1. First definition: index constructed based on the following criteria:They 
involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized groups 
who sought to take control of a government, take power in a region, or use 
violence to bring about a change in government policies.  
▪ The conflict killed or has killed at least 1000 over its course.    
▪ At least 100 of the dead are on the side of the government (including civili ans 
attacked by rebels). This last condition is intended to rule out state-led 
massacres where there is no real organized or effective rebel opposition.  
▪ Colonial Wars. 
4 Barakat, B., and Urdal, H. (2009). 
Breaking the waves? Does education 
mediate the relationship between 
youth bulges and political violence?  
1. First definition: domestic armed conflict onset, is drawn from the Uppsala/PRIO 
dataset. The Uppsala/PRIO dataset sets a relatively low violence threshold for 
conflict, and distinguishes between minor armed conflict (a minimum of 25 
battle-related deaths per year), and war (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per 
year).  
5 Taydas, Z., and Peksen, D. (2012). 
Can states buy peace? Social welfare 
spending and civil conflicts. Journal 
of Peace Research, 49(2), 273-287. 
1. First definition: initiation of civil conflicts uses the list of intrastate-armed 
conflicts collected by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 
2002). An armed conflict is defined as a ‘contested incompatibility that 
concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between 
two parties results in at least 25 battle- related deaths. 
6 Collier, P., and Hoeffler, A. (2004). 
Greed and grievance in civil war. 
Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 
563-595. 
1. First definition: civil war as an internal conflict with at least 1,000 combat -
related deaths per year. In order to distinguish wars from massacres, both 
government forces and an identifiable rebel organization must suffer at least 5% 
of these fatalities.  
7 Andersen, J. J., and Aslaksen, S. 
(2013). Oil and political 
survival. Journal of Development 
Economics, 100(1), 89-106 
1. First definition is measured as political instability by constructing an index of 
entry and exit of political parties in power, using the Database on Political 
Institutions, DPI (Beck et al., 2001; Keefer, 2007). The dependent variable in is 
a binary one indicating whether the chief executive’s party is removed from 
power in a given year. 
8 Morrison, K. M. (2009). Oil, nontax 
revenue, and the redistributional 
foundations of regime 
stability. International 
Organization, 63(01), 107-138. 
1. First definition: political instability is measured by regime instability that takes 
a value of 1 if there is a regime change from one year to the next, and 0 
otherwise. A regime is considered to have changed if it receives a 0 in Polity 
IV’s durable variable, which counts the number of years since the most recent 
regime change. A regime change in Polity IV is defined by a change of three 
points or more in the polity variable- which ranges from -10 (most 
authoritarian) to 10 (most democratic)- or the end of a transition period.  
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9 Smith, B. (2004). Oil wealth and 
regime survival in the developing 
world, 1960–1999. American 
Journal of Political Science, 48(2), 
232-246. 
1. First definition: political instability measured in terms of regime failure. Index 
is constructed using the Polity98 data and code it “1” for each year that is given 
a value of “0” in the regime durability variable, or each intervening year 
between a change of 3 or more on Polity’s regime type index. 
2. Second definition: anti state protest, measuring protest as the sum of peaceful 
demonstrations, riots, and strikes in a country in any given year.  
3. Third definition: civil war is coded, from “0” to “3”: 0 indicates no armed 
domestic conflict, “1” indicates a conflict with at least 25 battle-related deaths 
per year and fewer than 1,000 during the course of the conflict; “2” an 
intermediate conflict with at least  25 battle-related deaths each year and an 
accumulated total of atleast 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 in any given 
year; and “3” a war with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths each year.  
10 Collier, P., and Hoeffler, A. (1998). 
On economic causes of civil 
war. Oxford Economic 
Papers, 50(4), 563-573. 
1. First definition: the occurrence and the duration of civil war. Civil war is based 
on four dimensions as following: 
▪ One of the primary actors in any conflict identified as a civil war must be the 
national government in power at the time hostilities begin.  
▪ The concept of war requires that both sides have the ability to inflict death upon 
each other.  
▪ Significant military action must take place. Only civil wars that resulted in at 
least 1,000 battles related deaths per year are included in the data set.  
▪ The war must be internal to the country.  
11 Collier, P., and Hoeffler, A. (2002). 
On the incidence of civil war in 
Africa. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 46(1), 13-28. 
1. First definition: the occurrence and the duration of civil war. Civil war is based 
on four dimensions as following: 
▪ One of the primary actors in any conflict identified as a civil war must be the 
national government in power at the time hostilities begin.  
▪ The concept of war requires that both sides have the ability to inflict death upon 
each other.  
▪ Significant military action must take place. Only civil wars that resulted in at 
least 1,000 battles related deaths per year are included in the data set. The war 
must be internal to the country.  
12 Alesina, A., Özler, S., Roubini, N., 
and Swagel, P. (1996). Political 
instability and economic 
growth. Journal of Economic 
Growth, 1(2), 189-211. 
1. First Model: Government Change= Regime type+dummy variable of change of 
excutive a government+dummy variable takes (1) unseccessful change included 
coup otherwise (0)+annual growth of per capita GDP+real per capita GDP at 
level + regional dummy variables of Africa and Latin America 
2. Second Model:Annual growth of GDP per capita= Average annual rate of 
growth of per capita GDP+average probability of government change+dummy 
variable of democracy+number of revolutions and coups per year per country+ 
number of assassination per million of population+GDP per capita in 1960 at 
level+primary scholl enrollement in 1960+average of real government 
consumption+Deviation of purchasing power parity in 1960 from the sample 
mean+dummy variable for outward/inward trade regime orientation + regional 
dummy variables of Africa and Latin America. 
13 Collier,  P., Elbadawi, I., and 
Sambanis, N. (2000). How Much 
War Will We See? Estimating the 
Likelihood and Amount of War in 
161 Countries, 1960-
1998.Unpublished mimeo, The 
World Bank (January). 
1. First definition:  political instability measured in form of civil war when the 
following criteria is satisfied: 
▪ The war caused more than 1,000 thousand deaths. 
▪ The war challenged the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state 
▪ The war occurred within the territory of that state 
▪ The state was one of the principal combatants 
▪ The rebels were able to mount an organized military opposition to the state 
▪ Combatants were concerned with the possibility of living together under the 
same political unit after the end of the war 
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14 Marcus Alfred, A., Mazhar, I., and 
John, M. (2008). Youth bulges, 
busts, and doing business in 
violence-prone nations. Business 
and Politics, 10(3), 1-42. 
1. First Definition: index is constructed to measure political instability which 
is defined as form the clashing of interests and values of some duration and 
magnitude between at least two parties whether they be organized groups, 
states, groups of states, or other organizations. Under its definition, conflicts 
can exist even if there is no official or formal state of war among the 
contending entities. The elements of conflict that considers are territory, 
secession, autonomy, ideology/ system, national power, international power, 
and resources. Conflict is classified into level based on its intensity as 
following:  
▪ Medium state capturing single or occasional outbursts like riots, coups 
d’états or terrorist attacks  
▪ Latent if demands are articulated by one of the parties and perceived by the 
other as such.  
▪ It is considered manifest if there are acts preliminary to violent force such as  
verbal pressure, threats of violence, or the imposition of economic 
sanctions.  
▪ It is considered a crisis when there is a tense situation in which at least one 
of the parties uses violence in sporadic incidents. The crisis, when force has  
been used repeatedly in an organized way. 
▪ It becomes a war when force is used continuously  in an organized and 
systematic way and the extent of destruction is massive and of long duration  
▪ Data used to construct the index of political instability comes from Conflict  
Barometer, which is an annual report on global conflicts published by the 
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK)  
15 Alesina, A., and        Perotti, R. 
(1996). Income distribution, 
political instability, and 
investment. European Economic 
Review  , 40(6), 1203-1228 
1. First definition: political instability is measured by constructing index that 
comprises the following components: 
▪ The number of politically motivated  
▪ The number of people killed in connection with domestic mass violence 
▪ The number of successful coups 
▪ The number of attempted but unsuccessful coups 
▪ Dummy variable that indicates whether a political regime is democratic, 
semi-democratic or authorization. 
2. The first equation is:Total investment= political instability index +the 
enrollment ratio in primary school in 1960+ purchase power parity in 
investment deflator (PPPI) in 1960 relative to US dollars+ the magnitude in 
deviation in PPPI from the sample mean. 
3. The second equation is: Index of political instability= income distribution+ 
primary school enrollment in 1960+ per capita GDP in 1960+ total 
investment+ urbanization 
16 Muller,   E. N., and Seligson, M. A. 
(1987). Inequality and 
insurgency. American Political 
Science Review, 81(02), 425-451 
1. First definition measures political violence as the natural logarithm of the 
death rate from domestic conflict per one million population. 
17 Sambanis, N. (2001). Do ethnic and 
no ethnic civil wars have the same 
causes? A theoretical and empirical 
inquiry (Part 1). Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 45(3), 259-282. 
1. The first definition measures political instability in terms of onset of an 
ethnic war 
2. The second definition measures political instability in term of 
revolutionary/other wars. 
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18 Bricker, N. Q., and Foley, M. C. 
(2013). The effect of youth 
demographics on violence:              
The importance of the labor 
market. International Journal of 
Conflict and Violence, 7(1), 179-
194. 
1. First Definition: index is constructed to measure political instability which is 
defined as form the clashing of interests and values of some duration and 
magnitude between at least two parties whether they be organized groups, 
states, groups of states, or other organizations. Under its definition, conflicts 
can exist even if there is no official or formal state of war among the contending 
entities. The elements of conflict that considers are territory, secession, 
autonomy, ideology/ system, national power, international power, and 
resources. Conflict is classified into level based on its intensity as following:  
▪ Medium state capturing single or occasional outbursts like riots, coups d’états 
or terrorist attacks . Latent if demands are articulated by one of the parties and 
perceived by the other as such. .It is considered manifest if there are acts 
preliminary to violent force such as verbal pressure, threats of violence, or the 
imposition of economic sanctions. It is considered a crisis when there is a tense 
situation in which at least one of the parties uses violence in sporadic incidents. 
The crisis, when force has been used repeatedly in an organized way. It 
becomes a war when force is used continuously in an organized and systematic 
way and the extent of destruction is massive and of long duration .Data used to 
construct the index of political instability comes from Conflict Barometerr 
19 Leite, C. A. and J. Weidmann 
(1999). "Does mother nature 
corrupt? Natural resources, 
corruption, and economic growth." 
Natural Resources, Corruption, and 
Economic Growth (June 1999). 
IMF Working Paper (99/85). 
1. The first definition: political instability is measured in term of revolutions and 
coups 
2. Model used to estimate the determinants of corruption: Corruption= natural 
resources + trade openness+ rule of law + political instability  
20 Mo, P. H. (2001). "Corruption and 
economic growth." Journal of 
Comparative Economics 29(1): 66-
79. 
1. The first definition of political instability is the average of the number of 
assassinations per million population per year and the number of revolutions per 
year over the period  
2. Model use to estimate the determinants of economic growth: Economic growth 
rate= corruption+ ratio of private investment to GDP+ initial per capita income 
in 1970 + political right+ average years of schooling in age 25 and above from 
1970 to 1985 + measure of political stability + rate of population growth. 
21 Blomberg, S. B. (1996). Growth, 
political instability and the defence 
burden. Economica, 649-672. 
 
1. The first definition: political instability is measured as a number of coups in 
each year in each country.  
2. First model rate of economic growth= primary school enrollment + military 
spending as percentage of GDP + Dummy variable of Latin America and Africa 
+ probability of coup  
3. Second model probability of coup= primary school enrollment + Dummy 
variable of Latin America and Africa + annual growth rate  
22 Mauro, P. (1998). Corruption and 
the composition of government 
expenditure.Journal of Public 
Economics, 69(2), 263-279. 
1. The first definition of political stability is the average of the number of 
assassinations per million population per year and the number of revolutions per 
year over the period 
2. Model estimates the determinants of public expenditure on education= per 
capita GDP in 1980 + the percentage of people in age 5-20 to total population+ 
political instability + corruption 
23 Lane, P. R., and Tornell, A. (1996). 
Power, growth, and the voracity 
effect. Journal of Economic 
Growth, 1(2), 213-241. 
 
1. The first definition of political instability is an index comprises of the following 
components: 
▪ Political assassinations, violent deaths per million population, successful coups 
and unsuccessful coups. 
2. The model: The annual average per capita growth over the period from 1970 to 
1990 = GDP per capita in 1970  + the average years of schooling of the 
population in age (25) and older + the average annual growth relative price of 
exports to imports over 1970 to 1990 + Dummy variable of powerful interest 
groups + index of political instability + the income share of the third and fourth 
quintiles in the income distribution+ dummy variables of Africa, Asia, Latin 
America and Central America. 
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24 Londregan, J., and Poole, K. 
(1992). The seizure of executive 
power and economic growth: some 
additional evidence. Political 
Economy, Growth, and Business 
Cycles, 51. 
 
1. The first definition political instability measured in form of The riots, 
elections, political executions, deaths from domestic political violence, 
successful irregular transfers of executive power, and unsuccessful attempt 
regular transfers of executive power (failed coups)  
2. The model is: Political instability= Recent coups + Past coups+ Last period 
per capita income + Last period growth rate + dummy variables of Africa, 
Europe and North America and South America 
3. The second model is change in per capita GDP= Recent coups + Past 
coups+ Last period per capita income + Last period growth rate + dummy 
variables of Africa, Europe and North America and South America 
25 Perotti, R. (1996). Growth, income 
distribution, and democracy: what 
the data say. Journal of Economic 
growth, 1(2), 149-187. 
 
1. The first definition of political instability is an index comprises of the 
following components: 
▪ Political assassinations, violent deaths per million population, successful 
coups and unsuccessful coups. 
2. The model growth: average yearly growth rate of per capita GDP, 1960-85= 
per capita GDP in 1960 +average years of schooling of male population in 
1960+ average year of schooling of female population in 1960+ value of 
investment deflator relative to US dollar in 1960+ political instability index. 
3. The second model is political instability=average years of schooling in 
male population in 1960+ average years of schooling in male population in 
1960+ share in income of the third and fourth quintiles, in or around 1960 
+dummy of Latin America +Dummy of Asia+ Dummy of Africa 
26 Kimenyi, M. S., and Mbaku, J. M. 
(1993). Rent-seeking and 
institutional stability in developing 
countries. Public Choice, 77(2), 
385-405. 
1. The first definition measured political instability in term of the survival of 
regimes in months 
2. The second definition measured political in term of successful and 
unsuccessful coups. 
3. The model used to estimate the relationship is: Regime survival= index of 
religious homogeneity+ index of ethnic homogeneity+ % of population 
living in urban area+ annual growth rate in urban population+ % of income 
generated from agriculture+ ratio of military spending per soldier per 
income per capita+ total population+ civilians per soldiers+population 
density per KM square+per capita income in US dollars+ annual growth rate 
in GDP+ % of income generating from public sector+ dummy variable 
whether leader attain power by coup or otherwise 
4. The second equation in political instability index= index of religious  
homogeneity+ index of ethnic homogeneity+ % of population living in 
urban area+ annual growth rate in urban population+ % of income generated 
from agriculture+ ratio of military spending per soldier per income per 
capita+ total population+ civilians per soldiers+population density  per KM 
square+per capita income in US dollars+ annual growth rate in GDP+ % of 
income generating from public sector+ dummy variable whether leader 
attain power by coup or otherwise 
27 Basedau, M., and Lay, J. (2009). 
Resource curse or rentier peace? 
The ambiguous effects of oil wealth 
and oil dependence on violent 
conflict. Journal of Peace 
Research, 46(6), 757-776. 
1. The first definition measure political instability in term of civil war. 
▪ The model used to predicate political instability= oil production per capita+ 
oil production per capita square+ primary commodity export to GDP+ 
primary commodity export to GDP square+ primary commodity export to 
GDP*oil dummy+ primary commodity export to GDP square* oil dummy+ 
log of GDP per capita+ GDP growth+ log population+ log of mountain 
terrain+ peace duration+ non-contiguous state + ethnic fractionalization+ 
ethnic dominance 
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28 Xu, T. (2011). The determinants of 
political instability: a regression 
analysis (Doctoral dissertation, 
Marietta College). 
1. The first definition of political instability focuses on the degree of social 
unrest as a measure of political instability. According to these definitions, a 
nation is politically unstable if its residents reveal some degree of 
unhappiness towards the government or the regime. This unhappiness could 
be expressed via numerous types of activities such as political violence, 
strikes, and other forms of political protests. Accordingly, dataset provided 
by the Center of Systematic Peace on the Major Episodes of Political 
Violence (MEPV), which measure political instability in scale of (10). 
Dummy variable is created (1) a country is stable if get (0) in scale 
otherwise it is unstable   
2. The model used to predict instability, Dummy of political instability= 
lagged purchasing power parity (PPP) of GDP per capita+ lagged of 
economic growth+ lagged of inflation rate + lagged of unemployment rate 
to total population+ Gross primary enrollment rate+ ratio of urban 
population to total population + % of internet users to population+ life 
expectancy+ regime type+ dummy variable whether neighbor country is 
stable or not  
3. The second model considers the economic and political conditions in the 
region where as a country is located to predicate political instability, 
Dummy of political instability= lagged purchasing power parity (PPP) of 
GDP per capita relative to the region average+ lagged of economic growth 
minus the region average + lagged of inflation rate minus the region average 
+ lagged of unemployment rate to total population minus the region average 
+ Gross primary enrollment rate+ ratio of urban population to total 
population + % of internet users to population+ life expectancy+ regime 
type+ dummy variable whether neighbor country is stable or not. 
29 Carmignani, F. (2009). The 
distributive effects of institutional 
quality when government stability 
is endogenous. European Journal of 
Political Economy,25(4), 409-421. 
1. The first definition of political instability is measured by the number of 
government change occurring over five-year period. 
2. The first model used to estimate political instability is , Government change 
= Gini coefficient+ dummy variable of the type of political system+ Index 
of legal structure and security of property rights from Fraser Institution+ 
average per capita growth of income + Total Herfindhal Index of 
parliament. The second model used to predicate Inverse extent of 
redistribution. The index is defined as  (Vmax − Vc) / (Vmax − Vmin), 
where V is the sum of transfers and subsidies over GDP= government 
change+ per capita income+ Share of population aged above 65+ trade 
openness+ regime type+ institutional quality + Gini coefficient   
30 Seligson, M. A. (2002). The impact 
of corruption on regime legitimacy: 
A comparative study of four Latin 
American countries. The Journal of 
Politics,64(02), 408-433. 
1. Based on survey results regime legitimacy is defined as prospective source 
of stability. 
2. The model used to predicate regime legitimacy=  corruption+ gender+ age+ 
educational Attainment + income per capita+vote for incumbent party  
31 Neumayer, E. (2004). The impact 
of political violence on tourism 
dynamic cross-national 
estimation. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 48(2), 259-281. 
1. Different forms of political instability are used to predicate tourist arrivals= 
tourist events account +violant events account+ conflict intensity+ human 
right violations+ Autocracy+ effective real exchange rate. 
32 Miljkovic, D., and Rimal, A. 
(2008). The impact of 
socioeconomic factors on political 
instability: A cross-country 
analysis. The Journal of 
Socioeconomics,37(6), 2454-2463. 
1. The three definitions used to predicate political stability is three alternative 
measures: irregular government changes (IGC), regular government 
changes (RGC), and stable/unstable binary variable.  
2. The model used to predicate alternative forms of political stability= GDP 
growth rate + initial level of GDP + dummy variable of democracy or 
otherwise+ number of years since dependence 
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33 Alesina, A., and Perotti, R. (1994). 
The political economy of growth: a 
critical survey of the recent 
literature. The World Bank 
Economic Review, 8(3), 351-371. 
 
1. The first definition of political instability is an index the comprises of the 
following components: 
▪ The number of politically motivated assassinations 
▪ The number of people killed in association with domestic violence  
▪ The number of successful coups 
▪ The number of attempted but unsuccessful coups 
▪ Dummy variable whether a country is democracy or not. 
2. The article predicates two models as following  
▪ Investment rate= primary school enrollments rate in 1960+ sociopolitical 
instability index+ deviation in investment deflator+ GDP in 1960+ middle 
class share in GDP,1960+ ratio of real demostic investment in GDP 
+dummy variables of Asia and Africa.  
▪ Sociopolitical instability index=  primary school enrollments rate in 1960+ 
GDP in 1960+ middle class share in GDP,1960+ ratio of real demostic 
investment in GDP +dummy variables of Asia and Africa 
▪  
34 Isham, J., Woolcock, M., Pritchett, 
L., and Busby, G. (2005). The 
varieties of resource experience: 
natural resource export structures 
and the political economy of 
economic growth. The World Bank 
Economic Review, 19(2), 141-174. 
 
1. The article aims to identify the impact of natural resources on six 
institutional variables separately. Political instability is identified as the rule 
of law, political stability( the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically-motivated violence and terrorism), government effectiveness, 
absence of corruption, regulatory framework and property right and rule 
based governance.  
2. The model to be estimated: 
▪ Each variable of institutional quality individually= manufacturing 
index+diffuse index+ point source index + coffee and coca index+ ethnic 
fractionlization+ predicated trade share+ latitude+ English language + 
European English+ GDP per capita+ secondary school achievement +Trade 
openness+ change in trade term+ share of primary export to GDP+ Sub-
Sahara Africa+ Europe and Middle East + Latin America+ East Asia 
35 Alesina, A., and Perotti, R. (1994). 
The political economy of growth: a 
critical survey of the recent 
literature. The World Bank 
Economic Review, 8(3), 351-371. 
 
1. The first definition of political instability is an index the comprises of the 
following components: 
▪ The number of politically motivated assassinations 
▪ The number of people killed in association with domestic violence  
▪ The number of successful coups 
▪ The number of attempted but unsuccessful coups 
▪ Dummy variable whether a country is democracy or not. 
2. The article predicates two models as following  
▪ Investment rate= primary school enrollments rate in 1960+ sociopolitical 
instability index+ deviation in investment deflator+ GDP in 1960+ middle 
class share in GDP,1960+ ratio of real demostic investment in GDP 
+dummy variables of Asia and Africa. 
▪ Sociopolitical instability index=  primary school enrollments rate in 1960+ 
GDP in 1960+ middle class share in GDP,1960+ ratio of real demostic 
investment in GDP +dummy variables of Asia and Africa. 
36 Isham, J., Woolcock, M., Pritchett, 
L., and Busby, G. (2005). The 
varieties of resource experience: 
natural resource export structures 
and the political economy of 
economic growth. The World Bank 
Economic Review, 19(2), 141-174. 
 
1. The article aims to identify the impact of natural resources on six 
institutional variables separately. Political instability is identified as the rule 
of law, political stability( the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically-motivated violence and terrorism), government effectiveness, 
absence of corruption, regulatory framework and property right and rule 
based governance. The model to be estimated: 
2. Each variable of institutional quality individually= manufacturing 
index+diffuse index+ point source index + coffee and coca index+ ethnic 
fractionlization+ predicated trade share+ latitude+ English language + 
European English+ GDP per capita+ secondary school achievement +Trade 
openness+ change in trade term+ share of primary export to GDP+ Sub-
Sahara Africa+ Europe and Middle East + Latin America+ East Asia 
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 Article Definition of Political Instability 
37 Salif R. Niang  (2011) The Youth 
Density Theory and the Mitigating 
Effects of Migration. Unpublished 
article. 
 
1. The political stability is defined as the likelihood that the government will 
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism”  
2. The model used to predicate political stability and absent of violence = the 
percentage of population in age (15-24) to population in age (15) and older+ 
youth bulge square+total population+ Infant mortality rate+ rgime+ 
neighbor in conflict+ state led discrimination + migrant (primary 
education+ migrant (secondary education)+migrant (tertiary education)+ 
Youth Density x  Net Migration+ Youth Density x  Net 
Migration  (primary)+ Youth Density x  Net Migration (secondary)+   
Youth Density x  Net Migration(tertiary) 
38 Barro, R. J. (1989). Economic 
growth in a cross section of 
countries (No. 3120). National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
1. There are two definitions of political instability, the first is the number of 
coups and revolutions per year from 1960-1985 and the second definition is  
the number of assassinations per million of population per year from 1960-
1985    
2. The models used to identify the determinants of economic growth as 
following: 
▪ Growth of per capita GDP = GDP60 (value of per capita income based in 
1980)+GDP70 (value of per capita income based in 1980 
+GDP60SQ+secondary school enrollment in 1960 +Primary school 
enrollment in 1960+secondary school enrollment in 1950 +Primary school 
enrollment in 1950+revoluations+ assassinations+ magnitude of deviation 
in PPP value of investment deflator in 1960 
▪ Total fertility rate =  GDP60 (value of per capita income based in 1980)+ 
secondary school enrollment in 1960 + primary school enrollment in 1960 
+ratio of investment to GDP+ assassinations+ revolutions+ PPP value of 
investment deflator in 1960 +mortality rate in age from 0 to 4+Africa+Latin 
America 
▪ Investment ratio= GDP60 (value of per capita income based in 1980)+ 
secondary school enrollment in 1960 + primary school enrollment in 1960 
+ratio of investment to GDP+ assassinations+ revolutions+ PPP value of 
investment deflator in 1960 +mortality rate in age from 0 to 4+Africa+Latin 
America  
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Table A2.2 Geographic Regions in the World 
Middle East and North Africa: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Syria, Yemen 
North Africa: Sudan and Guinea 
Eastern Africa: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania,   Zambia,   Zimbabwe  
Middle Africa: Angola,   Cameroon,  Central African Republic, Chad  ,Congo  Democratic Republic of the 
Congo,   Equatorial Guinea, Gabon  
Southern Africa:  Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland  
Western Africa: Benin  Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia,   Ghana,   Guinea Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia,   Mali, Mauritania, Niger,   Nigeria  , Senegal,   Sierra Leone, Togo  
Caribbean:  Bahamas, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Dominica, 
Grenada, Antigua and Barbuda, Puerto Rico 
Central America: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama  
South America: Argentina,   Bolivia,   Brazil,   Chile,   Colombia, Ecuador  , French Guiana, Guyana, 
  Paraguay,   Peru,   Suriname,   Uruguay,   Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of)  
East Asia: China, China-Hong Kong, China-Macao SAR , Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, 
Mongolia  , Republic of Korea    
Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan  
Southern Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives,   Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka  
South-Eastern Asia: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,   Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste ,Vietnam  
Western Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Israel, Turkey  
Northern Europe: Denmark,  Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway,  Sweden, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain, Northern Ireland. 
 Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands 
Switzerland  
Eastern Europe: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania 
Southern Europe: Albania,   Andorra,   Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,  Greece, 
Italy,  Malta,  Montenegro,  Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Republic of Macedonia  
Northern America: Bermuda,  Canada  ,Greenland,  Saint Pierre and Miquelon, United States of America  
Oceania: Australia, New Zealand 
Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia: Fiji  , New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu 
Guam,  Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of) Naura,  Northern Mariana Islands, Palau 
American Samoa, Cook Islands, French Polynesia Niue, Samoa,  Tokelau  Tonga  ,Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna 
Islands  
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Table A2.3 List of Oil, OECD and Democratic Countries 
Oil Countries: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bolivia, Cameroun, Congo, Dem. Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, 
Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Trinidad, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela and Yemen 
 Non-Oil Countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, 
Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Canada, Central African, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, 
France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala  Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, North, Korea, 
South, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Republic of China, Rumania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yemen,  Yugoslavia, Zaire, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe 
Democratic Countries: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, 
Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, South, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, 
Malawi, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, San Marino, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Surinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela and Zambia 
 Autocratic Countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroun, Cape Verde, Central African, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep, Croatia, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Equatorial Guine, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Korea, North, Korea, South, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Macedonia, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives Islands, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Rumania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, 
Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekist an, 
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Dem. Re, Vietnam, Republic, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom and United States of America 
Non-OECD: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda Argentina, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovi, 
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroun, Cape Verde, Central 
African, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guine, 
Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States, Fiji, French Polynesia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, 
Guadeloupe, Guam, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, North, Korea, South, Kuwait, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Macau, 
Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives Islands, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Martinique, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands Anti, New Caledonia, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Puerto 
Rico, Qatar, Republic of China, Reunion, Rumania, Russia, Rwanda, San Marino, Sao Tome-Princip, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Togo, Trinidad, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, Dem. Re, Western Sahara, Western Samoa, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
 
  
 336 
Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables  
Table B2.1 Descriptive Statistics of Political Instability and its Subcomponents 
Across the World 
Region  Political 
Instability 
Government Instability Internal 
Conflict 
Caribbean N 178 178 178 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 5 5 5 
Mean 2.747191 3.247191 2.280899 
Std. Deviation 1.339583 1.482713 1.361196 
Central America N 210 210 210 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 5 5 5 
Mean 2.914286 3.485714 2.338095 
Std. Deviation 1.305962 1.414987 1.46897 
Central Asia N 15 15 15 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 2 2 2 
Mean 1.133333 1.133333 1.133333 
Std. Deviation 0.3518658 0.3518658 0.3518658 
Eastern Africa N 267 267 267 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 5 5 5 
Mean 3.423221 3.539326 3.220974 
Std. Deviation 1.325255 1.474517 1.453493 
East Asia N 135 135 135 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 4 5 3 
Mean 1.933333 3.007407 1.185185 
Std. Deviation 0.8569296 1.432544 0.476072 
Eastern Europe N 201 231 231 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 5 5 4 
Mean 2.069652 3.168831 1.428571 
Std. Deviation 0.8573939 1.414852 0.7240329 
MMP N 30 30 30 
Minimum 2 1 1 
Maximum 5 5 3 
Mean 2.9 3.4 2.133333 
Std. Deviation 0.922889 1.037238 0.7760792 
Middle Africa N 232 232 232 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 16.79167 5 5 
Mean 2.800826 2.75431 2.724138 
Std. Deviation 1.681329 1.541624 1.554695 
MENA N 502 502 502 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 5 5 5 
Mean 2.679283 2.707171 2.669323 
Std. Deviation 1.506715 1.521604 1.530207 
Northern America N 60 60 60 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 3 5 1 
Mean 1.533333 2.616667 1 
Std. Deviation 0.5664839 1.222552 0 
Northern Africa N 59 59 59 
Minimum 2 1 2 
Maximum 5 5 5 
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Cont’d Table B2.1 Descriptive Statistics of Political Instability and its 
Subcomponents Across the World 
Region  Political 
Instability 
Government Instability Internal 
Conflict 
 Mean 3.728814 3.305085 4.152542 
Std. Deviation 1.014218 1.567496 0.826575 
Northern Europe N 255 255 255 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 4 5 2 
Mean 1.560784 2.721569 1.105882 
Std. Deviation 0.6545054 1.155663 0.3082921 
OCEANIA N 60 60 60 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 3 5 2 
Mean 1.466667 2.766667 1.033333 
Std. Deviation 0.650076 1.406603 0.1810203 
South America N 358 358 358 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 5 5 5 
Mean 3.078212 3.530726 2.650838 
Std. Deviation 1.183228 1.264869 1.383531 
South-Eastern Asia N 253 252 252 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 5 5 5 
Mean 2.320158 2.619048 2.142857 
Std. Deviation 1.398791 1.5062 1.404116 
Southern Africa N 89 89 89 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 16.79167 5 5 
Mean 3.053839 2.898876 2.94382 
Std. Deviation 1.991322 1.609947 1.264548 
Southern Asia N 120 120 120 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 16.79167 5 5 
Mean 3.856597 3.483333 3.833333 
Std. Deviation 1.663142 1.414115 1.311445 
Southern Europe N 208 208 208 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 5 5 4 
Mean 2.144231 2.995192 1.634615 
Std. Deviation 0.9470857 1.294722 0.9015038 
Western Africa N 265 265 265 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 16.79167 5 5 
Mean 3.218082 3.392453 2.792453 
Std. Deviation 1.536928 1.481176 1.330847 
Western Asia N 120 119 119 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 16.79167 5 5 
Mean 2.956597 2.865546 2.789916 
Std. Deviation 1.722281 1.234561 1.281379 
Western Europe N 202 202 202 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 3 5 3 
Mean 1.450495 2.39604 1.074257 
Std. Deviation 0.6149261 1.185142 0.2811326 
The Full Sample N 3819 3847 3847 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 16.79167 5 5 
Mean 2.60774 3.033273 2.284637 
Std. Deviation 1.440857 1.453003 1.442188 
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Table B2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Natural Resources Rents as a Percentage of 
GDP Across the World 
Region N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Caribbean 550 .000000 64.797954 3.30954862 9.181412307 
Central America 365 .000000 21.275051 3.75786142 3.722480488 
Central Asia 116 .342774 98.099104 23.54732613 24.173700711 
Eastern Africa 525 .000000 39.058023 8.05719014 7.318435401 
East Asia 204 .000719 44.935394 4.07749182 7.635915286 
Eastern Europe 245 .139687 44.525925 4.88252471 7.189452147 
Micronesia, Melanesia and 
Polynesia 
295 .000000 60.395458 6.61975125 11.947184080 
Middle Africa 367 2.297299 100.366886 26.27689532 22.006132275 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
644 .002172 89.428722 24.66126123 20.138261394 
Northern Africa 43 .000000 27.448480 5.38792898 8.661650040 
Northern America 86 .431173 13.345867 3.67989553 2.635053913 
Northern Europe 370 .000000 21.906956 2.67615316 3.819654778 
OCEANIA 86 1.414478 11.121180 3.47948720 2.077892140 
South America 516 .631509 52.093892 10.95839527 8.978858967 
South-Eastern Asia 340 .000000 84.014547 13.16243871 16.995096136 
Southern Africa 205 .271581 39.903690 5.13067442 5.190488466 
Southern Asia 303 .016172 76.960796 6.92326526 10.191611498 
Southern Europe 374 .000000 19.817042 1.05037751 2.343698904 
Western Africa 635 .309869 76.921549 13.48138182 14.515593520 
Western Asia 195 .000000 68.165868 5.93404503 14.623269874 
Western Europe 362 .000000 85.784515 3.84257975 13.236709218 
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Table B2.3 Descriptive Statistics of GDP Annual Growth across the World 
Region N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Caribbean 598 -18.444166 26.139296 3.38513580 5.342739220 
Central America 443 -30.900000 15.166531 3.84048395 4.716332717 
Central Asia 127 -29.000000 35.384557 2.92410967 8.988368073 
Eastern Africa 614 -50.248067 35.224078 3.90136928 6.165530977 
East Asia 269 -27.300000 27.498964 6.36500312 5.738168092 
Eastern Europe 254 -22.934046 42.410414 2.21595488 6.154882930 
Micronesia,Melanesia and 
Polynesia 
250 -14.267483 34.600001 3.31589538 6.070245681 
Middle Africa 417 -35.999967 149.97296 4.45371079 11.264930007 
Middle East and North 
Africa432 
657 -62.076508 104.48446 5.15374939 9.545568115 
Northern Africa 53 -10.100000 16.665219 3.43537911 5.922811330 
Northern America 106 -3.020266 7.658303 3.26904819 2.183644137 
Northern Europe 450 -32.118570 13.060838 3.01129023 4.323132224 
OCEANIA 96 -3.936338 7.800279 3.03870689 2.158739281 
South America 621 -14.163446 18.286607 3.41797380 4.496632958 
South-Eastern Asia 434 -19.826716 22.562428 5.73323109 4.555341774 
Southern Africa 233 -13.513497 26.404877 5.19104701 5.243821205 
Southern Asia 313 -13.973729 28.696265 5.19426842 3.764300288 
Southern Europe 443 -29.588998 88.957664 3.66681139 5.976664862 
Western Africa 747 -51.030863 106.27980 3.62401245 7.734367358 
Western Asia 244 -44.900000 34.500000 4.23120034 8.086431428 
Western Europe 406 -7.283175 14.582442 2.84351382 2.571923142 
  
                                                 
432 In Libya the economic size contracted in  2011 as the results of overthrown of former polit ical regime; 
however, its size recovered in 2012 with growth rate of 104% in comparison with its level a year earlier. 
Similar unexpected circumstances drive annual growth in Middle Africa as its maximum growth reaches 
149%   
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Table B2.4 Descriptive Statistics of Percentage of Youth Bulge to Population aged 
15 and above across the World 
Region N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Caribbean 719 16.701675 38.341988 29.03071005 5.086486843 
Central America 507 20.459356 40.491425 33.30045905 3.777012535 
Central Asia 303 20.812903 37.012540 30.24919622 3.955987458 
Eastern Africa 977 20.150885 41.704114 34.34727294 3.810148726 
East Asia 427 11.636847 39.069063 26.48159277 6.388777074 
Eastern Europe 464 13.729019 30.940363 20.32255053 3.060535076 
Micronesia, Melanesia and 
Polynesia 
427 21.092212 42.689238 32.23591387 4.067741784 
Middle Africa 610 22.887812 41.691449 32.34837251 3.739156187 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
1099 16.674407 40.807525 32.15183245 4.382993535 
Northern Africa 122 25.209762 37.735965 33.79158238 2.704740821 
Northern America 122 16.118170 26.734535 20.92874721 3.217113551 
Northern Europe 610 13.546210 27.615886 19.37022980 3.026156637 
OCEANIA 122 17.260290 25.824681 21.24859593 2.749673858 
South America 732 19.559284 38.832374 30.31364253 4.564010699 
South-Eastern Asia 671 16.381490 40.483615 31.39868492 4.351058833 
Southern Africa 305 28.341314 40.838246 34.48185371 2.666910853 
Southern Asia 470 21.054887 37.732491 32.48638223 2.867306457 
Southern Europe 444 11.684646 34.309575 21.41812238 5.262348159 
Western Africa 908 22.691187 42.937976 33.97741706 2.664693958 
Western Asia 366 19.019337 36.944408 26.37081054 4.324801138 
Western Europe 427 12.970747 24.326430 17.90580942 2.631811359 
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Table B2.5 Descriptive Statistics of Percentage of Youth Bulge aged 15-24 to Total 
Population across the World 
Region N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Caribbean 699 12.95597 23.70618 18.66292 2.218765 
Central America 488 15.85189 22.87058 19.37944 1.403425 
Central Asia 303 12.16875 22.77718 18.84885 2.572967 
Eastern Africa 977 15.50983 24.40358 19.20852 1.494036 
East Asia 427 10.09072 26.14085 18.05778 3.29978 
Eastern Europe 483 11.90065 21.69952 15.72801 1.874687 
Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia 429 13.3974 31.11484 19.39422 1.613559 
Middle Africa 862 12.98969 25.71526 18.90153 1.73027 
Middle East and North 1099 12.96679 26.21522 19.16184 2.082227 
Northern America 122 13.09895 19.8784 15.6326 2.08163 
Northern Africa 173 17.43148 23.42964 19.3173 1.319468 
Northern Europe 610 11.00472 19.42648 14.85663 1.752066 
OCEANIA 122 13.12423 18.51241 15.63636 1.671024 
South America 732 14.95124 23.35177 18.6919 1.692262 
South-Eastern Asia 671 12.62372 24.51364 18.97747 2.178251 
Southern Africa 183 16.7989 21.10942 19.02279 1.143586 
Southern Asia 470 13.62681 24.50359 19.22265 1.482374 
Southern Europe 444 10.04412 23.52553 15.82433 2.421558 
Western Africa 725 11.82496 23.61832 19.04964 1.415853 
Western Asia 366 11.70531 24.1972 17.90615 2.415297 
Western Europe 437 10.9939 17.60082 14.12979 1.709934 
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Table B2.6 Descriptive Statistics Trade Openness Across the World433 
Region N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Caribbean 595 .312738 375.378586 77.82839397 45.212242914 
Central America 358 24.932245 333.532237 86.90938624 57.616243448 
Central Asia 151 19.620599 179.120901 76.29074783 33.707124995 
Eastern Africa 544 10.922909 188.977470 73.62929732 40.574410044 
East Asia 375 6.320343 157.865169 69.85817022 30.398247960 
Eastern Europe 296 9.248361 199.675024 78.73797436 36.040177218 
Micronesia, Melanesia 
and Polynesia 
348 15.239016 149.453388 69.82295672 27.242823870 
Middle Africa 364 10.337444 208.725579 71.01345352 49.926300576 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
688 16.951122 458.332192 98.33042284 80.887889355 
Northern Africa 34 13.533834 150.326063 88.20283200 48.848512620 
Northern America 78 41.906251 149.425465 103.30558645 36.898526734 
Northern Europe 342 4.193000 162.914492 57.56089333 29.022263628 
OCEANIA 92 52.471120 151.025293 89.10514792 17.850871645 
South America 437 9.105691 198.766775 79.09170713 36.189055909 
South-Eastern Asia 412 9.057735 531.737435 65.09597709 71.778056049 
Southern Africa 209 10.995626 186.940661 69.82260820 37.855108471 
Southern Asia 358 9.305021 189.876785 68.13674447 39.443987819 
Southern Europe 396 .308803 251.138880 63.33697615 45.231007526 
Western Africa 672 5.725123 280.361035 75.16955180 41.368282801 
Western Asia 214 25.663526 348.050124 83.19535889 36.149143216 
Western Europe 397 20.964046 411.035285 111.33556171 73.526224774 
  
                                                 
433 Trade openness used in this thesis  is the percentage of imports and exports to GDP.  
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Table B2.7 Descriptive Statistics of Total Youth Unemployment Across the World 
Region N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Caribbean 157 3.1 54.0 28.685 8.9818 
Central America 145 3.8 35.3 14.151 7.3171 
Central Asia 11 5.2 20.1 13.318 4.7640 
Eastern Africa 42 .7 44.3 16.164 10.2957 
East Asia 120 2.8 15.9 8.073 2.8715 
Eastern Europe 142 4.6 43.9 21.591 7.9104 
Micronesia, Melanesia and 
Polynesia 
14 5.3 45.9 20.136 9.9947 
Middle Africa 1 8.2 8.2 8.200 . 
Middle East and North Africa 98 1.3 47.8 23.439 8.3267 
Northern Africa 1 22.9 22.9 22.900 . 
Northern America 66 9.3 19.2 13.674 2.3858 
Northern Europe 260 3.9 35.1 15.171 7.3118 
OCEANIA 60 7.9 19.4 13.513 3.0038 
South America 204 4.5 40.0 18.521 7.0679 
South-Eastern Asia 127 1.6 32.4 11.059 7.2378 
Southern Africa 34 13.6 58.9 42.318 10.0426 
Southern Asia 55 1.9 35.6 14.113 9.4067 
Southern Europe 202 8.6 70.9 28.454 13.7947 
Western Africa 14 .8 41.2 10.543 10.8346 
Western Asia 100 3.9 57.6 19.547 9.0792 
Western Europe 194 2.6 28.9 12.184 7.0135 
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Table B2.8 Descriptive Statistics of the Level of Democracy Across the World 
Region N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Caribbean 952 1 21 11.46954 4.364458 
Central America 520 3 21 13.03654 5.993302 
Central Asia 114 2 18 6.403509 4.703076 
Eastern Africa 1065 2 21 9.657277 4.958655 
East Asia 492 1 21 9.670732 6.975467 
Eastern Europe 551 2 21 10.6951 6.971211 
Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia 556 7 20 11.63849 2.072704 
Middle Africa 880 1 20 9.234091 5.261077 
Middle East and North 1210 1 18 5.576033 4.23752 
Northern America 130 21 21 21 0 
Northern Africa 242 2 19 8.818182 4.034087 
Northern Europe 650 11 21 18.91231 3.927306 
OCEANIA 130 21 21 21 0 
South America 780 2 21 13.71154 6.105417 
South-Eastern Asia 673 2 21 10.17236 5.341884 
Southern Africa 195 4 19 9.25641 4.742427 
Southern Asia 498 1 20 10.77711 6.859067 
Southern Europe 662 2 21 12.90937 6.809996 
Western Africa 773 2 19 9.397154 5.297261 
Western Asia 349 4 21 15.56734 5.081991 
Western Europe 677 2 21 17.0192 5.718075 
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Table B2.9 Descriptive Statistics of Urbanization Growth Rate Across the World 
Region 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Caribbean 877 -3.817315 17.729848 2.91762237 2.632876449 
Central America 457 -3.103374 17.550007 2.64694895 2.491977107 
Central Asia 217 -1.011050 8.621102 3.56122323 1.718938333 
Eastern Africa 923 -1.716968 12.487289 3.04423771 2.246305351 
East Asia 424 -.330893 20.196932 4.78837598 3.495265718 
Eastern Europe 473 -2.948278 14.128242 2.98737255 2.359192685 
Micronesia , Melanesia 
and Polynesia 
477 -2.804971 12.865427 2.91055142 2.315495647 
Middle Africa 524 -1.794878 8.352390 2.15005864 1.606326263 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
973 -2.197615 17.744913 4.05740008 2.707742902 
Northern Africa 87 -42.301838 17.134216 2.35558508 8.015986792 
Northern America 109 -.909327 5.093081 2.78757122 1.403238795 
Northern Europe 525 -3.567257 11.239530 3.30098941 2.052473939 
OCEANIA 110 -1.626033 12.871234 2.57090939 2.947184009 
South America 520 -.972043 8.655349 2.48851582 1.998209812 
South-Eastern Asia 465 .195988 9.669740 3.74819584 1.894227381 
Southern Africa 267 .826420 12.007638 3.75974940 1.512717286 
Southern Asia 426 -4.670734 7.197996 2.48691810 2.061039407 
Southern Europe 520 -2.088190 12.348838 3.00692127 2.339027673 
Western Africa 770 -2.165171 16.850544 3.35390642 2.560376831 
Western Asia 350 -3.235513 11.798623 2.52473371 2.921097958 
Western Europe 526 -5.612900 21.748874 2.96007351 2.776475674 
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Table B2.10 Descriptive Statistics of Logarithms of Total Population Across the 
World 
Region N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Caribbean 719 1.724784 4.053143 2.91858728 .710132070 
Central America 507 1.838333 5.071464 3.51830273 .692731418 
Central Asia 303 3.083144 4.443564 3.76131311 .359461474 
Eastern Africa 977 1.560170 4.939995 3.55994298 .742045922 
East Asia 427 2.230674 6.133482 4.15485397 1.098005149 
Eastern Europe 464 3.727148 5.172727 4.32388669 .421408912 
Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia 427 1.678473 3.836257 2.42117563 .540510206 
Middle Africa 610 1.764647 4.793729 3.37097235 .724851345 
Middle East and North Africa 1099 1.397923 4.892516 3.54814544 .781423999 
Northern Africa 122 1.138808 4.552084 3.10173377 1.122155733 
Northern America 122 4.137892 5.494498 4.86647675 .505016151 
Northern Europe 610 2.154290 4.792856 3.55231840 .573819935 
OCEANIA 122 3.280579 4.350335 3.82089225 .354206979 
South America 732 2.332436 5.290502 3.85660894 .686920853 
South-Eastern Asia 671 1.681250 5.381434 3.97113313 .875135585 
Southern Africa 305 2.436163 4.711405 3.26721210 .632558277 
Southern Asia 470 1.867562 6.081212 4.06973520 1.167168132 
Southern Europe 444 2.483877 4.781820 3.80494882 .687849823 
Western Africa 908 2.250581 5.203326 3.55329898 .594308815 
Western Asia 366 2.693739 4.858161 3.64480760 .546160476 
Western Europe 427 2.471293 4.923497 3.99790910 .705114513 
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Table B2.11 Descriptive Statistics of Gross Tertiary Enrolment Across the World 
Region N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Caribbean 173 0.60561 117.8914 19.53055 23.30079 
Central America 228 0.84567 46.74096 16.59986 9.934691 
Central Asia 97 8.87381 52.92236 27.26497 11.87337 
Eastern Africa 348 0.06821 40.32104 2.375906 4.994617 
East Asia 199 0.13147 101.7592 31.26782 24.71738 
Eastern Europe 356 0 91.45247 36.14623 21.34489 
Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia 33 0.67607 42.86175 6.506374 8.66696 
Middle Africa 288 0.01462 15.00411 3.22423 2.817644 
Middle East and North Africa 520 0.0134 60.87731 15.57907 11.96231 
Northern Africa 54 47.04594 97.09278 70.70514 15.16575 
Northern America 48 0.55336 15.17738 5.905866 4.815629 
Northern Europe 388 4.193 95.08737 43.51999 23.09777 
OCEANIA 86 15.76842 86.33409 48.47121 23.05771 
South America 332 1.5861 78.62611 22.87722 16.49198 
South-Eastern Asia 299 0.08335 59.89669 13.87758 13.46927 
Southern Africa 70 0.47896 10.31276 2.704474 2.34615 
Southern Asia 174 0.22137 24.7677 5.348444 4.227735 
Southern Europe 310 2.52697 113.9834 33.21248 21.7771 
Western Africa 261 0.03754 20.6206 2.951147 3.425818 
Western Asia 176 1.30066 69.38549 27.27436 16.12584 
Western Europe 250 1.07454 77.34356 34.22236 18.68783 
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Table B2.12 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables of all 
Sub-samples 
  Political 
Instability 
Youth 
bulge 
Youth 
unemploymen
t 
Rents from Natural 
Resources 
Trade 
Openness 
GDP annual 
Growth 
Level of 
Democracy 
Gross tertiary 
enrolment 
Log total 
population 
Urban 
growth rate 
Non-
Oil 
N 3282.00 1558 3355 2090 3468 3662 2491 3282 2855  
Min 1.00 11.68 -0.36 0.00 0.31 -51.03 1.00 0.00 2.40 -42.30 
Ma
x 
24.00 41.70 4.26 94.64 411.04 106.28 21.00 117.89 6.13 17.55 
Mea
n 
7.72 28.15 2.74 6.70 74.75 3.55 14.25 27.80 4.01 3.08 
St.
Dev 
3.99 7.94 0.63 10.31 49.31 5.96 6.63 24.26 0.64 2.77 
Oil N 655.00 159 685 330 672 748 423 655 542  
Min 1.00 15.02 0.26 4.26 5.73 -62.08 1.00 0.08 2.53 -0.97 
Ma
x 
21.00 39.05 3.87 84.03 279.12 104.48 21.00 79.28 5.26 17.74 
Mea
n 
7.96 30.11 2.73 29.90 80.24 3.78 7.71 22.51 3.96 3.49 
St.d
ev 
4.07 5.97 0.59 15.05 44.46 8.20 6.50 18.76 0.67 2.17 
Autocr
atic 
N 2744.00 583 2772 1710 2833 3087 1749 2744 2457  
Min 0.50 15.882 -0.357 0.000 5.725 -62.077 1.000 0.081 1.792 -42.302 
Ma
x 
24.00 42.403 4.261 100.367 208.726 149.973 20.000 117.891 6.133 17.745 
Mea
n 
8.74 31.683 2.697 14.618 70.399 3.957 9.419 15.877 3.889 3.202 
St.d
ev 
4.35 5.754 0.740 16.694 38.342 8.145 5.824 16.314 0.737 2.749 
Democ
ratic 
N 1681.00 1256 1905 1110 1986 2098 1390 1681 1598  
Min 1.00 11.64 -0.22 0.00 0.31 -21.26 2.00 0.56 1.80 -4.67 
Ma
x 
24.00 40.49 4.08 56.82 411.04 19.45 21.00 113.98 6.08 14.74 
Mea
n 
6.04 23.46 2.73 3.30 77.36 3.25 18.13 40.01 3.77 2.97 
St.d
ev 
2.95 7.51 0.58 6.49 55.58 3.84 4.00 23.83 0.85 2.44 
Non-
OECD 
N 3076.00 4204 1272 4259 2766 4406 5098 2587 4204 4042 
Min 0.50 13.31 -0.36 0.00 1.50 -62.08 1.00 0.00 1.79 -42.30 
Ma
x 
24.00 42.40 4.26 100.37 375.38 149.97 21.00 117.89 6.13 21.75 
Mea
n 
8.10 29.93 2.78 11.03 69.70 3.92 11.59 20.95 3.68 3.21 
St.d
ev 
4.19 6.64 0.68 15.30 40.13 7.07 6.03 20.14 0.82 2.74 
OECD N 668.00 682 707 419 735 768 665 668 608  
Min 1.00 11.64 1.16 0.00 0.31 -11.89 2.00 7.32 3.51 -2.95 
Ma
x 
14.33 35.49 4.01 21.91 411.04 11.27 21.00 113.98 5.49 12.87 
Mea
n 
5.42 18.22 2.63 1.94 95.74 2.34 20.32 49.26 4.30 3.24 
St.d
ev 
2.28 4.46 0.56 3.16 74.33 2.68 2.55 20.90 0.52 2.45 
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Appendix C: Unit Root Test for Independent Variables 
Table C2.1 Unit Root Test of GDP Annual Growth 
Fisher-type unit-root test for GDP Annual Growth 
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =    187 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  41.58 
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotic: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:  Included 
Time trend: Included                      Cross-sectional means removed 
Drift term:   Not included                  ADF regressions: 1 lag 
Statistic      p-value 
Inverse chi-squared (374) P      2223.6651       0.0000 
Inverse normal            Z       -32.6978       0.0000 
Inverse logit t(939)      L*      -43.7049       0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       67.6305       0.0000 
P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
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Table C2.2 Unit Root Test of Natural Resources Rent  
Fisher-type unit-root test for Natural resources rents as percentage      
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests       
       
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =    185     
   
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  36.90    
          
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T -> Infinity     
   
Panel means:  Included        
Time trend:   Included                      Cross-sectional means removed     
   
Drift term:   Not included                  ADF regressions: 1 lag      
     
Statistic      p-value          
    
Inverse chi-squared(370)  P       597.8575       0.0000       
Inverse normal            Z        -7.1020       0.0000        
Inverse logit t(929)      L*       -7.3332       0.0000        
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        8.3762       0.0000      
    
P statistic requires number of panels to be finite.        
Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels.  
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Table C2.3 Unit Root Test of Total youth unemployment  
Fisher-type unit-root test for Total youth unemployment 
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =    147 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  13.93 
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:  Included 
Time trend:   Not included 
Drift term:   Not included                  ADF regressions: 0 lags 
Statistic      p-value 
Inverse chi-squared(202)  P       614.1195       0.0000 
Inverse normal            Z        -6.1019       0.0000 
Inverse logit t(479)      L*      -11.9106       0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       20.5037       0.0000 
P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels 
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Table C2.4. Unit Root Test of Level of Democracy  
Fisher-type unit-root test for polity  
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =    209 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  57.89 
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:  Included 
Time trend:   Not included 
Drift term:   Not included                  ADF regressions: 0 lags 
Statistic      p-value 
Inverse chi-squared(416)  P       620.9622       0.0000 
Inverse normal            Z        -3.8717       0.0001 
Inverse logit t(719)      L*       -7.8841       0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        7.1058       0.0000 
P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
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Table C2.5 Unit Root Test of Urbanization growth rate 
Fisher-type unit-root test for urban growth 
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =    202 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  49.60 
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:  Included 
Time trend:   Not included 
Drift term:   Not included                  ADF regressions: 0 lags 
Statistic      p-value 
 Inverse chi-squared(396)  P       582.4525       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z        -1.1248       0.1303 
 Inverse logit t(994)      L*       -2.8623       0.0021 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        6.6253       0.0000 
P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
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Appendix D: Endogeneity Test of Independent Variables 
Table D2.1 Endogeneity Test of GDP annual growth 
Political 
instability  
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
GDP growth -0.3284824 0.0664621 -4.94 0 -0.4590064 -0.1979583 
Yb 0.2193792 0.0237715 9.23 0 0.1726947 0.2660638 
TYU 0.4661397 0.1549261 3.01 0.003 0.1618825 0.7703969 
Rents -0.0437477 0.0138493 -3.16 0.002 -0.0709461 -0.0165492 
TO -0.0039013 0.0016572 -2.35 0.019 -0.0071558 -0.0006467 
RT -0.0266814 0.0293801 -0.91 0.364 -0.0843807 0.0310178 
GTE -0.0075013 0.0063628 -1.18 0.239 -0.0199972 0.0049945 
Log T.pop  1.269573 0.1583399 8.02 0 0.9586113 1.580534 
UGR 0.049379 0.0359939 1.37 0.171 -0.021309 0.1200669 
Residual 
from reduced 
form 
equation 
0.2703167 0.0730768 3.7 0 0.1268023 0.4138312 
Constant -3.233797 1.114934 -2.90 0.004 -5.423399 -1.044194 
 
 
1.1 Test one period lag of GDP annual growth as valid instrument 
test( lag1 GDP annual Growth=0 
( 1)  lag1 GDP annual Growth = 0 
F(  1,   607) =  126.84 
Prob > F =    0.0000 
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Table D2.2 Endogeneity Test of Trade Openness 
Political instability  Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
TO -0.0026188 0.0017182 -1.52 0.128 -0.0059933 0.0007556 
Yb 0.1614153 0.0220133 7.33 0 0.1181815 0.204649 
TYU 0.5516106 0.1595619 3.46 0.001 0.2382344 0.8649868 
Rent -0.04589 0.0142337 -3.22 0.001 -0.0738447 -0.0179352 
RT -0.0294491 0.0302699 -0.97 0.331 -0.0888986 0.0300004 
GTE -0.0092752 0.0065945 -1.41 0.16 -0.0222266 0.0036762 
Log T.pop  1.498085 0.1587726 9.44 0 1.186259 1.809911 
UGR 0.0484306 0.0372984 1.3 0.195 -0.0248227 0.121684 
Residual from reduced form equation -0.0099376 0.0101922 -0.98 0.33 -0.0299549 0.0100796 
Constant -4.205366 1.137393 -3.7 0 -6.439181 -1.97155 
Table D2.3 Endogeneity Test of Gross Tertiary Enrolment 
Political instability  Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
GTE -0.0018009 0.0066494 -0.27 0.787 -0.0148617 0.0112598 
Yb 0.1740595 0.0219424 7.93 0 0.1309603 0.2171588 
TYU 0.5123374 0.1592156 3.22 0.001 0.1996059 0.8250689 
Rents -0.0589703 0.0142588 -4.14 0 -0.0869775 -0.0309632 
TO -0.0026142 0.0016698 -1.57 0.118 -0.0058941 0.0006657 
RT -0.0539232 0.0308853 -1.75 0.081 -0.1145882 0.0067417 
Log T.pop  1.506403 0.1593674 9.45 0 1.193373 1.819432 
UGR 0.027636 0.0369941 0.75 0.455 -0.0450279 0.1002998 
Residual from reduced form equation -0.051481 0.042899 -1.2 0.231 -0.1357432 0.0327812 
Constant -4.131381 1.150593 -3.59 0 -6.391378 -1.871384 
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Table D2.4 Endogeneity Test of Total Youth Unemployment 
Political Instability  Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
TYU 0.6435888 0.1776768 3.62 0 0.294575 0.9926027 
Yb 0.1807943 0.0215589 8.39 0 0.1384457 0.2231429 
Rents -0.0446328 0.0147594 -3.02 0.003 -0.073625 -0.0156406 
TO -0.0031231 0.0015519 -2.01 0.045 -0.0061714 -0.0000747 
RT 0.0190194 0.0310883 0.61 0.541 -0.042048 0.0800867 
GTE -0.0049126 0.0060464 -0.81 0.417 -0.0167896 0.0069645 
Log T.pop  1.431293 0.1505622 9.51 0 1.135541 1.727045 
UGR 0.0499323 0.0350739 1.42 0.155 -0.0189641 0.1188286 
Residual from reduced form equation 0.3651097 0.3997326 0.91 0.361 -0.4200923 1.150312 
Constant -5.689349 1.127188 -5.05 0 -7.903504 -3.475194 
Table D2.5 Endogeneity Test of the Level of Democracy 
 
Political Instability  Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
RT 0.0325799 0.1939769 0.17 0.867 -0.3483687 0.4135285 
YB 0.1802877 0.0495338 3.64 0 0.083009 0.2775665 
TYU 0.5156428 0.1626492 3.17 0.002 0.1962182 0.8350674 
Rents -0.0352882 0.0421173 -0.84 0.402 -0.1180017 0.0474253 
TO -0.0026725 0.0020784 -1.29 0.199 -0.0067542 0.0014091 
GTE -0.0090517 0.0078185 -1.16 0.247 -0.0244063 0.006303 
Log T.pop  1.478108 0.1562808 9.46 0 1.17119 1.785025 
UGR 0.0328387 0.0372181 0.88 0.378 -0.0402535 0.1059308 
Residual from reduced form equation -0.0654752 0.1963509 -0.33 0.739 -0.4510861 0.3201357 
Constant -5.607345 4.81678 -1.16 0.245 -15.06695 3.852263 
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Appendix E: The Empirical Results of the Robustness Test 
Table E 2.1 Empirical Results of Model 2 Based on the Percentage of Youth Bulge 
over Period 1984-2013. 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Political Instability  
Model 2-1 Model 2-2 Model 2-3 Model 2-4 Model 2-5 Model 2-6 Model 2-7 Model 2-8 
YB 0.230*** 
(0.028) 
-2.146  
(1.777) 
0.248*** 
(0.058) 
-0.157* 
(0.094) 
0.280*** 
(0.035) 
-0.549 
(0.348) 
-2.145 
(1.777) 
0.230***  
(0.028) 
TYU 0.720*** 
(0.184) 
0.584 
(0.989) 
0.831*** 
(0.214) 
-0.214 
(0.481) 
0.875*** 
(0.182) 
-1.490** 
(0.674) 
0.584 
(0.989) 
0.720*** 
(0.184) 
Rents -0.030*** 
(0.014) 
-0.066 
(0.086) 
0.016 
(0.025) 
-0.036** 
(0.015) 
-0.038** 
(0.017) 
-0.012 
(0.027) 
-0.066 
(0.086) 
-0.030*** 
(0.014) 
TO -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.045** 
(0.020) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.045** 
(0.020) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
GDP growth -0.323*** 
(0.071) 
-0.753 
(0.476) 
-0.413*** 
(0.082) 
-0.238* 
(0.128) 
-0.338*** 
(0.079) 
-0.499*** 
(0.191) 
-0.753 
(0.476) 
-0.323***  
(0.071) 
RT 0.005 
(0.043) 
0.004     
(0.252) 
-0.101* 
(0.061) 
-0.004 
(0.055) 
-0.004 
(0.049) 
-0.080 
(0.097) 
0.004 
(0.252) 
0.005 
(0.043) 
GTE -0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.291* 
(0.170) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.116*** 
(0.028) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.069* 
(0.038) 
-0.291*  
(0.170) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
Log T.pop 1.132*** 
(0.164) 
1.549 
(2.945) 
0.907*** 
(0.194) 
0.282 
(0.461) 
0.872*** 
(0.168) 
1.693* 
(1.008) 
1.549 
(2.945) 
1.132*** 
(0.164) 
UGR 0.070* 
(0.040) 
-0.181  
(0.667) 
0.144*** 
(0.045) 
-0.028 
(0.064) 
0.076* 
(0.040) 
-0.043 
(0.136) 
-0.181 
(0.667) 
0.070* 
(0.040) 
Constant -4.273*** 
(1.387) 
80.544 
(75.791) 
-2.891* 
(1.652) 
15.531*** 
(5.777) 
-4.734*** 
(1.444) 
26.400* 
(16.002) 
80.544 
(75.791) 
-4.273*** 
(1.387) 
Adjusted R square 29% 63% 21% 20% 28.00% 42% 1% 29% 
Number of observation 589 28 424 193 541 76 28 589 
Sample Countries 
have youth 
bulge 
<=38.9% 
Countries 
have youth 
bulge 
>38.9% 
Countries 
have youth 
bulge 
<=24.278% 
Countries 
have youth 
bulge > 
24.278% 
Countries 
have youth 
bulge 
<=31.407% 
Countries 
have youth 
bulge > 
31.407% 
Countries 
have youth 
bulge 
between  
34.411% 
to 
42.937% 
Countries 
have youth 
bulge 
<=34.411% 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Wald test (P-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 1   
P-value (the validity 
test of one year lag of 
GDP growth as 
instrument of GDP 
growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesises. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent  level, respectively. YB is youth bulge, TYU is rate of total youth unemployment, Rents is rents from natural 
resources, TO is trade openness, GDP growth is GDP annual growth, RT is level of democracy, GTE is gross tertiary enrolment, 
Log T .pop is logarithm of total population and UGR is urban growth rate. 
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Appendix F: The Empirical Results of the Robustness Test 
Table F2.1 Empirical Results of Fixed Effect (period effect) over Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Political Instability  
Model 2 Model 19 Model 24 Model 29 Model 33 Model 38 
YB 0.209***   
(0.023) 
0.185***   
(0.023) 
0.183***   
(0.023) 
0.116***    
(0.035) 
0.235***   
(0.022) 
0.148***   
(0.027) 
TYU 0.601*** 
(0.151) 
0.594***  
(0.160) 
-0.061 
(0.208) 
0.534***    
(0.152) 
0.767***   
(0.154) 
0.615***   
(0.150) 
Rents -0.062*** 
(0.013) 
-0.065***   
(0.014) 
-0.050***   
(0.013) 
-0.065***   
(0.013) 
-0.054***   
(0.013) 
-0.069***   
(0.013) 
TO -0.004***   
(0.001) 
-0.004**   
(0.001) 
-0.003**   
(0.001) 
-0.004***   
(0.001) 
-0.004***   
(0.001) 
-0.004***   
(0.001) 
GDP growth -0.286***   
(0.059) 
-0.537***   
(0.126) 
-0.285***   
(0.058) 
-0.293***   
(0.059) 
-0.248***   
(0.061) 
-0.289***  
(0.059) 
RT -0.041 
(0.029) 
-0.067**   
(0.031) 
-0.034 
(0.028) 
-0.035 
(0.029) 
-0.021 
(0.028) 
-0.043 
(0.028) 
GTE -0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.040***    
(0.011) 
-0.007        
(0.006) 
Log T.pop  1.316***   
(0.155) 
1.384***   
(0.161) 
1.163***   
(0.154) 
1.323***   
(0.153) 
1.162***   
(0.154) 
1.288***   
(0.153) 
UGR 0.075**   
(0.036) 
0.092** 
(0.038) 
0.055 
(0.035) 
0.076**   
(0.035) 
0.090**   
(0.035) 
0.086**   
(0.035) 
YB*GDP growth  -0.032*** 
(0.009) 
    
YB*TYU   -0.097***  
(0.021) 
   
YB*RT    0.012***   
(0.003) 
  
YB*GTE     -0.003***   
(0.0009) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
YB*Rents      -0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Constant -3.413***   
(1.098) 
3.864***   
(1.232) 
4.690***   
(0.954) 
2.495***   
(0.918) 
2.210**   
(1.044) 
2.288**   
(1.003) 
Adjusted R square 35% 29.00% 38% 37% 39% 32% 
Number of observation 617 617 617 617 617 617 
Estimation method 2SLS Fixed effect(period) 
Wald test (P-value)       
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one year lag 
of GDP growth as instrument of GDP 
growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesises. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent  level, respectively. YB is youth bulge, TYU is rate of total youth unemployment, Rents is rents from natural 
resources, TO is trade openness, GDP growth is GDP annual growth, RT is level of democracy, GTE is gross tertiary enrolment, 
Log T .pop is logarithm of total population and UGR is urban growth rat e. 
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Table F2.2 Empirical Results of Alternative Measure of Political Instability over 
Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Political Instability  
Model 2 Model 19 Model 24 Model 29 Model 33 Model 38 
YB 0.084*** 
(0.009) 
0 .080*** 
(0.008) 
0.080*** 
(0.009) 
0.044*** 
(0.018) 
0.095***  
(0.009) 
0.061***   
(0.011) 
TYU 0.223*** 
(0.074) 
0.223 
(0.072) 
0.106 
(0.136) 
0.189*** 
(0.072) 
0.302***   
(0.073) 
0.227***   
(0.074) 
Rents 0.006 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.009*   
(0.005) 
0.004   
(0.005) 
TO -0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.001***   
(0.0005) 
-0.002***   
(0.0005) 
GDP growth -0.056*** 
(0.021) 
-0.110*** 
(0.056) 
-0.055** 
(0.021) 
-0.056*** 
(0.021) 
-0.041*   
(0.022) 
-0.056***   
(0.020) 
RT 0.009 
(0.015) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
0.011 
(0.014) 
0.011 
(0.015) 
0.020   
(0.014) 
0.009   
(0.014) 
GTE -0.005*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.022***   
(0.005) 
-0.005***   
(0.002) 
Log T.pop  0.448*** 
(0.968) 
0.460*** 
(0.061) 
0.421*** 
(0.060) 
0.456*** 
(0.058) 
0.380***   
(0.060) 
0.436***  
(0.057) 
UGR  0.004 
(0.017) 
-0.002 
(0.017) 
0.0009 
(0.016) 
0.004   
(0.017) 
0.005   
(0.016) 
YB*GDP growth  -0.006 
(0.004) 
    
YB*TYU   -0.017 
(0.012) 
   
YB*RT    0.005*** 
(0.002) 
  
YB*GTE     -0.001***   
(0.0004) 
 
YB*Rents      -0.003***   
(0.0008) 
Constant -2.045*** 
(0.488) 
0.668 
(0.547) 
1.082*** 
(0.383) 
0.644* 
(0.376) 
0.130   
(0.456) 
0.549    
(0.450) 
Adjusted R square 38% 35.00% 38% 39% 41% 40% 
Number of observation 633 633 633 633 633 633 
Estimation method 2SLS 
Wald test (P-value)       
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one 
year lag of GDP growth as 
instrument of GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesises. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent  level, respectively. YB is youth bulge, TYU is rate of total youth unemployment, Rents is rents from natural 
resources, TO is trade openness, GDP growth is GDP annual growth, RT is level of democracy, GTE is gross tertiary enrolment, 
Log T .pop is logarithm of total population and UGR is urban growth rate  
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Appendix G: Correlation Matrix  
Variables PI YB TYU Rents TO GDP growth RT GT Log T.pop UGR 
PI 1          
YB 0.465 1.000         
P-value 0.000          
TYU 0.170 0.052 1.000        
P-value 0.000 0.028         
Rents 0.049 0.230 0.005 1.000       
P-value 0.003 0.000 0.842        
TO -0.020 -0.047 -0.086 0.001 1.000      
P-value 0.378 0.017 0.005 0.956       
GDP growth -0.140 0.059 -0.143 0.132 -0.056 1.000     
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004      
RT -0.261 -0.457 0.023 -0.371 0.006 -0.065 1.000    
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.319 0.000 0.741 0.000     
GTE -0.365 -0.748 0.065 -0.243 0.006 -0.087 0.513 1.000   
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.810 0.000 0.000    
Log T.pop 0.108 -0.039 -0.084 -0.004 0.101 -0.007 0.121 0.109 1.000  
P-value 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.797 0.000 0.640 0.000 0.000   
UGR -0.033 0.043 0.023 0.046 -0.140 0.023 -0.041 0.033 -0.030 1.000 
P-value 0.083 0.009 0.378 0.005 0.000 0.156 0.006 0.100 0.071  
PI is political instability, YB is youth bulge, TYU is rate of total youth unemployment, Rents is rents from natural resources, TO is 
trade openness, GDP growth is GDP annual growth, RT is level of democracy, GTE is gross tertiary enrolment, Log T.pop is 
logarithm of total population and UGR is urban growth rate 
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Appendix of the Third Chapter 
Table A3.1 Past Empirical Literature on the Consequences of Corruption 
Research Area: The adverse 
effect on economy 
Research Area: The 
adverse effect on economy 
 
Research Area: The 
adverse effect on 
government 
performance 
 
Research Area: The 
adverse effect on other 
aspects 
 
On initiating economic 
reform:  Rundquist et al. (1977); 
Myint (2000) 
On expanding of the Shadow 
Economy (Legal side): 
  Myint (2000); Echazu and 
Bose (2008); Schneider and 
Buehn (2009). 
On a government 
revenues and 
expenditure: Tanzi 
(1998); Myint (2000) 
 
On social values and 
norms:  Tanzi (1995), 
Nowak (2001); Truex 
(2011); Bardhan (2005); 
Rose- Ackerman and 
Truex (2012) 
 
On GDP/capita and GDP growth: 
Husted (1999); Hall and Jones 
(1999); Kaufmann et al. (1999); 
Tanzi and Davoodi (2001) 
 
On price control and black 
market: Myint (2000); Tanzi 
(2013)  
 
On quality of 
infrastructure: Tanzi 
(1998); Mauro (1998); 
Kenny (2006) 
 
On civil and political 
rights:   Evans (1999); 
Kaufmann (2004) 
 
On entrepreneurship: Tanzi 
(1998); Ades and Di Tella (1999); 
Baumol (1990); Murphy et al. 
(1991) 
 
On skilled emigration: 
Docquier/Rapoport (2011); 
Dimant et al. (2013a) 
 
On a government plans 
and decisions: Evans 
(1999); Tanzi (2013) 
 
On public support of a 
government legitimacy 
 
On investment and business 
environment: Nowak (2001); 
Tanzi (2013) 
 
Research Area: The 
adverse effect on public 
welfare 
 
On a governmental 
budget allocation: 
  Mauro (1998); 
EstyandPorter (2002); 
Gupta et al. (2002) 
 
On moving to democracy 
and market 
economy:  Tanzi (1998); 
Johnston (2000) 
 
On consumption Patterns:  Myint 
(2000); Gokcekus/Suzuki (2013) 
 
On service delivery and 
human right:  Mauro (1998); 
McPake et al. (1999); Tanzi 
and Davoodi (2001) 
 
On composition of 
public investment 
expenditure:   Wei 
(2000); Wei/Wu 
(2001) 
 
 
On production decisions:  Mauro 
(1995); Sequiera and Djankov 
(2010) 
 
On social welfare: Kurer 
(1993); Nowak (2001); Tanzi 
(2013);   Wei (2000); Tanzi 
(1998); Sand holtz and 
Koetzle (2000) 
 
On efficiency of the 
Government’s 
performance:   Tanzi 
(1998); Rose-
Ackerman (1999); 
Seligson (2002) 
 
 
On FDI and a country capital 
stock:  Campos et al. (1999); 
Habib and Zurawicki (2002) 
 
On increasing inefficiencies: 
Myint (2000); Zhong 
(2010);  Myrdal (1968); 
Tanzi (1998); Nowak (2001);  
 
On management of 
public funds:   Tanzi 
(1999); Myint (2000) 
 
 
Distortion of Markets:   Beck et 
al. (1991); Mêon and Sekkat 
(2004) 
 
On income inequality: Kurer 
(1993); Tanzi (1998); Wayne 
(2000); Myint (2000); 
Nowak (2001); Gupta et al. 
(2002);  Begović (2006); 
 
On expenditure on 
education and health 
sector: Mauro (1998); 
Hunt (2006); Rose 
Ackerman and Truex 
(2012) 
 
 
On quality of public investment: 
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997); Sarkar 
and Hasan (2001) 
 
On reallocating wealth from 
poor to the rich: Tanzi 
(1998); Evans (1999)  
 
  
On expanding of the Shadow 
Economy (Drugs and Smuggling): 
   Johnson et al. (1997); Myint 
(2000); Schneider and Buehn 
(2009) 
 
On sustaining development 
process: Dasgupta (2001); 
Aidt (2009) 
 
  
Table adopted from (Dimant, 2013) 
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics  
Table B3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Corruption Across the World Region 
Region N Min Mix Mean St. Deviation 
Caribbean 178 2 6 3.643 1.044 
Central America 210 1 4.5 3.283 1.081 
Central Asia 15 3 4.5 4.294 0.474 
Eastern Africa 267 2 6 3.619 1.041 
East Asia 135 1 5 2.587 1.192 
Eastern Europe 231 1 5 3.115 1.072 
Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia 30 2 5 3.711 0.961 
Middle Africa 232 0 6 3.508 1.264 
MENA 502 2 5 3.509 0.782 
North America 60 0 2.292 0.985 0.768 
Northern Africa 59 2 5.5 3.849 1.028 
Northern Europe 255 0 4 1.126 1.300 
OCEANIA 60 0 1.5 0.763 0.484 
South America 358 1.5 6 3.384 0.865 
South-Eastern Asia 252 0 6 3.196 1.247 
Southern Africa 89 3 5 3.818 0.593 
Southern Asia 120 2 6 3.730 0.861 
Southern Europe 208 1 5 2.497 0.953 
Western Africa 265 2 6 3.823 0.882 
Western Asia 119 1 4.5 2.932 1.180 
Western Europe 202 0 3 0.993 0.785 
Total 3847 0 6 3.023 1.353 
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Table B3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Corruption of all Sub-samples 
Classification N Min Mix Mean St. Deviation 
Non-OECD 3104 0 6 3.40076 1.099119 
OECD 743 0 4 1.444145 1.161742 
Autocratic 2181 0 6 3.620568 0.9945496 
Democratic 1606 0 6 2.227636 1.368871 
Non-oil 2870 0 6 2.939184 1.354526 
Oil 695 0 6 3.627158 1.062833 
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Appendix C: Endogeneity Test  
Table C3.1 Endogeneity Test of Corruption 
Political instability  Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Corruption 0.996 0.447 2.23 0.027 0.114 1.878 
Residual from model used corruption 
as dependent variable 
-0.669 0.477 -1.4 0.162 -1.609 0.272 
Gross tertiary enrolment -0.052 0.013 -4.19 0 -0.077 -0.028 
Youth bulge 0.087 0.048 1.82 0.07 -0.007 0.182 
Population Growth Rate 0.260 0.134 1.94 0.054 -0.004 0.523 
Urban growth -0.096 0.078 -1.24 0.215 -0.249 0.056 
Total public spending 2.069 1.033 2 0.047 0.031 4.107 
GDP Annual Growth -0.087 0.049 -1.78 0.077 -0.185 0.010 
Level of democracy 0.267 0.058 4.61 0 0.153 0.381 
Youth unemployment 0.801 0.390 2.06 0.041 0.033 1.569 
Trade Openness 0.002 0.003 0.69 0.493 -0.004 0.008 
Constant -8.993 3.963 -2.27 0.024 -16.808 -1.179 
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Appendix D: The Empirical Results of the Robustness Test 
Table D3.1 Empirical Results of Fixed Effect (period effect) over Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Political Instability  
Model 1 Model 6 Model 11 Model 16 
YB .147*** 
(.024) 
.147*** 
(.023) 
.134*** 
(.023) 
.079*** 
(.025) 
TYU .452*** 
(.149) 
.553*** 
(.153) 
.278* 
(.152) 
.627*** 
(.146) 
Rents -.049*** 
(.013) 
-.051*** 
(.013) 
-.035*** 
(.013) 
-.045*** 
(.013) 
TO -.003** 
(.001) 
-.004*** 
(.001) 
-.002* 
(.001) 
-.003*** 
(.001) 
GDP growth -.313*** 
(.058) 
-.300*** 
(.058) 
-.313*** 
(.057) 
-.292*** 
(.057) 
RT -.004 
(.029) 
.001 
(.028) 
.010 
(.028) 
.023 
(.028) 
Corruption .682*** 
(.105) 
1.017*** 
(.162) 
.571*** 
(.106) 
1.300*** 
(.140) 
GTE -.001 
(.006) 
.001 
(.006) 
-.005 
(.006) 
-.029*** 
(.007) 
Log T.pop .934*** 
(.163) 
.959*** 
(.162) 
.773*** 
(.164) 
.629*** 
(.163) 
UGR .045 
(.035) 
.045 
(.035) 
.045 
(.034) 
.081** 
(.034) 
Corruption*YB  .035*** 
(.013) 
  
Corruption*TYU   -.457*** 
(.098) 
 
Corruption*GTE    -.024*** 
(.003) 
Constant -2.505** 
(1.082) 
3.200*** 
(1.0566) 
1.536 
(1.112) 
1.660 
(1.154) 
Adjusted R square 39% 41% 41% 44% 
Number of observation 617 617 617 617 
Estimation method 2SLS- Fixed (Period Effect) 
P-value 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one 
year lag of GDP growth as 
instrument of GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesises. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent  level, respectively. YB is youth bulge, TYU is rate of total youth unemployment, Rents is rents from natural 
resources, TO is trade openness, GDP growth is GDP annual growth, RT is level of democracy, GTE is gross tertiary enrolment, 
Log T .pop is logarithm of total population and UGR is urban growth rate. 
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Table D3.2 Empirical Results of Alternative Proxy of Political Instability over 
Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Political Instability  
 Model 1 Model 6 Model 11 Model 16 
YB .063*** 
(.009) 
.063*** 
(.009) 
.059*** 
(.009) 
.043*** 
(.010) 
TYU .140* 
(.073) 
.1555** 
(.074) 
.086 
(.077) 
.199*** 
(.071) 
Rents .004 
(.005) 
.003 
(.005) 
.008* 
(.004) 
.004 
(.004) 
TO -0.002*** 
(0.0004) 
-.002*** 
(.004) 
-.002*** 
(.0005) 
-.002*** 
(.0004) 
GDP growth -.064*** 
(.022) 
-.063*** 
(.022) 
0.064*** 
(.021) 
-.058*** 
(.021) 
RT .014 
(.014) 
.015 
(.014) 
.019 
(.013) 
.023* 
(.014) 
Corruption .211*** 
(.032) 
0.254*** 
(0.077) 
.186*** 
(.030) 
.383*** 
(.046) 
GTE -.007*** 
(.002) 
-.007*** 
(.002) 
-.008*** 
(.002) 
-.018*** 
(.003) 
Log T.pop .349*** 
(.058) 
.355*** 
(.058) 
.293*** 
(.060) 
.265*** 
(.058) 
UGR -.022 
(.018) 
-.022 
(.018) 
-.022 
(.017) 
-.011 
(.017) 
Corruption*YB  .005 
(.006) 
  
Corruption*TYU   -.136*** 
(.040) 
 
Corruption*GTE    -.008*** 
(.001) 
Constant -1.341*** 
(.493) 
1.055** 
(.488) 
-.086 
(.454) 
-.256 
(.522) 
Adjusted R square 41% 42% 43% 45% 
Number of observation 626 626 626 626 
Estimation method 2SLS    
P-value 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of 
one year lag of GDP growth 
as instrument of GDP 
growth) 
0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesises. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent  level, respectively. YB is youth bulge, TYU is rate of total youth unemployment, Rents is rents from natural 
resources, TO is trade openness, GDP growth is GDP annual growth, RT is level of democracy, GTE is gross tertiary enrolment, 
Log T .pop is logarithm of total population and UGR is urban growth rate. 
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Table D3.3 Empirical Results of Alternative Proxy of Corruption over Period 1984-2013 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Political Instability  
 Model 1 Model 6 Model 11 Model 16 
YB .158*** 
(.029) 
.158*** 
(.029) 
.168*** 
(.032) 
.129*** 
(.034) 
TYU .352 
(.235) 
.349 
(.256) 
.399 
(.252) 
.414* 
(.240) 
Rents .005 
(.012) 
.005 
(.013) 
.002 
(.012) 
.004 
(.012) 
TO -.002* 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.001) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
-.002* 
(.001) 
GDP growth -.330*** 
(.100) 
-.331*** 
(.111) 
-.332*** 
(.099) 
-.313*** 
(.101) 
RT .091** 
(.042) 
.091** 
(.041) 
.094** 
(.043) 
.089** 
(.041) 
Corruption TI .211*** 
(.072) 
.205 
(.152) 
.223*** 
(.072) 
.364*** 
(.109) 
GTE .010 
(.007) 
.010 
(.007) 
.011* 
(.007) 
.0008 
(.009) 
Log T.pop 1.011*** 
(.171) 
1.010*** 
(.170) 
1.051*** 
(.171) 
.897*** 
(.183) 
UGR .155*** 
(.045) 
.154*** 
(.044) 
.160*** 
(.045) 
.160*** 
(.044) 
Corruption*YB  -.0005 
(.013) 
  
Corruption*TYU   .109 
(.088) 
 
Corruption*GTE    -.004* 
(.002) 
Constant -5.481*** 
(1.533) 
.347 
(1.590) 
-3.855** 
(1.536) 
-3.071* 
(1.809) 
Adjusted R square 24% 24% 24% 26% 
Number of observation 416 416 416 416 
Estimation method 2SLS    
P-value 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity test of one 
year lag of GDP growth as 
instrument of GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesises. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
level, respectively. YB is youth bulge, TYU is rate of total youth unemployment, Rents is rents from natural resources, TO is trade openness, GDP 
growth is GDP annual growth, RT is level of democracy, GTE is gross tertiary enrolment, Log T .pop is logarithm of total population and UGR is 
urban growth rate. 
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Appendix E: Correlation Matrix 
Variables PI YB TYU Rents TO GDP growth Corruption RT GTE Log T.pop UGR 
PI 1.000           
YB 0.465 1.000          
P-value 0.000           
TYU 0.170 0.052 1.000         
P-value 0.000 0.028          
Rents 0.049 0.230 0.005 1.000        
P-value 0.003 0.000 0.842         
TO -0.020 -0.047 -0.086 0.001 1.000       
P-value 0.378 0.017 0.005 0.956        
GDP growth -0.140 0.059 -0.143 0.132 -0.056 1.000      
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004       
Corruption 0.339 0.516 0.223 0.335 -0.029 0.069 1.000     
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.201 0.000      
RT -0.261 -0.457 0.023 -0.371 0.006 -0.065 -0.395 1.000    
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.319 0.000 0.741 0.000 0.000     
GTE -0.365 -0.748 0.065 -0.243 0.006 -0.087 -0.324 0.513 1.000   
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.810 0.000 0.000 0.000    
Log T.pop 0.108 -0.039 -0.084 -0.004 0.101 -0.007 0.104 0.121 0.109 1.000  
P-value 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.797 0.000 0.640 0.000 0.000 0.000   
UGR -0.033 0.043 0.023 0.046 -0.140 0.023 0.079 -0.041 0.033 -0.030 1.000 
P-value 0.083 0.009 0.378 0.005 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.006 0.100 0.071  
PI political instability, YB is youth bulge, TYU is rate of total youth unemployment, Rents is rents from natural resources, TO is trade openness, 
GDP growth is GDP annual growth, RT is level of democracy, GTE is gross tertiary enrolment, Log T.pop is logarithm of total population and 
UGR is urban growth rate. 
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Appendix of the Fourth Chapter 
 Table A4.1 Unit Root Test of Total Expenditure to GDP 
Fisher-type unit-root test for Total expenditure to GDP 
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =    154 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  34.58 
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:  Included 
Time trend: Not included 
Drift term: Included                      ADF regressions: 0 lags 
Statistic      p-value 
Inverse chi-squared(306)  P      1232.0453       0.0000 
Inverse normal            Z       -24.3033       0.0000 
Inverse logit t(769)      L*      -26.9467       0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       37.4332       0.0000 
P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
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Table A4.2 Endogeneity Test of Total Expenditure to GDP 
PI Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
GS -0.826 0.369 -2.24 0.025 -1.550 -0.103 
TYU 0.670 0.166 4.04 0 0.344 0.996 
Rents -0.043 0.015 -2.9 0.004 -0.072 -0.014 
TO -0.005 0.002 -2.87 0.004 -0.009 -0.002 
RT -0.097 0.031 -3.16 0.002 -0.157 -0.037 
GTE -0.045 0.007 -6.68 0 -0.058 -0.032 
Log T.pop 1.166 0.194 6.02 0 0.785 1.546 
UGR 0.091 0.038 2.39 0.017 0.016 0.165 
Residuals from reduced form equation 0.803 1.751 0.46 0.647 -2.636 4.241 
Constant 5.553 1.636 3.39 0.001 2.340 8.766 
                 
Table A4.3 Unit Root Test of Education Expenditure to GDP434 
Fisher-type unit-root test for Difference of log of education expenditure to GDP 
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =    164 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  14.98 
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:  Included 
Time trend:   Not included 
Drift term:   Not included                  ADF regressions: 0 lags 
Statistic      p-value 
Inverse chi-squared(296)  P      2315.2659       0.0000 
Inverse normal            Z       -34.0997       0.0000 
Inverse logit t(714)      L*      -52.1064       0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       82.9913       0.0000 
P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels 
. 
  
                                                 
434 Unit  root test shows that the variable is not stationary at level and after transformation into log. Therefore it takes 
the log difference to transfer it into a stationary variable, the reported is the log difference.  
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Table A4.4 Endogeneity Test of Education Expenditure to GDP 
PI Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
GR 49.289 45.051 1.09 0.275 -39.348 137.926 
TYU 0.954 0.207 4.62 0 0.547 1.360 
Rents -0.059 0.026 -2.31 0.021 -0.109 -0.009 
TO 0.006 0.004 1.63 0.104 -0.001 0.014 
RT -0.130 0.047 -2.75 0.006 -0.223 -0.037 
GTE -0.005 0.017 -0.27 0.784 -0.038 0.029 
Log T.pop 1.181 0.235 5.03 0 0.719 1.643 
UGR 0.211 0.076 2.76 0.006 0.061 0.361 
Residual from reduced form equation -50.842 44.960 -1.13 0.259 -139.299 37.615 
Constant -0.231 2.395 -0.1 0.923 -4.943 4.482 
Table A4.5 Descriptive Statistics of Government Size Across the World 
Region N Min Mix Mean St.dev 
Caribbean 198 3.219 39.881 14.950 8.409 
Central America 279 4.997 43.479 12.638 5.173 
Central Asia 115 5.915 30.000 15.519 5.710 
Eastern Africa 448 2.047 69.543 16.771 7.496 
East Asia 157 7.474 29.796 14.977 3.879 
Eastern Europe 247 5.690 27.399 16.997 4.175 
Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia 96 11.469 36.047 19.863 5.046 
Middle Africa 508 2.651 84.508 17.282 8.649 
Middle East and North Africa 556 5.746 76.222 18.586 6.502 
North America 81 14.255 24.096 18.719 2.739 
Northern Africa 73 4.835 17.071 9.791 2.877 
Northern Europe 318 10.284 29.553 21.409 3.705 
OCEANIA 82 14.590 20.526 18.334 0.939 
South America 443 2.976 31.475 13.132 4.477 
South-Eastern Asia 247 3.460 17.734 10.351 2.774 
Southern Africa 118 6.308 25.469 13.629 4.225 
Southern Asia 247 3.164 24.717 10.827 4.497 
Southern Europe 271 8.536 29.434 17.157 3.790 
Western Africa 426 4.833 64.392 15.117 7.819 
Western Asia 194 5.861 43.406 17.009 8.132 
Western Europe 222 9.154 26.481 19.842 4.648 
Total 5326 2.047 84.508 16.025 6.681 
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Table A4.6 Descriptive Statistics of Government Size and Government Role under Different 
Sub-samples 
Classification Variable N Min Max Mean St.dev 
Non-oil countries Government size 3341 0.716 4.242 2.681 0.408 
Government role 1917 -0.248 3.792 1.408 0.440 
Oil Countries Government size 663 1.576 4.334 2.716 0.396 
Government role 285 -0.351 2.653 1.397 0.428 
Autocratic countries Government size 2592 0.716 4.334 2.616 0.437 
Government role 1191 -0.351 3.792 1.309 0.490 
Democratic countries Government size 1595 1.090 3.644 2.805 0.334 
Government role 1185 0.045 2.958 1.533 0.348 
Countries where the percentage of youth bulge 
<=30% 
Government role 1738 1.090 4.334 2.790 0.343 
Government size 1270 0.045 2.958 1.489 0.361 
Countries where the percentage of youth bulge >30% Government role 1973 0.716 4.242 2.589 0.451 
Government size 876 -0.351 3.792 1.303 0.519 
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Appendix B: The Empirical Results of the Robustness Test 
Table B4.1 Empirical Results of Alternative Proxy of Government Size over Period 1984-
2013 
Independent variables 
 
Political Instability  
 
Model 7 Model 13 Model 19 Model 25 Model 31 
TYU 0.746***  
   (0.197) 
    
TO    -0.005***  
  (0.001) 
 
Government Size -1.209**  
  (0.489) 
-0.277 
(0.620) 
-1.841**  
   (0.732) 
-1.517***    
(0.522) 
-1.562***  
  (0.510) 
Corruption  0.735***    
 (0.108) 
   
GTE   -0.046***   
 (0.007) 
  
UGR     0.061 
(0.040) 
TYU*Government 
size 
1.443**    
(0.660) 
    
Corr*Government size  -0.893***   
 (0.220) 
   
GTE*Government size   0.009 
(0.030) 
  
TO*Government size    -0.002  
   (0.008) 
 
UGR*Government 
size 
    0.368***  
(0.133) 
Constant 3.940***    
(1.326) 
2.267**    
(0.988) 
8.543***  
  (1.093) 
1.858 
(1.471) 
0.368***  
  (0.133) 
Adjusted R square 26% 30% 30% 24% 26% 
Number of 
observation 
616 625 1076 616 616 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Countries      
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 
P-value (the validity 
test of one year lag of 
GDP growth as 
instrument of GDP 
growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. TYU is rate of total youth unemployment, Rents is rents from natural resources, TO is trade openness, GDP growth is GDP annual 
growth, RT is level of democracy, GTE is gross tertiary enrolment, Log T .pop is logarithm of total population and UGR is urban growth rate. 
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Table B4.2 Empirical Results of Alternative Proxy of Political Instability over Period 1984-
2013 
Independent variables 
 
Political Instability  
Model 7 Model 13 Model 19 Model 25 Model 31 Model 37 Model 41 
TYU 0.279*** 
(0.071) 
    0.271*** 
(0.082) 
 
TO    -0.003***   
(0.0005) 
   
GDP growth        
Government Size -0.589***    
(0.164) 
-0.021 
(0.218) 
-1.084*** 
(0.179) 
-0.650***   
(0.182) 
-0.637***     
(0.171) 
  
Education Expenditure      -0.415 
(0.754) 
-0.438 
(0.725) 
Corruption  0.309 
(0.046) 
     
GTE   -0.025*** 
(0.002) 
    
UGR     0.0005 
(0.015) 
 0.043* 
(0.022) 
TYU*Government size 0.501*** 
(0.195) 
      
Corr*Government size  -0.125 
(0.082) 
     
GTE*Government size   0.044*** 
(0.007) 
    
TO*Government size    -0.001 
(0.002) 
   
UGR*Government size     0.203*** 
(0.053) 
  
Education 
Expenditure*TYU 
     0.167 
(0.945) 
 
Education 
Expenditure*UGR 
      -0.283 
(0.254) 
Constant 2.407***    
(0.471) 
1.738***   
(0.406) 
0.740    
(0.550) 
1.378**   (0.552) 1.682***   
(0.559) 
1.180** 
(0.580) 
0.602 
(0.655) 
Adjusted R square 34% 37% 38% 33% 36% 28% 29% 
Number of observation 589 598 589 589 589 380 380 
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of instrument 1 1 1 1 1 1  
P-value (the validity test 
of one year lag of GDP 
growth as instrument of 
GDP growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. TYU is rate of total youth unemployment, Rents is rents from natural resources, TO is trade openness, GDP 
growth is GDP annual growth, RT is level of democracy, GTE is gross tertiary enrolment, Log T.pop is logarithm of total 
population and UGR is urban growth rate. 
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Table B4.3 Empirical Results of Fixed Effect (Year) over Period 1984-2013 
Independent 
variables 
 
 
Political Instability  
Model 7 Model 13 Model 19 Model 25 Model 31 Model 37 Model 41 
TYU 0.755***   
(0.161) 
    0.959*** 
(0.176) 
 
TO    -0.008***   
(0.001) 
   
Government Size -1.198***    
(0.441) 
-0.043 
(0.445) 
-2.589***   
(0.430) 
-1.489***   
(0.456) 
-1.624***    
(0.420) 
  
Education 
expenditure 
     -2.766 
(1.715) 
-2.984* 
(1.672) 
Corruption  1.008*** 
(0.110) 
     
GTE   -0.053***   
(0.007) 
    
UGR     0.083** 
(0.039) 
 0.122***    
(0.041) 
TYU*Government 
size 
1.756*** 
(0.427) 
      
Corr*Government 
size 
 1.008*** 
(0.110) 
     
GTE*Government 
size 
  -0.053*** 
(0.007) 
    
TO*Government 
size 
   -0.008 
(0.006) 
   
UGR*Government 
size 
    0.444*** 
(0.096) 
  
Education 
expenditure*TYU 
     -0.693 
(2.391) 
 
Education 
expenditure*UGR 
      -1.098* 
(0.582) 
Constant 7.122*** 
(1.255) 
3.787*** 
(1.054) 
3.402*** 
(1.280) 
4.474*** 
(1.277) 
5.637*** 
(1.256) 
5.253*** 
(1.378) 
3.201** 
(1.386) 
Adjusted R square 27% 26% 29%  27% 25% 25% 
Number of 
observation 
580 589 580  580 378 378 
Estimation method 2SLS-Fixed Effect (Year)   
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of 
instrument 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
P-value (the 
validity test of one 
year lag of GDP 
growth as 
instrument of GDP 
growth) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
White Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are in parenthesizes. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% lev el, 
respectively. TYU is rate of total youth unemployment, Rents is rents from natural resources, TO is trade openness, GDP growt h is GDP annual 
growth, RT is level of democracy, GTE is gross tertiary enrolment, Log T .pop is logarithm of total population and UGR is urban growth rate. 
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Appendix C: Correlation Matrix 
Variables PI Government size Education Expenditure TYU Rents TO GDP growth RT GTE Log T.pop UGR 
PI 1.000           
Government size -0.183 1.000          
P-value 0.000           
Education expenditure -0.016 -0.001 1.000         
P-value 0.534 0.968          
TYU 0.170 0.177 -0.039 1.000        
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.207         
Rents 0.049 -0.097 -0.069 0.005 1.000       
P-value 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.842        
TO -0.020 -0.047 -0.003 -0.086 0.001 1.000      
P-value 0.378 0.027 0.912 0.005 0.956       
GDP growth -0.140 -0.126 -0.103 -0.143 0.132 -0.056 1.000     
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004      
RT -0.261 0.063 0.008 0.023 -0.371 0.006 -0.065 1.000    
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.747 0.319 0.000 0.741 0.000     
GTE -0.365 0.287 -0.013 0.065 -0.243 0.006 -0.087 0.513 1.000   
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.616 0.011 0.000 0.810 0.000 0.000    
Log T.pop 0.108 -0.211 0.010 -0.084 -0.004 0.101 -0.007 0.121 0.109 1.000  
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.685 0.000 0.797 0.000 0.640 0.000 0.000   
UGR -0.033 0.039 0.005 0.023 0.046 -0.140 0.023 -0.041 0.033 -0.030 1.000 
P-value 0.083 0.028 0.843 0.378 0.005 0.000 0.156 0.006 0.100 0.071  
PI political instability, YB is youth bulge, TYU is rate of total youth unemployment, Rents is rents from natural resources, TO is trade openness, 
GDP growth is GDP annual growth, RT is level of democracy, GTE is gross tertiary enrolment, Log T.pop is logarithm of total population and 
UGR is urban growth rate. 
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